THE WHITEFRIARS PRESS LTD PRINTERS LONDON AND TONBRIDGE

pacific settlement of disputes constitute an element of international life. Even if its existence is not immediately in question a weak nation no longer feels secure in a world where force becomes the decisive factor and where one can, in the name of strategic interests, destroy by surprise moves those countries which hinder the expansion of their neighbours.'

Denmark

Berlingske Tidende (April 26th) says with reference to the increase of Denmark's armed forces: 'A necessity it was because it is the inevitable and logical consequence of re-armament and new obligations on the Continent so extensive that Britain's Navy and Air Force were no longer sufficient to cover them.'

National Tidende (April 29th) says with regard to Herr Hitler's speech: 'The speech means that there will be no relaxation of the tension in Europe, but it does not usher in an acute crisis.'

Holland

Het Volk (April 28th) states laconically: 'Hitler has burnt his boats behind him . . .'

The Empire

Two noteworthy comments on Herr Hitler's recent speech appeared in two of the most prominent newspapers of the British Empire.

Sydney Herald (Australia) (April 29th) remarks: 'Germany's answer to President Roosevelt is uncompromising to a point of defiant hostility . . . The incongruous blend of defiance and conciliation seems to indicate that Mr. Chamberlain's new policy is commanding respect if not acceptance.'

Rand Daily Mail (South Africa) (April 28th) says: 'Hitler's promises have too often been repudiated by his actions to be accepted any longer without reserve. Most people now will agree with Mr. Churchill that it is not what Hitler says but what he does that really matters. . . .'

Hungary

From the editorial comments which appeared in leading Hungarian newspapers after the return from Berlin of the Hungarian Premier and Foreign Minister it would appear that Hungary is now completely under the domination of the German Reich.

Pester Lloyd (May 2nd) says: 'Between Germany and Hungary there are no disturbing questions to be settled. This visit is a case of friend seeking friend so as to examine the way at a vital moment and determine what further steps are to be taken.'

Fuggetlenseg (May 2nd) says: 'Hungary's place has always been at the side of Germany since there has been a Hungarian state.'

The following brief extracts, taken from leading newspapers of the smaller democratic countries of Europe, may be taken as typical examples of the deep apprehension felt in those countries.

Switzerland

Journal de Genève (April 23rd) published a leading article dealing with the German questionnaire to the countries enumerated in President Roosevelt's earlier appeal. It says: 'If we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Reich with regard to ourselves, we are disturbed along with all those who believe that the respect for engagements and the

such a crisis Britain has no moral right to take shelter behind French and Polish troops. Nor is it enough for her to say she mounts guard at sea. . . . To be even half-way secure Britain must bring to bear the whole weight of her man-power.'

Herr Hitler's utterances on April 28th were received in America with utter scepticism. The *New York Times* is summing up precisely what all other leading American newspapers said with little variations.

New York Times (April 29th) writes in a leading article commenting on Hitler's speech: 'Herr Hitler has made and broken so many promises—he would never annex Austria, he would be satisfied with the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia, and would never bring non-German people into the German Reich—that it has long since become necessary to look beyond his words and attempt to gauge the temper, strategy, and larger purposes that lie behind them. It is a fair apprisal of yesterday's speech that it seems to foreshadow no immediate move on Germany's part, but that it offers no assurances whatsoever for the future. . . .'

TURKEY

Turkey's reaction to two main events of recent times may be gauged by the following brief extracts from two papers which on matters of international politics express the views of the Turkish Government.

Tan (May 8th) says with reference to the Milan agreement between the Axis Powers: 'Italy finds herself solemnly tied to Germany's fate in the event of a general conflict. Will not the newly consecrated Italo-German military alliance accelerate the conclusion of the peace-front negotiations hitherto proceeding so slowly? . . .'

The official Government explanation why Turkey has concluded the recent agreement with Great Britain is set forth in the Ankara

Djumhuriyet (May 13th), which argues that a continuation of Turkey's traditional policy of strict neutrality has become impossible in view of the treatment which some of the Balkan nations had to suffer. It then goes on to say: 'The Turkish people are the most faithful of friends when on an equal footing, but will never yield to domination. . . .'

find herself in a position of inequality although she would assume exactly the same obligations as France and Britain.'

In an official welcome of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement a less reproachful tone may be noted.

Izvestia (May 15th) writes: 'The declaration that an Anglo-Turkish Agreement for mutual assistance is being prepared must be regarded as one of the steps towards the creation of an effective peace front in face of the menace of a further extension of aggression. . . . Public opinion in the Soviet Union, as well as that of all sincere advocates of peace, will regard the conclusion of an agreement between Turkey and Britain as a contribution to the cause of peace which the Soviet Union has always consistently defended.'

United States of America

American public opinion has been more deeply impressed by the introduction of conscription in Britain than by anything else.

New York Times (April 27th) says in a leading article: 'It must be evident even in Germany that the temper of the British people has changed since Munich—that England continues to hope for peace but means to prepare in all seriousness for the alternative of war. . . . There is an enormous task of organisation to be undertaken. It now becomes the responsibility of Mr. Chamberlain's Government to prove that in matters of this kind the democracies know fully as well as the dictatorships how to get things done; how to avoid waste and inertia; how to act decisively in a time of crisis.'

New York Herald Tribune (April 27th) writes: 'With Mr. Chamberlain's historic announcement of peace-time conscription another page is turned down upon the history of nineteenth-century Liberal England. . . . None who cherishes old freedoms can fail to feel that still another pillar of the past has fallen. Yet the ground is already strewn with so many of them that perhaps it does not matter.'

New York World Telegram (April 27th) comments: 'Mr. Chamberlain was well within the truth when he said that "no one can contend that this is peace-time." It may not be war, but with 2,500,000 German and Italian troops mobilised at strategic points it certainly is not peace. In

our strategic advantage. The Free City is cut off from East Prussia by the Vistula, and there is no bridge in the Free City zone. On the other hand, the Free City is joined to the Polish hinterland by no fewer than three railway lines and seven roads.'

Soviet Russia

Comments on Soviet foreign policy are habitually scarce in the columns of the Soviet Press. This habit was not even broken at a time when the newspapers of all other countries printed whole pages of comment and news on the topic of Anglo-Russian negotiations. One long article did, however, appear on the subject, setting forth the Soviet's criticism of the British proposals. It is from this article that the following extracts are taken.

Izvestia (May 11th) says, with reference to the alleged Soviet demands for a full military alliance with Britain and France, reported in the international Press: 'There is no need to show that this absurd nonsense has nothing in common with the attitude of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has held, and continues to hold, that if France and Britain really want to create a barrier against aggression in Europe a united front of mutual assistance should be created, primarily of the four principal Powers in Europe—Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Poland—or at least three of these Powers—Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.' The paper then develops the official Soviet view on the 'principle of reciprocity':

'It must be noted that this clear and fundamentally defensive and peaceable attitude of the Soviet Union, which, moreover, is based on the principle of reciprocity and equality of obligations, has not met with a sympathetic response on the part of Britain and France. As is known, Britain, with the consent of France, has made counter-proposals. Great Britain's suggestions avoid the subject of a pact of mutual assistance between France, Britain, and the Soviet Union, and consider that the Soviet Union should come to the immediate aid of Britain and France should they be involved in hostilities as a result of carrying out obligations they have assumed in guaranteeing Poland and Rumania. . . . It thus follows that under this arrangement the Soviet Union must

and our good will in the highest degree, but we categorically reject all one-sided concessions violating our interests. . . . We shall never agree that our own "living space" should form part of Germany's "living space." We shall, moreover, never agree that friendly relations with Germany should be bought by one-sided concessions, political isolation or the sacrifice of our real independence.'

Kurjer Warszawski (April 30th): 'It is bad enough that Hitler unilaterally denounced a solemn engagement which we entered into only five years ago, but it is worse that his speech, with its long list of lies, distortions, and broken pledges, has utterly destroyed any faith that might have been placed in German promises. . .'

Gazeta Polska (May 1st) published a leading article which was generally regarded as an official statement of the Government's view. 'Germany has shown her regard for international engagements by her recent occupation of Memel, by her denunciation of solemn treaties, and has shown quite clearly that German policy aims at separating Poland from her outlet to the Baltic Sea, the importance of which to Poland needs no emphasis. The policy of Berlin thus creates a situation which forces Poland to go farther in her demands concerning Danzig than she did formerly when concluding the 1934 pact with Germany.'

In spite of the great importance for Poland of the outcome of the Anglo-Russian discussions, there have been remarkably few references to Poland's present attitude to her eastern neighbour. From the little that has been said one may, however, gain the impression that Polish suspicions and fear of Soviet Russia, so strong in the past, are slowly receding.

Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy (May 12th), the leading Nationalist paper, which used to be violently anti-Russian, contains a leading article in which the following remark was found: 'In case of war it would be of the utmost importance that the long frontier which Russia has with Poland and Rumania should be peaceful and open.'

With regard to widespread rumours of an imminent German raid on Danzig the Warsaw evening paper

Dobry Wieczor (May 15th) made the following remark: The Danzigers themselves realise that the Poles would be the first to arrive in the Free City. A glance at the map shows

its attitude to the Government. . . . I do not hesitate to tell my Labour friends I am profoundly convinced that British conscription is a move of capital importance and one on which the peace of the world depends.'

From reading French papers of varying political complexion it would seem that French determination to give *Poland* every assistance she may need is stiffening visibly. There are, however, some newspapers still supporting the policy of 'peace at any price' with regard to the Danzig problem.

Ce Soir (May 3rd) contains a bitter attack against the 'appeasement policy' of a certain section of the French Press. It says: 'These papers are publicly or unofficially inspired by M. Bonnet. One can only wonder whether the British reticence and the Press campaign in France are not calculated to drag out the negotiations with Russia until the time when something irreparable has happened in Europe. . . . The technique was worked out perfectly in September.'

The Axis agreement of Milan has made no deep impression in France. A typical comment is that of the Right Wing *L'Ordre* (May 8th), which says: 'For the moment the German-Italian agreement at Milan appears to be one of those noisy and ostentatious actions which are designed to remind the democracies that war is threatening them and that they will escape it only by a second surrender on the model of Munich . . . If Hitler and Mussolini threw themselves into the worst of adventures, would they have to expect hostilities on the eastern as well as on the western front; that is the most certain key to war and peace. We are therefore brought back to the supreme necessity of neglecting nothing to come to an agreement with Russia.'

Poland

As is natural, comments on the future of the Free City of Danzig and of German-Polish relations have taken precedence over almost every other topic in the Polish Press. It is remarkable that the tone of the official and semi-official newspapers has been all along as strong as that used in the opposition Press.

Gazeta Polska (April 26th) says in a leading article: 'We have shown towards Germany our wish for an understanding

character directed against Italy, who is the most directly interested in this section of the Mediterranean.'

Voce D'Italia (May 13th) says: 'Europe is becoming divided into blocks. The democracies are trying to construct the armed trench to enclose and immobilise the two Axis Powers and to launch against them the final attack. Italy throws back that threat with firmness.'

With regard to the Milan agreement between Germany and Italy the

Giornale D'Italia (May 8th) declares: 'It is a really crucial moment in the history of Europe. To sum up, the much explored policy of blocks is reappearing, but the responsibility lies wholly with Britain and France who began it. The military alliance between Italy and Germany, together with our armaments policy, is only the result of French and British precedents. . . .'

France

The introduction of conscription in Britain was hailed by the entire French Press without a single exception. It is worth noting that the jubilations were as loud, if not louder, in the Socialist and Communist Press as in Right Wing newspapers.

Le Temps (April 27th): 'It may be said that the introduction of conscription is a moral revolution of capital importance to the entire evolution of the international situation. . . . There is no doubt that this is the greatest sacrifice that the British people has ever made to the spirit of freedom, but the sacrifice is made necessary by the imperative needs of the hour.'

Populaire (April 27th) contains an article by M. Blum criticising the Labour opposition to conscription. He says: 'While I am not blind to these objections . . . I must say this: The Labour Party is of course an opposition party. But on what has its opposition to the Government been based during the last ten months? Our Labour friends have accused the Government . . . of weakness towards the dictators and lack of determination in building a system of collective security. I am therefore struck, and so is the whole of French opinion, by what seems an inexplicable contradiction between the Labour Party's attitude to conscription and

article concludes by saying: 'But conscription is also an attempt to intimidate the Axis Powers and to attract the other States which it has asked to join in its encirclement policy.'

The questions of *Poland and Danzig* have of course received the greatest attention. The unbreakable solidarity of the Axis is repeated in every article in an almost stereotype form. By comparison with German comments on the subject one cannot, however, fail to notice a difference in tone and, between the lines, a good deal of anxiety lest Germany should drag her ally into an Eastern European conflict.

Informazione Diplomatica (May 6th) says with reference to the Polish question: 'Above all, it will be made clear once again that the Axis, while being ready to defend itself strenuously against all attempts at encirclement, is not a factor for war, but an instrument of peace.' It then goes on to say: 'The general situation is fluid rather than dangerous, and almost awaits crystallisation in a definite form so as to permit the peoples of Europe to take up again their work.'

Messaggero (May 6th) writes: 'We have already noted that the Führer did not close the door to Poland, and the same may be said of the Polish Foreign Minister. . . . The line adopted by Colonel Beck is such as to make negotiations possible, from which a solution may be expected capable of guaranteeing peace. . . .'

It is significant, in this connection, that the organ of the Vatican published in prominent place a long article on Danzig.

Osservatore Romano (May 3rd): 'With Danzig in German hands Poland would be as much under German control as Bohemia or Slovakia. Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the whole of the Balkans would follow the same fate. German hegemony would be complete, and this fact would be decisive for the west of Europe as for the east. . . . The fact that Italy constitutes the other extremity of the Rome-Berlin Axis does not eliminate the question of the balance of power from German-Italian relations. Any preponderance, any hegemony, is a danger to friends as well as to enemies.'

Comments on the conclusion of the *Anglo-Turkish agreement* are bitterly anti-British in tone and substance.

Giornale D'Italia (May 13th) comments: 'It will suffice to-day to say that the new pact confirms with concrete evidence the Franco-British policy of encirclement with an offensive

Much the same line is taken by the German Press with regard to the *Anglo-Russian negotiations*. For example, the *Nachtausgabe* (May 10th) says: 'Britain clearly wants Russian military aid to fill up the gaps in her own defences without declaring herself ready to give anything in return.'

The conclusion of the *Anglo-Turkish Agreement* has provoked another series of furious anti-British comments in the German Press.

National Zeitung, Essen (May 13th), writes in a leading article: 'After years of a happy and healthy foreign policy Turkey has abandoned the path of neutrality and, by the conclusion of a pact of mutual guarantee with Great Britain, has joined the British aggressive pact system directed against Germany and Italy. . . . The Turkish Government is playing the British game. They will not be left in any doubt as to the consequences which Turkish participation in the policy of encirclement will naturally have for Turkey. . . .'

Diplomatische Korrespondenz (May 14th) says: 'Thus Great Britain has reached her goal which she was not able to attain in war-time . . . Turkey appears to be on the way of becoming a bridgehead for foreign aggression and imperialistic designs in this region.'

Italy

The Italian Press has been as anxious as the German Press to minimise the importance of conscription in Britain. In so far as it is at all taken seriously it is presented as yet another proof of the 'war preparations of the democracies.'

Tribuna (April 25th) writes: 'The British Government undoubtedly recognises that in the present situation to have no army is a cause of grave inferiority, especially when guarantees are being distributed right and left. To-day's news infers that everything will be reduced to a hybrid and limited form of military training designed not to upset British habits. . . . This kind of thing does not preoccupy or alarm anybody—or rather it preoccupies only the allies on whose side these amateur warriors are to line up.'

Giornale D'Italia (April 27th) says: 'We do not pretend to under-estimate this new event in Britain. . . . But it would be an exaggeration to say that this conscription means the displacement of strength between the two camps.' The

nonsense. On the contrary the British and French newspapers pour oil on the flames . . .'

Colonel Beck's refusal to accept the 'offer' made by Herr Hitler in his speech of April 28th provoked an outburst of anger in the German Press.

Diplomatische Korrespondenz (May 6th) says: 'If Colonel Beck thinks he will find comprehension and toleration for this denunciation of the 1934 policy of agreement and the adhesion of Poland to the British front of encirclement, if he thinks he has furnished valid reasons for the repudiation of the German proposals, he is mistaken . . .'

Voelkischer Beobachter (May 6th) says with regard to the Danzig question: 'In the last analysis it is for Danzig to decide whether it will remain for ever cut off from the German community because in Warsaw no Government has the courage to oppose the chauvinistic circles and help justice to triumph.'

Apart from obvious efforts to intimidate Poland by means of open or veiled threats, other efforts were made to influence Polish official opinion. These efforts consisted mainly of assertions that Britain would neither be willing nor able to honour her pledge.

Hamburger Fremdenblatt (May 9th), for example, published an article by its Diplomatic Correspondent, Dr. Halfeld, bearing the headline 'A Runciman In Sight.' In it Dr. Halfeld says: 'The British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated that the Danzig question was one which should be settled . . . by means of negotiations. If mediation was desired the British Government would be ready to lend its good offices. . . . We admit that this declaration has made us prick up our ears. Mr. Butler's words can only be interpreted in one sense, namely, that the British Government has decided to apply in the German Polish discussion the same methods that it employed last year when the Czech crisis was still in its first stages and was threatening to reach a climax. . . . Now, after first of all taking the line that it was a good thing to back Poland . . . Britain is showing herself in the new rôle of an honest broker. . . . Crises are created and intensified merely in order that Britain . . . may exercise her influence on the Continent and gain diplomatic positions. . . .'

point of view. Typical headlines were: 'A sensation that isn't'; 'Britain's new political bluff'; 'Military six months' children'; 'Tommy plays soldier'; 'Belgian experts smile,' and many similar ones.

Nachtausgabe (April 26th) says: 'The fitness of the young Englishman for military service is the worst possible of all the nations in the world. In the British Army 60 per cent. of the volunteers presenting themselves may be written off as unfit.'

Hamburger Fremdenblatt (April 26th) declares that '. . . it is understandable that the Paris Press is already asking to-day whether these very restricted measures which, according to Continental ideas, can scarcely be called compulsory military service, will satisfy the high expectations of the actual and potential allies of the British Empire.'

Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (April 26th) contains a special article by a German military expert, Ritter v. Schramm, which deserves quotation because it is one of the few exceptions from the rule. It says: 'They (the English) are certainly not bad soldiers, as we learned during the last war. On the contrary, but the people as a whole have no feeling of soldierly tradition or inclination to military technique. . . .' Of the British Regular Army the author says: 'We have respect for this hard, tough, and battle accustomed élite of our brother nation across the Channel.'

The various aspects of the *Polish question* have, of course, been very much in the foreground. One characteristic comment appeared in the

Berliner Lokalanzeiger (April 29th), which says: 'The insincerity of the atmosphere became intolerable when Poland, in spite of the non-aggression pact with Germany, which offered her much more than any guarantees by the hysterical Roosevelt, allowed herself to be made the exponent of London's encirclement policy on Germany's eastern flank, and rejected Adolf Hitler's generous offer.'

On May 2nd, the same paper added in an editorial: 'The two Englishmen, Chamberlain and Halifax, are endangering the peace of Europe.'

Voelkischer Beobachter (May 2nd), writing in the same vein, remarks: 'The new guardians of Poland—Chamberlain and Daladier—are not seeking to control this inflammatory

WORLD OPINION

A Press Summary

Not nearly enough space is available for this summary to deal individually with the many recent events of first-rate importance that have been topics of international Press comments. Any list of events which occurred during the month under survey would have to include at least: (1) the Military Training (Conscription) Bill; (2) Herr Hitler's speech of April 28th; (3) the international tension over Danzig; (4) the various stages of the Anglo-Russian discussions; (5) Colonel Beck's speech in the Polish Sejm; (6) the military alliance between Germany and Italy; (7) the Anglo-Turkish Agreement. Needless to add that each of these events produced a veritable flood of discussions and comments in the columns of the Press.

It is also evident that such a list of events could easily be doubled or trebled, so as to include such items as: the increasing Axis pressure on Yugoslavia, the events in Spain, the sudden fall of M. Litvinov, Germany's 'encirclement' propaganda, the Anglo-Rumanian trade agreement, China's April offensive, the Japanese raid on Amoy, and many others. In normal times any one of these latter-named events would certainly have been a topic of public discussion and Press comments for quite a considerable time. The fact that they were now treated as relatively insignificant affairs cannot, however, minimise their real importance.

Therefore, the attempt is made in this month's summary to convey an impression of *the general trends of world opinion.*

Germany

The State-controlled German Press made every effort to ridicule and minimise the importance of the introduction of conscription in Britain. On the whole, the British step was interpreted as a 'bluff' and quite worthless from the military

now that the lambing season is on the wane, volunteered the information that he 'bain't got no objection to this 'ere conscription: reckon it's just one durn bit of bluff to keep them folk over to France quiet. But don't let's have no exceptions; the landed gentry's got to go same as we chaps what works—b'ain't ye of the same mind, Garge?' 'Garge,' the local carpenter, joiner and even undertaker—when the occasion arises—having served throughout the Great War, and therefore looked upon as an authority on such matters—'reckoned that that there training wouldn't be anything like long enough, but 'twasn't too bad so fer as it goes, but it don't go fer enough, and, like most things that there Government's done of late, they'm spoiling the ship for a hap'orth of tar.' At this moment 'Garge's' wife appeared with a reminder that the next dance 'be the Valeta and 'twere time he got warmed up and to leave them there politics bide.' Mrs. 'Garge' had excitedly told me a few moments before that her daughter 'what works in London, so knows what she's talking about,' had written a few days before to assure her mother that 'war was being declared at the end of the week and there was a big firm in London what had bought up all the green fields around which were for sale to be used as cemeteries to bury all the thousands what would be killed!'

With this 'very reliable information' ringing in my ears was it to be wondered at that I had little inclination to seek a partner for the ever popular dance in these rural parts—the Valeta—however alluring one might find the music so boisterously rendered by the village silver band! Which reminds me that I once asked my weekly 'char' which instrument her husband played and was told, 'Oh, my Will, he play the big drum he do and he don't half beat he!' I wonder why these words insisted upon running through my head on April 20th when tuning in to a certain continental capital?

ELIZABETH DASHWOOD.

I know you won't mind that; *one* of my sons I should say, 'cos I've four of 'em and some feeding they wants, too, working on the land, but there—'tis worth it, for they'm all good lads, come to that.' 'All working, Mrs. ——?' ''Es, that they be—there's always work on the land, and not enough to go round, but come October my youngest'll be called up. Oh no, he don't make no words about it and reckons he's one of the lucky ones. Says he'll see more of the world than most of the lads around here. I tells him it'll broaden his mind and the six months'll go by all too fast, and he'll be back on the land afore he's been away so to speak. But what about they poor town lads, clerks and such like? It don't seem fair if they'm to lose their jobs when they've finished training. I reckon they'd have made a better job of it if them what employs was conscripted to take 'em back—leastways that's how I thinks about it. But there, one way or t'other we wants the men, and trained at that, if we'm going to knock that old bounder out! What trouble he do cause all the way round, and there won't be no peace so fur as I can see——' 'Never mind, Mrs. ——, it'll all come right sooner or later, don't you think so?' 'P'raps you're right, M'am, we'll hope so, but I reckon we've got to have a war some time or other—'tis dreadful waiting for it from one day to t'other: just about stops you getting on with things—if 'tisn't one country in trouble 'tis another, and only one man to blame for it . . . Hitler!'

For many months past the village folk have taken an intense interest in the international situation, and I was able to gather some typical comments at a 'social' in the village hall. Objections to conscription were few and far between: one man, who had been in the army for twenty-eight years, volunteered the information that in a future war the men must go into the field fully trained, adding that every young man should receive training in peace time so as to be ready if war should come. A lively, and at times a somewhat heated, discussion arose between two ex-army men as to the merits and de-merits of the Italian soldiers, and, whereas one recalled what a 'washout' they were in the Great War and 'weren't no better to-day,' his friend emphatically maintained that the present-day Italian soldier was 'summit to reckon with.' The shepherd, temporarily released from his arduous duties

'This yere conscription' had set him thinking. 'Sometimes I feel 'tis a good thing, but t'other times I'm not so sure. I reckon boys at school (referring to country lads naturally) should get proper physical training and throw some military drill in along with it. Them last two years at school was wasted at present. Reckon when a boy's learned to read and write t'wasn't no good to learn him more: t'would be darned sight better they'm taught to work on the land instead of keeping 'em at school them last two years.' Before I could resume my walk, we were joined by a man who makes a hobby of studying international affairs and who is—in his own words—'most emphatically in favour of conscription, and always has been,' but, he added, 'I should make the new law more comprehensive and extend the period of service to at least one year It's a fallacy,' he continued, 'to suppose that a volunteer is a better soldier than a conscript. Surely British soldiers aren't so much volunteers as professional soldiers. I can go back to the days of the South African War when the continental critics sneered at the British Army as being a mercenary one. Don't forget that the British sailor of the past, whose record in naval warfare is unsurpassed, as often as not was a victim of the press-gang, and anything but a volunteer.' 'Maybe,' replied the milkman, collecting his empties from the doorstep, 'of course you've got the learning what we country folk ain't got, but conscription or no conscription, don't let's hear that there word appeasement again; seems as though Chamberlain's a bit gone on it—pity he dursent roll it around the old umbrella and forget 'im. Too old he be for his job—but there, poor old dear, I s'pose he means well, but bain't he just one of them sort what won't listen to them what knows better? There! be it one way or t'other, I must get going and here's hoping the Government'll do the same with Russia.' And with that rejoinder we went our various ways.

Mine led me down a winding, narrow lane—the hedges white with blackthorn and the banks thickly covered with bluebells, 'ragged-robins' and a host of spring flowers. I was greeted, at the door of the cottage I wished to visit, in that warm, congenial manner I have learned to appreciate since living in the heart of the country: 'Do come in, M'am, and take a seat: my son is just in for his dinner, and

living a few cottages further down the road, and before long the inevitable subject cropped up: How long did I think it would be before war started? Surely we can't go on like this much longer? Why don't we make friends with Russia? Was it true we are to have a black-out this coming week-end? 'Well, Mrs. ——,' I said, 'how about your boys; will they be called up?' 'Oh yes, our Bill, he'll be twenty come October, but he's carrying on proper like, says he b'ain't going to join the blinking army for a bob a day, not even if they send to fetch him away; all the gang where Bill works is all of the same mind. You know what it be, it's just their age, I says, but my Bill says he's going all conscientious objector when it comes to a shilling a day—don't s'pose he knows wot the word means. Come to that I s'pose I'm a conscientious objector—all we mothers be—none of us wants to see our sons killed. You see, I lost two of my brothers in the Great War, and it's only natural I don't want to see my boys go the same way. I was talking to my eldest brother last night, he b'ain't half carrying on 'bout our Bill. 'Conscientious objector,' be damned, he says. S'pose he knows what he's saying; went through the South African War he did and saw service on three fronts during the last war. Tom, he's my eldest, you know, makes we laugh, for he's told young Bill if he mentions the word conscientious objector come next October he'll give he the biggest thrashing he's ever had in his life, and Tom means it, too!' 'Well, I reckon it's a good thing,' interrupted Mrs. ——'s neighbour, 'and my husband says if they'd take him he'd go like a shot—finest thing out the Army, he says.' 'Finest thing for discipline,' rejoined Mrs. ——, 'and that's just what these lads want at that age, and that's just what I hope my Bill'll get.' 'You won't forget the lecture on "Home Nursing," will you?' I said, patting the latest arrival in the family on the cheek. 'Do thee keep quiet, won't thee?' ejaculated this juvenile-looking mother of seven children. 'That we wont,' she answered, ''specially as we can bring the babies with us.' 'And,' added the neighbour, 'don't you forget we *both* signed on as Volunteers, and we'm both ready to do our bit the moment you send for us; we don't mind what 'tis.'

On my way homewards I met the congenial milkman, who reminded me he had served for four years in the Great War.

and things look blacker than ever. I shouldn't be surprised but what Hitler and Musso are for it *this* time, and serve 'em damn well right, too.' 'Well, what about your two boys, will they be called up?' 'The youngest one'll come under it in October, so I reckon he'll be going, but, with the sight in one eye nearly gone, I don't suppose they'll want him, and he'll be left on the farm, where he's been since he left school. Still, if they want him they must have him.' 'What about it, Arthur?' I asked. 'Damn good thing, I call it, calling them up, and all I hope is they'll pass me: but there—if they don't—it's milking for me week in, week out. I'm just about fed up with it, and six months in the Army would be a welcome change.' 'Just off to market,' interrupted my farmer friend. 'Get a move on, Arthur.' 'Well, there won't be any need to bother about markets soon, Mr. ——, you'll all be retiring *now*.' 'What do you mean—can a farmer ever retire?' 'What about the Government's two pounds per acre subsidy?' I said. 'Good heavens, that's no good to us!' replied the farmer, with a snort. 'That two pounds per acre only applies to land that's lain fallow for donkey's years—just another brain wave of the Government's—pooh! Two pounds per acre . . . I'll tell you what'll come of it. Them that've got acres of rank fallow land'll turn it up, get the two pounds subsidy, and then the land'll go back to where it started. Two pounds per acre . . . pooh!'

I have been asked to find an audience for a free lecture on 'Home Nursing and First Aid in the Home,' to be given by a member of the Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence. This has brought me in touch with many of the women in our village: several of those who offered accommodation to children from London in the event of a war have often expressed anxiety as to their welfare should any of them fall ill—especially in those homes where children have long since grown up and the burden of bringing up a young family has been forgotten. A mother of seven children, whose ages range from six months to twenty-six years, came to her little gate as I stood admiring the wonderful display of flowers in her front garden, and for some time we discussed the many changes the bees had wrought since last spring by completely altering the shades of the brightly coloured flowers. By this time we were joined by a neighbour

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING

BLUE skies overhead and at long last a real breath of spring induced me to wander afield to ascertain what my neighbours had to say about things in general. Crossing a meadow golden with buttercups I chanced to meet Mrs. ——, who, though a Londoner by birth, has lived so long in her little three-roomed thatched cottage that the vast Metropolis is almost a forgotten incident in her hard work-a-day life in the country. 'Fancy a war coming on a day like this,' volunteered Mrs. ——, glancing up at the cloudless sky; 'but there, I don't see no way out of it; my son Fred, what's chauffeur to Lord ——, wrote last Monday and told me sure as God made little apples we'm in for it next week. Course he *ought* to know seeing his gentleman speaks in Parliament, but I don't know, I'm sure; it do seem a pity to have one just when the sun's shining like this. 'Tisn't no good reading the papers: they all tell you something different. I'm just about fed up with 'em.' 'Do you know how many of the lads round about here will be called up under the Conscription Bill?' I asked. 'Oh! there's a tidy few of 'em comes under that, but, bless me—they all says they ain't going, not even if they'm fetched: silly I calls it. Well, I mustn't stand talking here: there's work to be done so I'll wish you good morning.'

Emerging on to the main road, which traverses our little village, I met my neighbour who owns one of the largest farms around: he and one of his sons were endeavouring to coax 'Daisy'—a hefty cow—and her newly born calf into a gateway. When 'Daisy' was disposed of, my friend expressed a keen desire to know what I thought of things. 'Looks pretty rotten to me,' he volunteered. 'I just can't see any way out of it. It's a pity, but the sooner we get going the better, I reckon: every time one tries to kid oneself there isn't going to be a war some darned thing or other crops up

strong. Dr. Rauschning, by the way, thinks that the Nazi nihilists scarcely conceal a natural tendency to come to terms with Russia.

One wonders how Dr. Rauschning himself ever came to keep such company. He believes that anti-Semitism and Nazi minority policy are destroying precious German assets. He is certain that chauvinistic emphases cannot solve European problems, that the rigidity of frontiers must be progressively lessened until a true federal co-operation across frontiers is ensured. It was his idea to use the German-Polish pact to such an end, and it was the opposition he encountered from the Nazi chiefs themselves to any practical expression of the 1934 Agreement which helped him to discover that their diplomacy was a smoke-screen for their destructiveness and fundamentally hostile to the statesmanship which constructs and conciliates.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

often participated in the confidential discussions of the Reich Party leaders and was indeed the chief mediator between Germany and Poland prior to the 1934 German-Polish pact. Not immediately, but gradually, it became clear to him that Hitler and his cronies, in the place of statesmanship, indulged in nothing but a cynically ruthless opportunism, a completely destructive nihilism, because this alone would preserve the power they had won without any positive idea of how power should be used. Anti-Semitism, *Blut und Boden* and the rest of the alleged principles of the Nazi party, Dr. Rauschning exposes as sheerly propagandistic, designed to prolong the *Kampfstkstase* of the masses, and, through it, the rule of the Nihilists. This involves a progressive radicalisation. 'The dynamic radicalisation of National Socialism is like the veil dance of Salome One ideological veil after another falls away.' Alfred Rosenberg, for example, has fallen into the background because he was too consistent in his ideas; in other words, a stated programme is hampering. 'The uncertainty of German intentions is the expression to-day of their unlimited nature.'

The question of the attitude of the Nazi leaders to England, as Dr. Rauschning frequently heard it expressed, is, of course, the one of most immediate concern to us. To this he dedicates much of the section headed *Die verlorene Herrschaft und die sterbende Nation*. 'That England is altogether incapable of waging a war, and that one can therefore demand anything from her with impunity has long been a political axiom of National Socialist foreign policy,' writes Dr. Rauschning. And when the time comes, and if the idea of taking England with them is finally dropped in favour of a frontal attack, Nazis will be ready with a propaganda campaign that England is Juda. France, they consider, gave up in 1936.

One of the most important and interesting passages in this book describes a lunch *chez* Hitler in the summer of 1933, at which the political undermining of all foreign countries was discussed—at a time, let it be remembered, when the Nazis showed intense irritation at the faintest suggestion that their activities ever over-stepped the frontiers of Germany. Democracies, the luncheon guests said, were inherently weak as long as they remained democratic. The task should be to reduce the democracies to chaos, but to make friends with the

Georgians!—against whom this charge is again levelled elsewhere. The weakness of Mr. MacNeice's present dogmatic position is unveiled when he conducts us, in the very valuable and frank section called 'Case-Book,' through his intimate poetic life, and reveals from his quotations how many temporary halts we have already been invited to accept on pain of excommunication as the final goal of poetry.

The third section is extremely interesting, and shows a less metaphysical and more practical approach to the problems of his craft than has been shown by others of his group. Here, in a detailed analysis of established modern technique, he seeks to justify it, largely from the standpoint that much of it was used by the ancients, but of course for the wrong reasons! One is inclined to smile at the persistence with which the poet who is nothing but a poet is attacked by one who obviously enjoys the chemistry of his art more keenly than many of the 'pure' poets. A further irony is to be found in the allusion to Mr. Pound as a 'dilettante' poet. Mr. Pound has allowed himself, in his passionate search for truth in poetry, to be hounded into the most unexpected worlds of economic and social theory. Yet all Mr. MacNeice can find to say of one of the creeds which he would have poets regard as more vital to their lives than their own poetry is that 'Marxist materialism . . . is . . . a good creed for the artist who must move in a concrete world.' But there is no fumbling or looseness in the actual technical discussion in this part of the book. He is handling, and handling brilliantly, what he knows, and he has given us here the most important and valuable contribution to the study of poetics that we have had for some generations: privately, since Hopkins; publicly, since Coleridge.

BENJ. GILBERT BROOKS.

Die Revolution des Nihilismus, by Hermann Rauschning (Europa Verlag, Zürich–New York).

No one, since headlines first concerned themselves with Hitler, has provided so clear, so learned and so true a definition of National Socialism as Dr. Rauschning in his *Revolution des Nihilismus*. Once Nazi chief of Danzig, Dr. Rauschning

By comparison with Mr. MacNeice's *Modern Poetry*, the book presents a perfectly sound general attack on its subject. Mr. Pound has done for the intellect what Mr. Joyce did for humanity in *Ulysses*—presented a cross-section of a limited period of existence. In the medico-psychological jargon current among the more 'modernistic' of the Moderns, Mr. MacNeice would call it a case-book. The period covers March and April of the year which he variously terms 1937, or anno E.F. XV. *Guide to Kulchur* has every appearance of an improvisation, notably in the chapters on Johnson's *Vanity of Human Wishes* and on Aristotle's *Nichomachean Notes*, in both of which he ends with a point of view not quite the one with which he set out. But the work is an honest presentation of a lively, sincere and struggling mind. For those who are still inquisitive about Mr. Pound, or to the very young, it may well be of absorbing interest. The occasional oddness of emphasis is partly to be accounted for by the distance at which the writer lives from England. Movements which mean so much to Mr. MacNeice pass unnoticed by Mr. Pound—and *vice versâ*: for each of these cocks crows merrily away on his own dunghill. Partly, too, the oddness is due to the American audience which one feels hovering in the background, and whose special weaknesses would seem to call for a different treatment from that administered to us.

Mr. MacNeice opens his 'personal essay' with a number of generalisations on the development of modern poetry which can only be substantiated if one accepts the conclusions which he arrived at in his adolescence about the writers he discusses, apparently without having submitted them to the test of more mature reading. I have already discussed his main position. It is hard to see in what way the Communist poets are more functional to English society than were the Romantics: such a statement simply reveals ignorance of the intellectual atmosphere in which the latter moved. The notion that before Mr. Eliot the modern city, industrialism, the Christian religion and European politics did not exist for poetry, may be, like the previous matter, well enough established in the advanced literary magazines for us to be expected to accept it without further inquiry, but it leaves out of consideration people like the Brownings, Swinburne, Davidson, Kipling, Gibson and Abercrombie—the last two

It shows the same abruptness in transition, the same range of interests, so far-flung in some respects, so obviously limited in others. But the thesis in each case is the same. Mr. Pound started out with a demand for the *mot juste* in poetry: all his early books were so many triumphal proclamations of moments in literature when the *mot juste* was supreme. We know them all—China, Provence, Classical Rome, Anglo-Saxon England, Mediæval Italy, and so on. The next point was his discovery that great ages, in poetry and the arts generally, synchronised with the existence of 'clear definition of terms.' It was his enthusiasm for Chinese poetry that led him here. For 'clear definition of terms,' together with a belief in the essential efficacy of the intuitional or poetic apprehension, forms the 'vital principle,' or—as Giles calls it, with a careful preservation of pictorial detail which might have been expected of the Imagist poet rather than the scholar—the 'connecting thread' of the teachings of Confucius. When this 'clear definition' goes—Mr Pound quotes it several times in Ideogram, with a parade of learning at once needless and irritating !—there is invariably something wrong with the arts. 'But the one thing you shd. not do is to suppose that when something is wrong with the arts, it is wrong with the arts ONLY.' Seeking, therefore, the corrupting principle, he finds it in certain economic conditions which encourage in the artist pretentiousness and a contempt for permanence. The most vicious of these is the development of usury: the worst term of abuse he can offer for any period (the nineteenth century gets it !) is that of the Age of Usury.

It is from his insistence on this and his praise of totalitarian governments as having, in his opinion, eliminated usury and restored the 'clear definition of terms,' that the widespread impression arises that Mr. Pound has 'gone Fascist.' Admittedly, he reaches the pitch of saying that 'poetry is totalitarian in any confrontation with prose'—a mystical use of the word which seems to take it far from the realm of practical politics—but all his abuse of democracy can only, by its very violence, imply that he would willingly see democracy 'defining its terms' and abolishing those economic conditions which he considers he has found to be synchronous with corrupt art.

but not enough to spoil the pleasure of the casually informed reader by any call for annotation.

What Mr. MacNeice does not realise is that the modern 'impure' style of poetry, which to him has a strange finality, out of keeping with the perpetual ebb and flow of poetic fashion which he recognises in all periods before the present, derives in its essence from the very strictness with which the much despised 'pure poet' pursued his art. And this is to be associated with the queer circumstance that he persistently avoids dealing in detail with the one modern poet who might have shed light on the real cause of the new developments, and at the same time revealed the fact that the 'Modernist' position of the *New Signatures* group is merely a paradoxical inversion of the established theories of good art. Several times he pays lip-service to Mr. Ezra Pound, generally in collocation with Mr. T. S. Eliot. But the latter, because he is unwilling to theorise about his own poetry, lends himself more easily to the sort of analysis which Mr. MacNeice, out of his relative immaturity, has decided to apply. Mr. Pound is, if anything, too willing to discuss the theory of his poetry: he is, indeed, an excellent example of the 'pure poet,' and it is in the fact that the 'pure poet,' devoted exclusively to the cultivation of his art—a horrid heresy to Mr. MacNeice!—has found himself driven to face problems of economics, sociology, or even politics, that the real significance of the present-day tendency lies. The poet has no business to be other than a 'pure poet.' That he cannot always be so is obvious: but that the poets of the 'Modernist' group will *not* survive by their 'impure poetry' —in fact, are more than likely to be waterlogged by it— should be equally clear from the relationship which the satires, lampoons and political ballads of Rochester, Suckling, or Marvell, for example, bear to their lyrical or meditative poetry.

The meaning and importance of Mr. Pound's later development becomes very clear from his recent book, *Guide to Kulchur*. Written in an unpleasantly aggressive but vigorous and incisive style, it moves with a vulgar and encyclopædic ease (slang, abbreviations, pedantry and all!) through the changing conceptions of world culture amid which he has been bombinating these last thirty years. It seems to be a prose exposition of the ideas used in *Cantos*.

physicist as the other. In any case, the geo-centric theory was not ego-centric, as is too loosely assumed.

From what we have described as the provincialism of Mr. Smellie's outlook arise several examples of loose writing. It is not very accurate to speak of 'the dogma of papal infallibility' in the Middle Ages, when the writer really means certain theories of papal jurisdiction. The late Dr. Neville Figgis, whose name is quoted in this connection, was far too disciplined a thinker to have fallen into such a confusion.

REGINALD J. DINGLE.

Guide to Kulchur, by Ezra Pound (Faber & Faber, 10*s.* 6*d.*). *Modern Poetry*, by Louis MacNeice (Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press, 7*s.* 6*d.*).

Most so-called Modernism in literature, as in other spheres, tends to arise from ignorance. It may be a cultivated and nursed ignorance which nevertheless cannot help being affected by what it chooses to ignore, or it may be just ignorance. I am disposed to think that the latter is sometimes the case with Mr. Louis MacNeice. He undertakes to defend what he calls '*impure poetry*' against all comers. Of course, in so far as he means that the poet needs to be a man living a profound intellectual and emotional life outside the mere job of poetry, he is sound enough, but not exceptionally revealing. But if he condemns his poet to write nothing which does not show direct contact with some burning social, political or economic problem of the day, then he is imposing an impossible limitation upon the spirit of poetic art. And it will be found that those poems of the past which he most admires generally bear the mark of their age through some subtler touch of manner or rhythm than is to be detected in works which embody for him the best of the Moderns. It is reasonable to concede that much of the important writing of great poets has the immediacy he demands. But their finest work reveals a freedom and a creative liberty which places them in a different category. The problems of the day merely provide that indefinable something in the texture which is sufficient to imply their period for the connoisseur,

from a Lecturer in Public Administration at the London School of Economics, including an impressive erudition. Some questions immediately suggest themselves when any author attempts in a single volume to deal with political thought from Plato to Marx, taking in his stride such trifles as 'The Status of International Law' and 'The Nature of the State.' We ask ourselves where its public is to be found. Scholars do not find a one-volume encyclopædia very satisfactory and the ignorant are likely to be merely confused. Moreover, the personal bias of the writer is likely to upset the proportion of the book.

In this volume we get the impression that Mr. Smellie gives a disproportionate importance to Hegel, and Hegelians themselves may wish that he had allowed the Master to say more for himself instead of presenting him so largely through his commentators. Any summary of this kind will owe its selections and inclusions to its *Weltanschauung*, and we need not be surprised to-day if it is a non-Christian one. It would, however, show a better sense of historic perspective if there were some recognition that, while it is not taken for granted that Christianity is true, there is no justification for assuming *a priori* that it is false.

Mr. Smellie's dogmatic approach to history is evolutionary. We make no complaint of that, but we resent his statement: 'The long ascendancy of Church dogma did much to confuse every issue involved. For by introducing the dogmas of the fall of man and his redemption by the Saviour, the idea of development which the Greeks had dimly grasped was withered or distorted.' Why talk of 'confusing' the issue? Mr. Smellie holds that the Greeks were right and the Christians wrong. He is entitled to do so, though the assumption that Christianity must always be referred to in the past tense is rather provincial, but it is not a question of 'confusion' or of 'distortion.'

There is further evidence of this prejudice when the author finds the explanation of one stage in the history of political ideas in 'the Copernican and other revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.' The most modern physical theories, we believe, hold that the controversy about the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems was irrelevant, one scheme of reference being as defensible to the mathematico-

whole thought, insists that the historic character of the universe belongs to its essence. Yet process and individuality require each other. Either as the sole starting point are falsehoods. Though it is clear discrimination which makes us human, this is but an accident of our existence. Civilisation degenerates if it gives exclusive importance to the abstractions of consciousness. One of Whitehead's chief criticisms is that modern thought and science have taken sense-perception as giving the most real, because the most clear, mode of knowledge. This error, he holds, goes back to the older European tradition in thought which placed the real behind transition and regarded change as only a partial reality.

His own conclusion is that nature is not self-sufficient, and therefore that the autonomy of the sciences is untenable. Nature without mind is aimless, yet mind is part of nature. The really real is some kind of mutual immanence of the world and the soul. We get some knowledge of this interpenetration in the consciousness of our own bodily states which are more real than, but not nearly so clear as, the spatio-temporal data of the senses. This consciousness is an instalment of that intuitive understanding which Whitehead holds to be the aim of philosophy.

The book consists of lectures given since the author's retirement from the Chair of Philosophy at Harvard. It is not a systematic treatise, but it might have offered some clue to the question with which it leaves us gaping: How does a universe which is all process give rise to consciousness which is so rebellious against accepting reality as process? Be that as it may, *Modes of Thought* is a fascinating spectacle of refined and nimble penetration beside which most other writing on ultimate questions looks like philosophy in hob-nailed boots.

V. A. DEMANT.

Reason in Politics, by K. B. Smellie (Duckworth, 12*s*. 6*d*.).

There is perhaps some justification in these days for feeling that a book on *Reason in Politics* has a family resemblance to the treatise on snakes in Ireland, but Mr. Smellie reminds us that reason has *de jure* claims, even if they are not exercised *de facto*. His work has all the qualities we expect

individual believer of the movement from lower to higher conceptions of truth that Dr. Fosdick is at his best

J. K. Mozley.

Modes of Thought, by Alfred North Whitehead (Cambridge University Press, 7*s*. 6*d*.).

There are two ways of maintaining equilibrium: the way of the stork on one leg, who keeps his point of support and varies his axis, and the way of the pogo-stick game, in which the point of support is changed in order to maintain the axis. If philosophy can be understood as the search for equilibrium, Dr. Whitehead is a professor of the pogo-stick method. In *Modes of Thought* he bids his readers to hop about among mental conceptions and at each point to examine their premises.

Philosophy, he tells us, is the search for premises. By these he means the original vague totality of experience. Clarity is only gained by a specialised knowledge which excludes items in this experience that are irrelevant to the special topic. Since definite and clear factors in our thought involve exclusion of much of reality, the task of philosophy is to recover understanding of the whole, with its opposites of clarity and vagueness, order and disorder, good and bad. Language is the perfection of expression, that is of abstracting a particular item from the total stream of experience: it is therefore not the essence of thought. This has to be sought by penetration to the presuppositions of language. Clarity and confusion are equally fundamental.

Professor Whitehead's method is to take some of the general ideas which form part of our mental stock and to examine the presuppositions which are rarely brought into the sphere of discriminating consciousness. The notion of matter-of-fact, for instance, he shows to be a work of the abstractive intellect; in actual human experience it is not separated from the notion of importance which appears to be Whitehead's most recent term for what in his earlier work he called value. What in *Science and the Modern World* ran 'The actuality is the value' becomes in this summary of his thought 'the importance of matter-of-fact.' In the chapter on 'Forms of Process,' Whitehead, true to the tenor of his

With this objection I should be in considerable agreement. But, with that important reservation made, I have far more to praise than to criticise in the way in which Dr. Fosdick works along the lines of his own method. He has built up his book round six great ideas—those of God, of man, of right and wrong, of suffering, of fellowship with God, and of immortality. In each case he starts with the earliest conceptions to be found in the Old Testament, shows how they came to be purified and enlarged and given a deeper ethical and spiritual content, and finally presents them in the form which they acquired as a result of the teaching of Jesus Christ and of that Christian faith which followed upon His life and death and resurrection.

Of special value are the chapters concerned with the ideas of God and of suffering Dr Fosdick lays justifiable stress on the fact that the monotheism of the Old Testament is 'the defiant faith of a humiliated and crushed people in the sole reality and sovereign omnipotence of their God.' The richer content of the idea of God in the New Testament is illuminated by the vivid sentence, 'the God of the early Christians was not so much the deity Jesus *taught* as the deity they believed him to be.' It is unfortunate that, when he comes to one of his final contrasts between primitive and later notions, Dr. Fosdick retains one of the most unhappy mis-translations in the Authorised Version, 'God is *a* Spirit.'

In the chapter on suffering the inadequacy of various explanations of suffering which appear in the Old Testament is pointed out, and a true emphasis is laid on their supersession in Deutero-Isaiah and in the New Testament by the idea of sacrificial, redemptive, suffering. Dr. Fosdick writes admirably on this matter, though I cannot agree that anywhere in the Bible 'God himself was portrayed as the eternal sufferer.'

One of the Biblical ideas of which Dr. Fosdick does not treat is that of the People of God: the section on fellowship does not supply what is needed. Accordingly he has not much to say about the Church, nor does he ever do justice to his own statement that in the New Testament 'the church is always in the forefront of attention.' It is when he is expounding the ethical aspects of religion and the value for the

the assumption that he knew them. Where St. John is concerned, such considerations do not appear to me very relevant, so individual is his method.

In his final chapter Mr. Gardner-Smith notes certain conclusions which are at least compatible with his argument. St. John may have been working on a primitive tradition other than that which St. Mark followed; and the date of his Gospel may be earlier than it has been customary to admit. The evidence for an early date is not 'compelling. But the problem, no longer encumbered by the false assumption of St. John's dependence upon the Synoptists, is worthy of fresh investigation'

There is much of interest in this book besides its central theme. Conservative students of the Gospels will find themselves not infrequently disagreeing with Mr. Gardner-Smith's judgments on the historical value of particular sections and incidents But, whatever a reader's views on that question, he will hardly fail to admire the thoroughness with which this Cambridge scholar has reopened discussion on a literary and historical problem and presented the case for a different solution

A Guide to Understanding the Bible The Development of Ideas within the Old and New Testaments, by Harry Emerson Fosdick (Student Movement Press, xvi, 348 pages. 10*s*. 6*d*. net)

The word 'Ideas' is in itself sufficient to make it clear to any reader who has looked at the Bible through the eyes of Barth or of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns that Dr. Fosdick represents a tradition of another order. Barth and Hoskyns and their followers would never suppose that by tracing the development of ideas in the Biblical literature one was thereby learning to understand the Bible. Such a method would appear to them to preclude any full comprehension of the Bible's message in its unity and its essentially dogmatic character. It is not that they would reprove Dr. Fosdick for writing his book, but they would object that the book was, necessarily, in view of its character, a quite insufficient guide to the great end which the title proclaims.

while his skilful and interesting presentation of his subject cannot fail to hold the interest of the ordinary reader.

JOHN LEPPER.

Saint John and the Synoptic Gospels, by P Gardner-Smith, B.D. (Cambridge University Press, 100 pages, 5*s*. net).

Their study of the Gospels led such eminent scholars as Dr. Stanton and Dr. Streeter to adopt the view that the fourth evangelist wrote with a knowledge of the text of St. Mark; of St. Luke also in Dr. Streeter's opinion. If this was indeed the case, it would be necessary to hold that at certain points in his narrative St. John was definitely correcting St. Mark; for instance, as to the hour when the crucifixion began (*cf*. St. Mark xv. 25 with St. John xix. 14), and that explanation has been given. But Mr. Gardner-Smith will not allow that any adequate proof of St. John's knowledge of the Marcan Gospel has been presented, and in this careful review of the evidence upon which the theory is based he has certainly shown that it often falls short of being conclusive. His argument against the dominant view is, broadly speaking, twofold: first, that its supporters have paid exaggerated attention to similarities in the Marcan and Johannine narratives and passed far too lightly over differences; secondly, that the resemblances may reasonably be explained as due to the fixed form which the oral tradition of the sayings and doings of Christ tended to assume. Thus, no idea of dependence is rightly to be framed from such a fact as the presence of the words 'It is I, be not afraid' in the two accounts of the walking upon the sea.

The reader is given ample material on which to base his own opinion. I do not myself believe that the thesis which is here attacked is capable of exact proof or disproof. The strength of Mr. Gardner-Smith's position lies in the fact of oral tradition, which, as a result of the method of Gospel-study known as 'Form-criticism,' is receiving more attention to-day than for many years past. On the other hand, I doubt whether nearly as much weight as Mr. Gardner-Smith gives to it should be attached to the unaccountable way in which St. John altered Marcan passages and Marcan wording, on

enemy as strongly entrenched as was the French army under Villars at Malplaquet, and the critical reader may be excused the suspicion that the Duke, conscious of his waning influence, hoped to dazzle public opinion in England by another victory of the magnitude of Blenheim, and was resolved upon a battle at whatever cost. His was the strategy of desperation.

While a considerable part of the book is necessarily concerned with military operations, the economic and social background receives its fair share of treatment, and the intricacies of the politics that governed this period of our history are disentangled by the author with amazing skill. For Bolingbroke and Harley, the Tory leaders, Mr. Churchill has little but contempt. To him they are just a couple of Tammany Hall intriguers who threw away victory when it was within their grasp and negatived the results of Marlborough's prudent and far-sighted policy. Yet one cannot but feel that the author has rather lost his sense of proportion when he continues to insist upon the enormity of the English desertion of the Alliance. Bolingbroke's methods in dictating peace may have been questionable, but neither the Dutch nor any of the Allies except the Catalans appear to have suffered any serious consequences as a result of his action, and most of the parties concerned were heartily sick of the conflict. Moreover, it is difficult to see what could have been gained by a prolongation of the war. The temporary destruction of the power of France might have been accomplished, but the consequent embitterment of that great nation would only have led to preparations for a new war of *revanche*. And when Mr. Churchill condemns Bolingbroke's trimming, he chooses to gloss over Marlborough's own record of faithlessness to political principle, and the correspondence with the Court of St. Germain. To condone Marlborough's inconsistencies as the natural accompaniment of his genius is to leave a loophole by which others may escape the harsh light of criticism.

But, whatever his failings, it would be ungenerous to deny the Great Duke his title to fame, and Mr. Churchill's brilliant study has done much to reveal the true stature of the man, and the value of his achievement in ridding Europe of the threat of French hegemony. Students of history will appreciate the author's wide learning and painstaking research,

accused of peculation, and subjected to such bitter and unreasonable personal attacks that he chose exile on the Continent. England continued a half-hearted participation in the war until 1712, when the British contingent of 12,000 troops was withdrawn from the army of the Allies. Deprived of England's military and financial support, the Dutch and Germans hastened to conclude a settlement with the French, and the war was terminated in 1713 by the Treaty of Utrecht.

Upon the accession of George I, Marlborough returned to England; but he played little part in public affairs beyond directing the operations which resulted in the defeat of the Pretender's army at Preston in 1715. He died in June, 1722, in the seventy-third year of his life.

Mr. Churchill is one of the few historians of our time who can make dead bones come to life. He tells his story with praiseworthy lucidity, and with a wealth of detail gathered from the many archives at his disposal. His personal experience of naval and military matters has served him to good purpose in his accounts of the strategy of Marlborough's campaigns. He is at his best in his descriptive passages and the chapter on the battle of Malplaquet presents a vivid picture of the horrors of contemporary warfare. 'No mercy was shown by the victors, and the wounded were slaughtered on the spot,' is Mr. Churchill's grim comment. The eighteenth century had little to learn from the twentieth in barbarity of military technique, and the combatants had not even the benefits of the medical science which is at our disposal to-day. The author gives a quotation from *The Examiner* of April 13th describing the condition of the wounded after Malplaquet.

> 'What a deplorable Sight it was to see Men with their Limbs shot off lying upon the Field in such an abandoned, wretched Condition that Ravens and Crows have fallen upon them for Carrion. Wanting proper Persons to dress their Limbs, their Wounds putrefied to such a degree that Dogs gnawed their flesh while they were yet alive.'

Mr. Churchill dismisses this as party propaganda; unfortunately there is much in his own narrative to support the belief that the account is but little exaggerated. Moreover, with all his persuasive eloquence, the author does not make it clear why Marlborough ventured a frontal attack upon an

The book reveals the causes of Marlborough's fall from power, and tells the story of England's desertion of her leadership of the Grand Alliance which had so successfully curbed the imperial ambitions of Louis XIV.

By 1708 the War of the Spanish Succession had proved so disastrous to 'Le Grand Monarque' that he offered terms of peace that the Allies would have done well to accept. Unfortunately, the exorbitant demands of the Allied Powers, and in particular the offensive proposal that Louis should assist them in removing his own grandson from the throne of Spain, made a resumption of the war inevitable. Louis appealed to his people to continue the struggle, and they responded nobly. In face of the threatened invasion of their territory, the French flocked to the colours in such numbers that Marshal Villars took the field with one of the largest armies France had ever raised. Slowly, but inexorably, the two armies moved into position for yet one more trial of strength.

According to Mr. Churchill, Marlborough sincerely desired peace, and did his best to avert the impending calamity. But his hands were tied by his instructions; while his power to influence the situation was weakened as a result of Tory intrigues at home. The war went on

On September 11th, 1708, took place the 'very murdering battle' of Malplaquet, later to be called by the French the 'block' of Marlborough. The Allies were left in possession of the field, but their losses were so heavy that they were unable to continue the pursuit of the French, who withdrew in good order. Malplaquet was destined to prove the last and most costly of Marlborough's victories, and its consequences were far-reaching. Elated by their comparatively successful resistance, the French troops took fresh heart; the Allies, on the other hand, inured as they were to victory, were profoundly discouraged by the first serious setback they had experienced over a number of years. In England, public opinion was appalled by the fearful slaughter, and the Tories took advantage of the growing unpopularity of the war to clamour for peace at any price. The intrigues of Bolingbroke and Harley, and the increasing hostility of the ageing and obstinate queen to the Godolphin Ministry upon which Marlborough depended, eventually brought about the downfall of the Whigs. Marlborough was deprived of his offices,

was spent to the best advantage. Yet this great project of rearmament in no wise exhausted his energies. Young gentlemen desiring to be lieutenants found themselves once more required to submit their competence to the test of examination. Captains were enjoined henceforth to sleep on their ships, while officers who absented themselves without official permission were sharply called to order and without respect to their rank. As Mr. Bryant puts it, the Secretary had a rule for everything and no matter was too trifling for his personal attention. Within four years the impossible had been achieved. He had undertaken to present his sovereign with a fleet capable of guarding the country, and he had kept his word.

Yet, when the time came, an ironical destiny ruled that no use should be made of the weapon which Pepys had forged. The fleet with which Dartmouth was instructed to oppose the passage of the Prince of Orange was unable to achieve its object and we cannot wish that it had been otherwise. Its failure brought about Pepys' downfall. He withdrew, like the good philosopher he was, into that literary and scientific world which he had found leisure to adorn even when fully employed in the service of the Crown. Yet his work remained. For though many lessons had still to be learned, and not least among them that the possession of a fleet did not suffice if there was not the will to take it into action, he had laid the sea-power of England upon a sure foundation.

R. N. CAREW HUNT.

Marlborough : His Life and Times, Vol. IV., by The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill (Harrap, 25*s*.).

With this book Mr. Churchill concludes his monumental biography of England's most notable soldier, and the high standard that his previous volumes have led us to expect is well maintained.

Previous biographies of Marlborough have suffered through the partisan bias of their authors ; Mr. Churchill's work achieves an impartiality that does him credit, although there are occasions when even he may be suspected of advocacy.

called upon to administer not less than a quarter of the country's revenues. Mr. Bryant has indeed compelled us to a re-estimate of his hero. We might well admit, with Professor Saintsbury, that Pepys 'always enjoyed a great reputation as a scholar, virtuoso and expert in matters naval,' and that he was 'far more diligent, able and patriotic than most of his fellows.' This alone is high praise. But how far it falls below the mark will be apparent to every reader of the present volume. We have to do with one who was far more than the industrious chief of a great department, in whom public spirit was combined with an intelligent appreciation of the good things of life. For a brief season, at least, he was the most powerful man in England.

The months immediately prior to Pepys' reappointment to the Secretaryship of the Admiralty, which he had been forced to resign in 1679, were employed upon his voyage to Tangier. It was his first experience of the Atlantic, and it was not a pleasant one. It gave him an insight into many matters. He sailed with commanders who did not know one rope or line from another, and who could not even be persuaded to keep a journal. Wherever he went it was the same story of disorder, indiscipline and rapacity. All the work accomplished during his five years at the Admiralty appeared wasted.

Yet it was not until he was reinstated in 1684 that the full situation became revealed to him. The ships lay rotting in the dockyards, and scarcely one was fit to go to sea. The Navy was £400,000 in debt, and what had become of the money voted to maintain it no one appeared to know. Nor was this the worst. As our fleet had declined, and with it our only protection against attack, that of our enemies, the Dutch, had risen to formidable proportion under the prudent supervision of William of Orange. Thus the country lay open to anyone who cared to invade it; and that this could be accomplished without difficulty, the landing of Monmouth duly proved.

Hence the years 1684 to 1688 were the busiest in Pepys' life. The Navy Board was abolished, though its incompetent and corrupt officials were retained and were given the appropriate employment of disentangling their own accounts. A large sum was voted by Parliament and, with Sir Anthony Deane to assist him, Pepys was able to ensure that the money

Years' War, and through it all the life of the people, in home and in town and village, with dance, song and superstition, with sport and marriage and divorce. Not a page is without the learning of a score of volumes, not a chapter without the architectonic power of a lifetime's sifting. Of great topical importance are the two balanced chapters on 'The Ghetto,' with their reminder of the true history of usury, and Matthew Paris's account of the conduct of the Papal usurers in England in 1253: 'This is worse than a Jew's conditions; for the Jew will receive the principal courteously whensoever thou shalt return it, with only so much interest as is proportionate to the time for which thou hast had it in hand,' and the shrewd statement that 'the Ghetto was in fact something of a precedent for the modern Nazi "protective arrest."'

The best picture of Dr Coulton himself can be gleaned from the rich chapter on 'The Fight for the Bible,' and that on 'The Open Bible,' whose tone is almost a rebuke from a more spacious tradition to an age of cynical and godless scholarship. The whole work is a proud justification of his motto from Ecclesiasticus: 'He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little.' If the contrast between patchwork and true mosaic is maintained by a confronting of Mr. Mathew's and Dr. Coulton's attempt at synthesis, it is reinforced all the more strongly in their notebooks. Mr. Mathew's work remains little more than a romantic scrapbook, but Dr Coulton in his *Social Life in Britain from the Conquest to the Reformation*, of which a new and cheaper edition has just appeared, gives a body of deftly selected material on every aspect of human life, indispensable both for study and for casual reading. Here is God's plenty, generously offered and seductively arranged.

J. ISAACS.

Samuel Pepys, The Saviour of the Navy, by Arthur Bryant (Cambridge University Press, 12*s*. 6*d*. net).

The Pepys whom we meet in this admirable third volume of Mr. Bryant's series is a very different figure from the man who won our sympathy in that distressing period from which he now triumphantly emerges. 'Thriving and swelling,' the embodiment of success, he is the occupant of a great office,

given him his lead. The visit of King Christian IV of Denmark is of interest to him only because Salisbury, as Secretary of State, had to supply police protection, but Sir John Harington, in *Nugæ Antiquæ* (which Mr. Mathew does not appear to utilise or mention), gives an amazing account of the drunken feast and masque with which the Danish king was entertained, with a very relevant comment on the 'liquidation of the Elizabethan spirit' as seen by one whose life spanned the two reigns. Faults of commission and omission, selection, interpretation, tone, texture, architecture, historical feeling and perspective convince us that an interesting story on the proposed theme might still be written, but with other material and by another hand.

The real mosaic of history is to be seen in *Mediæval Panorama*, with its sense of Chaucer and of the people's Bible. Where Mr. Mathew spoils his tale with strained and distorted description decorated beyond the evidence, misleading by documentation, the notorious and wicked Dr. Coulton indulges in understatement and a human minimum of controversy. With flashes of detail and real analogy darting into the darkness, he illuminates the ages, pointing the significance of the jury system, the belief that 'to have a mayor would bring the millennium,' the change in architectural and costume fashion, the sense of 'modernity,' the liquidation of illiteracy. His documented sureness and brilliant compression give us a world in chapters of ten or a score pages. First the structure of this Middle Age 'definitely a Christian era in a sense which cannot be predicated of preceding or of succeeding generations,' with the *Ecclesia Romana* as 'one of the completest examples of a Totalitarian State that history records,' the disintegration of the Roman world plunging man into 'the cauldron of God's wrath,' the organisation of Rome and the Papal power, and the conversion of the Wild Men who had conquered Rome, the emergence of Feudalism, the relation of priest and people, the life of the Monastery, the Shepherd and his Flock. Next comes the life of the mind, the artist, the scientist, the university and the theatre, the great individual minds Dante and Chaucer, the world of free thought and inquisition, the Papal schism and the Lollards. Then the worlds of chivalry and mysticism and the escape of Utopia, and the grim hindrances of the Black Death and the Hundred

wardens Accounts concerning 'the movements of humbler people in 1628:

'Paid Mr. Bander, a preacher, for making a sermon, 10*s*.

'Paid man to Mr. Hodges, a preacher, 1*s*.

'Paid to a Turkeyman in distress being turned a Christian, 6*d*., and to Richard Moore for carrying the return of the recusants to Winchester, 2*s*. 6*d*.

'The entry relating to the Turk is most attractive, and it is pleasant to think of this conscientious man coming in with the stream of the sober travellers.'

He is fond of commenting on style, and most of his comments perilously approach nonsense: Lancelot Andrewes' 'heavy oaken eloquence'; 'The letters in their Byzantine phrasing lay thick upon his table'; 'that webbed Jacobean verbal splendour.' He has a wanton use of analogies, historical, literary and artistic: 'the euphuistic imperialism' of Elizabeth's last years; 'There was something Palladian about the architecture and conception of the royal authority,' and of a quite ordinary piece of late Elizabethan prose style: 'Here is all the warmth of the Tridentine world, the certitudes so magnificently deployed and around them the seraphim and the cherubs billowing.' Although he bandies 'Euphuistic' and 'Baroque' about, when he does happen to quote an interesting specimen of either fashion he makes no comment. For one so much concerned with the glories of style, there are some strange lapses in his own: 'Some credence must be attributed to Clarendon's statement.' 'These words . . . required no respectful transliteration.' 'The data is really insufficient.' Thirty marble stones 'had been laded and erected in position.' Two characteristic failures may be mentioned in conclusion. His eagerness for the supposedly unpublished fragment leads him to quote imperfectly and to miss the point of Inigo Jones's description of the Teatro Olimpico, and his avoidance of the well-known has robbed him of one of the best pieces of evidence for 'the liquidation of the Elizabethan spirit.' In speaking of masques he has a piece of bad Walter Pater (which clue perhaps justifies us in calling this history a series of 'Imaginary Portaits'): 'These masques were to grow in elaboration for the sovereign's pleasure, and in some way seem especially to belong to the carefree post-Cecilian decade.' A wider view would have

and private hands. Such material, checked and guided by scholarly secondary sources is, of course, the normal material of the serious historian. In *The Jacobean Age*, however, the atmosphere is far from the normal calm of the serious historian; there is a delight at being behind the scenes, in reading private letters, in smelling out intrigue, a fervour of *l'inédit*, almost the atmosphere of an antique-shop kept by the kind of enthusiastic lady to whom everything is 'so quaint,' who dotes on a dull object because 'it used to belong to dear Lord X,' who uses fashionable but half-apprehended jargon like 'Baroque' or 'Tridentine.' The best parts of the work are the methodical if confessedly tedious survey of the uncalendared Salisbury papers, the incoming correspondence of a Secretary of State on 'political appointment and manœuvre, colonisation, private friendship, police methods and local crime,' the section in which the pervading stink of careerism is traced amid the general juggling with appointments and the manipulation of promotions and the particular case of the Provostship of Eton, and the sympathetic treatment throughout of the Catholic minority.

Together with an excessive worship of the unpublished goes a contempt for the known, 'the too frequently quoted statement of Clarendon,' which is nevertheless quoted yet again, and 'Aubrey in a familiar passage' which is related again, but with the omission of its point explaining the intellectual relationship of Hobbes and Bacon. Surely there is nothing more valuable in history or literature than the re-examination of 'the too frequently quoted statement.' In literary history, at any rate, the most frequently quoted definitions of poetry can be shown to have been torn from their context, and Milton and Wordsworth made to talk either nonsense or the opposite of their intention. There is also a consistent policy of inflation by which Mr. Mathew seems to approach the inventories of great houses with an *o altitudo*. A simple list of music books at Hengrave Hall is bracketed between 'Here there is a singular completeness and one can almost see the great volumes with their dull bindings lying about haphazard in the winter firelight,' and 'these evoke a delightful feature suggestive of the conventional Elizabethan gaiety.' No comment is needed for the typical and characteristic observation on items in the Basingstoke Church-

his great mosaic of the English scene from the Conquest to the Reformation is based on three-score years and ten of learning about human beings and shaped by half a century of teaching.

By contrast *The Jacobean Age* seems to have ignored the whole progress of modern historiography. It professes to study the historical setting of the first quarter of the seventeenth century, asserts rightly that 'such a study requires the examination of a mosaic of contemporary record,' and somewhat naively concludes that 'depositions, statements and informal notes and letters provide a flood of information on the state of mind of wide sections of the people.' But so far from providing a mosaic the book is in the nature of a patchwork quilt in which the individual patches are sometimes pleasant and often make us wish to see the whole pattern from which the sample has been wrenched, or of which it is the sole surviving fragment. The theme is not the Jacobean Age, however, but the origins and ancestry of 'that developed Georgian system which was to be exemplified in the control of the political chessboard by the great Whig families,' of the embryonic stage of 'the sense of oligarchic dynasty,' an analysis of the state of mind, not of wide sections of the people, but of those 'who had adequate possessions and were unembarrassed by a sceptical intelligence,' in a belief that 'there was an element of poetry in their serious labours as they disencumbered their fine properties and raised up their seed to enter into the patrician Promised Land of the eighteenth century. . . . The sense of corporate dynasty is also for the first time apparent. . . . The great families were beginning to advance in phalanx to the government of the State. The dominance of interests rather than individuals prescribed the slow and heavy rising to power of a plutocratic oligarchy.' It is not to be denied that this is an admirable, and in a way an original programme, well worth attempting. The objection is not to the theme, but to the texture. The material used, and listed in the bibliography, includes many of the calendars of the Historical Manuscripts Commission and State Papers, and a number of printed autobiographies, memoirs, diaries and collections of contemporary correspondence. Mr. Mathew has also had access to the unpublished Cecil papers at Hatfield House for the years 1606–1612, as well as other manuscript material in public

BOOK REVIEWS

Medieval Panorama, by G. G. Coulton (Cambridge University Press, 15*s*. net).

The Jacobean Age, by David Mathew (Longmans, 15*s*. net).

Social Life in Britain from the Conquest to the Reformation, by G. G. Coulton (Cambridge University Press, 12*s*. 6*d*. net).

In the Preface of his *Medieval Panorama*, an octogenarian miracle, Dr. Coulton touches the yet unsolved problem of modern history. He quotes Carlyle's complaint: 'What all want to know is the condition of our fellow-men; and, strange to say, it is the thing of all least understood, or to be understood as matters go.' Every age and every class has demanded its own history, the history of kings and of conquerers, of peoples and of regiments, the history of political and social and financial power, the growth of constitutions, the history of international intrigue and international treaties. Humanity insists on popping its head up. Plutarch felt it necessary to explain history by personal anecdote of great figures, by trivial detail such as the fishing party of Antony and Cleopatra which Shakespeare was glad to incorporate. The great achievement of the age of Voltaire in historiography was its insistence on private and human experience, the way men lived in the bosom of their families, the arts they cultivated. That superseded pioneer of English history, Sharon Turner, little more than a century ago, devoted a volume of his *History of the Anglo-Saxons* to an account of their infancy, childhood, names, their food, their drinks and cooking, their furniture, their conviviality and amusements, their money, their chivalry, their superstitions, their funerals, and even their literature. To-day, Mr. Lewis Mumford in his impressive synthesis, *The Culture of Cities*, carries the method further with an emphasis on the evolution of privacy. Dr. Coulton is fully alive to the responsibilities of this great human growth, and

Alive! Alive! We cannot be
Better than this in this gay hive.
Now is our time for honey, now,
As then was now to him who came,
Old and forgotten, to make old sleep
Dream a full sense and a new name.
Now is our time; and we shall keep
What memory and God allow
To the dead shell and the fixed frame.
Cézanne, Van Gogh, Renoir! Through you
We see, and you become more true,
In harvest-fruit, in our glad mime.
God's other way is not in Time;
For natures of the quick and dead
Are still unsummoned bones abed.

PROVINCE.

L. AARONSON.

MEMORIES OF THE PROVENÇAL PAINTERS

If Cézanne had never seen
With slow sure eyes that fought for love
The coloured shapes through which we move,
If Van Gogh had not danced his brush,
Or Renoir with the wine's full flush
Made earth an opulence and zest,
Would we have found the landscape blest?
The reds, the lemons, and the blues,
Ochres and pinks, and, in between,
The river-coolness of the flowers,
The porcelain-coldness of the rocks,
The rainbow-palette of the day,
Are morning's gift at Tholonet.
Green, green, green is the young Spring,
Running its shadows through our hair:
Water-woven the quiet hours.
Smooth as silk the milk-mild sky:
And we, through these, as much aware,
As if, through us, the birds must sing,
As if the landscape could not choose
But choose the heart that calls and knocks
And waits and will not turn away.
We are the wild evangelist
Converting the landscape with his fist,
Converting the landscape to his eye:
The old man with the patient teeth
Gnawing the rind for what's beneath:
The roaring lover of the grape
Rounding earth's flesh to sun-fired shape.
We have seen with all the eyes and see,
Being, here and now, immortally,
The heirs, the fathers, and alive.

SPRING, 1939

PRETEND to hope and be as bright with Time
As lily, lavender, and the leaf-lit fig
Be bud of dancing vine and cherry-rime,
As sure of summer as the men who dig
To let live waters in. Return again
From complicated vision to the hills,
Simple in aspiration after rain.
Forget the malady that welcomes ills
Because death was not eaten to the core.
Be all you might have been when you were young.
Run and return and to the heart restore
Meaning of love and give that meaning tongue
Thus Jeremiah spoke; but the charred hem
Still smelt of blood and burned Jerusalem

PROVENCE

FEAR IN TIME OF TYRANNY

If I were, all,
The monstrous thing I see myself,
Bundled in fur, small,
Evoking in the circle of my lamp
Futile kaballah tired with words for power,
Death would be life's one flower.

Fear is our grace
When we with it oppose our will
To see God face to face,
To be that moon that stands in midday sky,
Vacant with pride of night. Then fear is made
God's salve for flesh-afraid.

But fear that flies
The body bound in evil, and
In itself denies
All meaning but one self that tastes and takes
And sleeps, and wakes in its sad sweat to be
Its shivering mortality:

Such fear is this
Vile me in Rousseau guise, who thinks
That love is in a kiss;
And circled by the mountains' spurious strength
Becomes, when tyrants through the passes burst,
Of all their slaves the worst.

THE OMISSION

EMPTY-HEARTED am I, because
I had forgotten the pause
Between the still hour of the air
And awakening night;
Because, with the wind in my hair
And my shadow in flight,
I knelt not in prayer.

Night's on the flowers at last. The tide
Drains the stars as blind lids the pride
Of touch. The wanderer's dusty shoes
Dream by the quiet door.
But the feet that had bliss to choose
Wander the corridor
Seeking lost news.

Could I be Easter's lit grave,
Could I from scented wood and wave
Draw the immortal essences,
Could I forever eat
As if it were Last Supper, His
One passion were my meat,
And augury of Heaven, this.

PROVENCE.

And, since I ask, God, be as dumb to this
As if I were not. Were the mysteries
The ease of our creation, who would sin,
Or sinning come not quickly to Your bliss?
Though all the world go down (it sinks, and thin,
The hard steel moon is sharpened on our bones)
You *are*, though no man knows and no man owns.

PROVENCE.

POEMS

EASTER SUNDAY, 1939 EUROPE IN ARMS

THE day is done, not only in the sky
But also here, on earth. Though Christ die,
Though Christ ascend to Heaven, though water, wind,
The troubadouring meadows, all who sinned,
Catch Heaven's Halleluias from the sun,
And from the clouds' cocoon the sun soars free,
The life we knew is ended We have run
Through all our follies, we are, mortally,
The naked, netted Adam, we are lust,
The child of tired wisdom, God's defeat,
The answer to our will to be complete,
The unawareness of the central dust
We, who thought death the apple dropped for seed,
Must see a million apples drop and breed
Ten million worms that have no smaller dream.
We were by Nature nourished ; Nature's scheme
Devours us that had never once a faith,
Never a thought, and never a fear of death.
We would have none of God. Now God must be
Our Friday torment through eternity.
We shall inherit, yea ! the mortal earth
And never know God's freedom of His birth.
We shall be masters in the sheltered grave
And never know how God can surely save,
Not through our children or the barren State,
Not through the will, but where the dreamers wait,
Defenceless in humility, and dark
On one dark sea like Noah in the Ark.
God ! Shall we loose a dove again, and wait ?
Is there an Ararat above the tide ?
Was it indeed Yourself was crucified ?

is the same emphasis on the agreeable, the same good humour, the same appeal to the most easily released responses, the same fulfilment of mass-wishes. Above all, there is the desire to *please*. In this respect authentic publicity has a wider range, for the publicist does not shrink from the ugly and the frightening if they serve his purpose. 'Before and After Use' runs his motto, and a hideous picture illustrates the first condition, to set off the achievement of the second. By comparison, the Exhibition is one-sided; it is the world after all the nostrums of the publicist have been applied, it is the world 'After Use.' Here all girls are pretty, all landscapes worthy of the National Trust, the working classes, if depicted, as genial as the middle classes could wish. Unemployment, war, neurosis, have as little salience here as blackheads or superfluous hair.

Once it is realised that the Summer Exhibition is an exhibition of advertisements, it can be praised as it deserves. As publicity operating in the void, as it were, it is seen to be a logical performance and in its way masterly. It can be said, in fact, that Academy art is every bit as accomplished as the art of fashion magazines, posters and advertisements in general.

ALEX GLENDINNING.

and so appetisingly; his *Deep Sea Phantasy* is a sad and frugal affair by comparison.

There is an enormous canvas of Mr. Chamberlain, painted with great fluency. A calendar in the background reads July, 1938, and Mr. Chamberlain looks as reassuring and solid as the Rock of Gibraltar probably looked then. Lord Baldwin gazes calmly from another wall, in robes which I cannot identify. Calmness is the prevailing note; even Leda and the Swan are perfectly composed. You will not find a trace of the jitterbug on these walls.

At the Summer Exhibition time is arrested; among these familiar paintings one forgets the date, one can scarcely be sure what year it is, and such confusion has a recuperative value nowadays. I do not suppose, though, that the hanging committee chooses pictures with this end in view; and it is rather puzzling to decide how the Exhibition should be classified. What is it an exhibition of? Not art, certainly, though there are and have been artists, as distinct from painters, in the Academy. 'Oh, look!' I heard a woman cry before one picture. 'Just *look* at that little boy. Oh, *what* a darling!' This is the perfect response to Academy painting, the kind of response which its whole function is to evoke, and by this criterion the work of artists—think of Cézanne, or van Gogh, or Picasso—is likely to fail miserably. It is not required of Academy painting that it should be art, but it must at all costs be agreeable; it must, as they say, 'appeal.'

Reflecting thus before a carefully posed nymph, it occurred to me that, of course, the Summer Exhibition is an exhibition of advertisements. It is true that the names of products and other letterpress are missing, but these are easily supplied: 'You can have a Figure like Mine in Ten Days,' for example, or 'Plumpo for Bonny Bairns,' or 'Take a Ramble in Sunny Surrey.' There are portraits which might be suitably completed with one of those little streamers which emerge from people's heads in some advertisements—'Thinks: What a good thing I took Mabel's advice.' If such inscriptions are imagined, the pictures acquire a new coherence and plausibility. The motive of the Academy picture is not, of course, to sell somebody's product; but in technique it is indistinguishable from the advertisement, and would certainly be improved by the addition of slogans. There

parlour?' seems to have been taken to heart. The sequel to this will probably be an outbreak of door slamming, and politicians will then have to consider a new door problem: the door may be shut, but is it bolted? And if bolted—they might proceed—is the bell working? This last is an important question, as witness our Ambassador's efforts to secure an interview in Berlin some weeks ago. Germany's attitude on that occasion might be summed up as: Bell Not Working.

There is no reason why speculation should not go further, and distinguish between different sorts of doors—front and back doors, for example. If the front door has been slammed, might not the back door have been left ajar? This, I should think, is a very common state of affairs in politics to-day. But it seems to me that the most important factor in the door problem—the key—has been generally overlooked. If one has the proper keys, it doesn't matter much whether doors are open or shut; and I think our difficulties in the last five years have been largely due to the fact that we have got hold of the wrong bunch.

* * * * *

In a world full of shocks to confidence, shadows cast over genuineness, and so on, sanctuary may be found at the Summer Exhibition in Burlington House. Here are no shocks, no shadows; here, in paint, is a policy of appeasement which is a complete success. The subjects are as familiar as one could wish, and make pleasant reading in the catalogue: *Sunrise after Storm*, *Test Match at Lord's*, *A Village Rendezvous*, *Bath Time*, *Jealousy*, *Freddie's First Visit*, *The Legend of the Willow Pattern*, *Presenting Jimmy Snodgrass*, *The Tired Little Dancer*. . . . It is true there is a shortage of problem pictures, not a real puzzler anywhere—though I did hear someone whisper 'What's he up to?' in front of an allegory—but there are plenty of chubby little boys and girls in rompers, nymphs and aldermen and generals, fishing smacks, neo-Seurat pastorals, and Mr. Russell Flint's delightful showgirls, in tableaux which non-stop revue could not improve on. For some reason that perfect Academy subject, the Giant Panda, has been overlooked; but perhaps the Panda is considered a little *avant-garde* as a subject. I missed, too, the big luscious wave that Mr. Julius Olsson has painted so often

COMMENTARY

May 19th.

STARTING with fifty-six hours of fine, soaking rain, this has been a draughty, hot-and-cold, depressing month, and a fair symbol of the situation we now find ourselves in. Because there has been no immediate threat of a European war, we tend to regard it as a quiet month—our standards of what is alarming are now very high. There has been, of course, the military alliance between Germany and Italy; but, as a friend of mine remarked, when people who have been living in sin for years finally get married, there's no need for anyone to make a song and dance about it There has been conscription, and perhaps the most depressing thing about conscription is the reason Mr Chamberlain gave for it: in effect, that it is the only way left to make people believe us. Having run out of political sensations, the news-bills are now doing their best with bodies in cellars, eloping couples, and so on; and we may soon hear that tension is easier and things are looking up.

Meanwhile—to the joy of cartoonists—diplomacy is being conducted in terms of doors which have been left open, or shut, or ajar. The open door, in fact, threatens to become another blanketing formula like 'appeasement.' Whenever a foreign statesman makes a speech on international affairs, experts apply themselves to the problem of whether he has left the door open or not. If open, the question remains: how wide open? and measurements are taken. President Roosevelt is reported to have said that Herr Hitler's reply to his note 'left the door open about an inch,' and this is probably a minimum, or, as Americans would say, 'a new low' in open doors.

Speculation on this door problem appears to be academic, for, though doors now stand open in various parts of Europe and Asia, nobody can be induced to go through them. The moral of the rhyme which begins 'Will you step into my

and for delight . . .' And apart from some passages which are incoherent or mainly devoted to nomenclature, there is a measured beauty in his employment of this 'English tongue' —that one expects from the creator of *A Song to David.*

Smart was also a great patriot. Internal politics and foreign affairs always interested him, but he is convinced of the superiority of the West. There are one or two comically relevant lines applying to our present difficulties . . . 'Let Zurishaddai with the Polish Cock rejoice—the Lord restore peace to Europe . . .' and 'God bless Churchill, Loyd . . .'

In his Introduction and Notes, W. F. Stead gives us the benefit of his appreciation and careful research. We knew little of Christopher Smart apart from *A Song to David* and his tragic life, so thanks to the editor this revelation of his vision, his faith and his innocence are of invaluable assistance, although they cannot altogether solve the mystery. From the first moment of discovery there cannot have been any uncertainty in Mr. Stead's mind of the importance of this work which can only enhance the reputation of its author, and there is no doubt that the publication of *Rejoice in the Lamb* is a great event

ELIZABETH SCOTT-MONTAGU.

'Let Ethan praise with the Flea, his coat of mail, his piercer and his vigour, which wisdom and providence have contrived to attract observation and to escape it. . . .'

He renders justice. . . . 'Let Chalcol praise with the Beetle, whose life is precious in the sight of God, tho' his appearance is against him. . . .'

And the stoat—a disagreeable animal—'Let Mishael bless with the Stoat—the praise of the Lord gives propriety to all things. . . .'

But above all he loved his cat Jeoffrey. This animal he endowed with uncanny powers and speaks of him with an intuition that is beyond knowledge. 'For I am possessed of a Cat, surpassing in beauty. . . .'

There is something of St. Francis in his great love and intimacy with the natural world; and what could be more beautiful than these lines:

> 'For Flowers are peculiarly the poetry of Christ . . .'
> 'For Flowers are musical in ocular harmony . . .'

Sound—whether music or words—were of great importance to him. Onomatopœia and half rhymes occur frequently. Certainly he had a deep appreciation of music and was well acquainted with the various orchestral instruments of his day.

> 'For the Shawn rhimes are lawn fawn moon boon and the like . . .'
> 'For the harp rhimes are ring ring, string and the like . . .'

And the sound of words—even words of his own creation. . . . 'Let Ross, house of Ross rejoice with the Great Flabber Dabber Flat Clapping fish with hands . . .' If we are inclined to find in this quotation evidence of an unbalanced mind, let us look to some of the poets of our own age. The frantic searchings of the subconscious by the Surrealists have never produced anything to surpass many passages in *Rejoice in the Lamb*. The whole work should be of great importance to those still interested in Surrealism: they claim Blake, so Smart must take his place. . . .

And how Smart loved the English language! He could translate visions into words, and the words themselves were precious to him, even the letters that formed the words. 'For every word has it marrow in the English tongue for order

men to know—degradation, humiliation, despair—yet incredibly, when he writes, he seems unaware of his tragedy and he is magnificent in his triumph. *A Song to David* has taken its place beside the other great masterpieces in the English language. The extraordinary power to translate into words a transcendental vision, together with the certainty of his mystic perception, are the result of the perfect bond between himself and that which he saw so clearly. 'For I am the Lord's News-Writer—the Scribe Evangelist . . .' Cowper trembled in the darkness of his damnation while Smart worshipped in the white light of a God of mercy and of love. He fell on his knees not as a penitent, but in thankfulness for the miracle of Life and for his being one with the natural world.

Rejoice in the Lamb is indeed a curious document Smart evidently attempted when writing it to introduce a system. He would be systematic in his call to praise and to pray. There must be strict divisions so that in his passion for nomenclature he could be sure that nothing had been omitted. But the system became muddled, the divisions vague and the names incomprehensible. Repetition crept in and the terrible logic of the mind that is not normal. But as one reads, re-reads and begins to understand this work, it is not the insanity which impresses us but the sanity of his mind and the serenity of his soul.

There are many ways of approach to this—to quote the editor—' panorama of thoughts,' but it is doubtful if a purely academic interest will allow the freshness and beauty of Smart's imagination to be fully realised. For here is a true Song of Innocence—something of that long forgotten world of childhood. Animals, trees, birds, fish, flowers—all natural phenomena, his friends and foes alike—are all innocent. When he speaks of animals he is tender and understanding, as well as often biologically accurate. Like a child he endows them with a separate individuality, they lose their anonymity. . . . 'For the Mouse is a creature of great personal valour . . .' His knowledge and observation of the living world, his concise summing-up of their virtues—for he can find a good word for the most unpleasant of the species—demonstrate how truly he had spanned the abyss between ourselves and the brute creation.

'REJOICE IN THE LAMB'[1]

'FOR the Glory of God is always in the East, but cannot be seen for the cloud of the crucifixion. . . '

The materialism of three centuries had dissipated the heritage of mystical feeling left by the poets and martyrs of the Middle Ages; the secret of their power was lost and their simple radiant faith forgotten But the man who wrote these strange words could see beyond the cloud and his eyes were open to a great revealing glory This apocalyptic vision, one of the many revelations recorded by 'mad' Christopher Smart, gives a clue to the importance of the great spiritual and mystical renaissance of the 'age of reason'—the eighteenth century. Swift, Collins, Cowper, Smart, Blake, Clare, Hoelderlin These are great names indeed, and it is not enough to explain their genius by stressing their madness; surely we should respect this 'madness' and stand in awe of the great miracle which was theirs. . . .

Christopher Smart was a drunken sot. Christopher Smart was mad. He died in the King's Bench Prison at the age of forty-nine—unsung, forgotten. The brilliant promise that he had showed at Cambridge—where he was a Fellow of Pembroke College—ended in Bedlam and prison. His friends tried to save him from what seemed the inevitable, or so it appeared to Gray writing from Cambridge even at an early date, friends such as Dr. Johnson, Hogarth, Garrick. . . . But it was hopeless. Smart was a slave to his devil, and what he earned he soon frittered away in the ale-houses of the town, unable to save himself for his will was too weak. An unhappy family life and, after Cambridge, appalling literary drudgery, debts and wine caused those first signs of mental decay to appear which were only the beginning of his terrible Via Dolorosa.

He must have known more horror than it is given to most

[1] *Rejoice in the Lamb* A Song from Bedlam, by Christopher Smart Edited with an Introduction and Notes by William Force Stead (Cape, 15*s*)

trophic one—of human initiative to save by and for itself alone, a world without God.[1]

The 'historical transformation' here referred to is the liquidation of the capitalist order of society.

There remains the question: What is the Christian to do in the present state of things? M. Maritain would have him neither stand aside nor completely identify himself with any political movement He recommends 'political action *having a remote objective or at long range*.' To pursue the rest of the argument would necessitate controversies which I am anxious to avoid It has been possible in this short review to set out only the main lines of an attempt from the Catholic Christian standpoint to answer the questions which have presented themselves at each significant stage in the history of humanity M. Maritain's study of the relations between private and political morality is particularly valuable. Rejecting Machiavellianism, he points out that the 'principle of the lesser evil' is an ethical one and that the ethical problems of the politician cannot be settled by applying a set of abstract principles *more geometrico*.

M Maritain is conscious of the difficulties attending the formation of 'a political party with a religious label as was the *German Centrum*' Or, he might have added, the Italian *Partito Popolare*, for no explanation of the sufferings of Catholics in Germany and Italy would be complete if it left out of account the errors of judgment of political catholicism. He prefers 'one or more political groups truly and specifically political in fact and in name . and authentically Christian in spirit.' That has been the aim of some recent groups in France. The fate of the Dominican journal *Sept* is not encouraging, nor will it appear to everyone that *L'Hebdomadaire du Temps Présent*, with which M. Maritain is now associated, is a conspicuous improvement on its unhappy predecessor. But these are controversial questions. They should deter nobody who is anxious to know what significant things are being said on the contemporary aspects of eternal problems from making the acquaintance of Jacques Maritain.

REGINALD J. DINGLE.

[1] *True Humanism*, pp 256–257

moderns. Quantitatively, if these things may be estimated in that way, nine-tenths of it must have been pleasing to Rome. The one-tenth of error doomed it.

The humanism of M. Maritain has no use for either of these solutions. To take the second one first, it goes too far in its revolt against secular religion. The world is very evil. 'The Prince of this world cometh, who hath no part in Me.' But the Saviour is '*Salvator mundi*,' and the new dispensation begins with *sic Deus dilexit mundum*. Apocalyptic modernism is a too facile solution.

The reply to the 'back-to-medievalism' movement is the most substantial part of M. Maritain's book He outlines a 'new Christendom'—not to be confused with a new Christianity. The Middle Ages could take Christianity for granted as a basis of citizenship. The State could be intolerant of non-Christian belief. That is no longer possible. Are we, then, to have *l'état laïque* in the full sense? Not necessarily. M Maritain conceives of a community 'informed' by Christianity, while tolerating non-Christian beliefs. There will be no complete subordination of the temporal to the spiritual. The temporal order has a kind of autonomy, though it is 'infravalent.'

This conception of *une nouvelle chrétienté* is the heart of M. Maritain's book. How far is it practicable? The reader must decide for himself. But M. Maritain has no illusions about the difficulties. I think it was Tyrrell who said that the verdict of the deeper experience on life is always pessimistic. Here are M. Maritain's words:

> The accumulated fatalities of the capitalist economic order, the dislocation of human life consequent on the industrial conquest of the universe, and, on the other hand, the age-long development of anti-Christian forces, like the social bankruptcy of the Christian world which I have earlier pointed out—all these things make it necessary, to my mind, to regard the inauguration of new Christendom, which I regard in itself as *possible*, as highly *improbable*, at least with any degree of general and stable success, before that historical transformation of which we are speaking. For the acts and conflicts of historical forces must bear their fruit in time. And it is impossible to see how the religious servitude of man to material things, whether its form be scientific or in terms of the State, can come to an end without a supreme effort—an inevitably catas-

critical of some forms of this than he is of the two substitute 'ideologies.' One reaction to which Roman Catholics may be supposed to be particularly prone is an attitude which is simply 'reactionary' in the popular sense. Modernism is the evil. Let us get back to the Middle Ages. In Great Britain when Chesterton and Belloc began to prove that the devil had not all the best tunes there was a marked revival of a sort of medievalism, for which neither of these two brilliant writers was to blame, which had too much of the same character as the green carnation to have any lasting value. Nevertheless the question remains: amid the ruins of liberal optimism is a return to the theocentric Middle Ages possible?

Another approach to the problem is that of the apocalyptic school Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* and the movements of thought to which it gave rise have had an influence on the theology of the last quarter of a century which has never been fully estimated It presented, with a convincing array of fact and argument, a devastating reply to the liberal Protestantism of Harnack's early writings. That attack was pressed home with such force by Loisy's *L'Evangile et l'Eglise* and Tyrrell's *Christianity at the Cross Roads*, that many honest folk were puzzled at the time by the encyclical *Pascendi*. Was the Vatican unable to distinguish friend from foe? After Loisy had knocked the bottom out of the *Wesen des Christentums*, why shoot the apologist? Surely he was doing his best. And what could be more helpful than Tyrrell's *Christianity at the Cross Roads?* It said that all Harnack could find in eighteen centuries of history was the reflection of a liberal protestant face at the bottom of a deep well.

The apocalyptic school emphasised the conflict with 'the world.' Where all the modern liberals were presenting the historic scheme as a gradual approach to perfection, so that the 'signs of the end' might be expected to be a treaty of universal agreement on everything signed in a garden city, Christ offered 'wars and rumours of wars.' Tyrrell boldly declared the Christian doctrine to be one of 'inevitable failure' in a world given over to Satan and his angels. On the face of it, Roman Catholic 'modernism' was most strangely named, for it was an active revolt against the

is part of the Common Law of England. The secularisation of human societies, whether we welcome or deplore it, is a fact. Many of our venerable institutions begin to have an anachronistic air about them. There is much indeed to be said for the argument that the relations between the Church and the world to-day are those of the pre-Constantine age, and many of our notions require overhauling in consequence.

On all hands the reactions to this are to be seen. One of the most obvious is the pessimism of those whose bliss was to be alive at the dawn of modern secularism. G. K. Chesterton effectively threw back Swinburne's taunt before the crucifix, when he asked of the gospel of progress:

> Hast *thou* fed full men's starved-out souls?
> Hast *thou* brought freedom upon earth?
> Or *are* there less oppressions done
> In this wild world under the sun?

Pourquoi sommes-nous tristes? asked Anatole France. Nobody questions that we are. Communism and totalitarianism are attempts by violence to redress the ruin of humanitarian liberalism. Their violence is to their credit. It is the starting-point of M Maritain's inquiry that no defence of the bourgeois man, the man of nineteenth-century liberalism, is possible. What we want begins with the liquidation of the present order. *True Humanism* is not for anybody who does not appreciate the cataclysmic—one might almost say apocalyptic—character of the age in which we are living. There are still people who believe that nothing is wrong with the world but the existence of 'extremists.' Let them sleep on.

M. Maritain's analysis of the inadequacy of the communist and totalitarian solutions to the full nature of man must be studied in his own pages, but attention may be directed to his very interesting study of the question whether, for all its insistence on the economic interpretation of history, the basis of Marxianism is not really metaphysical. The adoption of something other than a pragmatic conception of truth is one of the inconsistencies running through the system and scientific socialism seems in the last resort to be a species of secular messianism.

What of the Christian reaction? M. Maritain is no less

man? We have been told that he is a little lower than the angels and also that he is a little higher than the *pithecanthropus erectus*. What is his relation to society? Totalitarianism and communism are violent attempts to solve that question.

Few thoughtful people will now question that the multiform problem which perplexes us all arises from the collapse of a *Weltanschauung* which not so many years ago seemed established for all time. Humanism meant the emancipation of man from God. Swinburne was one of its prophets:

> By thy name that in hell-fire was written and burned at the point of thy sword
> Thou art smitten, thou God, thou art smitten, thy death is upon thee, O Lord
> And the love-song of earth as thou diest resounds through the wind of her wings--
> Glory to Man in the highest! for Man is the master of things.

Alas, poor master! It has been difficult to keep pace with his post-reformation evolution. He has been robbed of all virtue by Luther in the name of theology and by Freud in the name of science, while the optimism of Jean Jacques relieved him of original sin Humanism, as Maritain sees it, restores the true picture of man, as 'at once a natural and a supernatural being' To Thomist philosophy he is the highest in the animal order, the lowest in the spiritual. The study of his nature begins with a paradox: 'There is nothing man desires more than a heroic life; there is nothing less common to man than heroism.'

It is impossible even to summarise in an article the arguments by which M. Maritain examines the attempted solutions of the antinomy. The reader may differ from his conclusions, but I think he will find it hard to resist the contention that the classic problems of liberty and grace are not outgrown. The theological problem stands at the approach to every other and it may not be evaded.

Arising naturally out of the problem of the imperfectly 'humanised' man of modernism is that of the social order. There is a sense in which it may be said that Christendom ended with the Middle Ages. International law is no longer the law of Christian peoples, nor is it true that Christianity

sophia perennis has not tinctured intellectual life here to anything like the extent that it has in France. The explanation is to be sought, I think, partly in a different tradition and partly in difficulties of a purely linguistic kind.

There is certainly not to my knowledge any book by an English writer comparable in its scope with the *Humanisme Intégrale* of Jacques Maritain, which is now available in an English edition under the title of *True Humanism* (London: Geoffrey Bles). It is the first book by the famous French philosopher on subjects which are profoundly influencing the non-philosophical public to be translated into English, and nobody who wishes to form a judgment on the obviously critical age in which we are living can afford to neglect it.

M. Maritain, who expounds philosophy at the Institut Catholique in Paris, has recently been in the public eye in connection with political views which divide him and his associates from the great majority of their co-religionists. It is possible to dissent vehemently—as the present writer does—from this aspect of his work, while recognising his austere intellectual honesty and a power of thought which puts him in the very front rank of contemporary thinkers. His special contribution to the Thomist revival has been the attempt to relate the philosophical principles of St. Thomas Aquinas with current problems. Nothing could be more necessary, more difficult, and perhaps it should be added, more dangerous. In two books, *Réflexions Sur l'Intélligence* and *Les Dégrés du Savoir*, M. Maritain has devoted himself to the problems raised by the speculations of the mathematico-physicists and his *Logique Majeure*, which will presumably deal with the latest logical theses, is among the most intriguing of 'things to come.' We are witnessing at present an invasion of the philosophical sphere by scientists like Einstein and Eddington and a courageous attempt by M. Maritain to return the compliment. As far as an onlooker can see, the bridge has yet to be built. The new physicists are far from satisfying the metaphysician and it does not appear that even Catholic physicists and mathematicians are satisfied that M. Maritain has grasped all the points.

True Humanism moves in a less rarefied atmosphere than these discussions. Its problems are those which present themselves to all thoughtful men and women. What is

THE HUMANISM OF JACQUES MARITAIN

AMID all the controversies by which our age is distracted there is a proposition that would command assent from those who probably agree on nothing else. It is that behind our disputes about actualities there lies a philosophical issue. On this ground the Marxist and the neo-scholastic are found united. The latter may push the controversy back as far at least as Plato and Aristotle, whereas the dialectical materialist, no less convinced than the Christian that he possesses *lux vera*, would hardly admit the relevancy of anything pre-Hegelian. Both are at one in attempting to interpret contemporary phenomena in the light of philosophical principles, and both are attracting an increasing degree of attention from the Jourdains who have been, in a manner of speaking, talking philosophy all their lives without knowing it.

The task is considerably easier in this country for the Marxian, for his language is familiar to the moderately educated public. We can all babble about the dialectical process, about thesis, antithesis and synthesis. But philosophical studies have proved their fitness by *der Sprung über das Mittelalter*, and how many people can be expected to recognise *aseitas*, to grasp the meaning of potency and act, essence and existence, or to distinguish between univocity, equivocity and analogy? It is not surprising that to the extent that neo-scholasticism is beginning to influence the intellectual life of this country it is by way of the French Thomists. Credit must be given to the Fathers of the Dominican Province for a literal English translation—to the extent that this is possible—of the *Summa Theologica*, and the work of Father D'Arcy, S.J., at Oxford, and of Dr. Thomas Gilby and others of the Dominican Order under the auspices of London University, as well as that of the Aquinas Societies, is deserving of every praise. It remains true that the *philo-*

there is a passage where Moore tries to create a domestic idyll out of this relationship. 'The sympathy,' he writes 'of a sister's love, of all influences on the mind of youth the most softening, was also, in his early days denied to him, his sister Augusta and he having seen but little of each other while young. A vent through the calm channel of domestic affections might have brought down the high current of his feelings to a level nearer that of the world he had to traverse and thus saved him from the tumultuous rapids and falls to which this early elevation, in their after-course, exposed him.' Hobhouse's comments upon this elaborate metaphor is short and sharp. 'Moore,' he writes, 'run mad.'

At the end of the same volume Moore returns to this theme 'His very inexperience in such ties,' he writes, 'made the smile of a sister no less a novelty than a charm to him.' 'My dear Moore,' scribbles Hobhouse in the margin, 'you know nothing of the matter.'

Yet Hobhouse, knowing all the circumstances of the separation, did not believe that it was caused by Byron's infatuation for Augusta. He in fact makes it clear by his comments that he remained for ever in ignorance of the true motives which inspired Lady Byron to leave her husband. There is a passage towards the end of Moore's life of Byron in which the biographer refers to the poet's foolish propensity for 'romantic mystification.' 'It has sometimes occurred to me,' writes Moore, 'that the occult cause of his lady's separation from him round which herself and her legal adviser have thrown such formidable mystery, may have been nothing more, after all, than some imposture of this kind, some dimly hinted confession of undefined horrors, which, though intended by the relator but to mystify and surprise, the hearer so little understood him as to take in sober seriousness.'

Hobhouse's comment upon this suggestion is illuminating. 'Something,' he comments in the margin, 'of this sort certainly, unless, as Lord Holland told me . . .' I fear that I cannot complete that sentence.

Yet the fact remains that Hobhouse, the closest of all Byron's friends, really *did not know*. How delighted would poor Byron have been had he known that we were still puzzling over this mystery 114 years after his death.

HAROLD NICOLSON.

traveller, though with pursuits so congenial to his own, grew at last to be a chain and a burthen to him; and it was not till he stood companionless on the shore of the little island in the Ægean that he found his spirit breathe freely.' 'What authority,' pencils Hobhouse furiously, 'has Tom got for saying this? He has not the remotest guess at the real reason which induced Lord B. at that time to prefer having no Englishman immediately or constantly near him.' Again we are left with a riddle.

I shall keep for my conclusion such additional information as Hobhouse is able to throw upon Byron's marriage and separation. Meanwhile I shall examine Hobhouse's views upon Byron's self-imposed exile. Moore took for granted, and perpetuated, the legend that Byron was driven out of England by an outburst of public resentment. Hobhouse denies this theory completely. Moore writes that 'the excommunicating voice of society seemed to leave him no other course.' 'There was not,' comments Hobhouse, 'the slightest necessity, even in appearance, of his going away.' On page 362 of Moore's second volume Byron himself is quoted as saying that his friends advised him to slip away quietly for fear that he might be attacked by an outraged mob in Piccadilly Terrace. 'Who gave him that advice,' writes Hobhouse, 'I know not. The apprehension was ridiculous.' Again and again throughout the volume does Hobhouse comment upon Byron's ill-founded persecution mania and the fact that there was no reason at all why he should not at any time have gone back to England. It was evident, Hobhouse suggests, that Byron actually preferred living abroad. There came a moment, it is true, when Byron became so bored by the Guiccioli that he began to think of returning. But by that time the cause of Greece had begun to glimmer as a more glorious method of escape. 'Such,' comments Hobhouse 'was the beginning of his conjectures on the effort which cost him his life.'

What light, in conclusion, is thrown by Hobhouse's marginal comments upon the eternal problem of Byron's separation from Lady Byron? I must confess that confusion is worse confounded. On the one hand, Hobhouse was fully aware of the relations between Byron and his half-sister, Augusta Leigh. That is quite clear. In his first volume

comment of Hobhouse's which is illuminating to the Byron student. Moore has a gushing passage about the delights of the Southwell circle. It was here, writes Moore, that Byron first had an opportunity of 'profiting by the bland influence of female society, or of seeing what woman is in the true sphere of her virtues—home. The amiable and intelligent family of the Pigots received him within their circle as one of themselves.' Hobhouse sharply dispels this idyllic picture. 'It was at this place,' he comments, 'that he learnt, not only his first lessons in sensuality, but had the opportunity of seeing to what base expedients self-interest will resort. One of the families mentioned winked at an intercourse between him and one of the daughters in hopes of entangling him into an unequal marriage.'

There are other of Moore's happy little legends that Hobhouse dispels with equal realism. He denies that either at Harrow or at Cambridge did Byron ever manifest any exceptional ability. He rebuts Moore's assertion that Byron was a fine orator and adds that the few speeches that he delivered were written out for him by Hobhouse himself. He disposes of the story of the debauchery at Newstead and says Byron and his friends did little more than 'drink heavily.' He brushes away Moore's, and Byron's own assertion, that the Edinburgh review left him indifferent, with a note to the effect that he was so crushed by it that he contemplated suicide. And, more interestingly perhaps, he disposes of Dallas' story that Byron thought highly of *Hints from Horace*, and never regarded *Childe Harold* as an important work. 'This is not true,' he pencils, and a few lines further on, 'So Mr. Dallas says, but I do not believe it.'

I have already referred to the fact that on their return from Childe Harold's first pilgrimage to the Levant, Byron returned to Athens whereas Hobhouse continued his journey home to England. On that second visit Byron did not stay at the pension of Madame Macri, mother of the Maid of Athens; he took rooms in the Capuchin monastery and used as his study the choragic monument of Lysicrates, which at that date was attached to the main building. Moore has a passage on this episode which was rightly calculated to arouse Hobhouse's wrath. 'So enamoured,' writes Moore, 'had he become of these lonely musings, that even the society of his fellow

deference that crept into the manner of his headmaster towards him.

Hobhouse refers to Byron's mother as 'that insane woman,' he mentions that at one moment she wanted to marry a Frenchman and to transport her son to France. This was prevented by Lord Carlisle. He also mentions the culminating scene between Byron and his mother at Southwell, when Mrs. Byron started throwing the fire-irons at her son and he escaped in fury and shame to London 'Byron,' writes Hobhouse in the margin, 'drove off in a chaise and four and she, poor soul, followed him in a chaise and pair.'

The next episode which Hobhouse comments upon is that mysterious quarrel between the young Byron and his tenant at Newstead, Lord Grey de Ruthven. It will be remembered that Lord Grey was very kind to his young landlord, allowing him to use one of the lodges as a private cottage, and finally giving him a suite of rooms in the Abbey itself. Suddenly one morning Byron returned to his mother at Southwell and refused absolutely to visit, or even to speak to, Lord Grey again. Mrs. Byron was distressed by his obstinacy, since she herself had acquired a marked affection for Lord Grey. Byron wrote somewhat pompously 'Were my reason known,' he wrote, 'which it never will be I should be justified in my conduct.' This episode has always been something of a mystery to Byron scholars. Hobhouse only increases the puzzle. 'A circumstance occurred,' he scribbles cryptically regarding Byron's visit to Lord Grey, 'during this intimacy which certainly had much effect upon his future morals.' We are left guessing.

It must be confessed that much of the additional information regarding Byron's biography which is supplied by the marginal glosses of Hobhouse, is of a negative rather than of a positive character. Thus he discredits the romantic legend of Byron's passion for Mary Chaworth. 'I do not believe it,' he writes. And when Moore alludes to Byron's broken heart when he learnt that Mary Chaworth had married Mr. Musters, Hobhouse comments: 'Byron told me many particulars of this marriage, some of them very ridiculous, which at that time he narrated without the slightest appearance of regret or feeling of any kind.'

While we are still in the Southwell period there is one

called 'that wine of passion—rage.' But there is a note somewhere on these wide margins which says 'This is wrong. There was nothing fierce about Lord B.' Hobhouse, again, distrusts all the more cynical remarks which in moods of loneliness or petulance Byron would insert in his letters. Moore quotes a letter to Murray containing the passage 'All men are intrinsical rascals and I am only sorry that, not being a dog, I can not bite them.' Hobhouse comments in the margin: 'He did not really think so.' Hobhouse confirms, also, what many of us have suspected, that Byron was essentially a shy man and one who suffered a sense of inferiority owing not only to his strange upbringing, but also to his lameness. On the latter point he was extremely sensitive, and against a passage in which Moore records Mrs. Byron's 'lame brat' insult, Hobhouse has written 'B. told me that he once reproved Lady Holland in an angry tone for referring to Henry Fox's lameness' I trust that Lady Holland, on that one occasion, blushed. Hobhouse admits that Byron was much affected by the Newstead legends of the fierceness of his predecessor in the title, but in general he pooh-poohs all Moore's romantic suggestions as to the influence of his heredity. And the general picture which emerges from these little pencilled contradictions is the picture of a wayward, unstable, affectionate, sensitive and somewhat feminine character.

What actual facts, in the last place, does the Hobhouse glossary add to our biographical knowledge? I shall treat these in chronological order.

Tom Moore has much to say about the precocity of Byron's sensual passions. Hobhouse rejects this with a hoot of derision. Moore becomes all lacrimose about the beauty of Byron's childhood-adoration for Mary Duff. 'With respect,' writes Hobhouse, 'to the early development of these propensities I am acquainted with a singular fact, scarcely fit for narration, but much *less* romantic and *more* satisfactory than his amour with Mary Duff.'

When we get to the moment of Byron's succession to the peerage and the famous story of how he wept aloud when his name figured in roll-call with the prefix of 'dominus,' Hobhouse writes that Byron had told him that the only intimation he had of the change in his status was the marked

Particularly amusing is Hobhouse's indignation at the frequent attempts of Moore to represent Byron as a serious scholar and as a student of politics. 'He was,' scribbles Hobhouse at one moment, 'totally ignorant of the point in dispute on that, or on any other, question, of politics.' There is a letter quoted which Byron wrote to the egregious Mr. Dallas and in which he makes the following boast. 'As to my reading, I believe I may aver, without hyperbole, it has been tolerably extensive in the historical; so that few nations exist, or have existed, with whose records I am not in some degree acquainted, from Herodotus down to Gibbon.' Hobhouse was not going to stand nonsense such as that. 'I am afraid,' he comments, 'that is not true to the extent which Byron would wish us all to believe.'

I have said enough under this heading to suggest that the general tone of Hobhouse's commentary is to correct all exaggerations of the Byron legend and to present us with the portrait, not so much of the author of the *Bride of Abydos* as of the author of the Byron letters.

I now pass to my second section, namely, an examination of those comments of Hobhouse which actually add to our conception of Byron's character.

Behind it all, as I have just indicated, is the conception of Byron, not as the great genius, not as the romantic figure, but as the gayest and wittiest of companions. There is a passage towards the end of Moore's life in which he refers in rather pompous language to the fading of memory. 'That is true,' writes Hobhouse, 'what I remember best to-day about the dear fellow is the way he laughed.'

There are certain other and unexpected aspects which Hobhouse's notes suggest. I had myself always supposed that Byron was a snobbish man who gloried in his rank, and, in fact, there are many passages in his writings and his letters which suggest a vulgar and ostentatious side to his nature. Hobhouse denies all this. Again and again, when Moore hints at his pride of birth, Hobhouse writes some such remark: 'T.M. may have derived that impression. I did not do so myself.'

Another aspect which Hobhouse's notes emphasise is the gentleness of Byron. True it is that the poet had a hot temper and that at moments he would drain what he himself

passage which demonstrates exactly Hobhouse's own conception of his dearest friend. In one of Byron's letters quoted in Moore's second volume there occurs the following passage: 'I can never get people to understand that poetry is the expression of *excited passion*, and that there is no such thing as a life of passion any more than a continuous earthquake, or an eternal fever. Besides, who could ever *shave* themselves in such a state?' 'See,' exclaims Hobhouse in the margin, 'the sense and truth of this! It is the man himself.'

It is not surprising, therefore, that having this reasonable conception of Byron, Hobhouse should have been infuriated by Moore's constant attempts to romanticise the subject of his biography. Whenever Moore indulges in purple passages the pencil of Hobhouse is certain to scribble such words as 'nonsense,' 'most unlike him,' 'I do not believe this,' or merely 'no' When Moore suggests that the writing of the Prisoner of Chillon must have cost Byron 'many a tear'—'Not one I believe,' barks Hobhouse from the margin. When Moore quotes Lady Blessington's description of Byron weeping at the mention of England and his little daughter, down the pencil comes with 'Very unlike him.' When Moore raves about the poetical genius of Byron, Hobhouse comments with some truth, 'But his poetry is only prose put into rhyme—a transcript from a narrative.' When Moore discounts inaccurately upon Byron's prowess at field sports and ball games, Hobhouse cannot refrain from saying that 'B. was an outrageous horseman' or 'The only thing B. could do well in this line was to swim.' Moore's actual silliness (as when he compares Hucknall Torkard to Missolonghi) makes Hobhouse gnash his teeth. His sickly sentiment drives him to fury. There is, towards the middle of the second volume, a somewhat unctuous tribute to Lady Byron. 'By none,' writes Tom Moore, 'would a generous amnesty over his grave be more readily and cordially concurred in than by her, among whose numerous virtues a forgiving charity towards himself was the only one to which she had not yet taught him to render justice.' Moore must have been pleased when he wrote that sinuous paragraph. He would have been less pleased if he could have read Hobhouse's comment upon it. That comment consists of only three words—'False and base.'

irritation expresses itself in his marginal notes. Moore states at one moment that 'after his departure from Southwell, Lord Byron had not a single friend or relative to whom he could look up with respect.' 'A very pleasing inference,' comments Hobhouse, 'to be drawn by the associates of his early days.' 'Although,' writes Moore a few pages further on, in referring to the early Newstead period, 'the irregularities he gave way to were of a nature far less gross and miscellaneous than those, perhaps, of any of his associates . . . .' Against this is pencilled by Hobhouse 'a further very agreeable reflexion for his friends.'

Moore quotes with some relish Byron's inscription over the grave of his dog Boatswain, and emphasises the two lines :—

> To mark a friend's remains these stones arise ;
> I never had but *one*, and here he lies.

'Which,' Hobhouse comments upon the last three words, 'I thus altered—" and here I lies." '

Yet it was not only of Tom Moore that Hobhouse was jealous. He objected to all the friends that Byron made after 1822. In speaking of the Villa Diodati period, Moore refers to Shelley. 'An aristocrat,' he writes in his snobby little chirrup, 'by birth and, as I understand, also in appearance and manners.' An angry pencil has underlined the last five words. 'Not in the least,' comments Hobhouse, 'unless to be lean and feeble is to be aristocratical.' The gorgeous Lady Blessington and her strange domestic circus come in for a similar snarl from the pencil of John Cam Hobhouse. Lord and Lady Blessington in 1823 made friends with Byron at Genoa. Moore was delighted at recording this 'new intimacy.' 'It was evident,' he writes, 'that to his mind the revival of English associations and habitudes always brought with it a sense of refreshment, like that of inhaling his native air.' 'Not much more reputable,' snarls Hobhouse, 'than the Leigh Hunts.'

Yet in Hobhouse's critical attitude towards Moore's biography of Byron there is something far more serious than mere jealousy. What he really objected to was the extent to which Moore had pandered to the Byron legend. For Hobhouse, Byron was always either the 'dear fellow' or the 'singular young person' of their early years. There is one

I begin with Hobhouse's attitude towards the Byron legend. In the first place Hobhouse was a conventional member of the British upper class and looked upon Tom Moore as a little Irish adventurer of no breeding and slight reliability. In the second place he was, I regret to say, deeply jealous of any friends whom Byron managed to make outside the Cambridge circle.

His hostility to, and contempt for, Tom Moore is apparent throughout his running commentary. Thus, towards the end of the second volume Thomas Moore rather unfortunately perhaps, quotes one of his own letters to Byron from Dublin. 'Though I have not written,' runs this letter, 'I have seldom ceased to think of you; for you are that sort of being whom everything, high or low, brings into one's mind. Whether I am with the wise or the waggish, among poets or among pugilists, over the books or over the battle, you are sure to connect yourself, transcendently with all, and come "armed for *every* field" into my memory.' That letter rouses Hobhouse to a stinging rejoinder. 'This shows,' he scribbles in the margin, 'the sort of intercourse which Byron and Moore kept up.'

Here is another disobliging reference to this intercourse. Tom Moore (again a trifle unnecessarily) quotes a slightly disparaging reference to himself in one of Byron's letters to John Murray. He continues as follows: 'I took occasion, in my next communication to Lord Byron, to twit him a little with the passage relating to myself—the only one, as far as I can learn, that ever fell from my noble friend's pen during our intimacy, in which he has spoken of me otherwise than in terms of kindness, and the most undeserved praise.' This was more than Hobhouse could stand. 'From his pen perhaps not,' he pencils savagely, 'from his lips, many.'

It must be realised therefore that the comments from which I shall quote were written in a mood of indignation against Moore. For in the official biography Byron's friendship with Hobhouse is either ignored or else referred to in terms of light disparagement. Yet, in fact, it was the keel and ballast of Byron's errant boat. It must in truth have been irritating for Hobhouse to find his own rôle in that romantic drama reduced to insignificant proportions and to see himself referred to all too frequently as 'Mr. H. . . .' At times this

Mr. Hobhouse was in Newgate? There are some of his phrases and much of his style which led me to suspect that either she had not, or that he had profited less than the others from her instruction.'

This quarrel was of short duration. Hobhouse travelled out to Italy and visited Byron in Pisa in September 1822. When he left, Byron was assailed by home-sickness. 'Hobhouse,' he said pathetically, 'you should never have come or you should never go.' That was their last meeting. Hobhouse never saw Byron again until that dreadful morning nearly two years later when, by the light of the candles in Sir George Knathbull's dining-room in Great George Street, he was obliged as an executor to identify the almost unidentifiable corpse brought back from Missolonghi in a cask of alcohol.

Hobhouse defended the memory of his friend with persistent loyalty His subsequent career was one of some distinction. He became Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for Ireland. He lives in Parliamentary history as the inventor of the phrase 'His Majesty's Opposition.' He attended Queen Victoria's first Privy Council, and has left a vivid record of that scene. He was created Lord Broughton, and died in his eighty-third year, in 1869, full of repute and honours.

What addition to our understanding of Byron is provided by Hobhouse's marginal comments upon Thomas Moore's biography?

Inevitably, I fear, my comments will be somewhat disjointed It is difficult to weave these fragmentary marginal jottings, scattered over two stout volumes, into any connected narrative or even into any symmetrical pattern. I shall divide these comments under three main headings. In my first section I shall describe the difference between the legendary Byron as portrayed by Thomas Moore in his biography, and the real Byron as known to Hobhouse from intimate association extending over some seventeen years. In my second section I shall refer to such additional light as Hobhouse's comments throw upon Byron's true character. And in my third section I shall analyse the actual additions to our knowledge of Byron's life which are furnished by these pencil notes, recovered after more than a hundred years.

your sentimental novel. I am sure that I did not suspect you of any fine feelings and I believe you were laughing. But you are welcome.' Another letter of Byron's of the same period, written from Athens, shows that he was not in fact indifferent to Hobhouse's affection. 'After all,' he wrote, 'I do love thee, Hobby, thou hast so many good qualities and so many bad ones it is impossible to live with or without thee.'

Byron thereafter returned to England and woke up famous. Hobhouse became a radical and contested the Westminster election. They remained close friends. Hobhouse acted as Byron's best man at that unfortunate wedding and stood by him to the very end during the scandal of the separation, even accompanying him down to Dover when Byron fled the country. Their relations, thereafter, became for a space of time a trifle colder. Hobhouse disapproved of the stories which reached him regarding Byron's standard of life at Venice. He disapproved of Byron's new friendships, such as those with Shelley and Leigh Hunt. Thus, when in 1819, Hobhouse was committed to Newgate for breach of privilege and for having slandered the mother of Parliaments in a pamphlet, Byron was over-joyed. He sat down and wrote a lampoon, which he sent to Murray. Hobhouse, who felt that his imprisonment at Newgate was a glorious act of martyrdom, was annoyed when Byron referred to it as 'Nugatory.' He was even more annoyed when a version of Byron's lampoon appeared in the public press. It is not a very good lampoon, and I shall only quote two verses.

What did the House upon this call
    My boy Hobbie O?
They voted me to Newgate all,
    Which is an awkward Jobby O!

But when you at Cambridge were
    My boy Hobbie O,
If my memory don't err,
    You founded a Whig Clubbie O.

On reading this lampoon Hobhouse wrote Byron a furious letter. Byron took it mildly. 'By the way,' he wrote to John Murray, 'you do not happen to know whether Mrs. Fry had commenced her reform of the prisoners at the time when

nobility. There were many such actions; Hobhouse was often pained.

It took John Cam Hobhouse but a few months to get over the grey horse and the white hat, and he soon found that the flamboyant young lordling possessed other qualities. He liked his sense of humour; he enjoyed his high spirits; he participated in his liberal sentiments; and above all he shared his taste in poetry. Not that Byron read poetry very much; but even at Cambridge he could write pretty verses. Hobhouse, who also enjoyed turning epigrams, found the young man congenial. They became close friends. Hobhouse visited Byron at Newstead, and thereafter he accompanied him on that famous journey which has been immortalised in Childe Harold. While Byron scribbled those remarkable cantos, Hobhouse also scribbled verses. These verses were published under the title of a *Miscellany*, and were always referred to by Byron and his friends as the 'Miss-sell-any.' And he also wrote a studious and scholarly book on these travels in Albania and the Levant

After visiting Constantinople, the two friends felt that it was time to return to England. They were given a passage on the *Salsette* frigate. But, as the ship began to leave the Ægean and to turn her prow towards England, Byron felt that he could not bear to return to his own home and island without paying a further visit to his beloved Greece. The *Salsette* therefore put in at the little port of Zea and Byron disembarked. Hobhouse continued his journey to London.

The strange circumstances of that parting at Zea have been recorded. It took place on July 17th, 1810. Hobhouse, that night, made the following entry in his diary: 'Took leave, *non sine lacrimis*, of this singular young person on a little stone terrace at the end of the bay, dividing with him a little nosegay of flowers, the last perhaps that I will ever divide with him." On reaching Malta a week or so later, Hobhouse wrote Byron a long letter. He added a postscript. 'I kept,' he wrote, 'the half of your little nosegay until it withered, and even then I could not bear to throw it away. I can't account for this, nor can you either, I dare say.' Byron received this letter when he was in Patras. He replied to it rather sharply. 'Your last letter,' he wrote, 'closes pathetically with a postscript about a nosegay. I advise you to introduce that into

AN ADDITION TO BYRON'S BIOGRAPHY

ONE day, a few years ago, I was sitting after breakfast reading my morning's letters. Among them was a catalogue from Messrs. Maggs Brothers, the famous book-sellers. I read it idly, when suddenly my eye was caught by an entry in leaded type. It ran as follows: 'Moore's Life of Byron. Two volumes, quarto, edges cut. Copy presented by the publisher to John Cam Hobhouse Esquire, to whom Byron left his manor of Rochdale (see Will of Lord Byron; page 820; Volume 2). The first volume contains John Cam Hobhouse's book plate.'

I felt there might be more in this entry than appeared. I went at once to Maggs and bought the two volumes. It was as I had expected. The margins of the text were scored with little pencil notes in the writing of J. C. Hobhouse. These notes were still perfectly legible. At one moment I feared that the notes were not all in the same script. Closer investigation showed, however, that Hobhouse must have read the book twice over, and that the notes which he made at the first reading were written in a smaller hand than those which he entered on his second reading. Internal evidence left no doubt at all that these notes represented the comments of Byron's best friend upon the 'official' biography of the poet. I took the precaution to have all these notes carefully deciphered and typed out.

Who was John Cam Hobhouse, and what was the nature of his long friendship with Byron? They had first met when Byron went up to Trinity College, Cambridge. Hobhouse, who from his earliest years was somewhat conventional, had taken a dislike to this florid and ostentatious young man, who attracted attention to himself by riding a grey horse and wearing a huge white hat. Hobhouse, as we shall see, was particularly sensitive to any action on Byron's part which appeared to him unfitting in a representative of our older

These figures, taken together with the details I have furnished with regard to Jugoslavia, show that Germany's war has already begun. It is an economic offensive on the smaller, a process of intimidation backed by the full war potential of the Reich and aiming at bringing the Balkans within the German orbit of 'protection.'

Strategically speaking, Germany could use the Balkans as an admirable base for a similar offensive against the West, and against that contingency, too, we must be prepared; but rearmament itself is not enough. We must undertake a vigorous diplomatic offensive throughout Western and Eastern Europe, including Russia, guaranteeing the integrity of the smaller States before the Nazi guarantee turns them against us. And we must be prepared to back that guarantee with loans and credits to those countries in need of it and with trade agreements.

At the moment Jugoslavia may not appear to realise it; but her position is very dangerous, and she is being subjected to tremendous pressure. On May 4th, for example, the German leaders of the Volksgruppen in Jugoslavia, Grassl, Hamm, Trischer and Papp, had conversations with the Ministers of Justice and of Culture with regard to the position of the German minorities. Reconsideration of the debt question was demanded, as well as increased facilities for Germans to purchase land. The Jugoslav authorities have postponed the question, and meantime are moving their northern factories further south.

In the last resort, it is being said, Jugoslavia would rather have the Italians in Ljubljana than the Germans, not merely because the Italians are less thorough, but also because Jugoslavia considers that Germany and Italy will quarrel over her. It is surely our task to help the country next most threatened. Intelligent co-operation can make her a willing weapon for the division and smashing of the Axis. If, however, she falls, the last bastion in Europe has fallen and the die is cast.

J. F. Hendry.

tons; and a regular land army of 110,900 soldiers; vast untapped economic resources, including the minerals of Macedonia and Serbia's grain; the natural mountain barrier of the Slovene Alps, so that the war would become a precarious fight for a foothold on the coast, a second Gallipoli; air bases on the Adriatic; and, above all, the Balkan Entente would crumble.

Article I of the Balkan Pact, signed February 9th, 1934, states: 'Greece, Rumania, Turkey and Jugoslavia guarantee mutually the security of their Balkan frontiers.' This may be interpreted as not applying to a German attack on the northern frontiers of Jugoslavia since these are not Balkan frontiers. It would be the beginning of the end of the Balkan Entente, which is the whole aim of Hitler at present.

Admittedly the position is a thorny one, and the guaranteeing of the *status quo* in the Balkans would definitely alienate Hungary and Bulgaria. Yet there can be no excuse at this juncture for leaving a loophole for aggression. There seems no reason why the system of unilateral guarantee should not be applied, as was the case with Poland. This could be given to Greece and also to Jugoslavia, and to Bulgaria after a settlement of the Macedonian question and the Dobrudja.

As I write, the Cabinet is reported to be discussing these and other questions, whilst it was rumoured from Bucharest that on Hitler's birthday, April 20th, Germany might put forward a plan for bringing the whole Balkan Peninsula into a 'federal economic system.' This is the German attempt at a final solution of the Balkan problem, and we may be sure that Jugoslavia comes first, if only because it lies along the line of the strategic railway drive to Salonika.

Eighty-four per cent. of Bulgaria's trade is now done with the Axis Powers. Here are the figures for the remaining Balkan countries in 1937[3]:

GERMAN SHARE OF FOREIGN TRADE (Austria included)

	Imports per cent	Exports per cent.
Hungary . . .	43	44
Rumania . . .	40	27
Greece . . .	29	29
Turkey . . .	43	39
Jugoslavia . . .	44	34

[3] From *Bulletin of International News*, courtesy of Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Matchek, and indeed the last part of his speech shows that he understands the position. Croatia would suffer most by Axis dismemberment of Jugoslavia. Her best port, Zara, is already in Italian hands, together with many islands down the Adriatic coast, a severe setback to start with. And the Slovenes themselves have many complaints regarding the persecution, imprisonment and torture of their fellow-nationals in Italy, where they have been called, in a charming and unforgettable phrase, 'the bugs that infest a house.' Their hatred for the Italians is as real as their admiration for Great Britain. Nevertheless, reactionary or misguided leaders are still capable of causing 1,500,000 Slovenes and 3,500,000 Croats to break away from the Serbs unless some understanding is shown of their legitimate desires.

'Decentralisation of government,' as a Slovene nationalist assured me last year, 'would not necessarily break up Jugoslavia, any more than decentralisation in Great Britain and Ireland. It would only give the peoples composing the group something tangible to fight for.'

Jugoslavia, of course, is only a geographical expression meaning 'Land of the Southern Slavs,' but one has only to look at Switzerland to see how geography can weld the most diverse peoples together into a State. Little military resistance, however, can be offered to any aggression from the north. Even Belgrade, the capital, has no A.R.P. and no gas masks. But these are not all the dangers. Attack may now be launched from the south also, on the pretext of freeing the million Albanians living in Jugoslavia. And the east is an Achilles' heel, for there lies Macedonia, which after the war was divided up between Bulgaria, Jugoslavia and Greece. Already the Axis Powers are mooting the suggestion of an 'independent' Macedonian State. This presumably would be under the tutelage of Bulgaria, to win over the latter to the Axis, for Bulgaria was not a signatory of the Balkan Entente owing to her revisionist claims. Ultimately, of the new state Jugoslavia, only Serbia would be left, were these possible developments to become realities, as they will do unless action is taken at once.

What would Great Britain lose? First, a staunch ally with effectives numbering 3,000,000 men of proved fighting ability; an air force of 300 'planes and 10,000 men; a navy of 9,500

in Germany. The Slovenes themselves are regarded in Germany as being Germans, although their language is Slovenian, as definitely Slav as is Russian.

There are several reasons for this. Before the Great War, Slovenia was a part of Austria-Hungary. All the key posts in administration, education, industry and agriculture were given to Germans, who still form a governing class in the country and constitute the nucleus for Nazi propaganda and espionage. Thus the *Pflug* Sports Club and the *Schlaraffia Marpurghia* Male Voice Society are Nazi-inspired bodies. In addition, Germans have recently been buying up landed estates on the border and along strategic roads and railways, which are either settled by Germans with the idea of creating additional minority problems, or controlled through willing Slovenes. 'Recently a poor farmer purchased a landed estate at St. Kriz on the Austrian frontier to the value of £4,200. Immediately afterwards the real purchaser, a rich German merchant, put upon it a mortgage to the value of the estate.' [2]

Among the older Slovenes, too, one hears occasionally a corruption of a German word, for example, *zeifa*, instead of the Slav original *milo*, which lends strength to the absurd idea that Slovenes are really German. The success of the above tactic is seen in the fact that 57 per cent. of the land round Maribor is now in the possession of Germans. Krupp has also won valuable concessions in the great mining region of Jesenice, just over the border, and in the heart of Slovenia.

These are not the only cards in the hands of the Axis partners. Germany will doubtless make it appear that she is freeing Slovenia and Croatia from the domination of Serbia, the third partner. Matchek is reported as saying: 'If Mussolini comes along and says, "Now look here, you Croatians, I will use my influence to help you get autonomy," we will say "Bravo, Mussolini." If Hitler comes along with the same offer, we will say, "Bravo, Hitler," and if Chamberlain comes and says, "I am sending a big squadron to the Adriatic and advising the Serbs to give you autonomy," then we will all cry, "*Hoch*, Chamberlain." For autonomy is what we want, *though autonomy inside, not outside, the Jugoslav state*.'

The fate of Slovakia should be a clear lesson to M.

[2] M. Risto Jelatchin in *Voix Européennes*, March, 1938.

The present Government of M. Tsvetkovitch is more liberal than the previous Stoyadinovitch Government, which concluded the notorious Concordat with Rome and was within the Nazi orbit. Negotiations are being conducted, with apparent success, with Dr. Matchek, leader of the Croat Nationalists, for a measure of political devolution. The forbidden Croat Nationalist flag has reappeared in Zagreb, the Croat capital. These are steps in the right direction, but that they are insufficient is shown by Matchek's recent statement to a *Daily Express* staff reporter [1]:

> Germany's plan, I believe, is to secure the Belgrade and south-eastern area as her zone I have seen a map on which a great German road and railway system through Belgrade to Salonika is worked out in detail For Salonika is the port which the Germans would like to make their great Mediterranean harbour . . . Croatia and the Adriatic coast of Jugoslavia would be left to Italy as her zone of influence. That would mean that Mussolini's position in the Adriatic would not be challenged by Germany.

Credence is given to this view by the reported Italian threat to march her troops from Albania down to Salonika, should the British fortify Corfu. There are other pointers. Germany has moved troops up to the borders of Slovenia, in the extreme north of Jugoslavia, and reports are current of disorders in Ljubljana, the Slovene capital. It is claimed that there is a German minority of 500,000 in Jugoslavia, out of a total population of 15,174,000, but this is an attempt to disguise the facts.

In Slovenia, for example, live 10,000 Germans in a little colony calling itself *Gottschee*. But they have lived there for 700 years and have nothing whatever to do with the impositions of the Versailles Treaty. Rather do they constitute a 'language island,' a freak element which occurs all over Europe. Originally from Wurtemberg, they have almost complete liberty in the new State, elementary schools in their own language, their own newspaper, and the civic rights of the ordinary Jugoslav citizen. Since the advent of the National Socialist movement, however, many of them have succumbed to Nazi agitation, carried on both personally and by means of the Press, since their only newspaper is printed

[1] *Daily Express*, April 10th, 1939.

Let us look at the map. The partisans of the Dual Monarchy praise it because it was a free trade area. But Germany to-day is almost as large as the old Dual Monarchy, and her interests, like those of post-war Austria, lie down, not up, the Danube. If a free trade area is all that is desired, why cannot we let Germany have it now? There are many arguments again, even if we adopt quite a neutral attitude. Europe has little reason to suppose that Nazi Germany is any more endowed with political genius than was pre-war Austria. Her installation of a governor in Bohemia was scarcely tactful, and can hardly be regarded as a permanent solution. Hence the more countries come into the Nazi orbit the weaker will Germany become, because her political experience, as opposed to military or economic experience, is *nil*.

Most cogent argument of all against permitting German domination of the Balkans, however, is that it would be but a step towards the domination of the world in a very real sense. The German army, that headless robot, is in command, as was the Austrian years ago, and it knows only the word 'March!' To be irresistible it needs two things above all others—oil and wheat. And these are found in abundance in the Balkans. Hence the recent German economic 'ultimatum' to Rumania, and the trade talks with Jugoslavia on April 10th. Economic penetration and control of the Balkans will, it is hoped in Berlin, not only provide the fuel for the mechanised German forces, but enable Germany to last out against any Allied blockade.

At the moment, therefore, especially in view of the Italian occupation of Albania, the key point appears to be Jugoslavia. Domination or intimidation of this State will be the beginning of the break-up of the Balkan Entente (Jugoslavia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey), and whatever the reason for the Italian invasion of King Zog's country, the reply would seem rather to be the guaranteeing of Jugoslavia's integrity than the guaranteeing of Greece, since it is much more directly threatened. It is in fact now surrounded, and the most vigorous steps will have to be taken by the British Government if the country is not to become another unwilling partner in the Berlin-Rome Axis.

Jugoslavia, of course, is a regency under Prince Paul.

JUGOSLAVIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE BALKANS

There is a tendency to-day to regret the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 'that splendid economic machine' as Fodor calls it in his book *South of Hitler*. It is difficult to know how to account for such a tendency when we remember that Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1905 quite as brutally as Hitler recently assumed control of Austria. Again, 'that splendid economic machine' in 1914 declared war on Serbia without waiting for the reply to its own ultimatum. The *Drang nach Osten* was just as pressing a problem in those days as it is now. And ultimately the splendid machine we like to think of was torn to pieces by the conflicting necessities of political devolution and economic expansion, forces to which the Third Reich in turn may succumb.

Those who regret the dismemberment of Austria invariably mention also the inflammatory nationalisms of the succession states, as though these were something artificial. Yet they are quite organic, and just as much political realities as economic realities. The only inflamed nationalism is Fascism, for that is nationalism which has taken over the State, economics, shall we say, made politics. Jugoslavia, however, has preserved at least the outward forms of democracy; and the succession states are less to blame for the development of economic nationalism than the Allies which, after the war, demanded from Germany more gold than there was in the world, then, on learning that was impossible, extorted from her huge sums in reparations which could only be paid by the most rigid economic nationalism conceivable.

Conceptions such as the above are not only untrue but dangerous in that they obscure the issue in the last and in possible future wars, and engender a kind of defeatism which rapidly becomes fatalism before a determined aggressor.

Conference. It is of much greater importance, therefore, to direct attention to the unity committees in the constituencies and the support they receive from the people. Here the challenge is shifted from the domestic affairs of the Labour Party to the much more important question of the direct action of the people to secure the unity expressed in the petition. Will it gather volume and strength sufficient to break the power of Transport House which is to-day the principal bulwark preventing the unity of the progressive forces?

If the Labour Party Executive proceeds to disaffiliate local Labour parties and to expel candidates who support the course taken by Sir Stafford, then there may be a quick breakdown of the present reluctance to face the prospect of disaffiliation. The campaign committees would in many places rapidly be transformed into local organisations of the Popular Front. If the campaign is allowed to run its course until the Labour Conference, Sir Stafford Cripps and his supporters will then have to face the question—what next? Either capitulation or a direct challenge over the heads of the Labour Party to the people!

Another factor in the situation is the number of prominent men and women of all parties who have been proclaiming the urgency of progressive unity. Since the expulsion of Cripps there has been a strange silence in their ranks, as if all were waiting for the 'domestic quarrel' in Labour's ranks to cease before entering the arena again. This lull cannot last. Indeed, it is already passing. The moment they line up collectively with the unity groups now forming in the constituencies, the Labour bureaucracy will be faced with a much greater problem than that of the disciplining of prominent members.

That has ceased to be the main issue. It is now a question of whether the Labour leadership is to be permitted, in the history of Britain, to repeat the fatal mistake of their colleagues of Germany and Italy. And that is not a question which can be formally relegated to a Labour Party Conference. The crisis in the Labour Movement to-day is nothing other than the crisis of democracy.

J. T. Murphy.

berlain, but as his henchmen. Then there will be no more of 'Socialism or nothing.'

Thus this slogan and the revolutionary speeches of the leaders of Labour, responsible for the expulsion of Sir Stafford Cripps and for opposition to progressive unity, turn out to be the old familiar camouflage of politicians shirking the responsibilities of power and retreating before reaction. It was thus that the Socialist and Labour leaders of Italy paved the way to the triumph of Mussolini when Turrati talked of 'letting the capitalists stew in their own juice.' It was thus the Socialist and Labour leaders of Germany refused the unity of the progressives and paved the way to the triumph of Hitler. Fascism does not conquer until the Labour Movement of a country has first defeated itself.

But the final stage has not yet been reached, although the issue has been joined. The campaign launched by Sir Stafford Cripps has certain unique features. Although the platform bears all the characteristics of domesticity, and much recruiting of members of the Labour Party is being done, it would be a mistake to think that the matter ends there. In the constituencies campaign committees are being formed which include Labour, Liberal, Communist and non-party people, who are conducting the house-to-house canvass for signatories to the petition

The eyes of the supporters are being directed to the Whitsuntide Conference of the Labour Party. That, however, can only be a temporary affair. Events, both inside the Labour Party and outside, are moving too swiftly for the propaganda to be allowed to flow smoothly towards so formal a decision. Already the Labour Party Executive has to face the question of disaffiliating the Bristol Labour Party for its loyalty to Cripps, and is threatening others.

In any case it would be folly to think that the issue rests with the Conference. Were it so, the result is already known. The bureaucracy of the Labour Party knows it has sufficient votes in its pocket to be able to announce the result of the voting now. At the best the Conference could only provide a platform for the supporters of progressive unity to make their speeches of protest.

It is safe to predict with confidence that Sir Stafford Cripps will not secure reinstatement in the Labour Party at its

House to 'Socialism or nothing' would be calamitous, were it true. The fact is, however, that the new gospel is being used only as a verbal justification for refusing to form a progressive alliance, and not as a guide to action to secure Socialism in anybody's time. For eighteen months the Labour Party supported the non-intervention policy of the Government in regard to Spain. When it was driven into the position of repudiating this policy it refused to take common action with others against the Government. It criticised the Government for non-co-operation with the Soviet Union, but its own unions refused to co-operate with the Soviet trade unions. It criticised the Government with regard to its policy on Czechoslovakia, but capitulated on the fateful Wednesday when Mr. Chamberlain went with a free hand to Munich, and resumed its criticism only after the damage had been done

Although it has repeatedly criticised the Government's foreign policy, at no time has it taken any steps to mobilise such opposition, either inside or outside the House of Commons, as would be calculated seriously to disturb the Government. It withdrew its opposition to rearmament without securing guarantees, either with regard to foreign policy or the limitation of the profits of the armament manufacturers. It accepted 'National Service,' which meant much closer collaboration with the Government, on the ground that they were 'preserving the voluntary principle.' It is now protesting against the introduction of conscription, and even as it protests it 'accepts conscription as a fact' and proceeds to direct attention to the need for reforming the conditions under which conscription is to be applied.

On these day-to-day issues, therefore, the Labour leaders have played the rôle of a 'loyal opposition,' a kind of devil's advocate providing opportunities for words—a safety-valve for protests. The logic of this policy leads, not merely to Mr. Morrison appearing on the same platform as Sir John Anderson and Mr. Brown, but to Labour entering the Chamberlain Government. It only needs the sharpening of the international situation, and a greater imminence of war, for them to be on the threshold of Downing Street, not as the contributors of an alternative policy to that of Mr. Cham-

it is one thing to expel the 'Left' for its Socialism; it is quite a different thing to expel a Socialist for his Radicalism at a time when the issue, dominating the minds of a radical people, is the danger that all their radical gains may be submerged by Fascist tyranny.

It is not that the leaders of the Labour Party deny the seriousness of the international situation. They proclaim its seriousness with an energy equal to that of the protagonists in the camps of Socialism and Liberalism. But, joining in the general alarm, they shrink from responsibilities which are imperative and make revolutionary declarations which they know they cannot implement.

To put through Parliament a complete Socialist programme —*i.e.*, the socialisation of the means of production—the Labour Party needs an absolute majority over all other parties. And this they have not taken the trouble to show they can secure. They have not answered analyses with counter-analysis, but with the affirmation of a *belief* in the possibility of gaining the majority they desire, and a denunciation of those who differ from them as 'pessimists and defeatists.'

Yet, when the very existence of the democratic institutions by which they hope to obtain power is threatened, the time factor is all-important. And it is precisely this fact of urgency, and the nature of the threat to democracy, which has swung the 'Left' Socialists, such as Cripps, as well as Communists and Liberals, into line. This is not because the Socialists and Communists have abandoned Socialism, or that they now regard it as synonymous with the democracy we have. On the contrary, it is that both Socialists and Liberals recognise they have a common interest in standing together against a common danger which threatens their mutual existence.

Politics consists not merely in the drafting of programmes, necessary and important as they are, but in leading social forces in the battle of life. And woe betide the leaders and the movements that fail to grasp the essential issues of the day and give the answer and the deed, which the great majority of the people can see are practicable and necessary, *now!* For if they fail in this duty of leadership, to-morrow's programmes will then be of no avail.

Tested by these criteria, the conversion of Transport

ices were extraordinary. The Party had been deserted its most outstanding leaders, and it must have time to over. It would then resume its onward march and tinue its progressive sweep towards a majority.

Many Liberals joined the Labour Party, holding the view t the Labour Party would play the same rôle, with modifi- ons, of course, that the Liberal Party had played in the -day of its glory.

But every published analysis of the trends of public nion during the subsequent years right up to the most ent by-elections shows that it has neither attained the level its 1929 vote, nor the remotest prospect of achieving an olute majority for its 'Socialism or nothing' programme ould there be an election within the next twelve months.

It is passing strange, therefore, that the leaders of the bour Movement, who, through all their years of leadership, re always relegated their Socialism to some 'far-off divine ent,' and in practice have consistently held their members the grindstone of practicability and immediate reforms, ould, at this hour, suddenly be transformed into the votees of an impracticable 'Socialism or nothing' attitude.

But it may be that they protest their virtue too much. iere are other explanations of this *volte-face* that may be arer to the truth. History, after all, is not without examples those who have drowned, with revolutionary speeches, eir shrinking from the responsibility that goes with power, d who have covered their retreating steps with the ogrammes of the grand 'day after to-morrow.'

Although it would be a great mistake to underestimate e growth of Socialist opinion in this country, it is a far eater mistake to underestimate the deep-rooted Liberal dicalism of the people, especially when all the forces of action of our time are combining to destroy it. It is a ill greater mistake not to recognise that in these days it is ot merely the *hopes* of Socialists which are threatened, but ie *actualities* of Liberalism—the democratic gains of a century f struggle.

The Labour leaders appear to have completely overlooked iese essentials of the situation. They have dealt with the ew agitation as if it were nothing other than a repetition f their previous controversies with 'Left' Socialists. But

'entangling alliances' and have adopted the policy of 'Socialism or nothing.' Such are the outstanding features of the crisis as presented to us.

Although the Labour Party is comparatively young, it has had to face four major crises in the course of its history. The first was on the outbreak of war in 1914, when Messrs. MacDonald, Snowden and other leaders of the Independent Labour Party, which then held the hegemony in the Labour Party, refused to co-operate with the Government of the day, and the leadership passed into the hands of Messrs. Arthur Henderson and J. R Clynes.

The second was the prolonged crisis following the war and ending in the Labour Party Conference of 1923. It had then to choose between revolutionary Socialism and Reformism. Under the direction of Mr Sidney Webb, with Messrs. MacDonald and Snowden back at the helm, it denounced all revolutionary doctrine and intention and announced a programme based upon the 'inevitability of gradualism.'

The third crisis followed hard on the heels of the General Strike in 1926 The whole Labour Movement became committed to the policy of 'collaboration in reconstruction,' expressed especially in the Mond-Turner agreements between the trade unions and the employers' federations, and the rupture of trade union relations with the unions of the Soviet Union. This was accompanied by the ruthless expulsion of the Communists and their sympathisers from the ranks of the Labour Party and the trade unions.

The fourth crisis fell upon it in the great economic slump of 1931. With the fall of the Labour Government the leaders, Messrs. MacDonald, Snowden and Thomas, left the Labour Party and joined forces with the Conservatives and some Liberals in the formation of the National Government.

Viewing these events in retrospect, the Labour leaders usually come to very self-satisfied conclusions on the grounds that, despite the crises, and right up to the time of the second Labour Government, they had witnessed the disintegration of the Liberal Party and a great growth in the voting strength of the Labour Party. The fact that since then, in the last two general elections, it did not poll so high a vote, or secure as many seats in Parliament as in 1929, is regarded with considerable complacency. It is explained that the circum-

THE CRISIS IN THE LABOUR PARTY

THE expulsion of Sir Stafford Cripps and several of his prominent supporters from the Labour Party is bringing to a head a crisis which has existed in the Labour Movement for some considerable time. How deep it is, and how far-reaching its implications, few people yet realise.

At the moment it bears the marks of domesticity—a quarrel between leaders of the Labour Party, the expulsion of prominent members, and a campaign for their reinstatement. The tactics pursued by Sir Stafford since his expulsion may be responsible for these limited impressions. Although an expelled leader, he stands before the country and the Labour Party as the most effective recruiting sergeant for the Party, protesting his loyalty and seeking reinstatement.

Nevertheless a closer examination of the facts of the situation will reveal that there is much more in it than appears on the surface. Indeed, it is not too much to say that this crisis is different, in its character and circumstances, from any the Labour Party has yet experienced.

For insisting that the most vital issue of current politics, the point of view of the minority on the Executive, should be presented to the members, Sir Stafford has been expelled. Regarding the situation as serious, he issued a petition to the people, both in the Labour Party and outside its ranks. The petition is to be presented to the leaders of the progressive parties at the completion of a great campaign. It calls on them to form at once a progressive alliance, with a view to conducting a joint opposition to the National Government, aiming at replacing it with an alternative government committed to a clearly defined and limited programme of home and foreign policy.

The content of these proposals was rejected by the Executive of the Labour Party as emphatically as was the procedure taken by Sir Stafford. They have rejected all

In our first morning drill we marched, were told to do difficult exercises, were taught how to remove our caps sharply when S.S. men passed.

There are no written regulations governing the Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp. The *Leitmotif* is that 'Everything is forbidden in the Camp.' This makes it exceedingly difficult for the prisoners, who, of course, have no redress, and never know which action will be considered punishable and which will not. The older prisoners told us that we must call each other by the familiar *Du*, that, even two weeks later when we were allowed to buy cigarettes if we had money, we were never permitted to smoke while working. Nor were we allowed to speak to each other while on duty.

The drill is not too bad when supervised by the older prisoners. But when the S.S. men have finished their excellent breakfast and appear, cigarette in hand, on the drill ground, the torment begins. They made us run for half an hour or bend our knees for a long time. The weaker men amongst us collapsed, but were kicked until they made the great effort of rising to their feet again. An elderly Jewish prisoner with a bad heart explained to the *Scharführer* that he was physically unable to carry on. When we left the drill ground he fell down dead.

For lunch that day we had a liquid potato purée in which small bits of red whale meat were swimming about. The food was highly spiced, but we never learned whence this taste came. For pepper, as an imported product, could not have been used in the camp. I had learned in the war that it was wise to keep up my strength, and ate all I could get.

In the afternoon we were again taken to the drill ground and we remained there, drilling and exercising, until six o'clock. We spent the evening sewing the numbers on our coats, but as only three or four needles were available we had to wait our turn. We were not yet allowed to smoke, read or write. We were terribly depressed by our anxiety about our families. They would not know whether we were still alive, and we, in turn, did not know whether our sons or brothers had been arrested.

EX-PRISONER.

(*To be continued.*)

There was no stove, but a few days later one was supplied for the room in which we spent the day. We were given nothing to eat that first evening. We were ordered to undress and to use our trousers, shoes and coat as a pillow. The senior prisoner then said a few words to us, telling us that any attempt to escape was hopeless, and warning us that homosexuality was severely punished in the camp. He also told us about all the punishments of the camp, saying that we could not imagine how terrible they were. Then, at eight o'clock, the lights were extinguished. The air in the overcrowded room was extremely bad.

We had to get up at five o'clock in the morning and, according to regulations, we kept on only our pants and went into the washroom. As the accommodation for so many men was insufficient we stood for a long time waiting to wash.

I went with fourteen comrades to get our food. We marched to the kitchen. Six large cauldrons were ready for each barrack. All the work in the kitchens is done by prisoners, but the S.S. supervisors could not resist pushing or hitting the men carrying the heavy cauldrons. Each of us was given only about half a pint of a milky-looking substance. There was tapioca or barley in this soup, which was slightly sweetened. We each had half a loaf of a darkish bread which had a sour taste and was very heavy. But we were so hungry that we were glad to have anything to eat. The barrack was so overcrowded that most of us had to stand while we ate. We were ordered to give back all the bread we did not eat. At first, when we still had reserve strength, we did not eat it all, and, though this was strictly forbidden, we gave what bread was left after each meal to older prisoners who were already suffering from malnutrition.

At half-past six we were marched out in rows of ten to the drill ground for roll call. This happened morning, noon and night, and each time we were counted and the senior prisoner from our barrack reported that we were all present. That first morning we learned that 1,500 new Jewish prisoners from Hamburg had arrived during the night. They had stood for forty-five hours without food or drink. No wonder that two of these Jews, in their despair and exhaustion, had cut through their pulse before their property, including their pocket knives, had been taken from them.

pocket. He explained to the *Scharführer* that he had heart trouble. The *Scharführer* took the medicine and said:

'If you are still alive in a week, you can come and beg me for it.'

The elderly Jew succumbed to a heart attack two days later.

After we had handed in our valuables, we were undressed and our civilian clothes were taken from us. We kept our shoes, as the camp had none to provide. We then went in to the medical officer. Fortunately for myself I was examined by another prisoner. The prisoners examined by S.S. doctors suffered the most obscene insults. After this examination we were shaved, our heads shorn, and bathed. The men who could not stand the cold water bath after the hours of exposure were kicked under the water by S.S. men.

I was then given:

An old army uniform coat.
A striped pair of convict trousers.
A pair of torn pants.
A shirt.
A pair of woollen socks, size 14.
An old soldier's cap without a brim.

When we lined up again in these clothes, our heads closely shaven, we hardly recognised each other. Whenever 360 men had assembled, their *Blockaltester*—the senior prisoner in the barrack in which they were to live—led them off.

I was taken to Barrack 'ab.' I had stood without eating or drinking anything from the evening of November 10th until six o'clock on the following evening—over twenty-one hours, and all I wanted was to sit down somewhere.

There were two wings in each barrack. There was room —tables, benches for sleeping, seven latrines—for 130 men, but as there were 360 of us only half of us could lie or sit down at the same time. None of us were allowed to leave the barrack that evening. The older prisoners, who had been at Sachsenhausen the longest, and some of the old political prisoners, had military bunks, hung three on top of each other. As we were not permitted to take in newspapers for the first two weeks—and then only National Socialist papers—there was no paper for the lavatories.

We lay on straw spread on the floor, and had two blankets.

dark woods from the Sachsenhausen station to the camp. Many of them already had head or face wounds.

We were told at half-past two that we would not be officially admitted to the camp until the following day. We had been ordered to give up any foodstuffs we might still have, so we stood in the November night, hatless, our coats and vests open, with nothing to eat. Nor had we had a drop of water. Then, a thousand Jews at a time, we were led across the drill ground and placed, our faces to the wall which surrounded the camp. We could hear other prisoners being maltreated by the S.S. through the night. There were no sanitary arrangements whatsoever.

At seven o'clock in the morning, when the other prisoners were answering roll call, we were still standing there against the wall. At nine o'clock we were taken back to our place near the barrack. At twelve o'clock I was called in. Inside, prisoners were filling in the cards of new prisoners. I was told to give my name, profession, address and the name of any member of my family who was to be notified in case of my death. Then I was hurried to another table, where I had to sign a card unread. To this day I don't know what was printed on that card. But, as the Germans still have that curious feeling for 'law and order,' I probably signed, among other statements, a clause agreeing to be cremated in case I died in the camp. Actually, of course, everyone who dies in a concentration camp is cremated, so that the cause of death can never be established.

After signing these cards I was given a linen square on which was printed: Number WXYZ.

When I was leaving the barrack I managed to avoid stumbling over the feet of an S.S. man who tried to make me fall. I went back to the others, and again we stood there for hours. Until four o'clock in the afternoon. Then we were taken to get our camp clothing. At five o'clock my turn came. I was ordered to give my money and valuables to a *Scharführer*. I had only a wrist watch and the silver insignia worn by men who were wounded in the Great War. The *Scharführer* flung this insignia on the floor. As I was giving up my things, I witnessed a terrible scene. An elderly Jew, who was so exhausted that he could hardly stand, was told to give up a small bottle of digitalis which he had had in his

at night. Then we heard a scream which had a terrifying animal-like quality. A Jew, terribly beaten by some S.S. men, was being dragged out of the barrack. Two high S.S. officers—I later realised that they were the Commandant of the concentration camp and his assistant—came across the drill ground. In this connection it is interesting to note that the names of the various S.S. men in charge of the camp are never made known to the prisoners. Probably these men, all of whom are cowards, are not quite so sure that the Third Realm will indeed last a thousand years, as Hitler predicts, and they would not like to be known by name to ex-prisoners.

That night was the first time I saw the Commandant. When he came out on to the drill ground, a heavy wooden block was brought out and placed in front of us. Two strong straps used for attaching a man to the block could be seen. A young S.S. man, who was with the Commandant, carried a long box. Out of this he took a stick which had been wrapped round with wire. The Jew, whose screaming had so terrified us, was strapped to the block and undressed. The Commandant then declared that the man had been sentenced to fifteen blows. He turned to the young S.S. man who was holding the stick:

'Is the Jewish . . . in position?'

'The position is first rate, *Herr Kommandant*.'

The searchlights were turned on to this ghastly scene so that we should all see as well as hear it. . . . We heard later that this Jew, who suffered so much cruelty merely because he had moaned when an S.S. man had struck him, was a scientist whose researches are known all over the world. When he was released, he was stood up, his face to the wall, against the barrack and ordered to hold his hands over his head. I heard one of the S.S. men say: 'What will we do with that Jewish swine? Take him to the woods. But don't forget to make him carry a spade so that he can dig his own grave first.'

We, in the meantime, were still standing. It was half-past two in the morning; 1,200 Jews from Hamburg and 850 from Berlin had been added to our number. The men from Hamburg had had a worse time, for they had been brought by train and then been kicked along through the

camps wear the death-head insignia, which is all too appropriate.

As more lorries arrived, our numbers increased. We were commanded to take off our collars, to open our coats and vests, and to empty the contents of our pockets into our hats.

The overseers—prisoners themselves—who wore old uniform coats and had a white number and a red triangle sewn on the left side of their coats, tried to help us carry out these orders. When I was a soldier I had learned that one should never be conspicuous, but I could not take off my collar as I was wearing a shirt with one attached I therefore turned in my collar. A Jew standing not far from me was in a similar position. He said that he could not take off his collar. As a result he was beaten by an S.S. man until he collapsed, and he suffered for weeks afterwards from this maltreatment.

We stood for hours, our hats, containing the contents of our pockets, in our hands. We watched other Jews in groups of ten being kicked into the barrack. Often, when they came out, the S.S. men put out their legs so that the Jews stumbled and fell to the ground. Then they were kicked by the S.S. men until they got up again.

As we stood there, ordered to look straight ahead, S.S. men walked round us. Sometimes they told one of us to step forward and asked the Jew what was his profession. When he answered, the S.S. men sneered and struck him in the face. If one of us turned or moved our head, heavy blows followed.

Next to me stood a dignified old gentleman with a white beard. A very young S.S. man asked him his age and his profession. The old Jew said :

'I was the President Judge at a court. I am sixty-six.'

'Well, you old fool,' the young S.S. man answered, using the familiar *Du*, which in such a case was so insulting, 'then you have lived a whole year too long. To-morrow all Jews over sixty-five are to be shot. You had better get ready to die.'

'That would probably be the best thing that could happen to one here,' the old gentleman answered quietly.

We stood and stood. There was a clock in the tower above the iron gateway. It was ten, eleven, twelve o'clock

that as I had a season ticket for the underground I preferred to go that way. The two men grumbled about being overworked. They said that they had been busy arresting Jews since six o'clock in the morning. The one who was less rude said he would call up my son after he left me to tell him what had happened to me. I gave the man 10 *Pfennige*, but do not know whether he actually called up my boy or not, for he told me afterwards that he very wisely remained away from our flat that evening.

I was taken to a crowded courtyard in the Alexander Platz Police Station. The men in charge, who were extremely harsh and ordered us to stand up in rows of five, were obviously S.S. men, though they wore civilian clothes. For the S.S. men are known to be the cruellest of all.

Motor lorries were driven up to the courtyard and thirty Jews were pushed into each. The lorry was covered with a tarpaulin, and as I was sitting near the driver I could not see out. Occasionally we heard shouts of 'Jewish swine,' but as a whole the people we passed in the streets were silent. The prisoners near the back could see that we were driving towards the north of Berlin, and we realised that we were being taken to the Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp near Oranienburg. We arrived there a little before eight. The back of the lorry was opened. We were told to climb over the benches on which we had been sitting, and to jump down to the ground. Many of the older men fell after jumping, but they were kicked until they got up again.

The thirty of us were quickly surrounded by a dozen S.S. men and *Scharfuhrer* (men with the rank of non-commissioned officers in the S.S.). Screaming, and kicking us, these men pushed us through the iron gateway and conducted us to an open space covered with earth. Searchlights threw a glaring light on this open space. We learned later that this was the place where prisoners were drilled and where roll call was taken.

We were ordered to run across the drill ground to a barrack, called Barrack B, in which the camp's secretarial offices were situated. A large number of Berlin Jews had already been assembled there, waiting to have their records noted, and the S.S. men, cursing and insulting us, told us to form rows of ten. The S.S. men assigned to concentration

IN A GERMAN CONCENTRATION CAMP

My son and I had returned to our flat in the western district of Berlin after witnessing the havoc and destruction which had been created in the Jewish shops. My brother telephoned to ask whether we were all right, and I sat down at my desk to write a letter. I was informed by the porter downstairs that 'two old friends' wished to see me and he was sending them up. Two men in civilian clothes entered and showed me their *Gestapo* badge. They asked me whether I was Dr. Z, and when I said I was they told me that they had come to arrest me. I inquired on what grounds I was being taken into custody. They said :

'There is nothing against you personally. Your arrest is merely one of many in pursuit of a general policy.'

Then they told me to get ready and come with them at once. My son, who had grown very pale, left the flat quickly and went down to a shop to buy me some rolls and a piece of sausage. With the permission of the *Gestapo* men, I also took 24 marks with me. I said good-bye to my son.

As we were walking along the street, I noticed other Jews being led away by the *Gestapo*. I asked the men with me what was going to happen to me, and they said they knew nothing except that they were to conduct me to the Central Police Station at the Alexander Platz. I mentioned that this was a strange expression of thanks for a man who had been wounded in the Great War. One of the *Gestapo* men told me in reply that Herr von Rath was equally innocent of any action against the Jews who had murdered him. The other *Gestapo* man was more friendly.

The men first took me to my local police station, where I waited in a room with many other Jews for several hours. At seven o'clock in the evening the *Gestapo* men returned, and took me to the Alexander Platz. One of them suggested that if I would pay for a taxi we could drive there, but I said

Hungary and Italy, a new edition of the coalition created by English diplomacy during the Crimean War and the Berlin Congress, while in Central Asia Russian expansion also came against firm opposition.

In 1897 Russia concluded with the Habsburg monarchy an agreement on the delimitation of mutual spheres of influence in the Balkans, which amounted to a renunciation by Russia of an active policy in the Donau Valley and the Black Sea territory. The Czarist Empire sought to cover her rear in Europe while pursuing the path of ruthless expansion in the Far East. In this period also the Franco-Russian Alliance (since 1891) signified, above all for Russia, protection against German aggression, and thus the security of her western frontiers. That this alliance was also aimed at Britain became evident at the end of the Sino-Japanese War and during the Boer War.

GREGORY BIENSTOCK.

(To be concluded.)

Russian expansion on the Central Asiatic Continent between 1860 and 1885 can be regarded as a direct consequence of England's opposition, during the Crimean War and the Berlin Congress, to her advance on the western sector of the Eurasiatic line. The *foreign political energy* of Russia, barred at the Black Sea, sought other outlets.

Here, however, on the Central Asiatic sector, Russian expansion once more came against British opposition. England answered Russia's penetration of Middle Asia by announcing her protectorate of Afghanistan and Baluchistan. In 1885 a border scrap on the Afghan frontier nearly ended in war between England and Russia. Ten years later a frontier agreement was made between Russia and Afghanistan which to some extent put a stop to Russian expansion in Middle Asia. From now on Afghanistan acted as a buffer state between India and the Czarist Empire and in this way the zone of conflict between the two World Empires was narrowed. In the meantime the centre of gravity of the Russian foreign policy was already shifting towards the Pacific.

At the end of the seventeenth century the Russian Government was obliged to renounce in favour of China all further penetration into the valley of the Amur (Treaty of Nertschinsk, 1689). It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the Russian advance in the Amur Valley began once more, and led in 1860 to the annexation of the whole left bank of the Amur and the coastal territory (Treaty of Peking; Founding of Vladivostock, 1860). Thus Russia achieved a firm foothold on the Sea of Japan.

After the Treaty of Peking, however, a break of at least three decades occurred in Russian expansion in the Far East. Russian foreign political activity was concentrated in this period partly in the western sector (Russo-Turkish War, 1877–88), and partly on the Central Asiatic sector (Conquest of Turkestan). Not until the end of the ninteenth century did Russia once more press her advance along the shores of the Pacific. At this time it seemed to the statesmen in St. Petersburg that the prospects for expansion in a far easterly direction were more favourable than in the other two sectors of Russian foreign policy. For towards the end of the 'nineties Russian activity on the western sector was obstructed by the so-called Eastern Triple Alliance between Great Britain, Austria-

The great Eurasian line of Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may be divided fundamentally into three principal sectors: the Near Eastern, including the whole of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles; the Central Asiatic sector, and, finally, the Far Eastern sphere. The western sector of Russian foreign policy was at the same time the most ancient, and developed directly out of the struggles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for the domination of the Dnieper Valley and the northern shores of the Black Sea.

Here, however, in the western sector of her foreign policy, Russia met with the opposition of Europe under the leadership of England (Crimean War, 1853–56). Twenty-two years after the Peace of Paris in 1856 which closed the Crimean War, during the Berlin Congress of 1878, this European front against the Russian advance to the Bosphorus appeared once more. On this occasion, too, it was British foreign policy which organised the resistance to Russia's advance to the 'warm seas.' The Russian offensive on the western sector of the Eurasiatic line was quiescent for more than a quarter of a century after the, for Russia, somewhat ineffectual war against Turkey of 1877–78. It was resumed after the unfortunate outcome of the Russo-Japanese War.

Russian advances on the Central Asiatic sector also had a long previous history. The conquest of West Turkestan, the key position of all Central Asia, from both sides at once, namely, from the West, from the Caspian Sea, and from the North *viâ* the valley of the Irtysch, was already under consideration by Peter the Great. The fulfilment of this plan, however, was delayed for a century and a half. The conquest of West Turkestan and, in general, of Middle Asia to the north of Hindukusch and Pamir, fell into the 'sixties and 'seventies and 'eighties of the nineteenth century, after the Caucasus and the Transcaspian had, following long-drawn-out struggles with the mountain peoples, been occupied by Russian troops. The conquest of Middle Asia was completed by the annexation of the Merv Oasis in present-day Southern Turkmenistan, on the watershed between the Caspian Sea and the Arabian Gulf. The building of the Transcaspian railway in 1885–88 secured the strategic and economic connections between the Empire and her newly-conquered provinces.

was without question by far the strongest military Power in Europe. The disunion of Germany, the struggle between Prussia and Austria for ascendancy in Central Europe, the weakening of France—all these factors augmented the influence of the Czars in European politics. Nicholas I became in fact the arbitrator of Central Europe. Russia's territorial aspirations, however, were no longer concerned with Europe.

The movement of Russia towards the South led inevitably to conflict with Turkey, who dominated the connections between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Russian policy aimed at settling the 'Straits Question' in a manner favourable to Russia. This method of solution, however, would have meant the appearance of Russia in the eastern Mediterranean. England set herself against the extension of Russia's sphere of power in this direction, and succeeded in forming a coalition against it with France, Sardinia and Turkey. After her defeat in the Crimean War, Russia, it is true, remained a Great Power, but suffered a weakening of her influence in the Black Sea and the Balkans, and was forced to renounce her aspirations to dominate the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

After the Treaty of Paris (1856) the Eurasiatic line of Russian foreign policy faced south. West of this line, on the Russian frontier between the Baltic and the Black Sea, her policy was defensive and aimed at maintaining the European *status quo*. On the Eurasian line, however, between the lower course of the Donau and the valley of the Amur, between the Carpathians and the great Hingan Range (Manchuria), the foreign political energies of the Czarist Empire were concentrated. To understand Russian foreign policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it is necessary to know the internal connection between the separate sectors of this politico-strategic line. In general it may be said that the basic tendency of Russian expansion points to the South—to the 'warm waters,' the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. The sum of foreign political energy was divided in different periods irregularly over different sectors of this line. There were periods in which it was concentrated more on one segment, in other periods on another, but the continuity between the different sectors remained unbroken.

Russian partnership in the anti-Prussian coalition from the feeling that this partnership had no importance from the point of view of Russian interests. On the other hand, approach was made to the two German Powers at the point of immediate significance for Russia, namely, the dissolution of the Polish heritage.

Since the great French Revolution and the beginning of the last French offensive, both against the Continent and against England, Russia's relations with the two Western European Powers, France and England, were of decisive significance in the formation of Russian foreign policy. The St. Petersburg Cabinet swung between an alliance with England against France's attempts at hegemony, and a continental policy in alliance with France with the object of completely eliminating English influence from the Continent and undermining the British Colonial Empire. Catharine II and Paul I dreamed of conquering India. Paul I, at the end of his brief reign (1796–1801), had made a formal alliance with Napoleon and set apart an army of Cossacks for a campaign against India. In the archives of the Russian Foreign Office is said to be a letter from Napoleon of February 2nd, 1808, in which he proposed to the Czar Alexander I to send a Franco-Russian army to conquer India

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Russian Empire, together with Great Britain, represented the rock against which Napoleon's dream of continental domination was shattered. Already at the beginning of the nineteenth century Europe, or rather the continental mass of Europe, had proved itself too weak to prevail against the two European wing Powers, Russia and England, with their extra-European reserves.

With the destruction of the Napoleonic domination and the annexation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Russia had attained her maximum expansion in the West. By the annexation of Finland the Gulf of Finland became a Russian inland sea, and the Gulf of Bothnia also entered the Russian sphere of influence. It is true that the remainder of the West Russian territory, Galicia, remained 'unredeemed.'

The western territorial boundaries of the Russian Empire, however, in no way represented the boundaries of her political influence. In the first half of the nineteenth century Russia

Donau between Russia and Turkey which were fought out in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Relations with Europe, in the eighteenth as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were decided by the inherent aims of Russian foreign policy. The Habsburg monarchy appeared as the natural ally of Russia. In approaching the Habsburgs the axiom was obviously applied: alliance with the further to fight the nearer. Ivan IV wished to have the Romish-German Emperor as ally in his struggles against Poland. In the seventeenth century the Romanoffs and the Habsburgs had a common enemy in Turkey. Friendship with the Habsburgs thus became a traditional part of Russian foreign policy.

Beside the Austrian friendship all other relationships sank into the background. Relations with England were friendly as a whole, and on Russia's side a political entente had actually been sought since the sixteenth century. This, however, had been skilfully avoided by England. Relations with France, on the other hand, were from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century inimical. France was, on principle, supporting Russia's three most dangerous neighbours—Sweden, Poland and Turkey.

The primitive nature of Russian policy towards Europe can be explained by the fact that at this time Russia had no actual European interests, and this accounts for her desire to remain at a distance from the complicated game of European politics. About the middle of the eighteenth century Russia had a great surprise, namely, the alliance of her traditional Habsburg friend with her traditional enemy, France (*renversement des alliances*). Russia, against her will, became a member of the Austro-French coalition against Prussia, and thus also against England, which was a direct contradiction of Russian policy since Ivan IV.

Russian foreign policy, however, had already begun to take a more conscious attitude towards the European game. Her relationship to the Habsburgs ceased to be the axis of her policy. During the Seven Years' War of the Coalition she learned to know the complicated mainsprings of European politics. Above all she acquired a greater understanding of English and French policy, and the struggle of these two Powers for supremacy in Europe. Catharine II dissolved the

mately the same problems of foreign policy as had been left behind by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: the union under the sway of Moscow of the West Russian peoples living within the Polish-Lithuanian State; attainment of an outlet to the sea; domination of the connections between the Baltic, the Caspian and the Black Sea. The eighteenth century was an epoch of uninterrupted Russian advance to the West and South. Under Peter, Russia annexed a considerable portion of the Baltic Coast and became the leading Power in Northern Europe and on the Baltic.

The wall which up to now had separated Russia from Europe collapsed, the 'window on to Europe' was flung wide open. Russia became a sea-power, and thereby a European Great Power. The breath of ocean transformed Muscovy into Russia, into a European Great Power with European interests and aspirations. But this Europeanised Russia, which now took active part in European combinations and intrigues, remained at the same time an Asiatic State. The same Peter the Great, who employed the whole strength of the nation in order to fling open the 'window on to Europe,' never for a moment forgot that Russia had another face—turned towards Asia. In the last years of the great Northern War (1700–21) Peter displayed great interest in exploring the water-ways to India. He also, after a victorious war with Persia, annexed the whole of the western shores of the Caspian Sea. Thereby Russia gained not only a base for the development of her trade with South-west Asia, but also a point of departure for all her later conquests in Middle Asia, which took place in the nineteenth century and led to the creation of a huge sub-tropical colonial empire.

At the end of the eighteenth century, under Catharine II (1762–96), Russia in Europe had attained her 'natural frontiers.' The whole of the valley of the Dnieper was conquered, the West Russian territories were torn from the Polish State, and, in alliance with Prussia and Austria, this State itself was destroyed. The last remnants of Mongol dominion in South Russia were dissolved and the northern shore of the Black Sea was incorporated in the Russian Empire. It was here, at the Black Sea, that Russia and Turkey met. Here was the starting point for those power struggles for the domination of the Black Sea and the lower course of the

in the ninth century in the Valley of the Dnieper by the Scandinavian Varangians. The dominant idea in this foundation was the conquest of the great river way from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Moscow, too, owes her rise to her geographical position at the junction of the upper courses of the Volga, Oka and Dnieper. The statecraft of Muscovy has been directed since its beginnings to the domination of the connections between three seas—the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Caspian.

The foreign policy of Ivan IV (1530–84) swung between the three directions—east, west and south. He succeeded in bringing the whole course of the Volga as far as the Caspian Sea under his sway by the conquest of the two Tartar czardoms of Kazan and Astrachan. Public opinion pressed Ivan to continue the policy of abolishing Tartar domination by conquering the Khanate of Crimea, which would give him a firmer foothold on the Black Sea. War against the Crimea, however, would have involved him of necessity in a conflict with the strongest Power in the Eastern Europe of that time, namely, Turkey. For this Muscovy's strength was insufficient. In order to go to war with the Turks adaptation to European military technique would first be necessary, and this involved direct contact with Europe. Ivan turned to the West, against the Knights of the German Order and later against their protector, Poland.

Ivan's war against Poland ended in catastrophe. Russia was thrown back from the Baltic for more than a century, the people's strength was exhausted, a powerful revolution was approaching.

While Ivan IV was harnessing all the forces of the nation in order to advance against the West, an opposing tendency gradually became apparent. The Russian masses, ground down by merciless military recruiting and the pressure of taxation, fled, mainly in a southerly and easterly direction. The colonisation of the 'New Russia,' the fertile steppes between the Oka and the Black Sea, began. At the same time the first Russian adventurers and conquerors crossed the Ural Mountains and started the subjugation of Siberia under Russian domination.

A hundred years after the death of Ivan IV, on the accession of Peter the Great (1682), Russia was facing approxi-

the emancipation of Muscovy from Mongol suzerainty. The struggle against the Mongols promoted the development of a national consciousness which until then had hardly existed. For the first time the question arises of the meaning and content of Muscovite foreign policy—a question which in the fifteenth, and still more clearly in the sixteenth, century was answered in a purely Maximalist fashion. Moscow is represented in the official publicity of the time as the 'Third Rome,' destined, after the fall of the Western and Eastern Roman Empires, to embody the true Christendom. Here already the Messianic motive is superimposed on the ancient Muscovite policy.

Besides this Messianic motive, however, furnishing its material background, is the elementary geographical fact that Muscovy was situated in an intermediate region where Asiatic and European influences met and mingled. Muscovy of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was, on the one hand, the extreme Western spur of the Eurasiatic Mongol Empire and, on the other, the most easterly territory of the European Germanic-Slav cultural sphere. In Central and Eastern Europe, Muscovy was sometimes regarded as an outpost of Mongol Asia. At the same time, however, the Pope and the Kaiser attempted to enlist the Russian princedoms, and especially Muscovy, into the Crusade against Islam.

Russian princes, such as Alexander Nevsky, employed Tartar-Mongolian auxiliaries in their struggles against Sweden and the Knights of the Teutonic Order advancing from the West. On the other hand, the idea of using European forces in taking action against Asia had already emerged in the time of Ivan III (1462–1505).

By the sixteenth century the foreign political programme of the Muscovite Czars appears to have been relatively settled. The aim of their policy was to unite all Russian races under Muscovite sovereignty and to abolish the remains of Mongol domination in the Russian plain—an expansion policy, therefore, in two directions—to the West and to the East.

Apart from this, however, a further objective may be observed—a breaking through to the sea, both to the Baltic and the Black Sea. This motive of rounding off and consolidating their continental dominions is firmly anchored in Russian foreign policy. The first Russian State was founded

FOUR HUNDRED YEARS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

I

THE foreign and internal policies of a country tend to act and react upon each other. The internal development of a State must exercise a great influence upon its relations with other States, and it is equally certain that profound changes in foreign policy must also lead to changes in the internal structure of the State. It is on that account impossible to describe the foreign policy of a State without also considering developments in its internal policy. It would, however, not be right to represent foreign policy alone in its relation to internal policy. It would seem that the development of the outward relationships of any State is defined by certain relatively immutable factors, partly of a geographical, partly of a historical character. It is important to follow this line of development, without, of course, exaggerating its 'immutability.' Every hypothesis is useful provided that in employing it one keeps its conditional nature in mind. It would, for example, be dangerous to trace the foreign policy of Bolshevism exclusively to the 'immutable' tendencies in the development of Russia's foreign relations. But it is impossible, on the other hand, to understand this policy if it is regarded merely as issuing from the internal policy of Revolutionary Russia. In what follows an attempt is made to set forth what is relatively immutable in Russian policy. This obliges us to go back several centuries.

The fifteenth century was one of decisive importance in Russian policy. Up to then Muscovy had felt herself to be merely the most westerly province of the great Mongol Empire extending from the Pacific to the upper course of the Volga. But in the fifteenth century began the decay of the Golden Horde, to whose sphere of power the Muscovite Principality belonged. Hand in hand with this decay went

that Herr Hitler is concerned with vastness of scale. Also as a politician. His soaring vision extends far beyond the present frontiers even of the new Greater German Reich. The visionary dimly sees great rivers emptying into the ocean, the true frontier of the German sway. The task of the Fuehrer, of himself, Adolf Hitler, the representative of Providence, the divinely chosen Liberator and Leader of the Germans, is to build up the Teutonic Empire, is to hate, to subjugate, and rule.

M. Wolf.

with those of Germany and made a part of a common policy of aggression. Furthermore, the already war-weary Italian people are unwilling to see Poland, Italy's friend of long standing, change suddenly into the enemy of both Italy and Germany. The official proclamation of the German alliance, with its reciprocal pledges of assistance, will, so the Italian leaders hope, reassure public opinion. If Poland turns her back on us, so much the worse for Poland. We are the better off, since, if ' peaceful ' measures do not give us what we want, we will enter a war with the German Reich at our side, a Reich with which we have just again affirmed our solidarity, which has guaranteed the satisfaction of our demands, and which has promised us its full support.

Thus fortified, the totalitarian partners advance along their chosen path. The immediate tasks that face them—as long as peace-time conditions persist—are the breaking down of the British system of alliances and the occupation of all the strategically valuable positions that can still be taken without provoking actual war. The primary objective of their propagandist and diplomatic activity is the shattering of the ' policy of encirclement.' It is a ' white war ' of positional manœuvring that is at present being waged by the Axis Powers with all the resources at their disposal. It is impossible that anyone should still be blind to the real aims of German and Italian policy—a brutal and aggressive imperialism.

A consideration of the mind and mood of the German dictator will only strengthen the conclusion at which we have arrived. Hitler has become the prisoner of ever more extravagant and grandiose conceptions. He lives in a self-imagined world whose immense dimensions stretch far beyond the mental horizons of the normal man. Those who know him well tell us that his political judgment is almost exclusively dominated by an overpowering hatred of his enemies, the ' betrayers ' Poland, Great Britain and France. Of late the Fuehrer of the Reich has been seriously considering whether or not to throw down the great public buildings that have been erected during his régime and have them replaced by other and vaster constructions.[*] The present monuments of his reign are too small; they will convey only imperfectly to future ages the true ' gigantic ' character of ' his ' time. But it is not merely as an architect

There is hardly a shred of evidence that Hitler has even begun to realise the nature and extent of the resistance which a new act of aggression on the part of Germany would have to encounter. In so far as any such realisation is beginning to penetrate the consciousness of the German leadership, it has resulted at most in a willingness to reconsider tactics. It has certainly not led the German leaders to consider the abandonment of any of their imperialist objectives. This apparent under-estimation of the forces arrayed against them, this careful differentiation between the method and the goal, is the more understandable in view of the technical changes to which the German economy has lately been subjected. Orders have been issued to the whole of Germany's war industry demanding the general introduction of a seventy-hour week. A major effort is called for. Technical experts have been categorically instructed that the end of June must see maximum production in all the departments of the Reich's war industries, in machine building as in the manufacture of munitions. Work on the west and north-west fortifications is proceeding at a feverish speed, as is the construction of the new line of fortifications on the German-Danish frontier.

The conclusion of the military alliance between Germany and Italy has finally convinced Berlin that the Axis has now become an indestructible and completely dependable instrument of German policy. The military alliance has in fact changed nothing in the relations of the two States. It is not the content, but the form, that has altered. The announcement of the military alliance has had certain psychological effects, and was made in order to secure those effects. That Italy, except as a reflex action following upon the outbreak of a general war, should break loose from the Axis was as unthinkable before as since the signing of the military alliance. The change nevertheless illustrates the ease with which the totalitarian partners can transform an agreement 'which in no way has the character of an alliance' and which was rhetorically described as 'eternally enduring' into something which, in outward appearance at least, is very different. The German leadership, anxiously looking across the Brenner, seeks by this military alliance to bind Italy more firmly than ever to the chariot wheels of the Reich. Italy, for her part, is not averse to seeing her own imperialist aims integrated

mobilisation this year was dictated by the fact that German troop movements were threatening the Polish frontiers. Hitler is able to use the expressions 'call to the colours' and 'mobilisation' in a completely misleading way. Germany, without carrying through a general mobilisation, was in a position to bring serious military pressure to bear upon Poland, since partial mobilisation had already been carried out in the Reich some months earlier. Since Hitler's speech, German preparedness for a Polish war has been secretly carried a stage further, and it can be taken that now all the preliminary technical measures have been finally completed. These measures include the return to Danzig of several thousand Danzig Germans who have illegally undergone military training in the Reich and their incorporation in the Danzig National Socialist formations, and the organisation of 'Free Corps,' most of which are stationed in Pomerania close to the German-Polish frontier. These technical measures are supplemented by intense political and propaganda activity. The National Socialist leadership is naturally aware of the fact that, since the conquest of the non-German territories of Bohemia and Moravia, it has become very difficult indeed to justify a 'German solution' of the Danzig and Polish Corridor questions by simple reference to the doctrine of racialism or by raising the cry of self-determination. The German Propaganda Ministry has therefore already begun to restate the German-Polish conflict in terms of personal symbolism—on the one side the good Adolf Hitler trying hard to find a peaceful solution, on the other the traitor Beck doing his utmost to provoke the long-suffering Reich to anger. This change of emphasis discernible in German propaganda is undoubtedly due to the fact that Germany's moral position in the eyes of the world has been impaired, and that since the events of last March the earlier line of German propagnada could not be relied on to produce satisfactory reactions abroad. All this, however, is hardly likely to influence the decisions of the Fuehrer, who bases his judgment, not on a critical and objective summing-up of the situation, but on his own personal, sensitive, subjective appreciation—an appreciation dominated always by an inflexible resolve to move forward towards the unchanging goal which he thinks Providence has set before him.

Traditional feelings, with their roots deep down in history, have a great deal to do with Germany's attitude towards the outside world and with her summing up of the peoples beyond her frontiers. Poland has again become 'the enemy'—an enemy for whom, apart from hatred, she feels nothing but contempt. The word 'Polak,' which the Prussian commonly uses when he refers to a Pole, sufficiently indicates the disesteem with which the superior race views its inferiors. The habit, natural to the Germans, of despising the Poles, has now come into its own. During the September crisis a remark was let fall in a Berlin drawing-room: 'What rotten luck that the Poles should be our friends.' The Poles are no longer 'friends,' and any mistaken ideas on this point are being readjusted with German thoroughness. A regrettable lapse in German policy, the Reich's friendship with Poland—incidentally the most hotly disputed issue of National Socialist policy both outside and within the Party—has now been corrected. The Polish Ambassador Lipsky, up to a short while ago treated as an honoured friend, is now socially ostracised in Berlin. The Protocol Department of the German Foreign Ministry was early in the field, advising former acquaintances of M. Lipsky to cease including the Polish Ambassador in any general invitations that might be sent out. The Wilhelmstrasse, indeed, set about its anti-Polish campaign with a zest and fury that were far in excess of anything witnessed during the earlier bouts against Austria and Czechoslovakia.

This pathological attitude towards Poland takes on a heightened significance when considered in relation to the military preparations set on foot by Germany against Poland and Danzig. In his address to the Reichstag Hitler pointed out, with a wealth of demagogic detail, that Poland had fallen into an error similar to that committed by 'the late State of Czechoslovakia' on May 21st, 1938; for 'Poland, incited by a world-wide campaign of lies and slanders, thought fit to call troops to the colours, although Germany, for her part, had not called up a single man, had not even contemplated doing any such thing, had made no move that could in any way be construed as a threat to Poland.' What Hitler said is, of course, simply untrue. Just as the Czechoslovakian mobilisation of May, 1938, was a reply to the military preparations made by Germany, so in the same way the partial Polish

declarations to the contrary are disregarded, and will be disregarded, as long as 'leading political circles abroad' continue to parrot the slogans coined by Dr. Goebbels. Misguided attempts to minimise the importance of the Danzig question may well set in train a series of events that will ultimately decide the fate of Europe.

The efforts that have been made to prepare the ground for a 'Munich solution' of the Danzig problem, the attempts to convince both peoples and Governments that no vital issue is bound up with the question of Danzig, are the more reprehensible since every indication from Berlin proves beyond all reasonable doubt that Hitler is not in the least interested in Danzig on racial grounds. The 'German folk' hardly comes into the picture. Self-determination is a forgotten watchword. As far as these demands are concerned, the solution of the Danzig question has not only been found: it is already in operation. From the 'geo-political' point of view (to use a favourite German expression) Danzig is not a complete German city. It is, however, a National Socialist city in the fullest possible sense. Terrorism, the secret police, persecution of the Jews, storm troopers, an authoritarian government, S.S. battalions, and all the other elements that go to make up the National Socialist scene, are already part of the political life of the city of Danzig. 'Back Home to the Reich,' beloved phrase of the German propaganda machine, is a sentimental and threadbare camouflage for aims that are in reality unashamedly militarist and imperialist. Germany again raises her insatiable demand for 'living space.' Danzig, in the latest edition of the German diplomatic phrase book, stands for Poland. The German claim on Danzig is a claim to reduce Poland to the level of a vassal of the Reich, to reduce Poland to political, military and economic dependence on the Axis. This and this alone is the problem with which international policy has to concern itself, now and in the future, when Danzig is discussed. More important than Hitler's propagandist offers to guarantee the neutrality of Danzig when once the city has been surrendered to him, more important than German promises, bribes and threats, are the military preparations already begun by the Reich against Poland, and more important than either is the psychological factor—the hatred of Poland that possesses the German leadership.

than the collapse of the Anglo-Russian conversations, and for very good reasons. The active adherence of the Soviet Union to the defensive alliance; the exclusion of any possibility of a Russian understanding either with Germany alone or with the Axis; the rejection by Russia of a possible policy of isolation: these would be the first fruits of an Anglo-Russian agreement, and they would be decisive for the future of Europe.

The consistent record of political defeats suffered by the Western Powers at the hands of Germany and Italy during the last few years is in large measure due to the fact that expert advice from the responsible officials of the French and British Governments has almost invariably been either ignored or else adopted with reluctance and only half-heartedly applied. The same thing is happening to-day, with this difference, that half-measures in the present international situation almost certainly mean war, while a bold policy consistently applied offers a reasonable chance of peace.

Public opinion in France as well as in Great Britain has swung decisively over to the view that only a marshalling of all the forces that are willing to oppose aggression in a solidly built peace front can save peace. In this the opinion of the public has far out-distanced that of the Governments. The truth of this is clearly shown by the nature of the popular judgments passed during the last few weeks on the various attempts made in different quarters to minimise the importance of the Danzig question. It may be a coincidence, but none the less worth our attention for that, that the slogan so often heard nowadays in Paris and London, that 'Danzig is not worth a war,' should be word for word the same as the message issued day in and day out by the German Propaganda Ministry. National Socialism shows its genuine gratitude for the efforts made by its friends, witting and unwitting, and is never tired of referring to the 'complete identity of view' that exists between Germany and 'leading political circles abroad' on the subject of Danzig. If we were here concerned with a question of propaganda only, the danger would be slight. The matter is in fact more serious. Hitler is perhaps already convinced, and his Foreign Minister is only too ready to be convinced, that neither Great Britain nor France are prepared to fight 'for Danzig,' and the most solemn official

Russia reluctantly and seeks to limit the extent of Russian intervention as narrowly as possible, and an opposing view that seeks a far-reaching Russian contribution to a widely-conceived front of collective security. Although the Foreign Office experts had urged the latter opinion from the moment that the Anglo-Turkish Pact was signed, it needed a marked stiffening of the Russian attitude, and open pressure from the French Government, before their point of view was able to prevail. The experts did not attempt to conceal their conviction that an immediate understanding with Russia, involving reciprocal obligations and including military commitments, was essential.

As against such a policy many voices have been raised. One group anxiously calls the attention of the Government to the critical position in Spain, or in Portugal. Another emphasises the supposed hesitancy of Poland and the Baltic States to suffer Russian aid. A third suggests that an Anglo-Russian Pact would constitute an open provocation of Herr Hitler, and should be rejected outright on that ground alone. In the face of present conditions such pleas are extremely unconvincing. In evaluating the political situation full weight must be given to the political and psychological character of the German leadership, and competent experts correctly point out that, as far as Herr Hitler is concerned, any and every decision of the Western Powers can and will be regarded as a pretext if the German leader wishes so to regard it. If Hitler decides to consider himself provoked, a suitable provocation will be found or manufactured. The decision hardly rests with the Western Powers. An agreement with Russia on the other hand, arising as a natural development from the new situation created by the Anglo-Turkish Pact, is more likely than not to have the effect of reminding Herr Hitler that second thoughts are best.

If it is realised by Herr Hitler and his bellicose advisers that a new German *coup de force* will be certainly and strongly resisted, the outlook for peace will, thus far, be improved. An agreement with Russia would at the same time end, once and for all, the illusion (still flourishing in Berlin and Rome) that the collective security policy initiated by the Western Powers can be successfully blocked and ultimately shattered. Nothing is more fervently desired in the totalitarian capitals

the political character of the defence front, giving it a more positive sense. It has also, by altering the strategical aspect of the question, placed the military defence of the area lying between the Baltic and the Black Sea on a new and more favourable basis. But, since the area has become defensible, it becomes more than ever necessary to use every opportunity of developing and strengthening the more favourable positions that have been won. And, strategically, the threatened Baltic–Black Sea line can only be adequately defended from bases lying in the Soviet Russian hinterland. Here, in the political and military safeguarding of this complex of countries fringing the Soviet border, rounding out a process of stabilisation that has already been set in motion as a result of the diplomatic achievements of the last few weeks, lies Russia's appropriate task, her natural share in the work of building security in the threatened areas of Europe. It is much to be regretted that the tactics adopted by Russia in the course of the negotiations between that country and the Western Powers were such as to raise doubts, particularly in certain British circles, as to the seriousness of Russia's intentions. On the other hand, it must also be admitted that Great Britain, taking advantage perhaps of a false lull in the international situation, allowed weeks to go by without making any practical contribution to the problem of securing Russia's adherence to the peace alliance. This, seeing that the situation abroad, though apparently more 'quiet' after the seizure of Albania, continued in reality to be fully as menacing as before, while the position as regards the aggressive intentions of Germany and Italy certainly underwent no change, seems as unintelligible as the rather tortuous course of foreign policy pursued by the Russian Government.

The British nation, with an almost unanimous voice, demands a Pact with Russia as an indispensable condition of the country's safety, though the correspondence columns of some of the more important newspapers are still filled with a carefully selected quota of letters for and against, as if to show the nice balance of opinion in the public mind. In responsible official quarters where foreign policy is determined, as well as in those less official circles which nevertheless claim the right to influence the course of affairs, the debate continues between the conservative view that admits

this offensive element, which must necessarily be a part of any defensive policy that sets out to be constructive rather than merely negative. The new positive spirit is further exemplified by a growing determination on the part of the associated States to act in unison for the preservation of political order and territorial stability over the whole of the area in which countries find themselves threatened, even though the immediate danger may be limited to regions which are of indirect interest only to this or that co-operating State. Another positive factor in the Anglo-Turkish Pact is the unlimited reciprocal liability assumed by each partner, a factor the importance of which is heightened by the existing Russo-Turkish connection and, even more, by the close ties which unite Turkey and France.

The signature of the Anglo-Turkish Pact shows conclusively that the construction of an extensive and positive front of resistance to German and Italian imperialist aggression is practically possible. The further progress of the negotiations with Russia will reveal, however, whether the responsible statesman at the head of the Western Powers are at last fully conscious of the far-reaching implications of the policy that has been initiated and realise the nature of the measures which they are now in duty bound to carry through if the desired goal is to be reached, or whether, in deference to conservative doubts or because the mistaken counsel of the appeaser still persists in their ears, they will rest content with half measures and fail to buttress the fortification which they have started to build.

As long as the total effort of the peace front against aggression amounted to a number of reciprocal guarantees, exchanged between Britain and France on the one hand and Poland, Roumania and Greece on the other, the question of Russian assistance was perforce vague. Many different views concerning the character and extent of the support that it was desirable to ask the Soviet Union to give were put forward, and each of the differing opinions found reasonable arguments to back it. But now that the Anglo-Turkish Pact has been signed, the situation is completely transformed. There can now be no two views as to the necessity for the fullest possible participation of the Soviet Union in the defence front. The adhesion of Turkey has not only changed

Socialist rulers of the Third Reich: it is the natural product of the boundless arrogance of the governing group in Germany.

The conclusion of a Franco-Turkish Pact, or, to put it another way, the extension of the present arrangement between Turkey and Great Britain into a tripartite agreement, will add new force to the defensive alliance far in excess of the strength which France will contribute as her own share. The military-strategic importance of the alliance is also very considerable. But the decisive significance of the Pact must be sought elsewhere, in the political perspectives it opens up, and in the qualitative change which it brings about in the whole European situation.

German and Italian pressure at Ankara notwithstanding, it is clear that the Anglo-Turkish Pact was not concluded because either one of the parties felt themselves directly threatened, or feared immediate military danger. As long as peace continues, the threat to the safety of Turkey or Great Britain is indirect only. No emergency situation has arisen to make the duty of self-defence imperative. Turkey is not geographically contiguous to either of the Axis Powers, nor is she politically and strategically on their immediate horizon. She is certainly not open to direct attack from either Germany or Italy, which Poland, the Baltic States, Roumania and Greece assuredly are. Taking a longer view, it may well be argued that a direct and acute threat to Turkey in the none too distant future must be reckoned with as a possibility. Even so, due weight must be given to the fact that Turkey, a country occupying a key position, geographically, strategically and politically, has at this present moment, in spite of all the bribery and blackmail attempted at Ankara by Germany and Italy, and without herself anticipating any immediate military threat to her independence, chosen to align herself with the defensive coalition headed by the Western States. The decisive significance of this move, and of the Pact in which it finds expression, is that for the first time a positive element makes its appearance in the process of building up the peace front against aggression—a potentially 'offensive' move comes in to complement the hitherto rigorously 'defensive' character of the alliance. But the generally defensive nature of the alliance is in no way impaired by the introduction of

One suggestion was that the German Government should use its influence with Italy to persuade that country to enter the Balkan Entente and pursue a policy of collaboration with Turkey, thus making the two countries effective masters of the peninsula. Another was that a 'Grand Alliance' should be formed between Germany, Italy and Turkey; the inducement to Turkey being, as the German envoy put it, that the whole strength of the Axis would be placed at the disposal of the Ankara Government for the achievement of its 'historic and legitimate ambition' of reconstituting the former Ottoman Empire in Asia. Not only is any such ambition completely foreign to Kemalist Turkey, whose 'nationalism' is anti-expansionist, but the Turkish Government was unable to forget so soon the public declaration by Mussolini in 1934 that Italy's field of imperialist expansion embraced not only Africa but also the mainland of Asia. It would be quite incorrect to regard these grandiose but deceptive proposals as merely typical emanations from the tortuous mind of Herr von Papen. There is no evidence at all that the German envoy in Ankara was not acting in complete accordance with the instructions of his Government in Berlin. All the proposals put forward by von Papen were typically in keeping with the present methods of conducting foreign policy favoured by the National Socialist Reich. Apart from the characteristic opportunism and brutality normally displayed by Germany in foreign affairs, there is no single feature of Nazi diplomacy which strikes the observer more forcibly than the unconcealed contempt of the Germans for the countries with which they desire to negotiate. Political principles held in high esteem, regarded even as vital to the continued existence of the prospective 'ally,' are carelessly flouted; and the proffer of a 'friendly agreement' is arrogantly thought to be an appropriate method of inducing a foreign country to accept the status of a vassal of the Reich. German diplomacy still remains remarkably active, though happily some of its efforts have been checkmated by the recent counter-moves of the Western Powers. The unwillingness, or the inability, of the Nazis to understand and take into consideration the mentality of other peoples—as shown once again in the German-Turkish negotiations—is not an accidental feature of the conduct of policy by the National

plans will have to be revised in the light of the new development. In Berlin and Rome it was thought that a German thrust to the south-east, strategically supported by the Italian and at least a part of the German fleets, operating from the naval bases of the Dodecanese and Italian North Africa, would be so powerful that no opposition could hold it in the east Mediterranean, Balkan and Black Sea area. A task which, before, was thought to be well within the strength of the totalitarian forces, has now been made very much more difficult; although it has to be admitted that the defence of the eastern Mediterranean by the Western Powers still presents many serious problems, even now that the Pact with Turkey is an accomplished fact. Further elements in the Mediterranean situation, namely, that Italy has, in Libya, a valuable base for an attack on Egypt, and that Malta is similarly vulnerable, must militate against the growth of an easy optimism concerning defensive possibilities in this quarter.

Since the contracting parties have already agreed in principle, and since the terms of the agreement provide for its immediate application if any sudden emergency should arise, the completion of the mutual assistance Pact between Great Britain and Turkey by the necessary technical and military discussions should present no difficulties. It was doubtless the original intention of the participating Governments that the agreement should only have been announced after technical and military conversations had been satisfactorily brought to a conclusion. But in view of the activities in Ankara of the German Ambassador it was thought to be desirable that the Anglo-Turkish agreement, provisionally arrived at, should be made public at once, in order that the attitude of the two countries should be made unmistakably clear. No objections to immediate publication were raised in London, which was the more understandable as Baron Franz von Papen had hardly troubled to disguise the fact that the purpose of his mission to the Turkish capital was to prevent at all costs the possibility of the Turkish Government reaching any sort of mutual understanding with the Western Powers. Immediately upon his arrival in Ankara von Papen inundated the Turkish authorities with a flood of projects, plans and proposals.

THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*

No. DCCXLVIII—June 1939

THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

ɔlɪtɪcally and strategically, the conclusion of a Pact :tween Turkey and Great Britain marks an important step ›rward in the diplomatic attempt which has been going on /er since last March to build up a powerful and firmly ›nstructed defensive alliance against new acts of aggression. ıdependently of the added political and military strength it rings to the agreements already made with Poland, Roumania ıd Greece, the Anglo-Turkish Pact, which has been ›mpleted by a similar understanding between Turkey and rance, ranges three Powers shoulder to shoulder in the efence of a certain region which, both in itself and in relation › the general situation in Europe, is vital to all of them.

It is only as a result of the conclusion of the Turkish Pact ıat the other reciprocal agreements have been given a :alistic strategical basis. Now, and only now, is it possible › speak seriously of the defence of the eastern Mediterranean, ;gypt, Greece, the Black Sea, Roumania and the Balkans. 'or, apart from the extent of Turkey's own military resources, ıe Pact gives the Western Powers the right to avail them- elves of certain war bases which would be of decisive ɪportance if the defence of the eastern Mediterranean had › be undertaken.

It would seem, moreover, that certain German and Italian

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

1877 1939

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

1939 JUNE No. 748. [illegible]

Price Three Shillings. Annual Subscription 36/- post free.

Published by

CONSTABLE & CO LTD, 10 ORANGE STREET, LONDON, W.C.2

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

Holland

Amsterdamsche Handelsblad (April 16th) says: 'Roosevelt's personal message addressed to Hitler and Mussolini is really of a sharp character. Although in no way an ultimatum it insists on a clear and categorical promise from the two dictators. . . .'

Switzerland

Zuercher Zeitung (April 16th) comments: 'President Roosevelt's message undoubtedly expresses what millions of people think, not only in the countries which consider themselves threatened, but also in the authoritarian countries. . . .'

Soviet Russia

It is perhaps significant that the officially inspired expression of approval with President Roosevelt's message is, for the first time, linked up with distinctly friendly remarks towards Great Britain.

Journal de Moscou (April 18th), the organ of the Soviet Foreign Office, writes: 'A danger is that a bellicose retort—which is not impossible—may intimidate certain states and lead to new capitulations. . . . The British Prime Minister's last speech and the declaration of the French Government mark a step forward towards clearing up the problems that are disturbing all peaceful nations.'

were as hostile in their attitude as those of Germany and Italy.

SPAIN

The following extract from a Madrid paper may be taken as representative of General Franco's Press:

Ya (April 16th) says: 'It is grotesque to ask Hitler and Mussolini to pledge themselves not to attack Norway, Ireland, or Iran, but it is sarcastic to ask them never to attack Russia. . . . If Roosevelt had condemned the continuous aggressions of Russia against all countries, with nefarious and criminal methods, which Spain has just experienced, the message would have won the respect which otherwise it scarcely merits.'

HUNGARY

It may serve as illustration to quote the statement made by the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Czaky, which was widely quoted in the Hungarian Press. He said: 'I do not believe that there are two Hungarians in the world who have forgotten Wilson's Fourteen Points. They resulted in the Treaty of Trianon. . . . I am unable to judge America's new interference without prejudice. We ask to be left to work in our own way . . . with our trusted friends to repair the damages done by the world war . . . and by the incompetence of others.'

FRANCE

The French Press—almost without exception—praised President Roosevelt for his initiative and gave much prominence to M. Daladier's favourable reply which was contained in a note transmitted to Washington by Mr. Bullitt.

Le Populaire (April 16th) sums up the attitude of the French commentators by saying: 'If the dictators refuse it, everybody can easily draw the conclusions. . . .'

SWEDEN

Dagens Nyheter (April 16th) says: 'President Roosevelt is warning Germany and Italy in amicable and carefully formulated terms. But he is also warning the people of the United States that they must immediately join the European democracies in the event of war. . . .'

Comparing Roosevelt's note with those of President Wilson (as in fact all newspapers did, following, no doubt, official instructions) the paper says: 'The whole trick is based on the assumption that Germany will allow herself to be tricked again.'

Italy

The Italian Press showed no greater inclination to accept Mr. Roosevelt's appeal as a basis for serious discussion than the German Press. On the whole, however, the tone of the Italian comments is some degrees less violent and abusive. Obviously, the order given to Italian editors was to ridicule the whole matter.

Giornale D'Italia (April 17th) writes: 'Italy does not recognise President Roosevelt's right to interfere in European affairs. He is too well known as an anti-Fascist and as an unscrupulous political opportunist to qualify as mediator in international affairs. . . . Italy will prefer to distinguish this man who will be classed among the villains of history from the people over which he tyrannises as a dictator.'

Giornale D'Italia (April 19th) adds to its previous comments in a somewhat milder tone: 'It is not said that Roosevelt's gesture will not produce replies from high places so as to clarify facts and situations which he so rudely tried to misrepresent.'

United States of America

The great Press of the United States has been practically unanimous in its approval of the President's message.

New York Herald Tribune (April 16th) says: 'However slender the chance that such words of reason can have any effect upon the minds of the dictators, the venture was well worth while, and we are confident that the country will approve.'

New York Times (April 16th) writes in a leading article: 'He is attempting to salvage peace by warning reckless leaders that they will find the odds overwhelmingly against them if they resort to acts of aggression.'

While the Press of almost all countries have welcomed President Roosevelt's move it may be noted that the Press comments of the two Axis satellites, Spain and Hungary,

the strongest. . . . This time the spectre of a general European conflict will probably pass, but everybody asks themselves how long this method of brute force can continue before the biggest disaster again hits the world. This paralysing feeling is not only experienced by democratic countries, but also by the greater part of the populations of dictatorial countries. . . .'

* * * * *

Having been completed on April 19th, the following extracts cannot provide more than a provisional and incomplete summary of the first reactions to Mr. Roosevelt's peace plan.

GERMANY

The very first German Press comments to Mr. Roosevelt's plea display a degree of indignation that is uncommon even in the German Press. The words 'stunt,' 'impudence,' and 'swindle' are repeated in every paper. On the whole, the German Press reacted with a fresh outburst of the anti-American Press campaign that has been in progress for some time.

Völkischer Beobachter (April 16th) contains a leading article under the headline 'Market Crier of Democracy,' which says: 'It is a remarkable bit of work when the leader of a great nation debases himself to the extent of circulating a shabby propaganda pamphlet to the heads of other States in the form of a "note." . . . Franklin D. Roosevelt is a boundlessly ambitious party politician who has utterly failed as head of the Government and has terribly disappointed his people.'

Lokalanzeiger (April 16th) call the President's note '. . . another move in the criminal game of encirclement chess,' . . . and goes on to say: 'The laws of life and of the peoples mock the forced rule hammered out at the conference table.'

Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (April 17th) is of special interest in so far as it directs its attacks mainly against Great Britain. It says: 'From the Soviet Union to America, Britain busies herself in forming the Grand Alliance against Italy and ourselves. The British newspapers should now acclaim Roosevelt as the last saviour from imminent catastrophe.'

and in the present case is directed against the vital interests of Britain and France in the Mediterranean.'

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New York Herald Tribune (April 8th) comments: 'As another outbreak of sacred egotism, irresponsible slaughter, propagandist mendacity, and brutally cynical power politics, it will leave no one sleeping any easier. The sands are running low now, and they are running fast. . . .'

New York Times (April 11th) writes: 'There cannot be the slightest doubt that the military activities of Italy are accelerating the development of the British policy, or that they give increasing concern in Moscow. Russia's outlet to the Mediterranean is through the Dardanelles, and the shadow of Axis diplomacy now lies athwart that gateway.'

BULGARIA

Slovo (April 7th) contains in its leading article a passage which is significant for Bulgaria's increasing interest in the Balkan Entente and her own position *vis-à-vis* the Entente. It says: 'The establishment of Italy on the Balkan peninsula is of paramount importance. All countries in the Balkans are faced with a new problem. When a house is on fire the neighbours cannot remain indifferent, or fail to take measures to save their own property. . . . Albania not being a member of the Balkan Entente cannot appeal to it for help. These events will prove exactly how deep the unity of the Balkan Pact is and reveal the means that the Balkan Powers will use to safeguard their own interests.'

HOLLAND

De Telegraaf (April 8th) contains a leading article under the title 'Anarchy' which reflects the apprehensions of the smaller democratic Powers—not only those of the Netherlands. 'Holland has no material interests in Albania, but Italy's armed action against a small country is here, as everywhere else, felt as a gross injustice. Once again it is shown that Europe is now in a state of anarchy where law and justice no longer offer any guarantees, unless it is the law of

and indirectly) to speed up her military preparations. The fact of Italo-German consultations before the occupation took place was generally emphasised as a special 'danger signal.'

Paris Soir (April 7th) writes: 'Never were the words "Made in Germany" so clearly written on any enterprise as on the Italian occupation of Albania. Obviously it is not for nothing that Field-Marshal Goering and Dr. Goebbels have been travelling about . . . and that the military heads of the Rome-Berlin Axis have recently met at Innsbruck.'

Le Temps (April 7th) makes a similar comment, saying: 'Italy acting doubtless with the full agreement of Germany has evidently wished to bring matters to a head in the Balkans. . . . Should the Italian drive across the Balkans to the Ægean Sea succeed Italian preponderance in the Eastern Mediterranean would be assured, and with it a permanent menace to the safety of the great imperial routes of Britain and France.'

Figaro (April 8th) writes: 'Fascism is trying to bar the land routes to the Balkan States. This puts one more bolt in the southern door protecting the German march to the East. Britain, as the chief naval Power interested, has henceforth more decisions to take than words to speak.'

Le Temps (April 10th) says in a leading article: 'It should not be concluded that war must be regarded as inevitable after a more or less brief space of time. But it means that the ordinary methods of diplomacy have been exhausted, that an exact stock is being taken of the forces that might have to face one another. . . .'

SOVIET RUSSIA

Pravda (April 7th) writes: 'It would be wrong to regard this as an isolated act of Italian Fascism. It is a new act of German-Italian aggression, aimed at Yugoslavia. . . . This aggression is a direct consequence of the Munich capitulation, and creates a still graver threat to Anglo-French interests in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean.'

Journal de Moscou (April 11th) contains a significant and undoubtedly inspired article which says that: 'Despite the provocational incitements by certain British and French reactionary circles, aggression on the part of the Rome-Berlin Axis Powers is not directed eastwards but westwards,

'Does Britain intend to extend her dominion to the Adriatic? Italy does not recognise any special vital interests of Britain and France in the Adriatic. She respects only the general interests with which she has no intention of interfering. Italy is violating neither the letter nor the spirit of agreements. If Britain wishes to hold a different opinion she can draw her own conclusions. . . . The reactions of the great democracies is merely a fresh pretext for the development of their offensive policy against Italy and Germany. She waits determined and will not deviate from her march of peace and civilisation.'

GERMANY

The German Press has fully supported Italy's action against Albania. What is more important is the fact that the official defence of Italy became at once the occasion for renewed attacks on Britain. We have not been able to find one single German comment on the Italo-Albanian conflict which did not contain one or the other remark of hostility against Britain.

Diplomatische Korrespondenz (April 9th) comments: 'Why King Zog departed from the clear line of the natural friendship between the Italian and the Albanian peoples remains incomprehensible. It is said that foreign influence played a decisive rôle. It would not be astonishing, with the state of mind that prevails in the Western democracies, if democratic war agitators had their hand in the game in order to create a new source of unrest in the Mediterranean. . . .'

Der Angriff (April 9th) says: 'For months past it has been an open secret that King Zog preferred British society. The agents of the British Intelligence Service employed their old tricks of putting bait before the Balkan politicians. They appealed to King Zog's vanity and private greed for power. They told him he could play a decisive rôle in the Mediterranean.'

FRANCE

Italy's action has made the deepest possible impression. The action itself is condemned in the strongest terms by all Press commentators. Strategic considerations were predominant in a significantly large number of comments, and in connection with them renewed appeals to Britain (directly

The Telegram (Canada) (April 3rd) writes: 'Delivered with all the power of two strong, confident, and completely united nations it will serve as an encouragement to the threatened State, and may act as a deterrent to the dictator.'

The Star (Canada) (April 3rd) says that: 'The latest Chamberlain move has solidified British sentiment and brightened the hope of peace.'

The Cape Argus (South Africa) (April 3rd) comments: 'Mr. Chamberlain's momentous statement has struck new hope into a world which has seen naked force triumph too long over the liberties of small European peoples.'

The Sun (Australia) says in its leading article: 'Mr. Chamberlain's statement means that Australia is also committed to war if Germany attacks Poland. The world waits on Hitler.'

II. THE INVASION OF ALBANIA

Italy

The official explanations for Italy's aggressive action against Albania published in all Italian newspapers were similar to the point of literal identity. A certain variety of expression was found only in regard to the intensity of the verbal attacks made against the 'warmongering democracies.' The Italian standpoint is, of course, most clearly expressed by the well-known official commentator, Signor Gayda, in

Giornale D'Italia (April 7th), which says in its leading article:

'A new and important event is being accomplished in the Near East of Europe. At the call of patriotic Albanians who are unable further to suffer the misgovernment of their King, obliged by the necessity of defending the life and land of the Italians in Albania who are openly threatened by obscure armed bands, Italy to-day has landed without encountering any resistance her troops, who are pushing forward to the various vital points of the country. . . . By her intervention Italy has restored to Albania peace and order and the liberty of civil workers which was being seriously compromised.'

Voce D'Italia (April 9th) contains another article by Signor Gayda in which he continues his argument. Referring to the reactions to Italy's action in Britain and France, he says:

Pravda (April 2nd) says in a leading article: 'Britain is against a Polish-German conflict. She does not want a Polish-German war, but does not mind at all Poland ceding Danzig, and perhaps something more, to Germany as a result of negotiations. Mistrust of British foreign policy is one of the results of Munich, and would be dispelled only if Britain took such measures as would show her readiness to engage in a really active struggle to prevent aggression from spreading further.'

United States of America

The British guarantee for Poland has made a very deep impression in the United States. Both Republican and Democratic newspapers have welcomed the step and emphasised the significance of the fundamental change of British foreign policy.

New York Herald Tribune (April 3rd), referring to the Anglo-Polish Agreement, writes: 'This is an historic declaration which halts the long retreat, and in so doing supplies the first condition necessary to regaining the Russians, making Italian neutrality possible, and restoring to the democracies the bargaining power which is essential if there is to be a real settlement. . . . But because it settles nothing and still leaves all vital issues open it may equally precipitate a crisis if Hitler chooses to make peace an impossibility.'

New York Times (April 3rd) says: 'A Germany in full possession of its senses would recognise the importance of what happened yesterday in London. It would not make the mistake of believing that the temper of Britain and France in the spring of 1939 is the temper of Britain and France in the fall of 1938.'

Washington Post (April 3rd), a paper often identified with the views of the President, says: 'The British and French are apparently determined to retreat no farther from their courageous stand. It is the most salutary turn in Europe for many months.'

The Dominions

The following brief extracts may serve as illustration of the practically unanimous approval of the Anglo-Polish Agreement expressed in the various sections of the Dominion Press.

Polska Zbrojna (March 26th), the organ of the Polish War Office, writes: 'We are ready. We are ready for every war with every enemy, even the strongest. We shall fight. We are not afraid of any large number of regiments our enemies may have. We are not afraid of their highly technical armaments. We believe in the strength of our own position, in the fighting capacity of our men, in our Army and our leaders. . . .'

Gazeta Polska (March 26th) contains a leading article which is perhaps more significant in view of the semi-official character of this paper. It says: 'The tragic example of Czechoslovakia is most expressive and we Poles understand its meaning well. Never shall we allow any changes to be accomplished in a sphere which concerns Poland directly without Poland's consent. . . . We Poles would rather be cut to pieces than give up a single inch of our territory. We shall kill, shoot, destroy anyone who puts out his hands to touch our land.'

Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy (April 7th) states that: 'Poland must now definitely tie herself firmly and for ever to the Western Powers and join their efforts to organise peace in Europe and form a barrier to German expansion.'

Polska Zbrojna (April 11th) contains a leading article clearly addressed to Germany: 'The whole people will fight with determination for Polish liberty and independence. Nothing will be given up without a fight. Every Polish house will be a fortress which the enemy will have to take by storm. The danger from the air will not daunt Poland, which is chiefly an agricultural country, with few great centres, whereas the enemy has far more targets suitable for destruction from the air. Whoever seeks a quarrel with Poland will have more to lose than to gain.'

Soviet Russia

Ever since the Soviet proposal for a nine-power conference to discuss measures against further territorial conquests by the Axis Powers failed to materialise, the Soviet Press has remained highly sceptical of the sincerity of Great Britain's new foreign policy, and, in particular, of the British guarantee for Poland.

Osservatore Romano (April 3rd), from which the following extract is taken: 'The British guarantee to Poland has created an enormous impression. It is considered as a new guarantee of the peace in Eastern Europe. . . . The Polish-German Agreement of 1934 is based on the supposition of respect for Poland's integrity, but as there was a similar agreement between Berlin and Prague, Poland has taken military precautions as a natural course.'

FRANCE

While the great majority of the French Press praised both the British and the Polish Governments for the conclusion of the Guarantee Agreement, it must be emphasised that some few papers, notably *Le Matin* and *Excelsior*, raised a dissident voice, blaming the British Government for frightening the Poles away by its new attitude towards the Soviet Union.

Le Matin (March 26th), for example, writes: 'Wisdom commands that the Franco-British security zone should not reach beyond the Rhine and should contain only France, England, Belgium and Holland. . . .'

It should also be noted that Britain's new interests in Eastern Europe has given rise, in the French Press, to much criticism of Great Britain's reluctance to introduce conscription. Of this the following extract is a very typical example:

Homme Libre (March 27th), the paper of M. Bonnet, writes: 'Obsessed with the urge to break through at any price—as they already tried to do at Verdun—will not the Germans try in order to win a lightning victory to throw against the Maginot Line three or four or ten times the number of men as they hurled against Verdun? And if the Maginot Line gives way it will mean the collapse of France. Conscription may shock some gentle souls in a country living on old traditions. But it is not a time for quibbles and Great Britain's freedom depends upon the speed with which this decision will be taken. . . . The moment England makes up her mind it will make all the difference in Europe. . . .'

POLAND

Approval of the London-Warsaw Agreement is expressed by all sections of the Polish Press, not even excluding that of the Right Wing and Socialist opposition.

for Germany's vital rights and honour is not necessary—this would be as deplorable for the future harmonious development of Europe as it would certainly be harmful for the Polish nation itself.'

On the same day, however, a bitter Press campaign against Poland was launched in the German Press, beginning with an article in the

National Zeitung-Essen (March 28th) which says: 'Nearly every day brings fresh attacks on Germans, German women and German children who are threatened in the streets. . . . Up to now the German public has remained silent. . . . Now, however, it is no longer possible to remain silent.'

These outbursts were at once accompanied by a new wave of anti-British propaganda.

The successful conclusion of the Anglo-Polish negotiations provoked the most furious reactions in the German Press.

Völkischer Beobacter (April 7th) says: 'Poland undertakes to "protect threatened England" in the event of an attack on her. . . . Poland has deserted the policy of Marshal Pilsudski as a result of the most violent British pressure and insidious powers of persuasion. . . . Britain's policy is merely an attempt to restore the disastrously collapsed effort of Versailles.'

Italy

Although the Italian Press has adopted the German point of view with regard to the Anglo-Polish Agreement, the official support was expressed in unusually weak terms.

Messaggero (April 3rd), for example, confined itself to this statement: 'The British Government wishes to impose its help on Poland after the latter, together with the other four nations, had refused to sign a declaration of international solidarity against Germany, with or without Russia.'

Popolo di Roma (April 3rd) writes in the same vein, stating that '. . . the declaration may be designed to have a general influence on the Polish Government which has so far clung to its neutrality, a neutrality about which there has been doubt since the democracies burned their fingers so badly.'

It is perhaps more significant that the following article could appear in the paper of the Vatican:

WORLD OPINION

A Press Summary

The further development of the European crisis since Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia has remained almost the only subject of editorial comments in the Press of all countries. The two outstanding events were of course: Firstly, the British guarantee to Poland; and secondly, the Italian invasion of Albania. In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that more or less speculative comments as well as forecasts of possible future consequences have been as prominent in the ordinary 'news columns' as they were on editorial pages.

Extracts typical of the international reactions to both these events are recorded here under two separate headings—although such a separation may appear somewhat artificial.

I. THE BRITISH GUARANTEE TO POLAND

Germany

Diplomatische Korrespondenz (March 25th), the official news bulletin, contains an article the whole tone of which is typical of the comparatively mild criticism of Poland (though it was quickly followed by a violent anti-Polish Press campaign and open threats): 'Even without taking into consideration her ten years' treaty with Germany, Poland, which is said to be menaced by Germany, knows that the Reich regards the existence of a strong national Poland as a political necessity and an indispensable factor for the maintenance of order in Eastern Europe.'

Diplomatische Korrespondenz (March 28th) already speaks another language. Commenting on Germany's 'feelings of friendship towards her Eastern neighbour' it says: 'If the Poles should think that a corresponding attitude towards the German people is not necessary—in other words that regard

themselves a likely target for air attack, are naturally more conscious of and more disturbed by foreign affairs than countrymen safe amongst their hills and pastures. Nevertheless, so far as one can speak for many, the Londoner, having tried on his gas mask, laughed at his backyard steel shelter (if he has one), and admired the Government's plan to evacuate his children, refuses to worry any more. 'Let the Government worry; that's their job.' And such an attitude is natural and inevitable. It does not mean either indifference or lack of patriotism, but only that the daily task and the daily pleasure *must* take precedence in our thoughts till war begins. Else we should grow mad. Those whose business it is to be in the thick of political, diplomatic and press activities cannot easily appreciate how little the average member of the public even now concerns himself with the ups and downs of international tension. One who was recently in the heart of Gloucestershire met an old friend whose hobby was cricket. The visitor with his head full of the fall of Albania, German troop movements and the rushing about of diplomatists greeted the countryman with: 'Well, what do you think of the situation?' 'I rather fancy we are going to see some better cricket this year' was the reply.

JOHN SHAND.

time. And this illustration seems more apt when I remember an evening this April in a little inn high on the Chilterns. From the windows of the bar, as night fell, we could see dozens of searchlights playing about the sky from various points around London. Darts, dominoes and talk on local topics were interrupted while we crowded to the window and the door to comment on the spectacle, for not even the villagers had seen from their vantage point on the hills so many searchlights before.

'Seems like the Government be doing something to protect them Londoners at last,' commented an old farmer. 'Look there, Bob,' cried his wife, a moment later. Her sharp eyes had seen one of the moving beams of light reveal an aeroplane high in the clouds Almost at once from points that had before been dark a dozen or more searchlights were switched on and concentrated upon the tiny object of their search. 'Seems like a moth in the lamplight,' said the farmer's wife. 'You're right, ma'am,' agreed the innkeeper, 'and if that were one of Hitler's moths I'll bet he'd get his wings singed.' We returned to our mugs, but darts, dominoes and comment upon the local skinflint who grudged the villagers picking the rotting timber in his woods for firewood, were still suspended while we discussed the chances of war. The general verdict was: 'The likes of us don't know enough to say whether war will come or when; if it comes, it comes, bad luck to those who cause it; we've done our best to stop it, now it's up to Hitler and Mussolini; if they want a sock in the jaw we'll give them one.' Games and criticism of the miserly landowner were then resumed, and though some of us peeped occasionally at those London searchlights lighting so unnaturally the scurrying clouds, no one wished to continue the unpleasing subject.

One could wish that the many metropolitan chatterers who ponder the map of Europe, discuss with hope or despair our chances in battle, and talk with such glib confidence that you would think they were God's spies, had some of these villagers' modesty and quiet courage. But these paper soldiers and diplomatists are not representative, nor are the many defeatists in the capital representative of London, whether their gloom is based upon fear for their own skins or for the general fate of humanity. Londoners, feeling

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING

II

A FRIEND suggested to me that whereas in September last the general feeling in this country was anti-Nazi, it is now anti-German. If that is so, it is not my experience that the feeling is sharply hostile; we are slow to hate, though war and propaganda will soon make us bitter enough. The feeling is more one of disgust that any nation should so allow itself to be dragooned into the military machine, should so abjectly be conscripted in body and mind to the wishes of the State. But I would agree that so far as there is a feeling of hatred for the dictatorship countries as distinct from their rulers, that feeling is almost wholly against Germany. Rightly or wrongly, we regard the Italians as rather comic in fighting kit and Mussolini himself almost as funny as Disney's huffing and puffing Big Bad Wolf.

Certainly the British mood to-day seems quite different from what it was in September. There was then a touch of panic; there is now a feeling of resolution, and while we still hope for the best do not fear to meet the worst if it comes. The majority of us in September were naturally ignorant of the rate at which Europe had been travelling towards a war. The sudden awareness of immediate and terrible danger was a real shock. We were like a man who sees a ghost for the first time. Since then, however, the spectre has made other appearances, and though we still grow pale at each unpleasant visit, terror has given place to the desire to exorcise the damned goblin, the desire of the soldier in *Hamlet* who wanted to strike at the ghost with his halberd. Or we might illustrate the change of mood by a certain historic incident at Plymouth Hoe. Last September we were more like those who rushed to warn Drake that the Armada was in sight. To-day we possess more of the spirit of the admiral himself, who, prepared to fight, refused to be upset till it was

turned over a new leaf or not, ought to go. 'He's made enough of a muddle of things already.' A general election and a Labour victory would be the best thing, but the Labour leaders 'don't really want to win.' One man said: 'The Tories have got the whole country into a mess. Why should the Labour Party try and clean it up for them? Let them do their own dirty work. The Tories would like to have an election and lose it. Then the Labour Party would be faced with an impossible position. It's just a trick to discredit the Labour Party.' The class laughed at this, and the speaker was told that he ought to contract out of politics just like he contracted out of the political levy.

The rest of the students feel that they are 'contracted in' to politics, whether they like it or not. The danger of war is very real. Even more the nervous strain of waiting for it. What makes everything so much worse is the universal feeling of impotence. 'We just can't do a thing about it.' 'The newspapers don't really tell us anything what's really happening. During the crisis it was all time-tables. 11.45 Lord Plushbottom received Mr. Popovitch. Reading between the lines is all very well if you're educated. It doesn't help us.'

Political interest and political education is, I think, certainly more widely diffused and more advanced to-day than formerly. Adult classes organised by the Workers' Educational Association have played an important part. So have the sixpenny books. So have Duranty, Fischer, Gedye, Gunther, Reed and Snow, to mention only a few of the journalists who are now writing books in the same simple English that they use for their newspaper stories. (One of my students handed back Nicolson's *Peacemaking* with the comment that he'd had to look up five words in the dictionary in the first two pages, and while he was very interested, life was too short. Books written by working journalists, on the other hand, are nearly always 'sure fire' with working-class students.)

But more knowledge does not as yet seem to be leading to more power. Only to a clearer realisation of individual helplessness.

OTTO BERKELBACH.

Front by all means. And get the Russians in. But that won't stop Hitler. He's a wild man. It'll have to come to a war sooner or later, so let's get it over with.'

Mr. Chamberlain's Birmingham speech got a worse reception than I had expected. One reaction was: 'All sob-stuff. And fake at that. The idea of him appealing for our sympathy because Hitler had let him down.' Another said: 'Chamberlain was carrying on that Hitler fooled him at Munich and led him up the garden path. If he was tricked like he said, he ought to resign and let someone else take his place who wouldn't be taken in like he was.' The most usual attitude to almost everything the Government does is one of suspicion and distrust. 'Chamberlain only come that strong line of talk at Birmingham to save his own political bacon. As soon as things quieten down he'll sell us out again like he's always done.' Sometimes this suspicion breeds really ingenious theories. The indestructible Anglo-Italian Agreement had come up for discussion: 'Chamberlain won't break it off with his pal Musso. If you ask me, I think old Chamberlain's got a lot of property over there in Italy and he don't want to see it destroyed by no air raids.'

Suspicion is directed much more against the Birmingham politician than against the Birmingham policy. The policy even receives guarded approval. 'If we could be sure that this new policy isn't just a front and that they're not just fixing up another sell-out behind the scenes, we'd feel a good deal better about it.' The pledge to Poland ('better late than never') was better received than the Birmingham speech, but it also provoked the questions: 'Why couldn't they have done something like this six months ago and saved Czecho?' and 'What about the Russians? If we leave them out in the cold, we're going to get the frost-bite ourselves.'

Two or three weeks back the class discussed the possibility of a new Government including Eden and Churchill. This was regarded as a good move by some (although one man pointed out that 'old Hitler had put up an embargo against those two') but not by most. The majority of the students refused to be impressed. Churchill still has a black mark against him from the old General Strike days, and Eden was described as 'foxy, just like Baldwin.' The general opinion was also that Chamberlain, whether he had really

Public reaction to the bombs and bombast of the Fascist dictators, sympathy for 'Czecho,' interest in the foreign situation generally, seem to be delicate plants. All my students agree that there was a rousing of public opinion last September and again in March of this year. All are equally convinced that the feeling will subside again to-day just as quickly as it died down after Munich. ('As far as we're concerned, we are interested anyway. But the others only wake up when the bomb goes off, and then go right back to sleep again.') On this point the students are a lot more pessimistic than their tutor. The utmost they will admit is that people will *perhaps* stay awake and feel themselves concerned with foreign affairs if *either* they are given a definite lead *or* if Hitler and Mussolini themselves 'keep the pot boiling over' with renewed aggressions at regular intervals. 'But the Government don't give us a lead. They blow hot and cold. Nor do the trade union leaders. Nor does the Labour Party, hanging around the doorstep of No. 10 Downing Street. Call themselves an Opposition.' Another voice: 'There's a lot of feeling just now. Yes. But it's all running to waste A month from now the whole business will be forgotten.' The 'passives' are interested for the moment only. If the moment is not seized, the mass again becomes inert.

The German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia provoked some furious discussions among the class members—the 'actives.' One trend of opinion saw in the rape of Czechoslovakia a final proof that the Germans are a race apart—inherently vicious. 'It's not just Hitler. It's the whole lot of them. They want to boss everything and everybody. There won't be no peace in Europe till Germany has been broken up into a lot of little provinces governed by the English or somebody else. They're not fit to govern themselves.' I reply that you cannot indict a nation, that a distinction must be made between the ordinary people, people like ourselves, and their Government. This line meets with a good deal of approval (especially from the aircraft workers' group) though the morose minority remains unconvinced. Another minority (a much smaller one) takes an all-the-way pacifist view. But most of the students want to see Hitler 'stopped'—by fighting if necessary. 'Let's have a Peace

signed away at Munich. Much worse was the feeling of complete impotence. 'They' do this and 'they' decide that. 'We' just have to sit round and let things happen to us. Nor do we know what 'they' are going to do next. 'They' are the Government, and primarily Mr. Chamberlain. 'The Cabinet moves in a mysterious way all right, but it don't seem to perform no ruddy wonders.'

People were startled, frightened, and finally annoyed during the September crisis. For a few days Hitler was a menace and Chamberlain a hero. A few weeks later the immediate danger of war seemed to have gone. Hitler had degenerated from a menace to a nuisance. Disillusionment about Munich and doubts about Chamberlain succeeded the mood of admiration. One view was that Chamberlain had been 'properly sucked in by that there Hitler.' More widely held was the opinion that the Government hated the reds so much that they were willing to let Hitler get away with anything, murder included.

Most of my class members thought that the protests to Germany, the conscience money for the Czechs, and the pretence of resistance (for example the mobilisation of the Navy) were dictated by aroused public opinion up and down the country. The men and women attending classes are by definition interested in international affairs, and tend to be very conscious of a distinction between themselves (the active) and the ordinary ruck of people (the passive). Class members were unanimous, during the last two months of last year, in saying that public opinion had died down upon the subject of foreign affairs. 'Everybody is fed up with it. Chamberlain doesn't get any claps when he comes on in the newsreel and they don't even hiss Hitler and Musso.' The amount and kind of noise made by cinema audiences during the showing of the newsreel seems to be not merely the best but the only way ordinary people have of 'feeling the pulse' of local opinion. 'You clap Maisky and others join in. You don't feel so isolated. Or a lot of people start booing Hitler. Kicking up a row during the newsreel is about the only way in which you can show your opinions in this so-called free country.' At the same time, criticism of the newsreel companies for 'ignoring real news' or 'soft-pedalling' is fairly widely expressed.

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING

I

THREE nights a week I travel out of London to talk to adult classes on international affairs. During the last month or so the topics have largely chosen themselves, and the class has usually insisted on discussing, and having its tutor discuss, the latest changes in the map of Europe. Interest centres around the two questions: 'What *ought* to be done about it?' and 'What can *we* do about it?'

One of these classes, in a new light industrial area, is fairly homogeneous. Its members are all skilled workers, for the most part employed in the aircraft industry. It includes two shop stewards, the chairman of the Trades Council and the secretary of the Education Committee of the local Co-operative Society. All are Labour Party supporters, but the balance between 'sobriety' and 'extremism' is well held. The other two classes are rather more mixed as to membership. One is composed mainly of lower middle-class co-operators; the other is more working class in character, and meets in the Community Centre of one of the newer L.C.C. housing estates. The first class includes a high percentage of 'foreigners'—Scots and north countrymen. The others are almost completely made up of southerners. Ages range from seventeen to fifty-four.

Adult education classes start in the early autumn and continue with weekly meetings until the following Easter. All the classes therefore began during the September crisis, and the 'fly, fly again' policy of the Prime Minister naturally set the theme for class discussions. To most of the students the Sudetenland crisis came as a bombshell out of the blue sky. There was no background of recent history to help explain events. No knowledge of geography to make clear the military and strategic importance of the mountain barriers

single quotation will serve to indicate his attitude to his subject and, incidentally, his style. 'In regard to a subject so delicate and beset with so many pitfalls as this of Mysticism, it were prudent to have recourse to an unimpeachable authority.' His authority, to which he shows the unquestioning obedience of the neophyte, is throughout that of the Roman Church. A non-Catholic or an atheist (though an atheist 'may almost be regarded as a Catholic in abeyance') will not therefore share his conviction that 'We . . . are able to view the matter (the condemnation of Fénelon's *Explication des Maximes des Saints*) as a whole, calmly and dispassionately.'

The matter 'as a whole' is one of great complexity and interest from a theological point of view. Fénelon's Quietism and his association with Mme. Guyon are problems that his biographers and critics have not been able to account for with Mr. May's easy and happy assurance. To understand them is to understand Fénelon. I am very far from being convinced that Mr. May understands them except in so far as his faith permits him to accept some points and to deny others. For example, it seems to me difficult to accept without grave misgiving his suggestion that the condemnation of Fénelon's book was 'not without its justification' because, many years later, Voltaire and Rousseau 'discerned in Fénelon their spiritual and intellectual prototype.' Even less convincing is the suggestion that there is a remote connection between Innocent XII's verdict and the fact that Fénelon '"by merit raised to that bad eminence" is the solitary ecclesiastic who appears among the miscellaneous demi-gods whose busts adorn the Pantheon.'

JOHN HAYWARD.

have done with five writers out of six. The book is first-class Collins from the *Three Friends* vintage—human and kind and wise and sensible. And it has one shining merit—it is one of the very few books I have read recently that was not just a little too long. I catch out the author on a point of detail: on page 264 he gives his hero one 'bus-change too many. But what splendid entertainment all through!

So there is the cross-section—first quarter of 1939; well up to the standard of any similar cross-section in 1938 or 1937. Indistinguishable from it? Perhaps. And if it is rather a terrible thought that the majority of its component items are already dead and forgotten, we must console ourselves with the reflection that next quarter will unfailingly produce another crop. For though the pace is hot and the supply unfaltering, saturation point is still apparently far away.

HILTON BROWN.

Fénelon, by J. Lewis May (Burns Oates, 10*s*. 6*d*).

Like Mr. Alfred Noyes, his fellow convert to Rome, Mr. J. Lewis May has chosen for the subject of his latest biography a man over whose conduct and writings it would be easy for a good Catholic to go astray. But unlike Mr. Noyes, Mr. May has written a study to which none of the faithful could possibly take exception. Stamped with the official *Imprimatur* and *Non Obstat*, it is a book that will give pleasure and doubtless comfort to all who share its author's convictions. To those without the law, however, its prejudices and preconceptions will doubtless appear dangerously misleading. Mr. May is not an authority on Fénelon or his age; nor is he a theologian competent to discuss with authority the central crisis in Fénelon's ecclesiastical career. His biography, he admits quite frankly, is not for the learned but, as he says, for those to whom Fénelon is 'little more than a vague legend—vague, but for some mysterious reason, singularly attractive.' I find his ignorance or innocence disarming. It is not possible to put very much confidence in even a popular writer who approaches his task with such phrases as: 'It seemed to me—it must have been whispered in my inward ear . . . I suspected . . . I divined . . I looked to find . . . I confess I found myself in rather deep waters' and so on. His own mystical experiences having made him, as he says, 'a liege-man of Fénelon,' it is not perhaps surprising that he has found in Fénelon exactly what he hoped to find. A

surely they must be coming out in shoals?—about the Crisis; her Crisis is enshrined in Caledon, an east (?) coast village cursed with a new aerodrome, a suspected spy and other drawbacks. By a clever trick of construction the story is told alternately by the Vicar's sifter and by Kay, a young woman who fled to Caledon with a gentleman to whom she was not married. (*And* their baby.) To read this book is as good fun as anyone could want; fun tempered by excitement and by one staggering dénouemental surprise—the neatest and completest I can remember receiving for a long time. There are unevennesses; the humour varies in quality, though its best is perfectly delightful; there are some rather dragging complications, perhaps a little over-plotting; the final trumped-up marriage between Kay and her companion seems to me out of character. But the technique is excellent—very little stated, everything conveyed; the veiled humour is for the connoisseur; the characterisation has insight; and the humanity—above all, the humanity—is irresistible. *Most* enjoyable. And if none of it goes very deep, who will not agree with Kay on Crisis Honour—'Perhaps the men who know that honour is more than life itself would have succeeded in wiping out the human race altogether by now if they had been able to get their women to understand the idea.'

Humanity is again the trump card of Mr. Collins; like Mrs. Adam's, his *Love in Our Time* is a slight surface-skimming tale. It is about a young married couple in a North London suburb, living on the modern car-and-wireless-but-no-baby principle, which is their only possible system of economics. Unfortunately a baby begins; they decide to get rid of it, very wisely change their minds and are left trying to make the best of both worlds. Overshadowing them are *her* father, Mr. Biddle, and *his* stepmother, Mrs. Sneyd—both grandly done. I cannot say why this book should be so delightful; Gerald was an immature, selfish young fellow (though surely his fall into transient unfaithfulness with Celia was too rapid and easy; he was selfish, but not lax) and neither Mr. Biddle nor Mrs. Sneyd were exalted characters. I think its success must derive from a supreme naturalness, a perfect verisimilitude, that simplicity which is the quintessence of skill. Even the Order of Mariners never gets out of hand—which it would

of the heroics of the Newbolt school, of John Buchan in his more sahibly Hannay mood and of the complacencies of 'modern' science, uttering the final word about all subjects; and it leads him to a thoroughly amusing interlude where the hero takes his mistress to the seaside only to be lectured unceasingly in the language of the advertiser. But the ship hardly carries enough guns. Something more like real satire is reached with the Moribundian working family—which is *our* working family as we, its 'betters,' serenely describe it; but Mr. Hamilton has to come back to our talking advertisements again and the fun wears thin. Doubtless these are cretinous to a degree and the guying of them will make, say, an amusing *Punch* article; but it won't make a 'satire,' it won't make a book.

Neither, beyond a point, will the drinks, night clubs and semi-promiscuity of Manhattan—Miss Powell's *Happy Island*; not even when told—as here—with the most selective observation, the crispest of Transatlantic styles and the smoothest technique. American writing of this type always seems to me like an American car—shining, streamlined, but with that brutal bull-nosed radiator. This is the easiest book in the world to read—as much for its speed and its slaughtering humour as for its savage incisiveness. (As an example of this last—'if most women had to choose between kissing and telling they would pick the telling.') Perhaps this *is* satire—satire by photography. But its progress is largely a matter of repeated stimulants, and in the end it falls into a marsh of hangover from which its authoress, lashing her horses, cannot drag it. I think a convention should be agreed that books about drinks and night clubs and assorted overlapping triangles should never exceed two hundred and fifty pages; this one stopped really about that point and could not carry its extra sixty. The stuff just won't run to it, slash and dazzle as you may. I am quite sure nobody could do it better than Miss Powell; but—'What a bunch of dopes we all are, thought Brent,' on page 282. Oh, boy, you said it!

I think I must be of those limited people who prefer their novels neither very long nor very deep. For the two books I *really* enjoyed last quarter were both short and both rather superficial. (But oh! so well done.) Mrs. Adam's *There Needs No Ghost* is the only novel I have read—and

much talk by Simon about Simon; I could have forgiven him his rather machine-made politics and sociology if he had refrained from reminding us that Lincoln said: 'You can fool——' and *so* on. He should have been 'past that,' as the schoolchild said.

Certain recent and bitter disappointments caused me to open Mr. Wells's story of *The Holy Terror*, Rud Whitlow, who grew up to revolutionise and rule the world, with almost shrinking apprehension. But in the first chapter something very like the old Wells led us into the story, throughout whose four hundred and fifty pages he never quite deserted us. There is, of course, a very great deal of political and social dissertation, a torrent, an avalanche of talk; but through it all the people remain people this time, and do not develop into mere talking-machines. They almost entirely escape—I say 'almost'—a certain tedium noticeable in some of their recent predecessors, and their creator's unique fountain of ideas is sparkling more brilliantly again, and with a stronger jet. I wish I could adequately express my gratitude for his adventurous nicety of phrase, for those inevitably apt Wellsian adjectives that are a lesson (and a despair) to us all. The story of Rud is much what you would expect; he rose, got beyond himself and had to be put away; his revolutionised world—if barely realisable—is at least credible *pro tem*. There is a remarkable freedom from sex; Rud had a little bother with women about page 360, but for the rest we are man-to-man. If the faithful cannot but sigh for Chitterlow, say, or Aunt Susan or the Captain of the *Golden Lion* or Sargon-King-of-Kings Preemby, let them make shift meantime with the current accounts of the storming of the Hyde Park platform, the final fight with the Purple-Shirts at the Canton Hall or the death of Steenhold—especially the death of Steenhold. For nobody on earth but Mr. Wells could have written them.

After fantasia, satire. Mr. Patrick Hamilton has devised a *Moribundia* where the inhabitants speak (or at least write) English backwards and conduct themselves as do persons in our more imbecile pictorial advertisements. There 'bus-conductors are the 'bus-conductors and plumbers the plumbers of our robuster comic Press. The idea is newish and diverting—if rather small beer. It assists its creator to good take-offs

in business.) The opening words: 'It was the fourth of August, 1914' will strike alarm in the reader, but the alarm is needless; the war is going on throughout the book, but it is hardly mentioned for the first hundred and fifty pages, and while it influences the fates of all the characters, it does so in a curiously external and objective manner—much as if they, as actors, bumped occasionally against a stage backcloth. I do not remember a war-book in which the war was for practical purposes so subdued; this although there is a strong and moving account of an old-style air raid and an appalling confinement while it was going on. The most interesting character, I thought, was the original and clearly drawn Phyllis Drayton; her affair with Brookfield in the South of France has a life and vigour denied to much of the rest. (But surely one agonising confinement is enough for one book; need Phyllis have come to one, too?) On points of detail—were there white feathers in early August of 1914, and did any chorus sing 'When we wind (*sic*) up the watch on the Rhine' at the Hippodrome as late as 1916? I have no doubt Mr. Church is right about these matters, which are, after all, trifles; I was more dismayed by his occasional sententiousness and a certain quality over the whole book I can only call dullness.

Christmas Holiday is about a nice young man called—quite suitably—Charley, who goes to Paris for Christmas to visit an old school friend, Simon, who has become rather desperately anti-social. Simon plants Charley upon a Russian lady, Lydia, who by some odd and perverse mental process is 'atoning' for her husband's crime of murder by her own degradation as a prostitute-dancer at a night club. After some blameless days—and nights—with this rather tortuously minded companion, Charley goes home again to his pleasant family, seriously upset by his experience. The book furnishes a picture of astonishing clarity; it is also credible and interesting—it is difficult to say why, unless simply because it is the work of an expert at his trade. For its people are not intriguing and the indirectly related murder story and its repercussions seem aiming at some effect they never quite achieve. The humbug art-loving and devotedly Francophile parents of Charley are delightfully presented, but as a whole Mr. Maugham does not do himself justice. There is too

Oliver's historical novel—the second of a series designed, I understand, to cover each a century of Scotland's history. I have said already that the novel fails of greatness; I could not but see it through a thin film of disappointment. But the book remains a fine achievement and any criticism of it must take into account the magnitude of the task its authoress has essayed. From Laud's Prayer-Book to Glencoe and Darien—methinks it is no journey! Short of altogether impossible length, can any novel cover a packed century of history and at the same time deal with its own private and semi-fictitious characters in such detail as to claim the reader's heart? I doubt it. Miss Oliver has strung the Scottish seventeenth century on the fortunes of a minor Border family, and the string will hardly carry the beads. Ordinary people in themselves, they may play a romantic but not a determining part in the nation's destinies; with the result that the great figures of the period—Charles II, Montrose, Leighton, Sharp, Lauderdale, Claverhouse—appear always as outsiders with an impression of being dragged in. Similarly much of the history has to be told *as* history and not in the adventures of its protagonists. There is a certain amount of 'period-making,' which although faithfully exact—as the portraits, notably that of Lauderdale, are faithfully exact—seems at the same time a little industrious. Miss Oliver's scheme for a book a century is a fine one; but is it superhuman? For many the task would be impossible, but Miss Oliver can call to her aid a comprehensive sense of proportion, a calm selective faculty of judgment, an impartial fairness and a gift for seeing history as a whole, that should carry her through. I would only suggest that next time she should make her heroes and heroines pull the string instead of merely providing it.

Greatly to my own loss, I believe, I did not read *The Porch*, of which Mr. Church's *The Stronghold* is the continuation; had I done so, I might have better understood and liked his hero, John Quickshott, who struck me on first acquaintance here as a rather self-conscious prig. There seemed to me to be an almost Kafka-like unreality about this young man's way of going about things, as there was a Kafka quality in the Civil Servants with whom he worked and the publisher who produced his dead friend's poems. (*I* never met a publisher like that anyway, and I doubt if he could have continued long

The Yearling is one of those books which serve as a milestone—and perhaps as a touchstone also. If you had told me that I could read four hundred pages about a couple of families—for the most part, indeed, a single family—living in hand-to-mouth semi-savagery in the back blocks of Florida, I would have derided you; but, in fact, the four hundred pages passed like a flash. I would not have backed myself to swallow—let alone to enjoy—a long story based on a little boy living in such circumstances, who tamed a fawn, kept it for a time very happily and then had to destroy it because it damaged his father's crops. In fact, again, I enjoyed every page—almost every page—of the book; and something like half a million people have bought it. The importance of such a book lies not only in its extraordinary charm, but in its extraordinary success—for its success *is* extraordinary. And not only extraordinary but encouraging. If a book such as this, depending solely on charm, fine writing, honesty, beauty and—let us say it—genius, can sell in such numbers, then the reading public must exercise a finer taste than some of us had supposed. For the book has no 'interest'—topical, local, controversial or psychological; it is undated (one of the characters was at Bull Run, but otherwise it is an ageless chronicle of seasons); it is situated nominally in Florida, but actually in a country so exotic that it might be Mars. It has no connection anywhere with any of us. And yet it is engrossing. Why? It can only be because of the sheer impact of its writing; such episodes as the dance of the cranes, the rattlesnake adventure and the visit of the lone wolf are told with an exquisite skill that catches the breath; and if many of the descriptions are assisted by the employment of odd and attractive local words, is not the just manipulation of these of the essence of poetry? In a sense the book *is* a poem. Too much hunting, too much cooking and eating? But these—in such circumstances—are the material of life. Too little story? There is no 'story' in such existences. The climax (the burning of the Hutto house) rather misplaced, the end a little leisurely? Perhaps. But against these minor criticisms must be set a triumph of sincerity and charm, of draughtsmanship and colour, of balance and power and cumulative effect. A very memorable achievement.

Next as a contribution to serious literature I take Miss

BOOK REVIEWS

Fiction

The Yearling, by Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings (Heinemann, 8*s*. 6*d*.)
Not Peace But a Sword, by Jane Oliver (Collins, 8*s*. 6*d*.)
The Stronghold, by Richard Church (Dent, 8*s*. 6*d*.)
Love in Our Time, by Norman Collins (Gollancz, 7*s*. 6*d*.)
The Happy Island, by Dawn Powell (Constable, 7*s*. 6*d*.)
Christmas Holiday, by W. Somerset Maugham (Heinemann, 7*s*. 6*d*.)
The Holy Terror, by H. G. Wells (Michael Joseph, 8*s*. 6*d*.)
There Needs no Ghost, by Ruth Adam (Chapman & Hall, 7*s*. 6*d*.)
Impromptu in Moribundia, by Patrick Hamilton (Constable, 7*s*. 6*d*.)

The tendency of our time is for the fiction review to become more and more a *pre*-view; the publisher prides himself on saying, 'reviewed by X.Y. on the Sunday before publication.' The present article is a review in the stricter sense of the word—a looking back over some of the fiction of the quarter just ended. The small selection of titles on which it is based is of necessity representative rather than exhaustive, but it furnishes perhaps a typical cross-section—of this or any other quarter. The cross-section contains a notable contribution to literature (*The Yearling*) by an authoress who has apparently written little else; an acquisition to the historical school (Miss Oliver's) which somehow falls short of greatness; a satire (*Moribundia*); the indispensable essay in Transatlantic verve (*The Happy Island*). One of our Great Names (Mr. Wells) does himself justice; another (Mr. Maugham) does not; and there is a not too successful challenge by a name of rising greatness (*The Stronghold*). And the cross-section contains also the two novels I *really* enjoyed—those of Mr. Collins and Mrs. Adam.

regards himself as a progressive (just as the *Open Letter to C. Day Lewis* should be read by every communist who is interested in his own literature and wants it to be a tonic, quickening Left opinion, instead of a dope, which a good deal of it is). The road Bell had at last decided on is not only interesting as a clue to his character, it is also important as being perhaps the best line of march to-day.

> Really all is lost—all decency or sense or moderation. The only thing now is to down the fascists with the minimum of loss and fuss. I should like to see a genuinely Borgia policy being practised against them. . . . As to the L.P. and policy, I really think we must stop being decent and democratic and liberal—except in public. As long as we are the opposition we had better oppose—when we are the government we can find some excuse for going back on everything we've said, if we want to. . . . Because if we're in for a period of force, fraud is cheaper and less destructive. But the liberal façade is useful, no doubt, especially when you are the opposition.

Of course there is nothing new about all this—a Machiavellian method for the sake of an ultimate Thélème. But has the proposal ever been ably tried out by men who wanted, instead of pretending to want, liberty and happiness everywhere? And is it true that power invariably corrupts a man? I do not think it would have corrupted Bell, had he ever attained to it. It was because he was honest that he urged fraud; and, whatever means or masks he might have used, he was too firm and acute, too candid with himself, ever to have swerved from his ends for the sake of ease or power. And his ends were liberal; they consisted simply of the rights of the individual expanded into modern forms.

Bell did not expect to live long; he had 'a feeling of responsibility about the idiotic and infernal muddle of the world,' and he knew perfectly well that this would be leading him into dangerous places before long. Two years before his death he announced in a letter home:

> I have had an extraordinarily happy and complete life, and would rather be killed violently than die any other way.

And that is his best epitaph.

PATRICK EVANS.

and there, yes, but no more. Everything is brought down to within the terms of common sense, the ordinary moment:

> There's a superb evening with incredibly solid mountainous clouds in which an inaudible thunderstorm is flashing like a windscreen on a wet night.

Like a windscreen—how cosy and domestic the simile! And how uncannily accurate, in a way. But it makes the gathering storm seem an unimpressive affair, which it evidently wasn't. Bell could not 'emote' beyond a certain point—an invaluable quality in, say, a chief of staff or a commissar—and had no time at all for losing himself in the mystery of ordinary things; he liked getting things done. I wonder whether he ever read Alain Fournier, and if so what he thought of him?

These letters from Wuhan are really the complicated, irregular notation of Bell's personal life at a time when he was becoming himself. Through the whole recurs constantly the same *motiv*, the craving for action. Describing for his mother and step-father, the painters Vanessa Bell and Duncan Grant, the medley of sights and sounds and smells which greet the visitor to the tropics, he says: 'I think you would have enjoyed it even more.' This on the voyage out; already he knows that the merely sensuous and visual enjoyments, the pleasure of simply watching life go by, which to the artist are almost everything, a psychological prey, an immense nourishment, an insatiable delight, are to him not quite satisfying; only half an artist himself, he wants something which offers him more opposition, something more practical, something he can get his teeth into. A year later, along with brief comments on lectures and sailing and shooting and the Chinese and Housman, he is writing long letters about the trend of European and world politics, the possibility of galvanising the Labour Party, and of putting into action the political line he has thought out himself as a desperate remedy, a kind of piratical social-democracy. 'I want to see if I'm right and if anything can be done in these directions, not to conduct intellectual propaganda.' He has travelled a long way from the time when practical politics were beneath discussion.

The letters in question should be read by everyone who

paradoxically if you like—more of himself goes automatically into his words. Similarly in the *Open Letter to C. Day Lewis*, which is really a little manual not so much on communist poetry as on how to make a successful revolution. Bell here is roused to the full use of his capabilities for close argument, logical cross-examination and poetic sensitivity, and as he goes along he reveals his ideal of a modern intellectual, which he himself was on the way to becoming—a cold, humane, semi-military, semi-Augustan character—a figure which fills the reader with respect and awe. This is the stature of the man Bell might have become, and in comparison with it the poems do not seem worth bothering about.

Both these prose-pieces were written from China. There is no room to describe at length the private letters Bell wrote in the same period, though I for one found them the most readable part of the book. They will not live as Letters; they never approximate to the glyptic graceful prose of a Fitzgerald, for instance. They are poured out quickly by a witty man with a precise and epigrammatic pen. Mentioning to his brother his shooting exploits in the countryside round Wuhan, Bell comments with a kind of sour humorousness:

> The dog has mange, and will probably soon be poisoned or shot, or get bitten by a snake. My gun is broken at the stock killing a snake. And so much for the country gentleman.

There are innumerable little sketches of natural scenes and everyday happenings which are equally a pleasure to read; here is Peking:

> The country is incredibly beautiful, powder-coloured: pale-blue sky, pale-ochre earth, pale-yellow trees: a grove of bamboos the colour of olives: China pines as fantastic as a small plant. Lovely Bactrian camels march the streets.

He goes running on, without transition:

> Everyone wears furs and houses are kept hot: my German hotel is admirable.

And that is typical. In his many descriptions there is not a single note of mystery, *la rivière de Cassis roule ignorée*, nothing of that sort. A transient glint of strangeness here

rare it—an *aperçu* which, read in its entirety, is deeper and re vivid than anything else he ever wrote. He could sense theory, the practice eluded him. He said himself that ing a Stephen it [writing] is in my finger-tips a good l,' but, 'I don't think it's my vocation.' The pity of it s that it was in his finger-tips and nowhere else. His ems are tantalising, they appeal to the reader's pleasure exact craftsmanship, but nothing more; they don't reach suspected nerves, they have no power or impact. Most them are still-lives or landscape impressions:

> Cold morning upon stubble, swede.
> Whirring, up sudden springs
> Covey of brown
> Birds. Blue barrel and black dot,
> Thud and thin smoke of double shot.
> Feathers drift down
> Slowly, from breast and wing.

hese sharp water-colours are expertly painted; Bell's ngers were deft, his eye was clear. But when Garnett says, Julian was first of all a poet,' he underrates a fine man; nd when he adds, 'in his poetry he escaped from all his urmoil,' he notes what was in fact just the trouble. Bell ever bothered to live safely, which is one reason why one annot help admiring him; but he wrote safely, most of the me, far too safely.

When he wrote as a writer, that is to say. When he had ome practical end in mind and his subject overlapped on he world of action he produced his best. While his straight' poems are almost unreadable, his anti-war satire *Arms and the Man* (which appeared in *New Signatures*) is xcellent entertainment. And his essay on Roger Fry, where e makes an analysis of Fry's curious and unique *savoir-vivre* nd relates it to social and political necessities of the day, s much better: more exciting, because in it one senses omething of the meat and aura of Bell's own inner struggle. Setting out deliberately to discover whether there is not 'a possibility of learning something of use to us in the art of iving' ('us' being himself and his fellow socialist intellectuals), he feels that more is involved; he is excited by the issues he visualises, issues outside and beyond himself, and—

years later did he come to abhor vacuum, and even then not altogether.

But in the meantime he took his degree, worked and thought hard, and set his eyes on a fellowship. His writings were mainly academic, a dissertation on Pope's poetry and another on some applications of Ethics to Æsthetics and Politics; 'practical politics were beneath discussion'; and by way of credo he cultivated anarchism, 'anarchism of the most philosophical, anarchism in the mode of Blake and Dostoievsky.' For the rest, he perpetually enjoyed himself, beagling and dining and making love.

Yet some time the glass chamber had to crack apart, sooner or later there had to be an inrush of rude fresh air, to blow the gas away. Bell obtained in 1935 a post as Professor of English in Wuhan National University, a move which he regarded as 'the most drastic step I've ever taken after getting born.' Probably it was: a year and a half later he felt unable any longer to remain outside the urgency of events in Britain and Western Europe; resigned his post, paused awhile in England to train as an ambulance driver, and went out to Spain. His stay in China was in fact the period of his psychological metamorphosis, the period when after much deliberating within himself he changed from an intellectual into a man of action. *Douceur de vivre* and anarchism of the most philosophical no longer satisfied him. The vacuum had filled up at last.

One consequence of the change of heart was his death; another, that he will be remembered by more than his family and friends. The work he turned out during the last year of his life may yet exert an influence; all that he turned out before will not.

For there is no doubt that as a writer pure, Bell was a failure. He could never put his whole forces into the act—whenever he sat down to his typewriter he left so much of himself behind. Principally emotion; he could never write a poem like *Amergin*, or *Sir, no man's enemy*, or Canon Gray's *Song of the Stars*. He was an alive critic, he could recognise in other writers and in life the strange electric quality which his own productions lacked; in one of his China letters there is a brilliant half-page on 'the gut-blood-heart of "reality,"' and the fact that all but a few writers so far have failed to

rather wholesale with Shaw as leading light, Wells as more substantial (his Utopias were really inspiriting), and the Statesman (of the day) and *New Leader*.' Thus enjoyably crammed with undigested ideas, he was in due time shifted from school for an *au pair* sojourn in Paris, where Anatole France and poetry became his pabulum and where he wrote his own first poems: about Nature, and probably too about his own moods, the slighter and more transient ones, the ones which gave him least bother.

Then Cambridge: King's, in the autumn of 1928. His schooldays had been a shock to his whole emotional system and had sent him recoiling into himself: coming as they did on top of a zestful, positive childhood in which he was 'not punished, but reasoned with,' and of which several years were spent in the country, Bevis-fashion. From encountering him once or twice at Leighton Park, when I was a small boy, I remember an enormous bulky person, towering, very untidy, with a shock of red hair over a large brow, and occasional stiff gestures; I felt powerfully (though whether I ever formulated this to myself I don't know) that here was someone who was always afraid, always anxious to attack and argue because, *au fond*, he was always on the defensive. Luckily, it appears that Cambridge changed all that, the defiance and the awkward stance. David Garnett, in an introductory portrait, typifies Bell's 'varsity phase as 'endless laughter; endless disputation,' and gives a nice depiction of the confident, forthright man Bell had developed into. And in his own 'Notes for a Memoir' (included in the present volume) Bell records:

> The whole period was one of great expansion and a feeling of richness and possibilities in the world. I published my first poems, in *The Venture* and *Cambridge Poetry*, that autumn; I had a car, and my own room, furniture, pictures—all the amenities of Cambridge at its best. There was an extraordinary *douceur de vivre*.

He made many friends, most of whom were members of the Apostles Society:

> My first meeting . . . was terrifically impressive. . . . I really felt I had reached the pinnacles of Cambridge intellectualism.

Cambridge intellectualism, or undergraduate intellectualism anywhere else—vacuum to the *n*-th power! Not until several

JULIAN BELL[1]

JULIAN BELL was a brave and talented and exuberant man, who died when his talents were on the brink of flowering. The bomb from an insurgent aeroplane which killed him when he was driving an ambulance on the Brunete front on July 18th, 1937, in his twenty-ninth year, killed much more than the man who has left a handful of crystalline but almost worthless verse, one or two dissertations on academic subjects, and a few pamphlets on politics and policy. More, even, than the man his friends knew and miss; his death is a loss even to those of us who did not know him at all, or knew him slightly. For with his brains and determination and zest he might have become a powerful catalyst, a reformer and constructor, in the political and social life of England to-day, and in the years approaching.

He was the son of Clive and Vanessa Bell, grandson of Leslie Stephen, nephew of Virginia Woolf, first cousin once removed of 'J. K. S.' and H. A. L. Fisher (as Professor Keynes reminds us in a foreword to *Essays, Poems and Letters*). Coming of this stock, he was bound to be brilliant and a bit of a cynosure. But unfortunately, by some accident of temperament and milieu, an accident too complicated for an outsider to analyse, he was displaced; he never found his right field. Born to be a man of action, he devoted himself to writing. He lived all but the last few months of his twenty-nine years in a vacuum.

First there was the usual vacuum of adolescence—the time when one discovers atheism, socialism and Maupassant, has the most heartrending and exultant emotions, and is left flat in-between-times. Bell, in those unhappy, mob-hunted days at a Quaker public school, read books like a pigeon gobbling peas. He tells us his outlook was 'taken over

[1] *Essays, Poems and Letters.* With contributions by J. M. Keynes, David Garnett, Charles Mauron, C. Day Lewis and E. M. Forster. (The Hogarth Press.)

IV

BURY the broken body of the Jew
In European earth: Europe-to-come
And Europe, in one flesh. Cover the flesh
With European earth, lest all behold
What each one slaughtered with the others' hands.
And let flesh rot, and wandering have an end.

But all's imperfect. Time and history,
As one flesh, wander towards impossible death;
The innocent bloodstained, and the guilty clean.

CHARLES SCHIFF.

III

Bright daffodils : the rabble dressed in gold,
And, dressed in gold, no rabble. Birds in flight :
Generations we shall not behold.
Young crocuses : young Europe.

Time, this yellow flower just begun,
Lifts up its crown beyond all toil of sight
For ever to the not-yet-bitter sun.
But, born, the child is agèd.

I have no issue but the fabulous—
Young crocuses : young Europe. But the night
Brings generations that are pitiless,
And, as night falls, I tremble.

March, 1939.

II

To look on Europe with Isaiah's eyes
And see our casual bodies breeding Time
In the outrageous world that we inherit,
Is to inherit, in our generation,
Mere history, and hand on barrenness:
We shall be childless, and our children childless,
As they were childless that begat our bodies.
But to inherit what no man bequeathes,
And to bequeathe what all men may inherit,
Is to be fruitful in despite of loins.
Then am I each man's child and all men's father:
Europe is born. Before Isaiah's eyes
Europe is born, and by our generation.

POEMS

EUROPE

I

THE melancholy coming of great glory—
Pity electing each to his coarse fate,
And every common man the flesh of Europe—
Is borne, our fateful flesh, about the streets
For eyes to see : our bodies have their eyes,
And our eyes see our fate, and everywhere
One great fate gives meanness majesty.

It is majesty that makes us men,
And meanness must beget it. We are borne,
Mean in our own despite, from street to street :
The time seeks its fulness everywhere ;

And everywhere the fulness of the time.

no positive word to offer.' Their theology denies them any religious warrant for speaking such a word, and when some of their leaders attempt to discover one they open themselves to the charge that they are false to Reformation theology.

Catholics would say that only from the dogma of a connection between God's will as known in the 'Natural Law,' and His will as known through the Revelation of Grace, is it possible to give a more positive content to a religious doctrine of the State. They could point to the fact that at periods in which Christianity has accorded highest and most positive functions to the State and the social order, has it also been most readily critical of their actual social embodiments. With a doctrine of the State as merely God's instrument for social protection against the ravages of sin it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Reformation Theology, which insists with peculiar emphasis that the effects of sin are infinite, should logically hold that the coercive power of the State must be infinite.

In a pamphlet, *Rechtfertigung und Recht*, Barth appears to have given a more positive social function to the State than in his other works, but mainly in order the more clearly to define its limits, especially in relation to the Church. But the most striking slip away from his uncompromising tenet that the Gospel and Civilisation belong to unrelated worlds has been made in a letter to a professor in Prague on September 19th, 1938,[3] in which he said: 'Every Czech soldier who will fight and suffer will fight and suffer for all of us and—I say this without reserve—also for the Church of Jesus Christ.' Niebuhr cannot be gainsaid when he comments: 'In all the years before this crisis his "no" to the problem of culture and civilisation was too unreserved, and in the hour of crisis his "yes" is too unreserved.' It will be interesting to see how Barth will justify his speaking this utterance as a Swiss democrat and holding that he does it as a Professor of Reformation Theology.

V. A. Demant.

[3] An extract, with comment by Reinhold Niebuhr, from *Radical Religion*, appears in *Theology*, March, 1939.

reason it would give even less religious warrant for comparing the economic and cultural conditions in different social orders. Liberal religion tends to make its own social judgments with purely secular criteria, holding its own best reasons to be the Word of God, and claiming perhaps the ethics of Christianity as the highest standard. The Christian message for society is then equated with society's own best message for itself, and there is no absolute decisive Christian truth which enables one form of society to be judged more Christian than another. This Liberal Christian thought assumes the possibility of extending to the social whole, by a natural expanding process, the moral standards of brotherhood, service and stewardship which are conceived to be the recognised relation of individuals to one another. No more in the case of society than in the case of the individual is a radical transformation necessary, for on this view there is no fundamental contradiction in man.

But the same result is reached in the Reformation outlook with a totally different theology. Because the gulf between God and the actual world is so utter and complete, there remains no tension between religion and society which could affect the latter. On this side of the gulf man has no criterion but a secular one. Luther left the ordering of society to 'the Princes' much as modern Liberalism has left it to 'the experts'; for there can on neither of these assumptions be any *religious* warrant for judgments upon the social structure. Barth is in the difficulty that his theology has no positive standards for judging a political order; only the negative one of peace, justice, and freedom for the Church. This last concern has naturally taken a predominant place in his mind owing to the experience of the Confessional Church in Germany. But those Christians who are struggling to find some point of contact between their Gospel message and the needs of the national situation have some ground for complaint that Barth's intransigent 'hands-off' attitude is of no help. On the other hand, it is probable that he has no alternative as a faithful exponent of Reformation theology, for it seems to be the tragedy of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches that the situation presents them with a challenge: 'here is a serious human, social and national crisis which goes down to the religious roots of life, and your Churches have

Barth vehemently denies. The position seems therefore to be that Catholicism stands in a state of tension in which, it claims, lies its vitality, while Reformation theology and liberal religion have snapped the tension, each movement taking its own element and making a mutilated whole out of it.

The second question remains, namely the curious phenomenon that Reformation religion has been in fact the historic parent of the Liberalism in religion which is its dialectical opposite. In this article its implications can but be recorded, for to explain it would involve one of the profoundest problems of human existence. It is an outstanding example in the modern religious world of what Heraclitus called *enantiodromia*, the passing of a thing into its opposite, which marks so many historic turns of the human spirit. There is matter for interesting speculation in the fact that in the seventeenth century it was men of Calvinist upbringing, like Grotius and Locke and Althusius, who sponsored the development of purely secular interpretations of natural rights, unchecked by any doctrine of man's sinfulness and need of Grace. And this is matched in our own day by the converse spectacle of the welcome given to Barth's influence by those who have become disillusioned with the Liberal optimism which has been so shaken by world events.

There is a further example of the curious and enigmatic relation between Barth's position and that of religious Liberalism in the fact that the attitude of the Church to the world in the two cases, though theologically at opposite poles, nevertheless in practice comes to very much the same thing. In his penultimate lecture on *The State's Service of God*, Barth reiterates the genuine Reformation teaching that the political order is an instrument of God's governance of the world, even when it is a bad power. This happens, he says, and its service of God is 'obscured,' whenever the political power violates or suppresses justice and peace for its own advantage, or fails to provide freedom for the true Church, or becomes itself the false church. Now this is a reaffirmation of the doctrine of the State as a 'dyke against sin' given by God to prevent society's self-destruction, and with this doctrine men have a very negative and restricted criterion for judging between one kind of state and another. And with stronger

always liable to take it as the sole mode of divine revelation. There is thus in all natural knowledge of God an element of sinful misuse which is only eradicated when the mind of the redeemed Christian returns to the apprehension of God's immanent activity with the light solely given him by the transcendent God's self-revelation of Himself in the saving work of Christ and His Church. The two poles of Catholic religious philosophy have led to varying emphases one way or another within the Catholic ethos itself, and the interplay has been the substance of its vitality. The resurgence of Reformation teaching by Barth makes absolute, final and exhaustive the element of alienation between the world and God; religious liberalism minimises the factor of alienation and confines all God's action to His Spirit in the created world. Barth and the Liberals thus fasten each on to one of the two moments which are held in energising synthesis in the Catholic tradition.

When the Liberal Christians look at Barth they object to him for the same reason as they object to Catholic Christianity. And Barth has had to defend himself against the charge that he has Catholic leanings.[2] The defence is conclusive. When Catholics look at Barth they welcome his insistence that no religion which does not state the need for and offer the Gospel of Grace can claim the name of Christian. They would endorse the implications of his teaching that for those who take their stand upon natural religion alone there is no answer to nordic state-paganism, for there is then no authentic criterion for supposing that the democratic progressivism of the last century is more Christian than the cult of blood and soil. On the other hand, Catholic theology insists, against Reformation teaching, that while the Kingdom of God is not to be identified with any actual or possible achievement, it is a regulative criterion for the social order. It would repudiate the denial that the particular revelation given in Christ has any connection with a general revelation of God in nature and history, and in this repudiation it can appeal to the Pauline doctrine of the cosmic Christ as agent of creation. And Catholicism has always been jealous to defend religion as a guardian and purifier of civilisation, a responsibility which

[2] *The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life.* By Karl Barth (Frederick Muller, 1939. 5s.).

grace can he know God in any sense as Creator and Holy Spirit. While religious liberalism inclines to see man as a self-contained whole in a relation of continuity and affinity with the divine, Barth expounds the Reformation Christianity which sees man, apart from Grace, as a fallen whole, in a polemic and contradictory relation to the divine.

These are clear and uncompromising oppositions, and they raise some very strange questions concerning the religious situation of to-day. For one thing, Barth holds that Catholic Christianity is open to the same charges which he brings against liberal modernist religion, in that both take some achievement of man upwards as the Word of God which in his view only comes to man downwards. In view of the historic controversies between Catholics and religious Liberals, this charge raises serious issues. And, further, Barth's momentous challenge presses us to ask how and why religious liberalism should have emerged in the modern world under the ægis of non-catholic Christianity, and how it comes about that this Reformation teaching and the Liberal Christian position, which is its theological opposite, should both be wearing the same Protestant hat.

With regard to the first of these two questions, it is noteworthy that religious Liberals hold both Catholicism and Reformation teaching to be in error for stressing the antimony between God and the world. Barth places both Catholicism and Liberal Christianity under the condemnation that they assume a natural link between the two which can become an object of man's religious apprehension. This situation illuminates the fact that Catholic religious thought has a certain tension between the two positions which are constantly threatening to fall apart, and which have actually fallen apart in the modern non-Catholic world. It holds on to the truth that the fallenness of the world has not so utterly obliterated the link between Creator and creation that there can be no natural knowledge of God's hand in the temporal order, and that therefore man may discern something of His immanent activity in creation anterior to His redeeming action in the Saviour. But it holds also that this natural knowledge is not the deepest, most clear, most intimate, and necessary, of the ways in which God speaks to man. It gives but a darkened and perverted vision to unredeemed human nature which is

two such religious outlooks which have been, in actual theological history, at variance with one another. Both are for him vitiated by the error of natural religion, though the religious Liberal will object to Barth and to Catholicism for the same reason, namely that he is called upon in both systems to submit his natural knowledge to the test of a supernatural revelation. Barth's severest strictures are reserved for the liberal modernists with their assumptions of a 'continuity' between man and God which can be deepened by man's natural powers. For him, Grace, which offers to man a new life in God, does not set the seal of God upon the highest in the created order, but is a contradiction of all that is human, even its very best. Man is not qualified by his specific endowments to receive the divine revelation, but is called by God, for no other reason than His inscrutable will, to accept it as given in His Word which has no other content than Jesus Christ. There can be no knowledge of God, and therefore of the meaning of existence, in man's understanding of nature, history, philosophy or of his own soul. This theology has clearly no word of appeal except to those who already have made the act of submission *sola fide* to the specific revelation of God's word in the Holy Scriptures.

To the tendency in Liberal Christianity to seek man's knowledge of God in His immanent activity, Barth opposes a resolute doctrine of transcendence wherein God is understood as in no slightest degree revealed in the world order. God speaks to man in no sense *through* the created world but only *to* him in order to redeem him from its snares. In opposition to liberalism's Pelagian optimism about man's power of self-improvement and progress, Barth reiterates a doctrine of radical sinfulness. He will have no equating of the Kingdom of God with any achievement in the time process, and declares the Kingdom to be an eschatalogical fact towards which all terrestrial conditions stand in a relation of contradiction and under judgment. In contrast to the liberal humanist habit of placing Jesus Christ within a process of general revelation, even where He is held to be the highest manifestation of it, Barth upholds the revelation of God in Christ as convicting of utter darkness and error and pretension all man's gropings after divine truth. He insists that man can know God only as Saviour, and that only as believer in saving

the first of his Gifford Lectures [1] Barth recalls that he replied to the lecture invitation by reminding the Senate of the University that he was 'an avowed opponent of all Natural Theology' for the promotion of which study Lord Gifford's endowment was made. The invitation to lecture was, nevertheless, sustained and then accepted. The lecturer opens his exposition by declaring that 'it can only be to the good of "Natural Theology" to be able once again to measure itself as the truth—if it is the truth!—by that which from its point of view is the greatest of errors,' namely the knowledge and the service of God according to the teaching of the Reformation. The lectures consist of a theological paraphrase and elucidation of the *Confessio Scotica* written by John Knox and his friends in 1560. It has to be admitted that Barth has put his challenge in a way that gives him a certain impregnable advantage. He expressly does not enter into discussion with his opponent representatives of 'Natural Theology,' and he somewhat queers the pitch by asserting that 'the Reformation teaching does not live by its antithesis to "Natural Theology" in the way in which the latter lives by its antithesis to Reformed teaching.' This is an astonishing statement in view of the vitality of Natural Theology both within and without the Church long before Barth, or even Luther, appeared.

The main positions of Barth's teaching are presented in these lectures with a lucidity and downrightness that could not be bettered for English readers. It would be hard for anyone to confute his claim to have recovered the authentic note of Reformation Theology. But for that very reason his message raises the question of the significance and truth of this theology, as well as the question whether it is the theology of the original Gospel, as he would, with Luther and Calvin, claim it to be. Now, it is noteworthy that Barth's teaching is set in opposition to two other religious traditions which he regards as variants of the same error. These are Catholicism and Liberal Christianity. It will help us to assess the importance of this stout champion of Reformation Theology if we ask how he can combat with the same weapons

[1] *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation*, recalling the Scottish Confession of 1560. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in 1937 and 1938. By Karl Barth. Translated by J. L. M. Haire and Ian Henderson (Hodder and Stoughton, 1938, 12s. 6d.).

KARL BARTH AND THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION

There is, at the least, one inestimable benefit which Karl Barth is conferring upon this generation. He is compelling all who have a responsible place in the religious world to define and clarify their position. Or, it would be truer to say that he would compel them to do so if they used him in the way he would feel most honoured to be of service. There has, however, been little real antithetic discussion in England with the theology he so resolutely and astringently represents. On the Continent his work has put a new vitality into the Lutheran and Reformed Churches and has engaged in energising controversy some of the stoutest thinkers of the Roman Catholic Communion. In this country his influence has provoked a considerable reaction in Free Church circles against liberalising and humanist interpretations of Christianity. A group in the Anglican Church under the impulse of the late Sir Edwin Hoskyns has found in it a rediscovery of the Gospel, in some cases as a welcome contrast to a dreary social-leaven presentation of the Faith, in others as a relief from questionings about the Church-and-State problem, and in others, still, as a rapier to fend off a certain thrust of Thomist catholic philosophy into Anglican thought. While there have been expositions and interpretations in plenty, there has been no serious attempt by representatives of the religious positions which ought to be most disturbed by it to confront in fruitful controversy this most strident voice in the theological world. In this short essay I am setting out some of the issues which, as I think, such a real discussion would raise, without claiming to handle them with any measure of finality.

Barth has now invited those whose religious presuppositions he implacably opposes to sharpen their convictions by answering his presentation of Reformation Theology. In

perfectly disciplined and full-toned, to which latter quality the acoustics of the house lend powerful support. If the acting, *per se*, is not much to shout about, no more can be said for the big opera companies of the world. It is noticeable, however, that several of the singers here have a fine presence, which somewhat less rigidity would make doubly effective. More still than in straight acting, the art of maintaining a graceful bearing in immobility is vital to an operatic actor, for it very frequently happens that the protagonist of a certain part has to make up, by sheer force of acting, for a physique totally unsuited to the character portrayed. It is asking too much of nature to bestow upon one mortal the voice and the looks, not to mention other attributes such as physical resistance, intelligence, a psychological insight into the part and the power to express it, which go to make the ideal Tristan. But so much has already been achieved at Sadler's Wells that one can be optimistic about the future.

The repertory of the 'Wells' is certainly of wider scope than at Covent Garden, but it seems that still more could be done towards making known the few operas by British composers and, especially, encouraging the creation of new ones. It must be remembered that, however good the performances of foreign works may become, perfection cannot be attained when they are given in a language other than that for which they were written. For this reason, among others, a new opera by Vaughan Williams (whose *Hugh the Drover*—one of the extremely rare English operatic masterpieces—will be performed by the 'Wells' company at the Festival) would be a welcome event for London's true opera house.

Last, but not least, because of the growing popularity of this form of art, the Sadler's Wells Ballet Company has gained immensely in prestige over the past few years. Here again the value of team-work is vividly brought home in the perfect understanding between the stage, dancers and scenery, and the music, orchestra and composers. During the last season or so, in particular, new ballets have been created which reflect the greatest credit on our English school as a whole. With a choreographer such as Frederick Ashton and a composer-conductor such as Constant Lambert, we can look forward to still finer achievement.

JACQUES BORNOFF.

surroundings.' By the end of the century a theatre had been built where famous actors and music-hall artists appeared, including the clown Joe Grimaldi, but the establishment gradually lost prestige and, when Lilian Baylis purchased the building in 1927 on behalf of the Old Vic Opera and Drama Company, it was lying 'empty and half-demolished.' The reconstruction of the building and the reconstitution of the Old Vic Operatic Company which was to occupy it were almost entirely due to the enterprise of this remarkable woman who, in 1931, brought the Sadler's Wells Opera Company into existence.

While neither the building itself nor the production is on the grandiose scale of Covent Garden, this institution embodies all that is most admirable in British musical tradition. To use a word somewhat foreign to musical subjects but very dear to the English, the secret of the growing prestige of Sadler's Wells may be said to be its 'team-work.' Here, the powers-that-be have apparently realised the true meaning of the word production, and nowhere is the blend of visual and aural appeal more naturally achieved. The chief reason for this is that the modern conception of opera (and the 'Wells' is in the forefront where healthy modern practices are concerned) tends increasingly towards greater homogeneity at the expense of the 'star' system What is lost in the kind of thrill afforded by a voice of great magnificence—and, to be quite frank, although the average of singing is on a very high level, there are few such voices here—is regained a thousandfold in the fine balance and perfect blending characteristic of these performances. Moreover, if this company be typical of the present-day school of voice-production, it is obvious that a complete change has taken place in the last few years. Throaty tenors and fluty sopranos are, one is grateful to say, memories of the past. It is also highly gratifying to find the lesser rôles filled by singers fully competent to take their part in the ensemble; only too often, in the great opera houses abroad, ordinary performances—as opposed to Festival performances—are marred by poor singing in secondary rôles. As might have been expected here, the chorus is a wonderfully flexible body with a truer tone than that of most similar foreign bodies. There is not a very large orchestra at the 'Wells,' but it is very efficient,

usually happens that the conductor in charge at Covent Garden is familiar with their renderings; thus disaster is avoided. In fact, under such conditions, surprisingly good results are sometimes obtained. In spite of the shortcomings of these performances it is a great boon to be able to hear Wagner's operas with the principal rôles filled by the really great exponents of the present day (these can be counted on the fingers of one hand), but it cannot be denied that homogeneity is a word unknown at Covent Garden. So much for the 'Grand Season.'

It must always remain a source of mystery to a foreigner that a city of London's importance, possessing one of the most perfect opera houses in the world—indeed, the acoustics of Covent Garden are generally considered to be second only to those of La Scala of Milan—should not have a permanent opera company comparable with those in continental centres. This lack is certainly not due to want of trying: at various times during the last sixty years several English operatic companies have come into being which, after a short successful period, have either become semi-obscure touring companies or slowly died out. The Carl Rosa Company, which enjoyed an immense reputation for about ten years, from its inception in 1875, is an example of the former, and Beecham's famous B.N.O.C. of 1922 of the latter. The question of non-survival of our national opera companies bears directly on the attitude of the nation, as a whole, to opera. Because of a temperament not naturally suited to the requirements of opera, namely the characteristic reluctance of the English to show any emotion, British singers have rarely achieved eminence in this form of art. It has been shown, however, what British choirs have achieved through the sterling musical gift of self-discipline, and it is this very same quality which lends peculiar interest to the significant development of permanent opera in London.

At Sadler's Wells the great operatic public in this country has, at last, a theatre where regular performances are given to packed houses nearly the whole year round. The story of how the 'Wells' came into being is surely one of the strangest in the history of the world's opera houses. In 1638, a Mr. Sadler opened a 'music house' by the side of the New River 'where patrons could drink the excellent steel waters and listen to the strains of pipe and dulcimer in charmingly rural

medium, but one to which the English took very quickly, rather, one suspects, because of the social glamour with which it has been associated than through genuine liking for the art as such. The International Season, held now for many years at the Royal Opera, Covent Garden, has always had as its main object the production of a popular repertory by the finest international artists available; this means, roughly, a season of Verdi, Puccini and other Italian operas on the one hand, and Wagner and Strauss on the other, with very occasional out-of-the-way works, either by way of experiment or in a sense of forlorn duty to British composers who have attempted to write for this 'alien' medium. Works like Gounod's *Romeo et Juliette*, Meyerbeer's *Les Huguenots* and other operas of the French school were very popular as vehicles for showing off the great voices of the eighteen-nineties and nineteen-hundreds, but are now almost completely neglected at Covent Garden. It will be seen that the word 'popular' applies equally to *La Bohême* and to the *Ring* in full—in fact, ever since its first English production, in 1882, the *Ring* has been the mainstay of every German season. In one important sense, however, this word 'popular' is a fallacy; the exorbitant prices which have, of necessity, always been the rule during the 'Grand Season' prevent a vast number of genuine opera lovers from attending.

When allowance has been made for the change in taste during the last few decades, it will be found that the standard of performances at the International Season has not varied much with the years. Just as the eighteen-nineties had their Melba and de Reszkes and the nineteen-hundreds their Destinn and Caruso, so to-day a dazzling galaxy of 'stars' is assembled at Covent Garden for a few weeks each spring, although it must be said that considerably less glamour, and therefore probably more musicianship, surround the present-day singers. There is the usual repertory of confirmed masterpieces, and if, by any stroke of chance, the principals happen to have arrived (by aeroplane more often than not) a day before the actual performance in which they are due to appear, there is a possibility of co-ordination between the 'stars' and the rest of the production. Nevertheless, these singers have travelled the world over to interpret certain rôles with which they have come to be associated, and it

Strange to say, although renowned for the beauty of their tone, Welsh choirs do not, as a rule, shine in the interpretation of classical works; it is the 'industrial North' which has produced our greatest bodies. The Norwich Choral Festival goes back, in an amateur form, to 1770, although that city's choir has of later years been outclassed by the Sheffield and Leeds choirs. The frequency of choral festivals in the north of England has served to maintain a healthy spirit of emulation between the various choirs, and occasional visits to London have always been a regular feature. But the year 1911 must certainly have witnessed a record, when the Norwich, Sheffield and Leeds choirs appeared at the London Music Festival and sang, respectively, Elgar's *Dream of Gerontius*, Bach's B Minor Mass, and Bach's *St. Matthew's Passion*.

London's own choral bodies, however good they may be, have not always had such a good chance of survival as their provincial counterparts. One finds, for example, that the 'Sacred Harmonic Society' was reaping golden opinion for its singing at the Crystal Palace Handel Festivals, under Sir Michael Costa, towards the close of the last century; it nevertheless disappeared in 1887. The explanation probably lies in the fact that the northern choirs had built up for themselves such a reputation that their occasional descents on the metropolis were an overwhelming triumph, which had unavoidable repercussions on the Londoners' popularity. To-day, however, three great London choirs can always be sure of a large audience at their performances of the standard classic masterpieces, of which the *Messiah* is an almost certain 'draw'; they are the Philharmonic Choir, the Royal Choral Society and the B.B.C. Choral Society. The Bach Choir, lighter in calibre, is justly famed for its interpretations of the works of the master whose name it bears; it was founded in 1875 for the purpose of giving the first performance in this country of Bach's great Mass in B Minor. One of the outstanding events of the forthcoming Festival will be a performance of the *Dream of Gerontius* by a special choir composed of the very best singers from the Royal Choral Society and the Bradford, Croydon and Huddersfield choirs; it is not difficult to imagine the thrilling effect which such a combination is likely to produce.

In its present form opera has been an essentially 'foreign'

sensitive of our orchestras, and most aristocratic in its poise, is the L.P.O. The string section has a passionate lyricism which induces that 'singing' quality typical of the famous Viennese orchestras. Sir Thomas Beecham seems to devote loving care to the woodwind, which, incidentally, boasts a very great artist in its first oboe, Leon Goossens, and if it be true that an orchestra reflects the personality of its chief conductor, one need not seek far for the reason for the elegance and delicacy of phrasing of this body. To hear its playing of a Haydn or Mozart symphony one might believe that Beecham created it purposely to serve these two composers, for whom he has a particularly warm feeling. There is no greater contrast imaginable than that between the London Philharmonic Orchestra and the gigantic B.B.C. Symphony Orchestra; this latter is a mighty body, splendidly sinewy, but it has sometimes been known to convey the impression of machine-like power, power without warmth. It may be the ever-growing stature of its conductor, Sir Adrian Boult, or perhaps the increasingly frequent occasions for contact with Arturo Toscanini, but to-day every limb of this orchestra is animated by an intense warmth of feeling which gives a thrilling effect to its full-bodied strings. Lastly, mention must be made of the excellent work being done by several string orchestras, of which the one founded a few seasons ago by Boyd Neel makes a body of rare artistry; there is a growing public for this pleasant type of music-making, which has the double merit of bringing to light much good ancient music for strings and of encouraging contemporary composers to write for this medium.

Whatever musical visitors to England may have had occasion to think about our orchestras, there is one sphere of activity in which Britain has always been pre-eminent, namely choral music. While there have been notoriously few really great British singers, the invaluable quality of self-discipline has made British choirs second to none. The attack of German choirs can be as unanimous as the clicking of heels of an army company coming to attention, and the Italians at their best display an exceedingly beautiful tone (at their worst, the soprano section is unbearably shrill), but it is in this country that choral singing reaches the highest degree of perfection.

Strange to say, although renowned for the beauty of their tone, Welsh choirs do not, as a rule, shine in the interpretation of classical works; it is the 'industrial North' which has produced our greatest bodies. The Norwich Choral Festival goes back, in an amateur form, to 1770, although that city's choir has of later years been outclassed by the Sheffield and Leeds choirs. The frequency of choral festivals in the north of England has served to maintain a healthy spirit of emulation between the various choirs, and occasional visits to London have always been a regular feature. But the year 1911 must certainly have witnessed a record, when the Norwich, Sheffield and Leeds choirs appeared at the London Music Festival and sang, respectively, Elgar's *Dream of Gerontius*, Bach's B Minor Mass, and Bach's *St. Matthew's Passion.*

London's own choral bodies, however good they may be, have not always had such a good chance of survival as their provincial counterparts. One finds, for example, that the 'Sacred Harmonic Society' was reaping golden opinion for its singing at the Crystal Palace Handel Festivals, under Sir Michael Costa, towards the close of the last century; it nevertheless disappeared in 1887. The explanation probably lies in the fact that the northern choirs had built up for themselves such a reputation that their occasional descents on the metropolis were an overwhelming triumph, which had unavoidable repercussions on the Londoners' popularity. To-day, however, three great London choirs can always be sure of a large audience at their performances of the standard classic masterpieces, of which the *Messiah* is an almost certain 'draw'; they are the Philharmonic Choir, the Royal Choral Society and the B.B.C. Choral Society. The Bach Choir, lighter in calibre, is justly famed for its interpretations of the works of the master whose name it bears; it was founded in 1875 for the purpose of giving the first performance in this country of Bach's great Mass in B Minor. One of the outstanding events of the forthcoming Festival will be a performance of the *Dream of Gerontius* by a special choir composed of the very best singers from the Royal Choral Society and the Bradford, Croydon and Huddersfield choirs; it is not difficult to imagine the thrilling effect which such a combination is likely to produce.

In its present form opera has been an essentially 'foreign'

sensitive of our orchestras, and most aristocratic in its poise, is the L.P.O. The string section has a passionate lyricism which induces that 'singing' quality typical of the famous Viennese orchestras. Sir Thomas Beecham seems to devote loving care to the woodwind, which, incidentally, boasts a very great artist in its first oboe, Leon Goossens, and if it be true that an orchestra reflects the personality of its chief conductor, one need not seek far for the reason for the elegance and delicacy of phrasing of this body. To hear its playing of a Haydn or Mozart symphony one might believe that Beecham created it purposely to serve these two composers, for whom he has a particularly warm feeling. There is no greater contrast imaginable than that between the London Philharmonic Orchestra and the gigantic B.B.C. Symphony Orchestra ; this latter is a mighty body, splendidly sinewy, but it has sometimes been known to convey the impression of machine-like power, power without warmth. It may be the ever-growing stature of its conductor, Sir Adrian Boult, or perhaps the increasingly frequent occasions for contact with Arturo Toscanini, but to-day every limb of this orchestra is animated by an intense warmth of feeling which gives a thrilling effect to its full-bodied strings. Lastly, mention must be made of the excellent work being done by several string orchestras, of which the one founded a few seasons ago by Boyd Neel makes a body of rare artistry ; there is a growing public for this pleasant type of music-making, which has the double merit of bringing to light much good ancient music for strings and of encouraging contemporary composers to write for this medium.

Whatever musical visitors to England may have had occasion to think about our orchestras, there is one sphere of activity in which Britain has always been pre-eminent, namely choral music. While there have been notoriously few really great British singers, the invaluable quality of self-discipline has made British choirs second to none. The attack of German choirs can be as unanimous as the clicking of heels of an army company coming to attention, and the Italians at their best display an exceedingly beautiful tone (at their worst, the soprano section is unbearably shrill), but it is in this country that choral singing reaches the highest degree of perfection.

concerts, he stunned musical London with an orchestra of his creation called the 'London Philharmonic' which earned for itself overnight the reputation of being one of the world's greatest orchestras.

The three big London orchestras will naturally form the backbone of the London Music Festival. Therefore a few comments on their present qualities may be of some interest. When it has been said that these bodies need have no fears about any comparisons with the oldest established orchestras of the world which may be made by visitors to the Festival, certain fundamental differences must be noted in the instruments themselves which result in rather varied tonal colours. Thus the English brass is of a brighter tone than that of the famous German orchestras, such as the Berlin or Vienna Philharmonic; it is something like the difference between the brilliant colourings of a painting by Leonardo and the warm but sombre half-light which bathes a Rembrandt portrait. French woodwinds are undoubtedly the finest in the world, and it must be admitted that English flutes are apt to sound somewhat hollow next to the beautifully full-toned French instruments. This tradition of instrument-making is to some extent reflected in the players themselves, and the artistry of French woodwind players is supreme. However, from the purely orchestral point of view, and especially where interpretations of the classics are concerned, by stressing the parts at the expense of the whole, this kind of 'personality' may be a hindrance rather than a help to complete homogeneity. It is interesting to note that, in 1897, the Queen's Hall Orchestra possessed a Dutch first flute, a French oboe, a Spanish clarinet, a German first horn, and strings from all nations—but this was before the revival in English musical academies had borne fruit.

The noble tradition of the most ancient of London's orchestras, the L.S.O., is felt in the wonderful homogeneity and firmly welded tone of each of its sections; it also accounts for a certain healthy ruggedness which is in striking contrast with the newly-found delicacy of some present-day orchestral playing. There are times when one gladly sacrifices a coat of polish for such energetic and vitally alive performances as these players can give. The outstanding soloist here is the bassoon, whose tone is very full and powerful. The most

The subsequent history of London's orchestral life, leading to its present-day greatness, is closely bound up with the fight against a perennial disease called the deputy system, under which a player accepted any attractive outside engagement and provided a deputy to replace him at his regular post. However, as will be seen, this proved to be a blessing in disguise. The battle was joined, and for the time being won, in 1904, when Sir Henry Wood suppressed the deputy system in his Queen's Hall Orchestra. This step had the immediate effect of bringing about the resignation of fifty members; they banded themselves together to form the nucleus of the London Symphony Orchestra, and thus, curiously, a great orchestra was born! Richter took an active interest in the creation of this body, conducting at its initial concert and during every season until his Farewell in April, 1911. The following spring saw the L.S.O. in America for an extensive tour under the fiery Hungarian, Artur Nikisch, one of the greatest conductors the world has ever known, who also was closely connected with the fortunes of the L.S.O.; it speaks much for the excellence of the orchestra that he should have taken charge of it for this unique occurrence.

The years immediately following the war were musically almost sterile, but the early nineteen-twenties witnessed a slow revival in activity, although the standard of performance showed a marked deterioration from that ruling before the war, when the foreign element was such a beneficent factor.

Deputising was again rife, and it was left to the British Broadcasting Corporation to strike the next blow at the system. In 1929 they formed a permanent orchestra of one hundred and nineteen under the conductorship of Sir (then Dr.) Adrian Boult, and, to this day, the B.B.C. Symphony Orchestra, incidentally the largest in Europe, is the most strictly disciplined in the country. In contemplating the vast array of players on the Queen's Hall platform, it is amusing to recall that, in 1922, the British Broadcasting Company (as it then was) had started out with a Wireless Orchestra of *nine!* Executive music in London has been given a further fillip in recent years through the initiative of Sir Thomas Beecham, the most vital single figure in our musical life. On October 7th, 1932, at the first of the season's Philharmonic

quickening at that, of the normal pulse of a great city's musical life. It is hoped to show, in the course of this essay, how the 'unmusical' country of England has reached the stage where its unparalleled musical resources have enabled it to act as host to the world's musicians and music.

The foundation of the Philharmonic Society in 1813 marks the renaissance of executive music in England after many decades of eclipse. Their orchestra quickly reached a high standard of proficiency for those days, as witness the comments of several visiting composer-conductors: thus Mendelssohn, whose relations with the Society, ever since his first visit in 1829 to his death in 1847, were of the happiest kind, and for whom he wrote much of his best work; also Berlioz, who wrote to the Society in 1853: '*One rehearsal would be ample with your orchestra.*' Richard Wagner conducted the season of eight Philharmonic Concerts in 1855, and it is of extreme interest to find that so great a master (and critic) of the orchestra commented on the Philharmonic people's 'superb tone' and strong *esprit de corps.* The Society never prevailed upon Beethoven to visit this country, but they commissioned several works from him, notably the tremendous Choral Symphony which received its first English (MSS.) performance in 1825, and their kindness in sending a gift of money to the dying Beethoven is, of course, history. All through its career the Philharmonic has been greatly helped by the interest and active support of Royalty, especially of Prince Albert, command concerts being a frequent occurrence. The Society became the 'Royal Philharmonic' in 1912, just a year before its centenary.

Although the 'Philharmonic' was the first permanent orchestral society in England, there have been other active factors in the development of London's orchestras. Of these, the most important was the coming of the famous German conductor, Hans Richter, in 1879, to conduct a series of 'Festival' concerts with a picked orchestra consisting half of English and half of foreign players. This marked not only the beginning of his long association with England—no man did more than Richter to popularise British music—but the opening of an epoch-making era in orchestral music during which all the great conductors of the world visited London. It was, however, a predominantly 'foreign' era.

A CENTURY OF LONDON MUSIC

THE first 'London Music Festival' took place in 1899 at the Queen's Hall when performances were given on alternate nights by the Queen's Hall Orchestra under Sir (then Mr.) Henry Wood and the Lamoureux Orchestra of Paris under its founder and conductor, Charles Lamoureux; on the last night the two orchestras amalgamated and Wood and Lamoureux took it in turn to conduct. The tone of the combined orchestras of over two hundred musicians must have been truly overwhelming. At these concerts performances were given not only of the standard classics, but also of interesting novelties; thus Paul Dukas' famous Scherzo *L'Apprenti Sorcier* was played for the first time in England during that season. There were similar festivals in subsequent years, but the title had lapsed when, in 1933, the British Broadcasting Corporation revived it by giving a series of concerts under Sir Adrian Boult and Serge Koussevitzky. After several seasons on the lines of the 1933 festival, during which the most famous conductors in the world appeared, headed by Arturo Toscanini, a new departure is being made this year which will co-ordinate, for a few weeks in the spring, the immense resources of music in London.

The present article does not aim at describing the events promised by native talent and distinguished visitors to the '1939 London Music Festival'; however, it must be mentioned that, *inter alia*, a series of concerts will take place, probably unsurpassed in the history of concert-making: the complete cycle of Beethoven symphonies and two performances of the Mass in D will be conducted by Arturo Toscanini, by common consent the world's greatest living conductor. But the occasion becomes much more important when it is realised that, unlike the case of similar festivals abroad, this is no isolated phenomenon in a town otherwise poor in music, but rather a quickening, and only a slight

from the abuse it has been subjected to in the last few years. Certain words and phrases—' appeasement ' and ' good faith ' are obvious examples—will have to be put on the sick list and nursed back slowly to their original sense. Almost everything in politics is now described by its opposite. The official German News Agency described Italy's conquest of Albania as an action which ' coincides with the letter and the spirit of the Italo-Albanian treaty of friendship of 1927, and is characteristic of Italy's deep sympathy for the Albanian people.' Perhaps, instead of trying to restore meanings, it may be simpler to adopt the new terminology as it stands. Whether Germany, say, declares war on us, or declares sympathy with us, will not matter much if we know what to expect. And it is something, I suppose, that the dictators should feel obliged to refer to war as peace and sympathy. If this lip-service is all we have to show for some centuries of civilisation, it is still something. Let us console ourselves with this curious tribute, while we await the outbreak of general sympathy in Europe.

* * * * *

> The encirclement, such as it was, was of Germany's own making. . . . She had created a military bloc in the heart of Europe, so powerful and yet so restless that her neighbours on each side had no choice but either to become her vassals or to stand together for protection. . . . The Germans used their central position to create fear on all sides, in order to gain their diplomatic ends. And then they complained that on all sides they had been encircled.

These words are taken from G. M. Trevelyan's *British History in the Nineteenth Century and After*. They refer to the position in 1914.

ALEX GLENDINNING.

> been excavating to a depth much lower than that proposed in the Finsbury scheme. They have rooms deep down, protected with reinforced concrete. This room strength is of an extent comparable to no other in the country. There are girders eighteen inches by ten inches and six feet apart, solidly underpinned, driven in with oak wedges, and concreted in. The partition walls are made of solid steel.

Apparently the slogan should be revised to read : ' We are all in the trenches now, except at the War Office.'

* * * * *

April 20th

A while ago, during some minor crisis or other, a French statesman said : ' It rests now with England.' What he meant, as everybody understood, was : ' It rests now with Mr. Chamberlain,' just as when Mr. Chamberlain refers to ' Germany's attitude,' we all know that he really means ' Herr Hitler's attitude.' History is now in charge of two or three men, and if we choose on occasion to refer to them as countries we might as well be consistent. There is no reason why our historians, having written, say : ' England at this time took up a firm attitude,' should not also record that : ' England at this time went up to Scotland for a week's fishing,' or ' Germany, after a breakfast of prunes, drove to the Reichstag.' This identification of countries with statesmen cannot be carried beyond a certain point, however. When the head of a State declares that the State will fight for this or that, he is not usually referring to himself ; it is understood that it is the State which will do the fighting.

It may be recorded, however, that to-day is Germany's birthday. At the time of writing there has been no news that territorial birthday presents have been demanded or received—as some feared—and if it is Führer's weather that we are having here, it is very nice. Dr. Goebbels, I see, has made a birthday speech in which he describes Herr Hitler as the man who ' brought peace to Central Europe,' and Signor Mussolini, taking his cue very promptly, declared to-day : ' We do not want to attack anyone. We only want to be left alone to work in peace . . . the policy of the Axis is a policy inspired by peaceful collaboration.'

It will take a generation, I think, for language to recover

risks' as the fighting forces, there have been some further pronouncements. An eminent A.R.P. official summed up the matter a while ago in the slogan: 'We are all in the trenches now.' The reference to trenches was perhaps unfortunate, since there are practically no trenches for civilians to be in, and such tactless phrasing gives the jitterbugs an opportunity to carp and chatter—they are now saying that they don't want more protection than soldiers and sailors, but they would be glad to have as much. Meanwhile Sir John Anderson continues to ruminate on strutted basements and steel kennels. A small number of the population is now provided with kennels, and those with back-gardens, or with the means of quarrying in the cement of their back-yards, have been able to bury the kennels as instructed, though they have not always been able to prevent them from filling with water. In various congested neighbourhoods, such as Finsbury, the kennels cannot be used—these might be called the 'ghastly risk' neighbourhoods, which will help to preserve a proper balance between casualties at home and in the front line.

It is ironic that Finsbury should be in this plight, since it was the Finsbury Council which worked out the only A.R.P. scheme to offer protection from bombs. Sir John has just rejected this scheme, on the grounds that everybody might not be able to get into the proposed shelters in time, though Sir John does not suggest what they are to get into instead. The Finsbury Council, I understand, based their calculations on an even shorter period of warning than Sir John allows; but these technical quibbles are really beside the point, for it is clear that if the scheme were perfect, and provided absolute protection from bombing, it would be even less acceptable to Sir John than it is now. We are all in the trenches.

Last March Mr. H. Riley, leader of the Finsbury Borough Council, announced that the Council had decided to go ahead with part of the scheme on their own initiative, and as yet no way of preventing this appears to have been found. Mr. Riley had some interesting comments to make on Sir John's admission that he did not know what a bomb-proof shelter was. He said:

I suggest that he should visit some of the Government Departments where they are constructing deep bomb-proof shelters which have not been revealed to the public. At the War Office they have

The fact, which I think I may say has been established beyond question, that the greater part of this city is now in flames, will cause, I have no doubt, feelings of profound uneasiness and even alarm among those inhabitants who are conscious of the possibility of a threat to their security. The question we have to ask ourselves is whether this conflagration has not now created a situation which is incompatible with the safety of the community as a whole. I am sure that it will be generally agreed that the collapse of most of our public buildings, so far from relieving the apprehension which has been widely felt, has served only to increase anxiety and to administer a further shock to confidence. If the city is on fire, and if the lives of its inhabitants are in danger, then I confess that I find it difficult to reconcile this state of affairs with the view that there is no cause for misgivings in a situation which, if permitted to develop, may prove detrimental to the well-being of all concerned. It has been suggested that the Fire Brigade should be called, and I have no hesitation in saying that this suggestion is one which deserves the most serious consideration, and I may add that we are keeping in close touch with representatives of the Fire Brigade, with a view to such measures as it may be necessary to take in pursuit of our general aim to restore the confidence we all so earnestly desire. . . .

* * * * *

After the slow gesticulations of Mr. Chamberlain it was something of a relief to watch Tommy Farr and his straight left at the Tatler Cinema, where the fight was televised. Television on a large screen is still in its early stages, and if you are sitting near the front, as I was, the effect is rather like a scene in an aquarium, or like an animated spirit photograph, everything a little ectoplasmic and edges inclined to run a bit; but you get used to it, and with a duplicate ringside crowd cheering, and even shouting advice, it becomes exciting. No doubt television will soon be perfected; and when it is life-coloured and stereoscopic, and installed in every home, nobody will need to travel anywhere to see anything. This will be the final triumph of an age which has conquered distance and made it possible to travel everywhere and see everything.

* * * * *

Since Sir John Anderson made it clear that his aim in A.R.P. was to ensure that civilians run the same 'ghastly

time to switch off. A Good News Bulletin could be read at another time, perhaps by some well-known comedian.

* * * * *

April 13th

A peevish wind, left over from March, comes now to nag at our fine weather. The morning news-bills declare: 'World Awaits Premier,' and behind me on the 'bus a man says to his friend: 'Do you think he'll bring it off this time?' and his friend says: 'Well, if he doesn't he's finished, here and in America too.' But, as it turns out, these men are not hanging on the Premier's words; they are merely discussing Tommy Farr and his chances against Red Burman at Harringay.

At four o'clock a report of the speech is broadcast, and what a familiar speech it is! Listening to it, I was reminded of that Hyde Park orator whose speech is so well known that his audience, in chorus, anticipates every phrase. We cannot quite anticipate Mr. Chamberlain, but here are phrases and sentiments to which we are well accustomed:

> Public opinion throughout the world has once again been profoundly shocked by this fresh exhibition of the use of force. . . . To everyone, whatever his faith, whether Christian or Moslem, it must be apparent that a powerful nation has imposed its will on a small and relatively defenceless country, and has done so by an imposing show of armed force. . . . It will I am sure be felt widely in this country and in the world at large that the action taken by Italy in Albania, so far from contributing to the general cause of peace and security, must inevitably be a cause of further uneasiness and increased international tension. . . . I frankly confess my deep disappointment at an action by the Italian Government which has cast a shadow over the genuineness of their intentions to carry out their undertakings.

Apart from the concluding understatement, there is little to disagree with in this dragging summary; and we have to remember that what has long been obvious to most of us is still something of a novelty to Mr. Chamberlain; but time is short. I have heard Mr. Chamberlain accused of fiddling while Rome burns; but I do not think that if he were in Nero's position Mr. Chamberlain would fiddle. I think he would make a speech, and that it would go something like this:

crisis is made by the American, with a sigh: 'Why doesn't Hitler get married and settle down?'

* * * * *

One of the worst things about the tension we live in now is that it induces a state of morbid excitement which is almost exhilarating. There is a tendency to dramatise oneself, to feel one is living in 'momentous times,' and one recognises the feeling as a symptom of illness, like a mild temperature. I suppose it is chiefly a defence-mechanism; for if one were soberly aware, all the time, of all the present situation implies, life would be scarcely tolerable. To feel a little melodramatic about it is one solution; another is what Mr. Isherwood calls 'that special form of hysteria known as "business as usual."'

For some people, however, the crisis is already insupportable. At an inquest recently it was revealed that two elderly women had committed suicide after listening to the B.B.C. news-bulletin on Good Friday. 'That means war,' one of them said, and the same phrase was used by a youth who killed himself last September after listening to a broadcast speech by Herr Hitler. An elderly man took his life after listening to the news-bulletin on April 14th. These deaths will no doubt increase the resentment of those who complained up and down the correspondence columns of *The Times* some months ago that the B.B.C. news-bulletins were alarming. At the inquest on one of the women who heard the Good Friday bulletin, the coroner said: 'The news is not always happily expressed on the wireless.' (It would be interesting to know what light-hearted formula he could have found for the announcement that Italy had invaded Albania.) Resentment at bad news seems to me a typically English reaction—it is not so much the state of affairs which disturbs us as the fact that it is brought to our notice, and apparently the prospect of war is now included among the things one doesn't mention. If a world war should break out, however, it would be difficult to keep it dark, and complete suppression of bad news is scarcely practicable. I think the difficulty might be met by having a special Bad News Bulletin, to be announced as such, with an interval of, say, three minutes to give nervous listeners

COMMENTARY

April 11th

A SOFT, sunny day. Taken unawares by the fine weather, people in the streets have a slightly astonished look; astonished and a bit exhausted, too, for clouts have not yet been cast, and we sweat gently in our winter vests, blink and pant a little in the spring sunshine.

As I go to lunch, the news-bills read: 'France Stops Army Leave'; but I have learned when not to buy a paper, to know when the news-bill will correspond with an announcement of the same length in the Stop Press, saying the same thing. Anyhow, it's a heavenly day, and the situation will hold till after lunch; it can wait as far as I'm concerned.

But one cannot evade the crisis so easily. Here in the restaurant sits a group of journalists, and among them a refugee from the Sudetenland. Nobody talks of the crisis; but an American journalist tells us the story of how Queen Marie of Rumania was introduced to a famous American psychiatrist: 'This is Queen Marie of Rumania.' 'Very interesting,' says the psychiatrist, absent-mindedly, 'and how long has she had this idea?' We laugh at this; but now we have started to tell jokes, and the latest jokes are political—there is the one about M. Bonnet, and about what King Carol told Herr Hitler, and about Dr. Goebbels's operation. It is a proper enough approach to what is, after all, a gigantic clownery. In a silence the refugee says: 'It's very near now, don't you think?' War has become imminent enough to be referred to as 'it.' We agree, tiredly, that it is very near; and the inevitable discussion begins.

Walking back through the warm streets, everybody is depressed by a news-bill which reads: 'Duce's Message to Premier.' Somebody says: 'If Musso assures him of his good faith again, we're done for'; and somebody else says: 'I wonder if this situation is what the Bible meant by: *And a little child shall lead them?*' But the best comment on the

churches were still burning, revolvers were being used freely, and the town services had largely broken down, resulting in dirt, disease and unburied dead. Later on, when comparative order and organisation reappeared, the war conditions, including shortage of food and the constant possibility of casualties by air raid, made it desirable still to keep our men on board their ships.

The general effect of the Spanish war on the navy in the Mediterranean can hardly be said to be on the profit side of its account. For over two years the proper training of the fleet was seriously dislocated. So many ships had to be employed on patrol duty or dispersed at different places round the Spanish coast and in the Balearic islands that no systematic programme of gunnery, torpedo, fleet air arm and tactical exercises could be arranged, and the battle efficiency of that part of the fleet must to some extent have been detrimentally affected, though there is no need to suppose that the loss has been serious. Still, some loss there must have been. Nor can it honestly be said that the Nyon patrols provided us with conclusive evidence regarding our anti-submarine organisation. This organisation may (or may not) be as good as official spokesmen declare, but the Spanish war did not provide us with clear proof one way or the other. On the other hand, the successful return to harbour of H.M.S. *Hunter* after being mined in a particularly vulnerable part of the hull gives satisfactory testimony to the soundness of our modern destroyer construction.

But the brightest feature of the war, as is usually the case on such occasions as these, has been the bearing of the officers and men in the face of discomfort and hardship. We have to realise that for over two years very large numbers of them have been living under semi-war conditions, cut off from their normal expected recreations and relaxations, in many cases separated from their wives after paying their passages to Malta, and engaged for a great part of the time on exceedingly dull and wearisome patrol and similar work. As usual, however, the men have accepted all these added burdens uncomplainingly, though it is peace time for them just as much as it is for us. And we, as is our way, too, take all their extra toil and privation endured on our behalf for granted.

RUSSELL GRENFELL.

for wear, was seen steaming into the anchorage. 'Ah,' said the Spaniard maliciously, 'she looks as if she had had an accident. I hope she is full of dead and wounded.' His hopes were not unjustified, but the dead and wounded were Spaniards, and not British. The night before, the Nationalist cruiser *Baleares* had been torpedoed by Government destroyers, her oil fuel had caught fire, and she had burnt furiously for a time before going to the bottom. With her had been several consorts; but when she was torpedoed, these had gone off and left her. Two British torpedo craft chanced, however, to see the glare of her flames. They were the *Kempenfelt* (Captain R. R. McGrigor) and the *Boreas* (Commander J. W. M. Eaton). Closing to investigate, they immediately set about the work of rescue. While the *Boreas* lowered boats to pick up the men already in the water, the *Kempenfelt*, at no little risk to herself, went alongside the burning vessel, and only shoved off just in time before the doomed ship capsized and sank. By this means the two British ships were able to save about 400 men who, deserted by their own fleet-mates, must otherwise have perished. From that time onwards relations between the British and Nationalist navies were more cordial.

Of the Government navy, our ships saw very little; partly because it was based on Cartagena, which our men-of-war seldom visited, and partly because the disorganisation arising out of the 'liquidation' of the officers stood in the way of the normal exchange of courtesies customary between warships of all nations. But at Barcelona or Valencia, whenever our officers landed in uniform, they were always saluted respectfully by any soldiers who passed them, though a clenched fist is hardly the ideal manner of expressing a deferential salutation.

Our men were allowed ashore at Palma, but not, as already related, at Government ports. At Palma, the British liberty-men kept themselves to themselves and did not mix either with the Nationalist Spaniards or the Italians who were also using the port. The decision not to allow the men to land in Government Spain was due to a variety of reasons. It dated from the early days of the conflict, when Government Spain was in the first tumultuous throes of revolution, and if our men had landed it would have been in ports where

require much swell to make them roll their bilges out of water for hours and even days on end. What was still worse, ships had to be darkened at night in view of the possibility of air attack; which meant that in the height of Mediterranean summer every opening into the fresh air had to be ruthlessly screwed up and covered over, after which the living spaces rapidly became as hot as a furnace. There would have been nothing very much in putting up with such conditions once in a while, but to do so time after time was a different matter.

The Navy's relations with the two sides were marked by an impartiality which was as genuine as it was diplomatically correct. At first our officers were instructed to keep entirely aloof, and if official calls were paid on them in either Nationalist or Government ports, they were not to return them, explaining at the same time that it was to emphasise Great Britain's strict neutrality that this procedure was being followed. After a time this rule was relaxed to the extent that calls were allowed to be returned; while, still later, commanding officers began to give a certain amount of hospitality to the leading men at the ports they were visiting. Thus, the Spanish Admiral at Palma was an occasional guest on board a British ship, while the Republican Governor of Valencia is known to have been similarly entertained. The latter used to apologise for coming on board to dinner without his collar or tie. His own people might misunderstand it, he explained, if he attempted to be any more dressy.

Nevertheless, though official relations were correct, and, as between individuals, sometimes even sympathetic, it cannot be said that Britain was popular with either side. Indeed, her twofold unpopularity can be regarded as the true measure of her neutrality. The Government side was resentful because of our refusal to allow the export of arms, while the Nationalists were indignant at the curtailment of their offensive power through the denial of belligerent rights. The attitude of Nationalist officers towards our own was, in fact, for long distinctly cool, until a certain episode brought about a change of sentiment.

One day in March, 1938, a Spanish Nationalist officer was talking to an English lady at Palma, when a British destroyer leader with blistered paint, and looking very much the worse

charge without further question. This meant patrolling up and down, up and down, in fair weather and foul, out of sight of land and seeing nothing, day after day until relieved; and then coming back every fortnight or thereabouts for another spell.

The dullness of this routine was not even mitigated by any real prospect of encountering the objects of the search. The cessation of the submarine attacks almost as soon as the Nyon patrols had been established made it clear that the nation, whichever it was, to whom the submarines belonged had decided that the game was no longer worth the candle, and had brought its submarines back to port and respectability. This discreet behaviour on the part of the pirate Admiralty, if one may so describe it, not only rendered the Nyon patrol work very wearisome, but also deprived us of what might have been useful knowledge as to the efficiency of the post-war submarine-detecting apparatus, which had not hitherto been tried out under war conditions. The disappearance of the quarry left this question still untested, though a certain amount of experience was gained in the ability of the detection personnel to remain in operation during long periods.

In addition to the Nyon patrols, there was usually a ship at anchor off Barcelona and Valencia, and another at Palma, Majorca. The ships off the Spanish Government ports were there to keep in touch with the British Consul (or Minister if he happened to be present), and also to give assistance to British merchant ships approaching harbour, who might be attacked by aircraft or molested by surface vessels while still in the open sea. The men-of-war employed on this duty remained in position, as a rule, for a week at a time. And a very unpleasant week it usually was. To begin with, the men were not allowed ashore, only the officers being permitted to land. The former were thus cooped up on board for the whole week. In the bigger ships, where deck space was comparatively extensive, something could be done by organising games and recreations to keep the men amused and give their muscles a stretch. But destroyers provided insufficient room for taking exercise on board; while, being small and lively ships, and being anchored, specially at Valencia, well out clear of the land, it did not

The naval year is ordinarily a very full one. Seamanship, gunnery, torpedo, submarine and other forms of training take up the main part of the time; and cruises to foreign ports, various sporting events, such as regattas, athletic sports, rifle meetings, and football competitions, fill in the gaps. All these activities were seriously interfered with by the demands of the Spanish war. With a large proportion of the Mediterranean fleet tied to the Spanish coast, anything in the nature of regular training, and even more of recreation, became exceedingly difficult. Indeed, the calls on the Mediterranean fleet became at times so numerous that for long periods a number of Home fleet ships were sent out to reinforce it. On an average, it worked out that most ships did about a fortnight a month on duty somewhere on the Spanish coast and four days to a week at their base, probably either Gibraltar or Palma. The time at the base was nominally a rest and shore-going period, but it also provided the only opportunity for gunnery and torpedo practices, so that the real stand-off time was liable to be a good deal less.

In the early part of the war, the periods on war duty, though they sometimes entailed much sea-time and extra vigilance, were interesting enough. Actions between ships of the rival Spanish navies, bombardments of Algeciras, the blockade of Bilbao, the capture of Malaga, and other similar episodes provided plenty of incident. The Nyon patrol period, which followed, was much less exciting. The patrol had come into being in consequence of attacks on shipping by unknown submarines, the participating nationalities being given different areas to patrol. The main British area was the Western Mediterranean, and anti-submarine patrols, mostly of destroyers, were established along the routes which merchant vessels were publicly recommended to use. These surface patrols were supplemented by British flying boats operating from the French port of Oran on the North African coast. It is worthy of remark that the flying boats found themselves unable to do their work without a depot ship, and the submarine tender *Cyclops* had to be diverted from her normal duties to minister to their needs.

The destroyers on Nyon patrol were ordered to keep watch on their detecting devices for the location of submerged submarines which, if discovered, they were then to depth-

compass of the northern coast from Bilbao to Gijon, the Nationalists were able, for the first time, to provide a sufficient blockading force. The situations that ensued were, to some extent, reminiscent of the American rum fleet of prohibition days. At Santander and Gijon there were sometimes as many as seven or eight merchant ships lying stopped just outside the three-mile limit, while a Spanish cruiser would lie in wait on the other side to snap them up if they attempted to cross it. Merchant ships would sometimes wait as long as a fortnight in the hope of some opportunity to slip into harbour. They were seldom successful, and on the whole the blockade at these two places was entirely successful.

The position at Bilbao was different; for there the shore batteries were able to keep the blockading cruisers more than three miles from the shore, and consequently in the region where British naval protection could be given to shipping. Nevertheless, the Nationalist warships made an initial attempt to exercise their powers of blockade in this forbidden 'open sea' area. Early in 1937, the British ship *Thorpe Hall* was stopped by the *Almirante Cervera* about six miles from the shore. On this being reported to Commander (now Captain) C. Caslon, at that time senior officer on the northern Spanish coast with a division of destroyers, he steamed up to secure her release. For a time matters looked as if they might lead to a clash. Both sides were cleared for action, and the Spaniard had the heavier guns; but in the end the Spanish captain accepted the situation and made off. As a result of this encounter we brought the *Hood*, and later the battleship *Royal Oak*, to the Bilbaon coast in order to ensure having adequate force on the spot.

In these often delicate operations our younger officers showed admirable qualities of judgment, initiative and resource in circumstances in which they would certainly have been blamed for too energetic action, and were at the time actually being censured by Opposition speakers in Parliament for not being energetic enough.

What with the protection of shipping, the evacuation of refugees, and the necessity for observation squadrons in the Straits of Gibraltar, Majorca, and other places, the calls on the navy were heavy, and the normal peace-time routine of the Mediterranean fleet was thrown completely out of gear.

them left. By the end of the war almost every existing commodity was on the contraband list except ostrich feathers, while the invention of the doctrine of final enemy destination known as 'continuous voyage' was utilised to prevent the evasion of the contraband laws by means of indirect routeing through foreign countries. Restrictions on the economic blockade of a belligerent country had almost disappeared, and even if the old rules were still theoretically in force, the 'reprisals' doctrine had given the world an instructive lesson in how to get round them.

In these circumstances, the grant of belligerent status to the Spanish contestants would probably have exposed British and other neutral shipping to extensive interference by both Nationalist and Republican forces which, in view of the ample evasionary precedents furnished in the Great War, it might have been very difficult to withstand. The decision to regard the conflict as a civil rebellion overcame this difficulty and enabled the maritime Powers, if necessary, to give armed protection to their own commerce.

But this arrangement had its limitations. One convention that could not be got over in that way was the undisputed right of a nation to exercise jurisdiction over its own territorial waters, which are commonly deemed (though there are certain exceptions) to extend to three miles from the shore. Whatever classification, therefore, was given to the conflict that was going on, it was obvious that, at the very least, the right of the Spanish Government side to sovereignty over its own territorial waters could not be denied; and since the Nationalists were in possession of a long stretch of coastline, the British Government decided on a working compromise, by which each side was given a free hand inside its own territorial waters but no interference with British shipping was to be tolerated outside the three-mile limit.

Both sides had originally declared a blockade of the opposing coastlines, but the respective naval forces were in each case too weak to make such a blockade anything like effective over the large areas involved; and for some months, little attempt was made to interfere with commerce.

The Nationalist attack on the northern coast towns, however, converted a nominal blockade into a real one. By concentrating their naval units in the comparatively small

THE NAVY AND THE SPANISH WAR

THE outbreak of the Spanish civil war in 1936 brought a large section of the Mediterranean Fleet hurrying westward to Gibraltar, many of the ships to be dispersed almost at once to various different parts of the Spanish coast. And there, with little respite, they or their reliefs remained until the end of the war.

One of the first tasks that the ships found themselves presented with was the large-scale evacuation of refugees. It was a task that was far from being a novelty to British men-of-war, and the officers and men set about doing it in the same manner that has caused the Royal Navy to be remembered with gratitude by the victims of war and persecution, volcano and earthquake all the world over on countless occasions in the past.

Coincident with the succouring of these unfortunates, there arose another and even more ancient problem demanding the Navy's attention. This was the protection of British merchant shipping. The outbreak of the fighting brought claims from both sides to exercise belligerent rights at sea. These claims required the most careful consideration in other maritime countries, and especially in Great Britain. The practice of belligerent rights at sea had undergone considerable changes during the Great War, albeit many of these changes had been nominally within the framework of the pre-war rules. At the outbreak of the war in 1914, there were legally many handicaps on the exercise of sea power in the interception of enemy seaborne supplies, and the list of non-contraband goods was long and substantial.

The war played havoc with these pre-war conventions without actually leading to their express repudiation. Instead, the plea of reprisals against alleged enemy illegalities was used for the purpose of abandoning one after another of the agreed regulations until, in practice, there were practically none of

number required to comply with the provisions of the Act is not very large. If all the States entitled to send more than one representative to each Chamber of the Legislature should decide to accede, twenty-nine or thirty States would suffice. But the defection of a single great State might largely increase the requisite minimum, besides acting as a definite discouragement to medium-sized and small units. Only the future can show whether official confidence is justified; private advices from a variety of sources combine to produce the impression that the issue is by no means free from doubt. In the preparation of the Instruments of Accession, as Lord Linlithgow pointed out in his December speech and reiterated in March, everything possible has been done to apply a just judgment to the safeguards which the States Governments desire for their own protection, but in so doing the ideal of the unity of India has been kept uppermost. No doubt this is a perfectly proper attitude, but it is necessary to remember that the apprehensions of many States are very real.

From this review of the present complicated situation in India it is apparent that the difficulties which surround the completion of the Federal Constitution are in essence those of opinion. The criticisms which have been brought against the Constitution envisaged by the 1935 Act are so varied in their scope, and in many cases so incompatible one with the other, that the British Government is probably justified in its determination to proceed with the original scheme, without modification of the Act, in the hope that all genuine difficulties may be overcome by the same process of informal assurances and understandings which secured the inception of the Provincial Constitutions. There is, however, one important difference between the inauguration of Provincial autonomy and the inauguration of the Federation. Provincial autonomy was a matter for settlement between the British Government and Nationalist opinion in British India. But the inauguration of Federation requires the co-operation, not only of these two parties, but of the third party, namely, the Indian States.

Despite the clamant expressions of opinion from different camps in British India, it is the decision of the States which will determine when, and perhaps whether, the new Constitution will materialise.

L. F. Rushbrook Williams.

approach of Federation. In many States strong popular sentiments exist, of which the administrations have to take full notice. It is a great mistake to represent all the States peoples as panting eagerly for participation in the blessings which British India enjoys at present under Provincial autonomy, or may enjoy in the future under a federal dispensation. Both organised and unorganised bodies of opinion in many States have expressed themselves highly sceptical of the desirability of their Government acceding to the Federal Constitution. Indeed, in a number of States definite pledges have been given by the administration that accession will not in fact be consummated until the suggested terms have been examined, not only by the officials, but also by the leaders of public opinion. Suspicion centres in part round the belief that the States will have to make heavy financial sacrifices, and that the level of taxation, which is now as a whole substantially below that of British India, may be increased. But there is also a very genuine sentiment in many States against what is regarded as the merging of the traditional independence of the unit in any scheme embracing a larger whole, and this State patriotism has a force of which the Ruler and his Ministers are obliged to take the most serious notice. In smaller units, which are in close proximity to focal points of Congress opinion, sentiment is largely influenced by feeling over the border; and the desire for Federation has almost vanished on account of British Indian criticisms of the projected scheme.

It will readily be understood that when to these doubts and difficulties, whether of the Administration, of the States populations, or of both, have been added manifest indications of the deliberate hostility of Congress, the possibility of the speedy entry of the States into Federation has not, to say the least of it, been improved. This is the more unfortunate in that the enormous labour of preparing the Instruments of Accession, specifying the terms upon which the States will be permitted to federate, has now been completed, and the documents themselves have already been communicated to the individual States. So far as can be gathered, official opinion seems confident that a sufficient number of States will, within the next few months, signify their desire to accede to Federation, to enable the Federal Constitution to be inaugurated at any moment which may suit administrative convenience. The

custodians of Indian ideas in art, politics and philosophy, regard themselves as in a position to make a real contribution to the self-governing India for which they are as eager as any British Indian Nationalist. Secondly, they have their own particular kind of 'freedom' to pursue. Any suggestion that the Indian States desire to increase their 'independence' can proceed only from misconception; but they are in fact anxious to substitute for the discretionary diplomatic authority of the Political Department, which has controlled their activities in many ways, a more definite and precisely functioning machinery such as they hope may be provided by such institutions as the Federal Court. In the third place they desire, like British India, to acquire an opportunity of making plain their views and expounding their interests in matters, particularly economic, affected by policies laid down for the whole country. The system by which a British Indian Central Government in effect controls their vital interests in a variety of directions, while making no provision for their representation, has for long struck them as extremely unsatisfactory.

For all these, and a number of cognate reasons, many Indian States have lent their steady support to the section of opinion that holds that Federation in some form or other is not only inevitable but necessary. But the organic nature of the precise federation proposed, and the magnitude of the sacrifices in sovereignty which they find themselves called upon to make, have taken them somewhat by surprise, while the delays which have ensued in the completion of the federal structure have dulled much of the earlier enthusiasm, have encouraged the discovery of difficulties, and have fostered the creation of doubt. Hitherto, the main anxieties of the States have turned upon such questions as the avoidance of 'Federal outposts' in State territory, whose existence may divide the allegiance of their subjects; upon the fear of encroachment by federal organs and federal officers upon functions not specifically made over to the Federation, and upon the difficulty of preserving intact those spheres of power or privilege, whether within or without State territory, which are in theory to remain unchanged after the inception of Federation.

At this point it is necessary to make clear that it is not only the State Governments which are concerned at the near

terised the States, may not always have been adequate to situations suddenly created. On the whole, it must be said that progressive States Governments have so far weathered the storm well; few have shown any signs of capitulation to extreme Congress demands, although all are traditionally amenable to any genuine sentiments and desires expressed by their own people. For the time being, however, the States have been put upon the defensive, and efforts are being made to strengthen the ties between them by reconstituting the machinery of the Chamber of Princes in order to allow the great States to play their full part in common deliberations.

It is difficult to deny, on any impartial examination, that the recent Congress campaign against the States has had two unfortunate effects. In the first place, it has further aggravated the tension between Congress and the Moslem League, whose leaders clearly perceive that Congress, to whatever extent it may be honestly animated by the desire to promote democratic institutions in the States, is really engaged upon a tactical manœuvre with the object of securing power in the Central Legislatures. Accordingly, Moslem complaints regarding 'Congress terrorism' have been redoubled; there has been talk of organising Moslem 'passive resistance' in opposition to the Hindu mass-movements directed against Moslem States, and certain prominent adherents of the Moslem League have shown signs of making overtures to the States for an alliance against sections of opinion which appear to threaten both alike. Since the States have prided themselves, not without justice, on their capacity for mitigating in their own territories the communal tension so unfortunately epidemic in British India, they will doubtless regard the possibility of such an alliance with caution.

Of greater momentary importance is probably the second consequence—an aggravation of the anxieties with which the State administrations view the approach of Federation. Much has been written on the reasons which induced the States representatives in the first Round Table Conference to accede to the request from British India to join in the creation of an All-India Federal Constitution, and it suffices here to notice that these reasons fall under three categories. First is the element of idealism, which it is important not to underestimate. The greater States, which have never come under British rule, and are by tradition the

British India primarily derives its origin. And although it is difficult to make any generalisation which will apply without modification to the immensely varying conditions of the Indian States, it may be asserted that in many cases the identity both of sentiment and of interest between the Government and the governed is very marked. Where appreciable discontent exists, it is largely due to the operation of the same economic factors as produce discontent in British India, and is, as a rule, directed more against the imperfect operation of some simple and antiquated governmental machine, or against the prevalence of some ancient custom now considered oppressive, than against the Ruler himself or his Ministers. But it is both easy and dangerous for trained agitators to work up mass movements among an ignorant and credulous people—as is shown by the Bazalgette tragedy.

In certain of the very advanced States, where education is universal and where literacy, both male and female, has reached figures infinitely beyond anything which British India can show, there are some signs of a genuine local movement in favour of Responsible Government of a Western model, but in the majority of cases where a popular movement for the reform of the Government exists without being fomented artificially from without, it takes the form of a demand for the more regular operation of those institutions whereby popular sentiment and desires can be brought to the attention of the administration. The urban middle-class in the States, as in British India, is largely influenced by the personality of Mr. Gandhi, and would sometimes like to see the influence of its own class rank in the counsels of the States with the landholding aristocracy and the wealthy merchants. But in the majority of cases in which the States administrations have undertaken reforms on their own initiative it has been found amply sufficient to constitute representative councils for the promulgation of legislation and for the focussing of popular opinion. From this point of view it must be pronounced distinctly unfortunate that some of the worst cases of friction appear to have occurred in certain of the best-administered States; but, from the information at present available, it seems clear that these particular disorders were largely fomented by external agency, even though the handling of them by State officials, accustomed as they are to the harmonious atmosphere which has for so long charac-

theless, this perfectly correct enunciation of the position has aroused violent protests from the Congress party, including, unfortunately, no less a person than Mr. Gandhi. The British are accused of discouraging the growth of constitutional government within the States, and the Princes are solemnly called upon to look forward to the day when the Congress, rather than the British, will constitute the Paramount Power so far as the States are concerned. Undoubtedly behind these latest pronouncements there lies a real element of disappointment, for Congress seems to have reckoned confidently that a considerable measure of official encouragement for the liberalisation of governmental institutions in the States would be forthcoming. Whether such encouragement can ever proceed beyond approval and goodwill may be doubted; indeed, Lord Linlithgow probably went as far as any British official could go in this direction in his address to the Chamber of Princes on March 13th: while the Chancellor of the Chamber, in reply, pointed out how gravely Congress activities were discouraging real reform within the States. It must be remembered in this connection that Lord Linlithgow's intervention in the Rajkot dispute, which brought Mr. Gandhi's fast to an end, was confined to a brilliantly practical suggestion for resolving impartially the particular point in issue. At the moment of writing it looks as though Mr. Gandhi would once again cast his authority upon the side of moderation. The deplorable events at Ranpur gave him a severe shock, and the changes which his followers made at Tripuri in the resolution proposed by Mr. Bose's party converted a virtual ultimatum to the States into a mere warning.

The truth is that the Congress, in emphasising the contrast between 'Democratic British India' and 'Autocratic States India,' has based its strident demands upon a serious fallacy. Political development in British India has been largely stimulated by the desire to wrest power from the hands of a Government under non-Indian control. This motive has been absent in the case of the Indian States, which have never known foreign rule and have always enjoyed local autonomy in greater or lesser degree. The Indian States have therefore no experience of that clear-cut division between Government and governed from which the Nationalist movement in

Congress policy may well realise to the full both the attractive nature of their latest slogans and the difficulty in which these are placing the Paramount Power. For, when disorders are fomented in the States in the name of popular liberty, it is easy to represent any intervention which the Paramount Power may undertake, should the States authorities request support and assistance in emergency, as being designed for the perpetuation of autocracy and for the suppression of popular movements. In actual fact, it is hardly necessary to say, the policy of the Paramount Power in such circumstances would be perfectly clear. It was laid down some years ago by the Butler Committee, and it has recently been reaffirmed in Parliamentary Questions and Answers. The obligations of the Paramount Power extend both to protecting the Rulers against violence and disorder, and to advising and assisting Rulers to remedy such legitimate grievances of their subjects as might be found to exist. Moreover, as the Butler Committee noted: 'The guarantee to protect a Prince against insurrection carries with it an obligation to enquire into the causes of insurrection and to demand that the Prince shall remedy legitimate grievances.' It is obvious, notwithstanding that the intervention of the Paramount Power in such circumstances is a very delicate matter, only to be undertaken with reluctance. The Congress leaders fully appreciate this fact, and have for some time laboured to convince the Rulers of the Indian States that the Congress can make more trouble in various ways for the State administrations than the Paramount Power can easily remedy.

But it is to be doubted whether the covert or overt threats of the Congress, which have from time to time materialised in grave disturbances and embarrassment to the State administrations, have so far achieved the object which the Congress presumably has in view. The British Government has stated in unmistakable language that while it certainly will not discourage the growth of constitutional reforms in the States, it will not press particular institutions upon the Rulers, with whom responsibility for the form assumed by the State administrations, as well as for their proper functioning, must inevitably reside. This is, of course, a well-understood constitutional maxim; the British Government has neither the right nor the desire to rule the Indian States. Never-

satisfy the Congress sense of urgency. Not only was the Haripura resolution subsequently explained away at various times both by the Congress President, Mr. Bose, and by Mr. Gandhi himself, but 'unofficial' intervention by Congress leaders and Congress emissaries produced movements in many States which can only be described as subversive of local authority, culminating in certain instances in grave disorder, of which the most recent, and most serious, has been the murder of Major Bazalgette in Ranpur, one of the small and rather backward Orissa States. The Congress as an organisation has, it is true, nominally adhered to the Haripura decision, but it has fostered and encouraged the growth in particular States of State Congress organisations, whose activities it has guided and controlled. More significant still, the demand that 'some element of election' should be associated with the selection of States representatives in the Central Legislature gradually became superseded, as the months of 1938 passed, by the demand that Responsible Government should be introduced in the States, whether as a result of the activities of the State Congress organisations or through direct pressure by the Paramount Power, prior to the institution of Federation.

So seriously did Congress leaders take the whole matter that by degrees the demand that Responsible Government should, by whatever method, be introduced into the States, became the main plank in the Congress platform of opposition to the Central institutions contemplated by the 1935 Act. The other points of criticism have for the moment been relegated into the background, except by the more far-seeing leaders; and the whole considerable weight of Congress argument and denunciation has been centred upon the impossibility of accepting office in a Federation which admits in the Central Legislature of such 'ideological incompatibles' as representatives from democratically ruled British India and from autocratically ruled Indian States.

It is probable that the vehemence of the Congress does not proceed exclusively from a realisation of the tactical necessity of acquiring such influence over the selection of States representatives as may ensure that a considerable section at least of these will be ready to support a Congress Government in the Centre. The able tacticians who control

Central claims, then the Congress might find itself in a very difficult position.

Accordingly, throughout the year 1938, Congress has voiced with increasing vehemence a demand for the popular election of the Indian States representatives. To begin with, the claim that 'some element of election' should be associated with the nomination of the Ruler appeared, as we have seen, as one among several points which Congress had indicated must be amended before the Central institutions envisaged by the Act could be acceptable. An element of caution characterised the early pronouncements of Congress upon the subject, and the dominant Right Wing Party were successful in repressing the suggestions, put forward by Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. M. N. Roy, that the disruption and disappearance of the States must be the aim of Congress policy. Accordingly, in the Congress meeting at Haripura, held a year ago, it was resolved that while Congress sympathised with the subjects of the Indian States in any efforts which they might make for the acquisition of representative institutions, Congress as a body would not interfere between the Princes and their people. At the risk of some anticipation, it may be pointed out that the abstention of the Congress from direct action was, though more conditionally, and in face of greater opposition, reiterated at the Tripuri Session of March 1939.

Meanwhile considerable satisfaction was caused shortly afterwards by the declaration of Lord Winterton on behalf of His Majesty's Government that the Paramount Power would not intervene—as on occasion it had done in the past—to make difficult the policy of any Ruler who desired to liberalise the Constitution of his State. It was remarkable to notice, in the months that followed, how many Rulers, particularly of the smaller States, took advantage of this clarification of the position. Many of the larger States had already taken action, either by the appointment of committees or by other means, to explore methods of associating public opinion more directly with the policy of the Administration; and it was generally believed that in the majority of States the Rulers were prepared to take full account of popular opinion in selecting representatives for the Central Legislatures. Nevertheless, the pace of locally inspired reform did not suffice to

among the States representatives a substantial proportion of men who have occupied official positions of great distinction, have acquired broad views, and have exhibited great administrative capacity. Other States will be represented by members of great land-owning families, by prominent local industrialists, or even by Cadets of the Ruling House. But the one characteristic which may confidently be expected to distinguish State representatives is that they will really represent the outlook and interests of their unit; and precisely in so far as this holds good it is certain that there will be few 'rubber stamp' types among them. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the fears expressed by the Congress are a slur upon the patriotism of the States which is unwarranted. The States have already made clear—for example, in their insistence upon the necessity for Responsible Government in the Central Institutions—that they are no less eager than the British Indian Nationalists for the attainment of self-government by the country as a whole. To represent them as 'stand-patters' is to distort their point of view.

But although the apprehensions of the Congress concerning the probable nature and activities of the States representatives in the Central Legislature do not seem, on examination, to be well-founded, the existence of these apprehensions, the conviction and the tenacity with which they are held, are facts of the utmost importance in the alignment of Indian opinion to-day.

It is because of them that Congress opinion has for long been insistent that some element of popular choice should be associated in the process by which representatives of the States are chosen by the Rulers to sit in the Central Legislature. But the growing tension between the Congress and the Moslem League, the course of which has been traced, has served of late to give these considerations an urgency which they formerly lacked. If in the new Central Legislature—and for the purposes of this reasoning it is assumed that the Legislature would be of a kind in which the Congress could accept office—the Congress found themselves confronted not merely with a hostile Moslem bloc, but also with a solid body of States representatives who might from time to time ally themselves with the Moslems upon such common interests as the preservation of unit rights against

majority in both Houses might find itself in critical junctures at the mercy of a body of representatives who, it was confidently expected, could easily be swayed by the desires of British officials. Further, particularly by the Left Wing and Socialist sections of Congress opinion, it was feared that the States representatives would invariably throw their influence into the scale of caution and conservatism, thereby greatly increasing the difficulties of radical legislation, particularly in the economic sphere.

It seems desirable at this point to indicate that these apprehensions on the part of the Congress are almost certainly ill-founded. Geographically, as a glance at the map of India shows, the States are too widely scattered and composed of units too disparate in size and interests to make possible the constitution of a compact bloc of votes in opposition to British-Indian interests. States representatives will almost certainly align themselves, in all economic matters, with British-Indian representatives upon the basis of an interest which transcends political frontiers. Industrial representatives, both from British India and from the Indian States, will vote together. The same will hold good of the representatives from agricultural areas. Nor is it in the least degree likely that the State representatives will be amenable to the dictation of the Political Department. Indeed, it is common knowledge that one of the attractions of Federation, from the standpoint of the States, has been the realisation that important subjects of administration in which the influence of the British diplomats had hitherto been predominant will be transferred to the Federal sphere. Again, the long history of the States as separate entities renders it unthinkable that their representatives should, for as far ahead as can be foreseen, submit to the discipline which would be necessary for the creation of such a united anti-popular front as the Congress fears. This last difficulty will in fact be enhanced by the varying types of representative whom the States may be expected to send to the Central Legislature. The States have for long provided a field for the exercise of administrative capacity in high office which has only recently begun to exist in British India. Not all States, of course, will be in a position to free their higher and most experienced officers to represent them in the Federal Legislature; but there will certainly be

for India in England on the one side, and the Viceroy and Governor-General in India on the other, are imperfectly understood. To the impartial observer it was amply apparent that no such amendment of the Act was in contemplation. Both the Secretary of State for India and his Under-Secretary in the House of Commons made clear from time to time the precise intentions of His Majesty's Government; further emphasising the consideration that it was hardly practical politics to amend an important part of the machinery of the Indian Constitution before practical experience in its working had given some reason to suppose that amendment was desirable. But these statements, clear though they were, did not suffice to counter an eager credulity which seized upon every scrap of rumour or inference in support of the desire felt in Nationalist circles for an amendment of the Act.

It will be realised that the anticipation in Congress circles of the early introduction of the Federal Constitution gave great point to the apprehensions caused by the growth of that anti-Congress feeling in Moslem League circles which were described in the previous article. It became, in the view of many leaders of Congress policy, urgently necessary to seek other means of buttressing their power in the Central Legislatures in preparation for the struggle for the ultimate control of the reserved subjects. A ready field for these preparatory activities seemed to present itself in the existence of the Indian States.

We have already noticed that Hindu opinion had from the early days of Federal discussions expressed its dislike of the 'undemocratic' character of the projected States representation in the Central Legislature. The root of this dislike unquestionably lay in a fear lest States representatives, selected by the Rulers, would in effect constitute a new and more objectionable instance of the 'official bloc' to which politically minded India has for so long been accustomed in its varying types of Central Legislature. But the position of the States representatives would be far stronger than that of the old nominated officials. Numerically they would be very powerful—40 per cent. in the Upper House and 33⅓ per cent. in the Lower House. If they acted together they would be in a position to demand representation in any coalition government; and a party not possessing an absolute

INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

A Survey of Opinion in British India and the Indian States

II

On a broad view, it can hardly be doubted that the favourable experience of Congress Ministers in the Provinces has tended to strengthen the hands of that section of the Congress which believes that the proposed Federal Constitution could be made acceptable with comparatively few amendments in the Act. These amendments have been more than once listed. They would provide for direct instead of indirect election to the Federal Lower House, and for the concentration therein of financial control, as well as for the repeal of the rather drastic provisions which, on the plea of preserving British commercial interests from expropriation, are regarded as likely to place obstacles in the way of encouraging Indian industry, shipping, banking or commerce. Such amendments as these, it is urged by certain sections of Congress opinion, would make the scheme of the Act acceptable, if accompanied first by the same kind of assurance regarding the use of the Central safeguards as was given regarding the Provincial safeguards at the time when Congress agreed to accept office in the Provinces; and secondly, by some understanding that the 'undemocratic' nature of States representation in the Central Legislature would be modified.

During the course of last year hopes ran high in Nationalist circles as to the possibility of such amendments as these being made in the Act, and at the time when Lord Linlithgow was on holiday in England many rumours were current that he had reached agreement with the British Government regarding the precise amendments that would be carried through. Such rumours as these are common in Indian public life, where the relationships between the Cabinet and the Secretary of State

months it has become increasingly clear that Frenchmen would work together for national defence whether or not they liked the political colours of the Prime Minister. It could well be argued that in such a situation it was less important to form a really national government than to make sure that the Government had a sufficiently firm parliamentary base for stability and action. In view of the sharp reaction against the Front Populaire, support of Socialists or Communists might be considered more dangerous than advantageous for the Government. Until M. Daladier indicated in his broadcast speech that no hopes could be attached to the 'appeasement' policy, 'red' support might be thought to endanger the slender hope attached to negotiations with Germany. At all events, M. Daladier clearly indicated in his Marseilles speech at the end of October that he considered his internal opponent to be on the Left. The most important consequence of the electoral reform by proportional representation, to which M. Daladier has committed himself, and of which the Chamber has approved in principle by a most surprising majority, would be to make a non-Socialist majority in the Chamber probable for an indefinite period to come. This would be brought about less by the changes in the proportions of the parties than by the fact that the necessity for election alliances between Radicals and Socialists in the present single-member constituencies would be done away with.

D. R. GILLIE.

proceedings. The nation is amused, but not edified, to read of a slanging match or a 'scene' in the Chamber, and the whole body of Deputies gets the blame for the conduct of a minority.

M. Daladier has not taken any steps to assist the Chamber to maintain its dignity while in relative abeyance. He has not reserved important statements of policy for the Chamber. In fact he seems rather to have avoided making them there. When the Chamber met to discuss the international situation after the occupation of Prague, and to consider the Government's demand for plenary powers for national defence, M. Daladier only spoke after the debate had been degraded by violent interchanges between Right and Left. The speech that the Prime Minister then delivered was a violent attack on the Opposition. The reference which might have been expected to the disappearance of Czechoslovakia had to be inserted in the official report of the speech. It was, in fact, made quite impossible for the Opposition to do anything else but oppose, though no one compelled the Communists to play into the hands of their opponents by entering into an exchange of insults. That the Chamber voted full powers to the Government after such an undignified debate cannot but be a factor in the future of French parliamentarianism.

M. Daladier showed that when he wished to do so he could make the kind of speech which unites all sections of the nation when he broadcast on March 29th. The Press was practically unanimous in approval, from the Communists on the Left to the most rugged Conservatives on the Right. None the less it was to a great extent M. Daladier's work that M. Lebrun was induced to stand again for the Presidency in the name of national unity and continuity, but in circumstances which made it inevitable that he should not receive the votes of the Left, or, indeed, of a majority of the Deputies. The President was re-elected by the overwhelming majority of the three hundred Senators and by only about two hundred and fifty of the six hundred members of the Chamber. It would almost seem as if M. Daladier desired to prevent Socialists and Communists from voting either for himself or for the President.

This attitude might conceivably be defended as follows. In the atmosphere of international tension of the last six

for a republic to resort frequently to the temporary delegation of powers without some effects on the normal working of the constitution. The almost unlimited powers conferred on the Government in the third week of March until next November were the climax of a long series of such delegations, usually for financial purposes. Twice already M. Daladier's own Government had been empowered for shorter periods to legislate by decree. Quite apart from this the Parliament has during the last year obviously been losing all control of foreign policy. The present Foreign Minister has, during his year of office, only delivered one speech to Parliament on foreign affairs—at the end of January. He has frequently reported to and been questioned closely by the Chamber Foreign Affairs Commission, but this contact in camera does not appear to be politically effective. The one foreign affairs debate was dragged out in instalments over a fortnight, so that it, in fact, lost all the characteristics of a debate. Most of the speeches delivered had been forgotten by the time the Foreign Minister and, after him, the Prime Minister, replied to them. At all events it was the fall of Barcelona rather than any statement from the Government which demonstrated the impossibility of the policy advocated by the Opposition, a policy which might well have been practicable when the debate opened Twice since then the Opposition has tried to force M. Bonnet to take part in a debate. On both occasions M. Daladier has taken his place, and on the second occasion, after the fall of Prague, he replied in terms of home politics and practically refused to discuss foreign policy.

It is evident that a Chamber which has little control over either finance or foreign policy must expect to suffer in its prestige. Other circumstances have contributed to lower its authority. Elected with an emphatic majority to the Left, the Chamber has now a majority to the Right. The Chamber claims greater authority than the Senate on the ground that, unlike the Upper House, it is directly elected by universal suffrage. (The Senate is elected by the local governing bodies.) The failure of the Chamber to act as an effective political expression of the electorate's expressed wishes inevitably casts doubts on its own claims.

It has for a generation past been losing dignity in its

taking has been influenced far more by the empirical considerations of some dozens of politicians than by any doctrine

The politicians have been sniffing the breeze of opinion and at the same time taking the steps which the situation urgently imposed. Their political noses assured them that the agricultural population, still nearly half France, was thoroughly tired of labour agitation which aimed at securing advantages that could not, by the nature of agricultural work, be extended to the countryside as well as to the towns. The peasants, well aware that as in past wars they would bear a bigger share of the fighting than townsmen, were acutely uneasy at what seemed like the drift of the State into war on issues that they did not understand, while Capital and Labour hampered rearmament by their bickering. At the same time the bourgeoisie was anxious for firmness which would insure them against a return of the disorders of 1936 (of which there was, in fact, no danger, though the folly of the attempted general strike made it seem that there was). The small shopkeepers had ceased to attach hopes to the Front Populaire. The workmen themselves were tired of agitations and strikes which already a year ago were bringing in a markedly diminishing return. Meanwhile, the steadily growing realisation of the foreign danger (apart from a short period of recovered illusion during the late autumn) has been convincing every section of the community that the Republic's government must be carried on without interruption.

As far as internal politics are concerned, therefore, France is no longer a very difficult country to govern. M. Daladier, who gives some indications of considering himself the man of Providence, has in fact been helped by Providence over stile after stile. Were he to describe the rôle which he conceives has fallen to him he would no doubt compare himself with a Roman dictator in the original sense of the word, that is, a man granted plenary powers for a limited period in order to lead the Republic through a crisis. M. Daladier himself has never professed any but an orthodox republican philosophy. Anxious guardians of the constitution can at most reproach him with talking enviously in private of the facilities of the Duce and the Fuehrer, with denouncing the wordiness of Parliament and with showing occasionally a strong inclination to the first person singular. However, it is impossible

a very memorable discussion. A full account of the debate has been reprinted in the posthumous volume of Halévy's essays, *L'Ère des Tyrannies*, which attracted more attention in France than any of the successive volumes of his *History of the English People in the XIX Century*.

At the time when he spoke M. Halévy's views must have seemed to many of his hearers an almost perverse scepticism in face of the generous ebullition of the Front Populaire. Not so to-day. His thesis was that liberty is threatened from two sides. On the one hand there were the exigencies of war administration which had opened to the State, from 1914 to 1919, inviting perspectives of intervention in all spheres of economic and social life. On the other hand, the rise of Socialism both prepared the way for State intervention by its doctrines, and, through the anarchic impression created by labour disputes, incited the bourgeoisie to set a higher value on order than on liberty. He quoted the example of Italian Fascism for which the way was prepared by precisely the factors that he indicated, and of German Nazism, which has been able throughout the course of its career to use as a powerful argument both at home and abroad the disorders in Germany between 1919 and 1923. He pointed out that the force of the reaction continued long after the original danger had disappeared.

To-day the same two factors are dominating the French internal situation. So far has democracy lost prestige that a writer of the youngest generation (*i.e.*, still some years under thirty), M. Roger Caillois, can argue in the pages of the April number of the anti-Fascist review, *Volontaires*, that if Communism is to have a future it must break the association which it established with moribund democracy in 1935. For M. Caillois, Fascism is a perversion of democracy against which democratic institutions can provide no safeguard. The only alternative must be sought in the establishment of a hierarchical, aristocratic order with which, he argues, the Communist Party could compromise no less easily and a great deal more fruitfully than with the doctrines and institutions of democracy.

M. Caillois's article is a straw indicating one of the currents in the stream, but, although an ardent search for new doctrines is now in progress, the course that French politics have been

recovered a footing in the urban working class, which is evidently tiring of the rather sterile rationalist and Marxist diet on which it has fed so long. The Catholic trade unions have, in fact, benefited even more by the Labour movement of 1936–1937 than the C.G.T., the trade union federation with a mixed syndicalist and Marxist outlook which had hitherto attracted the almost exclusive attention on the men's side in labour disputes. The C.G.T., indeed, raised its membership from 1,200,000 to 5,000,000, but lost most of its new members and probably numbers little more than 2,000,000 to-day. The Catholic trade unions did not climb so rapidly in 1936, but lost few of their new recruits and can claim an increase from about 150,000 to 500,000. They have never before stood in such a favourable proportion to the C.G.T. The Catholic Church is at last reaping the fruits of its efforts to shake off the reproach of being a class institution.

Of all the disillusionments of the last two decades the most important and the most recent is the failure of the Front Populaire to fulfil the hopes attached to it. There, at last, was to be a government, supported by a great current of national life, able to overhaul the structure of the Republic and, without sacrificing liberty, to compete in vitality with the semi-revolutionary dictatorships of Germany and Italy. So far from increasing the authority and efficacy of the Front Populaire governments, organised labour hampered them at every turn, and subjected them to indignities never suffered by bourgeois ministries. A coherent policy was rendered impossible. Democratic institutions were brought into disrepute by those who claimed to be their defenders. The Government was forced by its followers to attempt a more generous distribution of goods and leisure, while production was steadily sinking. The leaders talked of unity of the nation, while their followers provoked such timorous anxiety in the possessing classes (very numerous in France) as to make sure of a sharp reaction in the future.

This background must be kept constantly in mind if the present situation is to be understood. In November, 1936, M. Elie Halévy, the great historian of nineteenth-century England, startled his friends and colleagues of the Société Française de Philosophie by the profoundly pessimistic view of the future of liberty which he expounded in the course of

be allowed to implicate France or in the reversion to simple 'anti-red' formulæ for internal politics.

Intellectually, men are returning to the consideration of first principles, or of the problems of the moment in their light; metaphysical, religious and political questions are ousting æsthetic preoccupations. Young writers during the last few years have increasingly made themselves known with essays on political issues, and their moral on philosophical implications rather than with novels. M. Jean Grenier's *Essai sur l'Esprit de L'Orthodoxie* and M. Armand Petitjean's *Le Moderne et son Prochain* are cases in point. Well-established writers have set the examples to their juniors by attracting the public's attention more and more with irruptions into politics. M. Gide's slim volume on the Soviet Union drew readers who had never looked at his novels. M. Georges Bernanos sprang from the fictional study of religious psychology into the centre of the political arena with his *Les Grands Cimetières sous la Lune*, recording his experiences during the civil war in Majorca, and his reflections on them. M. Céline has taken the lead of the anti-Semitic pack with *Bagatelles pour un Massacre*.

A young man like M. Jean-Paul Sartre, who has in fact made his reputation during the last year by a novel and short stories which delve in the most private recesses of the human character in a manner which recalls the preoccupations of ten years ago, shows himself to be none the less of a later generation by his purely philosophical contributions to the *Revue de la Métaphysique et la Morale*.

The revival of interest in religion is evident in general literature, in the Press and in the attitude of the general public, notably at the time of the death of Puis XI and the election of Pius XII. Anti-clericalism is the mark of the old-fashioned; it is one of the aspects of the Socialist Party which gives it an incongruously out-of-date appearance. (Even the Socialist Party, however, has now some distinguished Catholic members.) The *Humanité*, organ of the Communist Party, which, with its now customary opportunism, is seeking to exploit the latest movement of opinion, welcomed the new Pope with the lyricism of a diocesan magazine, and published the most flattering portrait of him in the entire French Press. This was a recognition of the fact that Catholicism has

FRANCE TO-DAY

The shadow of European catastrophe falls on a France which is surrounded by piles of discarded costumes, the moods and ambitions of the last twenty years. The post-war æstheticism and hedonism, the neo-americanism of those who hoped at the end of the 'twenties to modernise France on transatlantic capitalist lines, the social and democratic dreams of only three years ago, all seem to-day insubstantial, theatrical, without either a work-a-day justification or a sufficient spiritual inspiration.

A new exhibition of Picasso was dismissed recently by the critic of the *Nouvelle Revue Française* with the words: 'I have always asked myself if conjurors are happy; it has always seemed to me that they must suffer terribly from not being able to do anything but tricks.' Looking back over the stretch of years between catastrophe and catastrophe, Frenchmen are conscious of a wearisome excess of virtuosity, an unfortunate habit of treating symptoms rather than causes. The solid achievements of the last two decades, which were after all far from despicable, are for the moment overlooked.

Frenchmen have at last been compelled to concentrate their attention on a few essentials. The walls of the city must be manned; its fields cultivated; and its citizens must be encouraged to procreate, so that there shall be young men and women to take their places. These are the conditions of survival.

Reactions to this situation are naturally various. There is a very noticeable heightening of the sense of elementary solidarity, which is linked with the experience of two partial mobilisations within six months—the first in September, the second at the end of March. On the other hand there has also been in many circles an intensification of group-egotism, whether in the form of xenophobia and anti-semitism, in a disinclination to admit that geographically distant events can

level of economic, agricultural and social betterment from which they have been thrust down since, after Versailles, the French and British (Conference of) Ambassadors detached them from Vienna.

The snow was falling thickly behind an icy wind off the Russian steppes. The Carpathian forests were haunted by those who, after the invasion, knew themselves 'wanted' for having worked for autonomy and whom the new Magyar occupants, returned, have promised to hand over to any of their neighbours 'as a neighbourly act.'

The shock of this last German occupation which has unsettled Europe—where all is now felt to be possible to force, audacity and speed—could not but produce a rapprochement between the States of Eastern Europe which feel themselves threatened by German expansion. If Germany had occupied right up to the eastern extremity of Czecho-Slovakia (which is not much more than a hundred miles from Russia), Hungary and Poland would have had no means of joining hands except through a self-immured Germany or through a doubtful Rumania. Hence the haste of Hungarians to occupy Carpath-Ukraine.

VORTIGERN.

In the train, near frontier of Slovakia Protectorate and Hungarian Ukraine, end of March, 1939.

defended their flag and their country, not with words and declarations, but with their blood.

The Hotel Koruna at Hust, capital of Carpath-Ukraine, saw in ten days four changes of Government within its walls—Ukrainian autonomist approved by Prague, Czech Military Dictatorship, a Ukrainian 'Committee of Public Safety,' and the Hungarian Military Régime. Among the hundreds of Ukrainian citizens shot and killed are the principal writer and poet of this peasant land, Grenja Donsky, the President of the *Sitsh* Dr. Klympush, the Counsellor Dr. Kochergan, together with Kalinyuk, Rosocha and Voron the First Secretary of the Premier Mgr. Voloshin, who is now on his way to Belgrade.

As late as the evening of March 12th I attended, with a neutral Ukrainian-and-Czech-speaking friend, a great popular and cultural anniversary of Ukrainians. We got in by a side door and sat in the last row of the hall. The Ukrainian speeches all emphasised the loyalty of all responsible Carpath-Ukrainians to autonomy *under Prague*. But, so soon as the Czech military dictatorship suppressed the autonomy and had a hundred leading citizens shot, the Ukrainians, whose experience of being partitioned among four States led them to prefer western and Germanic administration to that of the Soviets, Poles, Magyars or Rumanians, were prepared to appeal to Vienna and the Fuehrer (then there) to restore order and to protect them against a Polish or Hungarian invasion.

To most Englishmen, just now, such an appeal may seem odd or unintelligible. But it must be remembered that both the 6,000,000 and the 1,500,000 Ukrainians (who are not Russians) 'given' by Versailles to Poles and Rumanians, are not unacquainted with the *old* Germanism. Until 1918 they were, in fact, ruled relatively liberally from Vienna. Seen out of the east, after twenty years of eastern-type police rule, Germany represents to Ukrainians at least an efficient and western administration.

They are a simple and healthy race in whom recent repressions have now created a mystic flame of Nationalism deep down among the people. But at heart the people are not so much born as made politically-minded by the treatment they receive from their non-Ukrainian rulers. Their Nationalism springs from a pathetic and deep determination that their children shall be enabled to rise again to at least that

dence. The Germans paid them their price. They were given independence . . . for one day. The citizens of the little autonomous State of Carpath-Ukraine alone were unsophisticated enough to fling themselves into fight for life and liberty, for hearth and home, against the invader from whom they had been emancipated in 1918.

The Petite Entente and other allies of Czecho-Slovakia looked on with apathy in the twilight of Treaties. Fellow-Ukrainians had already had a taste of the rule of Soviets, Poles and Magyars. Better, they felt, death. Berlin calculated that if the Czechs themselves suppressed Ukrainian autonomy there would be fewer and weaker Ukrainians to resist a third-party occupation. The Polish and Hungarian regular armies were massing on the two long frontiers of the little mountain country, waiting to effect a junction.

The Czech General, Prchala, had been sent from Prague to Hust as Military Dictator, supported by Czech troops. Instead of sinking superficial differences in the face of their two common enemies and rallying the Ukrainians to the defence of the republic, the General disarmed Ukrainians, including the national organisation *Sitsh*, corresponding to the Czech *Sokols*, and seized and shot 121 prominent citizens. Meanwhile, Slovakia, by arrangement with Berlin, rebelled behind the Czechs and cut off Prchala from Prague, and left him isolated in Carpath-Ukraine. The Hungarians, awaiting their chance, fully equipped with artillery and airplanes, crossed the frontier in force. Ukrainian peasants, mostly without arms, fought the invaders with sticks and stones and with their farm implements. The Czechs turned their machine-guns on the Ukrainians from behind as they fought the advancing Hungarians in defence of the Ukrainian part of the Czechoslovak Republic. They also blew up the Carpath-Ukrainian magazine at Hust, thus depriving the Ukrainians of access to ammunition. The explosion broke windows in the train as it came up the valley. The wireless word from Prague was for submission without even passive resistance. The Czech troops eventually retired into Poland and Rumania, leaving their fellow-citizens to their fate. They were shot down as *francs-tireurs* or ' rebels ' in arms. Much sympathy has naturally enough been expended upon Czechs, but little or none upon the only people of the defunct republic who

THE END OF CARPATHIAN UKRAINE

SUSPECTING in January, and certain since March 6th, that Slovakia, but not necessarily Prague, was about to be occupied, I reached Preshov in Eastern Slovakia on March 9th. There, by such stages as the already perforated west-east line of rail permitted, I moved slowly towards the easternmost of the three compartments of the Czechish 'sausage,' known as Carpath-Ukraine. It afterwards transpired that March 9th was the first day of the final agony of Czecho-Slovakia, this hybrid first-born of Versailles. I carried authoritative letters of introduction to all sides concerned. They assured me a friendliness which I was careful not to abuse. But all my Czech newspapers were confiscated each time I crossed any frontier 'lest they should spread Communism' (or any heterodox version of events ?) among Germans.

By discretion and determination not to offend Berlin, Prague had set a censorship on the republic's newspapers. Thus, right up to the day of the occupation, the Czechs and Ukrainians were ignorant of the full treachery of Slovak separatism and of any imminence of German irruption. But Berlin had forced the Czech Government to allow sale of German extremist newspapers so that the curious could everywhere buy the obscene *Stuermer* and Goebbels' *Voelkischer Beobachter*, brought daily all hot by air from Berlin. It was thus that Czech citizens learned with surprise that they were 'martyrising' meek Germans in the streets. The Czechs fell into a trap. In it, before they realised their position, their military envoys, sent (with German consent) to Slovakia and to Carpath-Ukraine, behaved with sudden brutality and political folly. Prague had been subjected to months of provocation. Their excellent soldiers were spoiling to show their metal. They arrived, in a disloyal Slovakia and in a noisily adolescent Ukraine, vowed to repression. The Slovaks sold themselves. The price was indepen-

Poland and Rumania and received assurances of co-operation. The Jewish problem in Poland has an international aspect and cannot be solved without the assistance of other countries. The respective Governments and social bodies are asked to treat this problem as an urgent matter and not to let it be overshadowed by the tragedy of German Jewry. The discrimination in this regard to the benefit of Nazis would be, as Poles say, nothing but a premium for violence. They believe that also in this case prevention is better than cure.

It is very unlikely that Poland will ever become a totalitarian country. The methods of the Third Reich, of Italy and Russia, are contrary to her social and national structure, to her traditions and her love of freedom. Certain Polish groups have tried to transplant Fascism on Polish soil, but without success. Recent events in Europe will undoubtedly make their efforts still more hopeless. Notwithstanding great difficulties Poland has managed to preserve more political and civic liberties than any other country in Eastern and Central Europe. There is good reason to believe that she will in the future play a prominent part in the defence of European democracy.

Poland faces calmly, with grim determination, the developments along her frontiers, ready to resist any threat to her independence. Vigorous measures of military precaution have been taken by the Polish Government to this effect. Internal disputes are forgotten, and the whole nation is united morally and materially behind her gallant army under the command of Marshal Smigly Rydz. All reports from Poland point to the admirable spirit of patriotism and sacrifice which is sweeping the country.

FLORIAN SOKOLOW.

to conquer Ukraine—in any case not in an immediate future—and the Soviet Union, in spite of many internal difficulties, shows no sign of a speedy disintegration. On the other hand, the Ukrainian patriots, whatever are their grievances against Poland, are not at all delighted with the prospect of German domination. Their leading organ in Poland, *Dilo*, declared recently that in the event of war they will fight against Germany.

One of the most deplorable facts in Poland was the rise of antisemitism during the last few years, mainly among the young generations of professional intelligentsia and among the middle class. It has not assumed such a cruel form as in Germany, and so far it does not profess a racial doctrine, but it disturbed the internal peace and was exploited by political demagogy. Poland is a country with the highest percentage of Jews in the world (over 10 per cent.). The Jewish problem in Poland has become more acute, since America and other overseas countries stopped mass immigration from Eastern Europe. Before the war and for some time afterwards more than 100,000 Jews and Poles emigrated every year from Poland. Over-population, economic competition arising from it, and the rapid growth of nationalism combined to produce most disastrous effects upon the position of Jews, who for many centuries had enjoyed tolerance in Poland. After the death of Marshal Pilsudski, whose enormous popularity enabled him to rule Poland without any concessions to the reactionary elements, the situation deteriorated considerably. But, whatever underlies politically and psychologically the wave of Polish antisemitism, there is no doubt that the demographic and economic causes contribute greatly to it. It is generally believed in Poland that the increase of Jewish emigration will at least mitigate the acuteness of the problem. Colonel Beck took the initiative in Geneva in 1937 of drawing the attention of the League of Nations to the necessity of an outlet for Poland's surplus population, particularly the Jews. The Polish Government co-operates with some Polish Jewish organisations in this direction. A delegation of Polish Jews arrived recently in London to submit their case to the London Committee of the Evian Conference. Colonel Beck discussed with the British Government the possibilities of Jewish emigration from

visits of Colonel Beck in the capitals of Scandinavian, Baltic and Balkan States expressed her desire to cultivate friendship with all countries, whatever their régime, the only condition being their reciprocity. She believes in simple methods of international understanding as the surest way to promote peace, and not in the multilateral pacts and conferences of large bodies with conflicting interests, which so far have proved a complete failure

It is hoped in Poland that the future will hold more ups than downs in her relations with France—her natural ally. The short-sighted diplomacy of the Quai d'Orsay, which underestimated Poland as a partner, bears a great amount of responsibility for the frictions which arose in the past between Paris and Warsaw. The French seem now to be fully aware of it. They have reaffirmed the alliance with Poland in a most emphatic manner. Poland has always been particularly interested in a lasting rapprochement with England, both political and economic. In spite of recent reverses, British prestige stands very high in the eyes of Polish people, who look to England with respect. The agreement for mutual assistance, achieved during the visit of Colonel Beck in London, was received by all Poles with cordial feelings. It is regarded as a most helpful extension of Polish-French alliance and as an indispensable counterpart to the German bid for hegemony in Europe.

There was much speculation lately concerning the Ukrainian problem. No doubt, Germany would like to exploit it for her ends. The activity of her agents in Carpatho-Ruthenia and Eastern Galicia is common knowledge. I am not going to discuss here the internal aspect of the Ukrainian question in Poland, as that of national minority. I wish only to emphasise that the crux of the problem, as far as it concerns European peace, the future of the Ukrainian nation and the German 'Raumnot' lies beyond the Polish frontiers, in U.S.S.R., where live 85 per cent. of Ukrainians. In time the Ukrainian problem may become very acute, but there is no indication that its critical stage is nearing. Its dangerous form is closely connected with the internal crisis of the Soviet Union, which may result in the decomposition of U.S.S.R. into national units. According to the opinion prevailing in Poland, Germany would not risk a war with Russia in order

Drang nach Osten. The realisation of it came too late. Poles say that Europe would be much safer now, had Poland been invited to take part in the Munich Conference. Colonel Beck has more experience in dealing with the 'Axis' dictators than the leaders of Western democracies.

Polish diplomacy after Munich was extremely active. The new situation confronted Poland with the necessity of clearing up her relations with a number of other countries. Herr von Ribbentrop, Count Ciano and the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Gafencu, visited Warsaw at short intervals early this year. Mr. Hudson went there for trade talks with Poland. Warsaw has become one of the great centres of European politics.

The annexation of Czechoslovakia and Memel by Germany stirred up public opinion in Poland. It could not fail to produce a deep crisis in Polish-German relations. There is no inferiority complex in Poland with regard to Germany. Poles have never been defeated by Germans and the famous victory at Grunwald in 1410, when Poles and Lithuanians crushed the mighty Teutonic Order, is still living in the memory of Poles. If the rulers of the Third Reich intend to provoke a conflict with Poland, she will accept the challenge. She is well prepared for all events.

One of the most spectacular successes of Polish diplomacy before the Munich crisis was undoubtedly the resumption of good relations between Poland and Lithuania. In this case Poland had also to resort to a strong action in order to break a twenty years' old boycott by Lithuania. The Vilna question, which for many years disturbed the peace of Europe, exists no more. The Kaunas Government dissolved the 'Union for the liberation of Vilna.' Frontiers between both States are open for normal intercourse and commercial traffic. Lithuania looks to Poland for help against further German aggression. The end of the old feud has contributed very much to Poland's prestige among the Baltic States. It makes it easier to lay a foundation for a neutral 'belt' extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and, in case of a war, for a powerful front against aggressors.

The bilateral policy of good relations with neighbours does not mean that Poland is indifferent to a close co-operation with the democratic Powers or with smaller nations. The

her 'middle course' in this or that direction. These facts were the best answer to the critics accusing her of being pro-German. Polish policy was neither pro-German nor pro-French, but simply and exclusively pro-Polish. It can justly claim to be more consistent than the meandering and manœuvring of the Western Powers. The history of Poland taught her to rely before all on her own forces if she wanted to be independent and not to allow German or Russian troops to march into her territory, as 'friends and protectors.'

To many foreign observers it may seem strange that in spite of being exposed to an attack on two long fronts, Poland was during the September crisis the least disturbed country in Europe. The explanation of this paradox is very simple. Germany knew well that Poland would resist any aggression or threat of aggression and that a war with Poland would lead to a general conflagration in Europe. Poland has not ceased to be *la clé de voûte* of Europe—to use the words of Napoleon I. Her vulnerability is at the same time an additional guarantee of her safety. It is just as difficult to discriminate in the safeguards of peace as to localise war. Locarno was one of the greatest blunders in this respect. It is a pity that only now the Western Powers have become fully aware that security on the Vistula is no less important to their vital interests than security on the Rhine.

Many adverse criticisms were levelled at Poland during the Czechoslovakian crisis for her ultimatum, which demanded from the Prague Government the return of the Teschen district, seized by Czechs in 1919, when Poland fought for her existence in a war with Soviet Russia. It is unlikely that now, *post factum*, any of her critics would prefer Teschen to remain with Czechoslovakia and so to enlarge the area of German domination in Central Europe. The Warsaw Government, taking into account all elements of the situation in September, 1938, formed an early conclusion that Czechoslovakia was not going to fight and that the Western Powers were not in earnest to defend her. This anticipation proved correct. What else could Poland do then, if not to act in a preventive manner? It is to be regretted that the Western Powers did not grasp in proper time the importance of the common Polish Hungarian frontier as a barrier to the German

assumption caused a wrong attitude towards Poland whenever tension arose between London and Paris. Poland was then victimised for being 'a pawn in French hands.' Later, when Poland started normal relations with Germany, the same mistake was repeated in a different way. While the entire world opinion welcomed the 'diplomatic miracle' which suddenly transformed the most dangerous spot in Europe (the so-called Corridor) into one of the safest regions, a campaign of speculations and rumours was launched against Poland. They represented Poland as a German vassal, and the Polish-German pact as a plot against Russia. The ten years' pledge, offered to Poland by Germany, which undertook to settle all differences by peaceful means, was criticised as a dubious gift to Poland with a view to induce her to attack Russia together with Germany. Of course there was no foundation for these assertions, but they were widely circulated and gained some credence owing to the lack of Polish counter-propaganda. Poland was unable to compete with the much superior technique of her antagonists in influencing the public opinion of foreign countries. She never spent large sums for this purpose, relying on facts as the best propaganda in the long run.

'Poland is sitting on the fence.' One could very often find in the English Press such a definition of Polish policy. Although this can hardly be applied to Colonel Beck's very active and peripatetic diplomacy, yet, taken symbolically, 'sitting on the fence' may be sometimes very useful, if there is no other way to preserve peace. There is practically no difference between such a method and the famous English principle, 'wait and see.' Poland's attitude in the recent crisis is the best proof that she is not afraid to act promptly and decisively and to take the greatest risks, whenever the situation demands it.

The visits of Colonel Beck to Berchtesgaden and of Herr von Ribbentrop to Warsaw last January, gave rise to a new crop of rumours about the alleged alignment of Poland with the Axis Powers, which turned out to be pure inventions. Poland refused to join the anti-Comintern pact. She re-affirmed her non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Poland did not leave the League of Nations, as was forecast in some papers. She resisted all external pressure to change

which the Western Powers endeavoured to achieve it could not inspire the confidence of the Polish Statesmen. The failure of the League of Nations and the collapse of other conceptions of collective security were in Poland taken for granted much earlier than elsewhere, not because Poland was unwilling to co-operate in the realisation of international peace, but because her rulers did not believe that under prevailing circumstances these conceptions could be relied upon as a matter of practical policy. Poland was a staunch supporter of the League of Nations as long as Geneva offered the slightest chance of a common action. Poland was first to enforce sanctions against Italy during the Abyssinian crisis and to carry out the resolutions of the Non-intervention Committee in the Spanish crisis. But Poland's policy means business and she could not afford to pay mere lip service to popular slogans and pious intentions. Her uncomfortable geographical position between two dictatorships compelled her to face the facts in their true perspective. Being a sort of a 'continental island' amid the stormy cross-currents of power politics, Poland had to watch carefully the course of events without cherishing false hopes and sentimental delusions.

For this reason Pilsudski was anxious to develop friendly relations with her neighbours, Russia and Germany, without prejudice to her treaties with other States and alliances with France and Rumania. He concluded a non-aggression pact with U.S.S.R. in 1933 and with Germany in 1934. His main idea was to preserve an equilibrium between these two Powers, a strongly armed neutrality, based upon the principle of *bon voisinage* and at the same time not to involve Poland in any new commitments beyond those which existed before 1933. Another guiding rule was to claim for Poland the right to participate in all international decisions affecting her interests. 'Nothing about us without us'—was his motto. No negotiations by Big Fours or Big Fives should be recognised as binding Poland, unless she attended them on equal terms. It is very difficult to understand Poland's policy without taking into account the tremendous influence exercised by Pilsudski on the minds of his co-workers and disciples.

One of the greatest mistakes was to regard Poland as anybody's vassal or satellite. For many years a view was held in England that Poland's policy was dictated from Paris and this

POLAND'S POLICY

BRITAIN'S semi-isolation in Europe has come to an end. A drastic reversal of policy, pursued by the successive post-war Governments of Great Britain, was revealed when England pledged herself to assist Poland if her independence is threatened. This pledge has been reciprocated by Poland. The partnership between Poland and England at such a momentous juncture has aroused considerable interest in Poland's policy. The purpose of the following observations is to give a retrospective review of that policy and of the outstanding problems with which Poland is confronted.

One of the greatest benefits conferred upon Poland by Marshal Pilsudski was a good foreign policy, full of forethought and imagination. He possessed an extraordinary knowledge of human nature and power of vision. Under his guidance Poland has become an important factor in the European situation. Marshal Pilsudski was not only able to predict correctly the trend of events, but also to take decisions, which minimised the dangers to Poland's safety. Colonel Beck, the present Polish Foreign Minister, his former A.D.C. and faithful disciple, proved to be a successful executor of Pilsudski's political testament. Tall, smart, with sharply-cut features and brisk movements, Colonel Beck gives the impression of a man who knows well what he wants and who never shrinks from taking a bold decision. He is still a young man, in the early forties, but he may be called a doyen of all Foreign Ministers in Europe, having been appointed to his post in 1932. He combines a keen sense of reality with wide experience and diplomatic skill. During the tenure of his present office he distinguished himself by relentless activity in following the footsteps of his master. It was not an easy job to apply the strict principles, established by Pilsudski, to the changing circumstances. No country is more interested in the maintenance of peace than Poland. But the methods by

That is why the future of this small country cannot be viewed without some anxiety. But speaking of Lithuania's future we cannot overlook her relations with her other neighbours. With Russia they are outspokenly correct and good neighbourly, so that Lithuania will only benefit if Russia is drawn into the new peace front. With regard to the Poles, Warsaw's ultimatum in March, 1938, has forced the Lithuanians definitely to renounce all claims to Vilna and to establish diplomatic contact with Poland. This contact is outwardly friendly, but in the heart of the Lithuanians the loss of the old capital still rankles, and they must also beware lest the embrace of Polish friendship should prove crushing. The Poles, always with an eye to the dangers besetting the Corridor, have more than a platonic interest in sea-bound Lithuania.

On the other hand, Poland's proclaimed 'vital interest' in the three Baltic States is a valuable guarantee of their integrity. Thanks to her alliance with Britain, Poland will now more than ever be stimulated to block Germany's path to the East and thus protect Lithuania and her Baltic friends The three latter, working in close political harmony, are now making great efforts to increase their defensive capacity, whilst at the same time adhering to a policy of strictest neutrality.

WOLFRAM GOTTLIEB.

interwoven with the whole question of future economic and, consequently, political relations between the two countries.

It was rumoured in Kaunas before the conference that Germany will use her victory over Lithuania to press for a monopoly in her foreign trade, to secure the 'peasant country's' agricultural supplies, and even to force Kaunas to use only German shipping lines instead of British. It is difficult to say how far these rumours were only an expression of nervousness in Kaunas, or whether they were founded on fact. One cannot judge agreements between the Reich and her small neighbours at their face value. More important is the secret trend of the conversations, which will emerge only later. But whatever their actual outcome is—one thing is certain: Lithuanian-German trade will be considerably increased, and with it the political pressure of Berlin.

Neutral observers consider that Memel remaining Lithuania's only outlet to the sea will be instrumental in augmenting the influence of the Reich in Kaunas. Memel in Germany's hands is a guarantee of Lithuania's observance of Germany's desires, particularly if these are fortified at any time by military pressure. It is true that Lithuania, having given up Memel, has got rid of her last 'aching tooth.' Mistakes committed in earlier years when dealing with the local Germans, and the intolerably growing Nazi propaganda, combined to make Memel, in spite of its economic profits, a thorn in the Lithuanian flesh. This thorn being eliminated, Lithuania has gained immensely in internal unity, and by having once and for all settled the old quarrel with Germany. The Non-Aggression Clause signed on the famous 22nd of March seems to be an enormously important guarantee of Lithuania's future integrity—and the Lithuanians are inclined, therefore, to adopt an attitude of good neighbourliness towards the Reich. But one cannot help wondering whether the latter will reciprocate this feeling. Is it to be supposed that the Reich will satisfy itself with having 'freed' the Memel-Germans, gained economic advantages and a strong naval base? Previous experiences elsewhere have shown that after the first blow the Reich invariably plans a second. The *Drang nach dem Osten* has not been given up, and, apart from the problematic way through Poland and Rumania, Lithuania is the only 'route to Moscow.'

commerce according to her present requirements. Drastic curtailments in the whole State expenditure have been made. The President of the Republic has voluntarily renounced 17.5 per cent. of his annual income, the Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament 10 per cent. Representation funds and departmental budgets are reduced, office hours for the civil service extended, and cuts in the salaries of officials are expected. The import of luxury articles will be prohibited, foreign travel limited. The tax system is to be reorganised. Appeals have been launched for popular sacrifices, to which the nation has responded magnificently. Hundreds of thousands of Lit., valuables, wedding rings have been given up for the country's needs, particularly for the new defence fund. Notable among these contributions are large amounts from Lithuanians in the British Empire and America. Fortunately agriculture is practically unimpaired, and its export is to be increased.

The financial questions being settled, the main problem now facing Kaunas is that of an outlet to the sea. There is a small Lithuanian fishing village not far from Memel, called Sventoji, which, given sufficient capital, could be transformed into a good port. But apart from the fact that Lithuania has no funds available, it is not to be supposed that Germany will ever tolerate the creation of a competitor to Memel. After the transfer, Lithuania redirected part of her foreign trade to the Latvian port of Libau, but, contrary to expectations, the Reich not only shows no sign of closing Memel to Lithuania, but presses her to use Memel exclusively even in her dealings with other States.

The question of the port is regulated by the German-Lithuanian Agreement of March 22nd, according to which Lithuania was to be given a free zone in Memel. The Memel Harbour Company, in which Lithuanian capital is the determining factor, has a ninety-nine years' lease of the zone. Payment for the lease is to be covered by the former Lithuanian Government investments in Memel. This sounded rather favourable for Lithuania, but provision was made to clarify the position in special conversations between representatives of both countries. This is the reason for the Berlin talks of April 24th, which, however, have also a wider and more fateful aspect. For the problem of Memel is

1,240,000 tons of cargo were handled. Memel dealt with more than 80 per cent. of Lithuania's foreign trade. It was one of her main sources of income which, amounting to nearly 15 per cent. of the total State budget, raised the prosperity of the whole country.

It is easy to imagine what it meant to Lithuania to give up all this. In addition to the port, one-third of the Lithuanian industry was lost, notably the cellulose, timber, cotton and artificial manure production, and two-thirds of the timber and wool industries. The blow was terrible, the task of readjustment immense. But the new Cabinet is a combination of strong men, some of them military. It is, moreover, a genuine national government, since for the first time in Lithuanian history the political parties have combined in a joint administration, which is reinforced by a number of non-party experts. This unity among the leaders has made a deep impression on the people. They have already recovered from the shock and are mobilising all their efforts to survive the blow.

But it is not so easy to achieve the new stability. A number of urgent problems must be solved. What is to happen to the 15,000 refugees from Memelland, who have abandoned property worth more than 15,000,000 Lit., and part of whom are homeless in Kaunas? Special committees have had to be formed for their relief. But the question of providing for the Lithuanian officials who lost their jobs in Memel is still unsolved. A number of Lithuanians who are left in Memel have to be evacuated, provided agreement with Germany is reached on this point. Then there is the task of transferring frontier posts, customs stations, cultural centres, etc. And one of the most important things is the new budget.

The Lithuanian annual budget amounted to approximately 360,000,000 Lit. (28 Lit. to the pound). Fifty to sixty millions will be lacking in the State income this year on account of Memel. Consequently, since Lithuania has no special funds on which to draw, the State economy must be drastically revised. A special Economic Council with very wide powers has been created which is to direct the future economic and social policy. A series of new regulations aim at the reorganisation of Lithuania's internal and foreign

thousands of their sons, and the enemy was still on Lithuanian territory. But immediately after the peace treaties the work of reconstruction began.

The Lithuanians, hardworking and unassuming, are mainly agriculturalists. Of a population of nearly 2,530,000 (140,000 in Memelland), 76 per cent. are engaged in stock raising, dairy farming, market gardening, forestry, poultry farming, grain and flax production. Only 10 per cent. are occupied in commerce and industry. From the first day incessant toil and the strictest economy were observed, leading to growing prosperity. The State budget showed a substantial surplus. This was mainly devoted to roadmaking, railway building, housing and social welfare. Huge sums had to be spent on the new capital, Kaunas, which—formerly a badly neglected Russian garrison town—gradually changed into a modern metropolis. But perhaps the greatest national effort was made in Memel.

Once a little timber port, Memel under Lithuanian sovereignty has become a prosperous city of 50,000 inhabitants. In spite of being ice-free throughout the year and deeper than many Baltic harbours, Memel, when part of Germany, remained insignificant because it lacked its natural hinterland. Russia, its neighbour who shipped her timber through Memel, failed to link it up with the country which forms the basis for its economic existence. The taking over of Memel by Lithuania in 1923 was therefore a natural process. It joined Memel with its hinterland and gave Lithuania the much needed outlet to the sea. And this arrangement soon reacted to their mutual benefit.

Memel at once became the centre of Lithuanian export and import. Since the port lacked most buildings essential to general trade, the Government built modern warehouses, cold-storages, grain elevators, cranes, oil tanks, etc. The harbour was deepened, breakwaters and wharfs were extended. During the last ten years about £2,000,000 were expended by Lithuania on improvements of the port, and the same amount was spent on linking it with its hinterland by railways and roads. The town developed markedly. Industries sprang up, notably saw mills, shipbuilding yards, spinning mills, bacon, furniture, plywood and cellulose factories. In 1937 nearly 1,500 ships, mainly British, entered the port and

LITHUANIA'S STRUGGLE FOR LIFE

LITHUANIA is decidedly one of the step-children of post-war Europe. It is more than hard to lose, within the short period of twenty-one years, first Vilna, the ancient capital, and now Memel, the only 'window to the sea.' But it is still harder to build up the country anew under the present circumstances. And this is precisely the task which now confronts the recently constituted government of Kaunas.

These two painful operations which Lithuania has had to undergo are not alike. The loss of Vilna, at a time when the contours of the young states were not yet defined, and the centres of gravity not fixed, was mostly of a moral nature. The forcible transfer of Memel, however, is a blow aimed directly at the material foundations of the country. When the Poles seized Vilna, it had scarcely become an integral part of the modern Lithuanian State. No capital had been invested in, nor benefit derived from it. And though the fact itself was a severe shock to the national pride of the Lithuanians and a curtailment of their natural development, it was possible for them not only to survive, but to prosper.

Memel is a different matter. Here the Lithuanians have in the course of sixteen years invested infinite care, capital and labour. The whole State was founded on the assumption that Memel, with its docks, factories and cultural life, was part and parcel of Lithuania. To lose all this is like cutting off one of its most important limbs. The health of the State—its economic and political balance, are shaken. And though, given normal circumstances, there should be no question of Lithuania's not surviving the blow, there are formidable obstacles in her way to future stability.

The Lithuanians are not afraid of difficulties. The Great War had reduced their country almost to a desert. Battles, requisition, military occupation accounted for more than £70,000,000 worth of damages. The people had lost

tarian Powers are to be brought to a genuine awareness of the new feeling they have to face. If this awareness can be brought about there is a real hope that war, which at the moment seems almost inevitable, may still be averted. But the accomplishment of this task calls for immediate and unremitting activity by Great Britain and France, for a foreign policy that concerns itself less with the 'friendly gestures' and demagogic counter-proposals so often made by the Fascist leaders than with the seemingly unalterable determination of both Hitler and Mussolini, driven by the whip of domestic difficulty, to seek solutions for their problems in the field of foreign adventure. Not the false pledges of peace made by the dictators, but their proven pursuit of imperialist ends, must be the object to which our policy is firmly and unwaveringly directed.

M. Wolf.

Morocco, though we can admit the possibility of different views as to the precise degree of danger that such measures indicate for the Western Powers and their Allies, there can be no two opinions as to the fundamental aims of the Axis policy.

But to choose, of all possible explanations, the most favourable, the 'safest,' is to court a much greater danger—namely, that the Germans and Italians will again be strengthened by such 'proof' in their already firm conviction that appeasement, not perhaps as a deliberate line of foreign policy, but as a 'line of least resistance' pursued in the face of mounting Fascist aggression, is still alive in the democratic countries. It is now more than ever necessary that Berlin and Rome should be told in unmistakable language that the coalition for collective defence against aggression is not just a formal retreat to the Genevan attitude of collective security, but a determined resolve to build up a politically powerful alliance ready to meet any new aggression with all the military force at its disposal.

The Germans and Italians are deeply convinced that the numerical superiority that won the day in September has been maintained since, despite all the efforts made by England and France. They believe their own position, despite the Anglo-Polish treaty and other developments, to have been so strengthened by the absorption of Czechoslovakia and Albania and by the Fascist consolidation in Spain that, as against September, they are now relatively better placed than before.

On the other hand, the decisive change in the West since Munich, the growth of a moral front of resistance to the totalitarian Powers, has been hardly, certainly not sufficiently, realised in either Rome or Berlin. The new spirit of moral resistance to aggression that has flamed up in the West will not be appreciated with proper seriousness in Berlin unless the counter-measures taken to check the military preparations of the Axis are strong enough to impress the Germans with the fact that no further political manœuvres in the field of imperialist aggression will be tolerated. Political expression of the most concrete, decisive and direct kind must be given to this moral passion which has transformed the situation in England and France since the September crisis if the totali-

fields, so here—the characteristic structure of the National Socialist State, internal slavery, the muzzling of all real criticism, the inculcation of an almost mystical belief in their own invincible power, and the equally exaggerated and systematic under-estimation of the strength of the enemy, combine to make an objective judgment of the situation well-nigh impossible.

The German position, which finds its counterpart and completion in that of Italy, at least as far as the imperial aims of the two countries are concerned, strengthens our impression, particularly when we remember the far-reaching technical preparations made by Italy and Germany within their own borders as well as in other places of strategical importance, that the activities to be undertaken in the coming weeks or months will more than ever develop from and underline the unity of action of the Axis partners.

Here and there, it is true, we can point to scraps of evidence—for example the existence of anti-German feeling in Italy, the possibility of a clash of interest arising during the present period of political manœuvre—that bolster up the hope that, at the critical moment, the Axis itself may break, and the political and military advance of the dictators be checked. The temptation to exaggerate the importance of minor or ephemeral 'incidents' is great; but those who succumb to the temptation not only tend to over-estimate the importance of the incident as an indication of 'stress' between the Axis partners, and minimise its significance as it affects the position of the democracies: they also completely fail to do justice to the unvarying imperialist aims of both German and Italian policy. Political diagnosticians of this school are fond of referring to the hostility with which the head of the Italian Government views the menacing imperialist policy pursued by his colleague, a hostility shown, so it is claimed, by the events of the last few weeks. That such a hostility exists has certainly never been proved during the last two years. We may easily agree that the political and military activities of the Axis Powers admit of more than one explanation. But whether we are concerned with the Balkans, with the German drive to the east, with Spain or with Egypt, with the German fleet movements or with the concentration of 50,000 men of the Spanish army on the frontier between French and Spanish

followed by another Munich. The occupation and strengthening of strategical points that threaten the vital interests of the Western Powers have not been carried out on the spur of the moment, have not been forced upon the totalitarian States by some sudden arising 'political necessity': on the contrary, these moves form part of a deliberate and well-planned programme. It would be quite false to see in them, as some have tried to see, evidences of a 'growing rift in the Axis.' The planned character of the German and Italian moves is the more obvious since the measures taken are completely in line, detail for detail, with the known strategical conceptions of the Axis Powers. And these are, again speaking generally, the widest possible extension of the theatre of war and consequent decentralisation of the struggle, the tying down of enemy forces to the defence of a large number of scattered fronts, and the decentralisation of the superior totalitarian forces also, but not to an extent that would preclude the possibility of delivering powerful attacks on the central and most politically and strategically important positions of their opponents. The military counter-measures of the Western Powers do not, so far, seem to have shaken the strategical plans of the Fascist States. Germany and Italy believe in and rely on their overwhelming superiority in ground troops and air strength. The great weight of naval armament against them can, in their opinion, be largely discounted, in spite of the fact that Italy lies widely open to attack, because the British and French fleets will be mainly occupied in the protection of positions in north Europe, Asia and Africa, and therefore only to a limited extent available for action in the decisive battle areas. Growing Italian doubts have been met with the argument that, even if Russian forces enter the conflict in strength, the German defences in the west and east are so strong that sufficient German troops could always be detached to aid the Italians, without sensibly diminishing the striking force available in the main theatres of war. The German and Italian opinion of their own great numerical and strategical superiority is doubtless largely responsible for the fact that, quite apart from Hitler and the extreme wing of the Nazi Party, the most influential military opinion also holds to the view that Germany and her allies would be invulnerable even in a general European war. As in other

difficulties or by some other cause. Nor is it likely that he will be checked by raw material deficiencies. Whether the newly constituted defensive coalition in Europe leads to war, or whether it will produce a stabilisation of the present situation, depends entirely on decisions taken by Hitler himself—depends, that is, on a mind and character swayed by irrational, not rational, influences. All other considerations are secondary. Will Hitler choose war simply because he 'needs' a war beyond the frontier just as he 'needs' the terror at home? Does he want war because up to now his successes have lacked the proper military quality of 'utter annihilation' he associates with military victory? Because the formidable weapons he himself has forged have not yet thundered the dictation of victory after battle? Or because he wants to live again the ecstasy that filled him in 1914 about which, in *Mein Kampf*, he has written so movingly? It is on imponderable factors, as subjective, personal, psychological as these that the Führer's decision, and with it the issue of peace and war, depends.

Hitler's decision, however basically irrational it may be, has nevertheless been made more difficult by the organisation of the peace alliance. That part of Europe that remains aloof from the Axis rejects the German doctrine of '*Lebensraum*' and, to some extent, bars the road to the satisfaction of the German claim. The barrier thus raised seems to rule out the plan, so dear to the heart of the German dictator, of a 'small war'—'to give the German people,' as Hitler said in private conversation, soon after Munich, 'confidence in themselves and their weapons which they lack at present.'

On the other hand, many careful observers take the view that the decisions reached by Hitler, and Mussolini for that matter, are even more far-reaching than the military steps already known to have been taken by the Axis Powers have led most people to suppose. They point out that the massing of troops on all the most strategically significant battle fronts, on the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Germany, on the frontier between Libya and Egypt, in the Dodecanese Islands, in Spain and in Spanish Morocco, and the movements and placing of the German and Italian fleets, suggest much more a serious and deliberate 'positional preparation' for war than preparatory moves for a new course of blackmail to be

clear that the idea of Germany's 'living space' dominates policy, and that the concept of 'living space' includes and justifies the conquest, annexation and subjection of any territory or state that in the opinion of the German leaders is necessary to the fulfilment of the imperial mission of the Reich. As the Germans have already proved, the idea of 'living space' knows no frontiers. Great Britain and France have their empires in five continents: Germany's right to 'living space' carries with it, in the eyes of the Nazi leaders, the right to create and possess her empire in Europe. But at the same time Germany's right to expand cannot be restricted within the continental limits of Europe. The Reich not only supports the Italian claims in Europe and Africa: it also aims at expanding and developing the anti-Comintern pact into a military alliance to challenge British and French interests in Europe, Africa and Asia. While German diplomacy endeavours, as it were, to drive Britain and France out of Europe, Herr von Ribbentrop at the same time is prepared to justify the intervention and interference of the Reich in every part of the globe under the pretext of 'protecting German interests.'

Since the principle of '*Lebensraum*' was enunciated by the Chancellor in his Wilhelmshaven speech, both Hitler and his lieutenants have repeatedly affirmed their readiness to wage war, preventive or offensive, if war is required to translate their demands into reality

It does not seem to be by mere coincidence that the racial doctrine is latterly being 'soft-pedalled' by the German propaganda machine (for domestic consumption at least), and that, instead, the emphasis is placed on the 'mission' of the German people and on the 'heroic' qualities that fit them for world leadership.

Trustworthy evidence seems to indicate that no substantial differences exist between Hitler, the Party leadership, von Ribbentrop and the army chiefs on the question of pursuing an imperialist policy that will gratify Germany's demand for '*Lebensraum*.' On the contrary, it appears that complete unanimity on this point has been reached. Nor does popular feeling in Germany supply any grounds for believing that Hitler will be halted at the outset of his next step towards the imperial goal by resistance at home, stimulated by food

are technically impossible of fulfilment. The German General Staff may (though this is not absolutely certain) regard the military value of the Anglo-French guarantees in a somewhat different light. But (and this is quite certain) the inclusion of the Soviet Union among the guarantors would, in the view of the Reichswehr generals, signify a radical alteration in the military-strategic situation in Eastern Europe. And quite apart from the purely strategical aspect of the matter, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that all attempts to stabilise permanently and securely the Balkan region (if sufficient time still remains to undertake such a task) by consolidating and extending the Anglo-French system of guarantees must, of geographical necessity, stand or fall with the attitude of Russia.

Berlin and Rome have endeavoured, and are still endeavouring, by every weapon of propaganda and diplomacy, to prevent the formation of the new coalition. In the German view the new alliance, in reality a simple measure of self-defence against an acute and menacing danger, is nothing more nor less than an attempt to encircle the Reich. It is difficult for the moment to judge whether the German Government is crying 'encirclement' for tactical reasons, or whether the propagation of this myth is designed to make it easier for the Nazi authorities to stuff the German people with a greater 'war-guilt lie' later on. The state of mind of leading Nazi circles at the moment inclines us to favour the second of these explanations.

For what Germany accomplished in practice in the disruption of Czechoslovakia has since that event been characterised, by Hitler in his Wilhelmshaven speech, by many other Nazi leaders in subsequent utterances, as completely in keeping with the basic principles of National Socialist German policy. In the seizure of Czechoslovakia, Nazi Germany has for the first time substituted the idea of '*Lebensraum*' (living space) for that of '*Volkstum*' (people). The racial concept has made way for a brutal and naked doctrine of imperialism. After Hitler's Wilhelmshaven speech it would be criminal for us to deceive ourselves into thinking that the fate of Bohemia and Moravia represents an isolated or special case. The formulation of the new German policy by Hitler and his lieutenants excludes the possibility of any such interpretation. On the contrary, Hitler made it crystal

the nature of the emergency and upon the kind of defensive alliance that ultimately emerges from the developing situation.

Discussions on the question of Russian support have already led, in Great Britain and France especially, to controversies. The disputants have for the most part not concerned themselves with the clear-cut issues and with the necessities of power-politics, but have strayed into the realms of 'right' and 'left' make-believe, occupying themselves with wish-fulfilling fancy. The dangers, both latent and present, that were effective in bringing a new foreign policy into existence, have in no way been materially diminished by the adoption of that foreign policy; and the importance of securing practical help from Russia is now greater even than before.

Soviet assistance, if it is to be forthcoming at all in the European theatre, is certainly of vital importance both for Poland and Rumania. Let us admit that Poland could, with her own military resources, protect her territory, at least for a limited period; the same is certainly not true of Rumania. Even with the support of Poland, Rumania would not be able to defend herself in the absence of Russian assistance. Rumania (even granting that her army possesses a greater strength than is generally allowed) would have to face the German south-eastern army supported, in all probability, by the armies of Hungary and of Bulgaria. Against such superior forces the issue would never be in doubt. But Russia, holding the balance of power in the Balkans, could become a political tower of strength to the coalition (in spite of all ideological differences) even if her rôle were limited to the defensive one of counteracting the present persistent and ever-threatening diplomatic aggressiveness of the Axis Powers. The Russian counter-proposals, brought forward during the present negotiations for strengthening and extending the system of 'guarantees,' add weight to the view that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in helping to ensure stability in the Balkans.

The importance of the Russian aid can be illustrated in another way. In their propagandist arguments, addressed to the smaller States, both Germany and Italy stress the doubtful effectiveness of the Anglo-French guarantees. What, they ask, do these guarantees amount to in practice. They are valueless, is the burden of the German argument, because they

desires from the internal political structure of the two countries, to under-estimate the strength of their opponents, is a source of serious danger to the whole world. It is a danger that finds its sharpest and most obvious expression in the political movements and technical military measures already taken by the Axis Powers.

We may more easily realise the dangers inherent in the present German propaganda campaign if we remember that the German leaders most probably believe that a bitter, aggressive and spiteful propaganda directed against the nerves of the foreigner will create a general atmosphere of anxiety and fear and lead to the re-adoption of the policy of appeasement. But though such a campaign may be bankrupt of results abroad, its effect inside Germany is likely to be powerful in the extreme; and the Government of the Reich may easily find that, as a consequence of the state of mind deliberately created within its own country, it will be forced to embark on measures which once undertaken will set in motion a chain of attack and defence difficult if not impossible to halt.

The coalition of countries bound together by pledges of mutual assistance and associated for the purpose of collective security under the leadership of Great Britain is, by its very nature, an alliance for defence. Where, as in the case of Danzig or the Polish Corridor, the question of what constitutes a threat to the vital interests of this or that member of the coalition is left to the judgment of the individual country concerned, the notion of an offensive or even a preventive course of action is equally excluded. The purely defensive character of the present grouping is brought out even more clearly when we turn our attention from the centre of the stage to the wings, from England and France to Russia and the U.S.A. The military strength of the co-operating Powers supports the political assurances that have been exchanged, but, as the negotiations stand at the present moment, the manner and degree in which the aid of the Soviet Union will be made, or can be made, militarily effective remains unclear. But even if the present talks with Russia are productive of general or limited military and political guarantees, the essentially defensive nature of the coalition still remains unquestionable. The U.S.A. is on a different footing again, and the precise form that its assistance will take must depend upon

propaganda that accompanied it, would effectively block all attempts of the Western States to safeguard their interests in the east of Europe.

The statesmen of the totalitarian countries were unwilling or unable to see that the very methods they used, the blatant contempt for international law and human rights they displayed, created in fact the indispensable conditions without which the new coalition could not have been built up. Just as little were they able or willing to see in the disruption of Czechoslovakia and the rape of Albania the motor that drove the new course of policy forward at an ever hastening speed. The time factor, as it entered into the calculation of the Axis Powers, had always been construed as the 'breathing space' that must elapse before the Western democracies could complete their defensive measures, political, military and technical; a 'breathing space' which would allow the Fascist States to carry through to a successful conclusion their widely-conceived imperialist plans. These plans can be summed up as the creation of a German Empire in Europe and an Italian Empire containing the Mediterranean. Had the fulfilment of this ambitious double programme (in 1940) coincided with the completion of the defensive preparations of the Western Powers, then a fully 'prepared' Britain and France would still, in the opinion of the German and Italian leaders, have held no terrors for the totalitarian States. Confronted by an Imperial Germany and an Imperial Italy, the Western Powers would again have found themselves relatively and absolutely in the weaker position.

At the present moment there is very little evidence that, even after the latest international developments, Berlin and Rome have come to realise, with any degree of clearness, the falsity of the assumptions underlying this view. In Italy a faint and growing appreciation of the situation is being stifled by powerful diplomatic and political pressure from Berlin. To what extent Hitler and his closest advisers are bothering their heads with any serious and objective analysis of the present position, to what extent they are therefore seriously weighing their immediate decisions as to policy—these are questions that must be considered as part of a wider evaluation of Germany's position as a whole. The fact that the Germans and Italians are compelled, for reasons that

THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

In the course of a few weeks the distribution of forces in Europe has shifted and altered. New combinations have come into existence. In spite of the fact that these changes, to some extent at least, and for months past, were clearly seen as demanded by the nature of the international situation, their realisation was thought to be impossible, both by the Axis Powers and by the countries associated in the coalition headed by Great Britain, a coalition now coming into existence for the purpose of opposing collective defence to aggression, and organised on the basis of pledged assistance to the co-operating partners in the event of war.

The aspect of international affairs was not only dangerous, but very obviously so. Nevertheless it seemed highly questionable that the Western Powers would be able to free themselves from their pursuit of the politics of appeasement, from the tyranny of other and similar hopes and fears, and bring themselves to the point of making a decisive change in their policy, even under the stimulus of a new and more resounding disillusionment. For a variety of reasons, Germany and Italy regarded such a re-orientation of Western policy as impossible, no matter what other new developments might be brought about in the international situation.

Even before the Munich meeting, Berlin and Rome were disposed to regard as necessarily still-born any idea of closer co-operation between the Western Great Powers and Southern or South-eastern Europe. The results that flowed from the Munich Agreement confirmed them in this belief; for Berlin and Rome were equally convinced that the decisive step had now been taken—as well geographically as from the military and political point of view—to end for ever the old balance of power in Europe. Even more than the geographical factor, so it was argued in Berlin, the increased military strength of the Axis, together with the velvet-gloved but threatening

civilisation and barbarism. We all know either when we see it at work. What is the reality? The reality is that the Third Reich and all it stands for is at gripe with England and all she stands for and has the determination to kill her by every means in its power. It is an attack by the unstable outer mass, that has never known the Roman discipline, that was always outside the Empire, which has always derived its knowledge from civilised man, which cannot create, which loses itself in mysticism, romanticism and uncouth and beastly dreams, which has only servilely accepted the religion of its superiors and shakes it off when it can and returns to the forest and to Wotan; it is an attack by the Barbarian horde upon the continuity, the so various energies and the lucid reason of the real world, that is, the ancient civilisation of Europe, Christendom with its age-old religion, its order, its institutions and its creative life.

It is all that which is at stake; and all that is civilisation itself, all that is Christendom and the dominion of the world.

What are we doing to save all that which, after 1918, ought never to have been in peril? Whom have we to face this Attila of the twentieth century, this anti-Christ who would destroy all?

I answer, the English. Given a sound lead the English will respond as they always have done and always will do till they are no more. They are not a military, but they are a warlike people. They have saved the liberty of Europe many times by their endeavour and their example. They have already defeated the Barbarian once and they can and will do so again. But it must be for the last time.

EDWARD HUTTON.

However that may be, for us there remain certain facts to be considered, if, as is so difficult, we are to benefit from the lessons of history.

Rome always defeated the Barbarians, but never succeeded in destroying their power to renew the attack. Stilicho defeated Alaric whenever he met him, yet Alaric at last entered Rome. Aetius broke Attila repeatedly, yet Attila at last was able to threaten Italy. Belisarius and Narses broke Vitiges and Totila, yet these Barbarians ruined the peninsula. For in spite of defeat, the attack was always renewed, because Rome had never really destroyed the Barbarian power. I may perhaps be allowed to quote some words from a book,[1] published in 1915:

> If we to-day spare the Germanies the uttermost price and the last, if we fail to push this war to the bitter and the necessary end, *in twenty years* or in fifty they will fall upon us again and perhaps in an hour for us less fortunate.

It was perhaps not within the power of Rome to break once and for all the Barbarian power. Time has been upon our side. To-day, if our courage and our endurance are strong enough, if we set our face like a flint, if we do not, as in 1918, grow weary, we may once for all rid Europe of this cancer, this Barbarian peril, which now as always is bent on the destruction and the loot of civilisation, pleads necessity, 'a place in the sun,' *lebensraum*, invokes its gods, and knows neither justice nor mercy.

Rome could not mobilise; we can. In the old days the Barbarians could break off first the point, as it were, of civilisation, then a little more, and so on, till the butt choked them. They can no longer do that if we refuse permission; though they have successfully seized without a shot Austria and Czechoslovakia and, worst of all, have attracted Italy as a satellite. The railway, the automobile, the aeroplane and modern shipping, wireless, the telegraph and the telephone have endowed us with such a power of mobilisation that we can compel the Barbarians to meet the mass of civilisation first instead of last.

It is easy and perhaps futile to theorise about such mysterious forces and to call them by vague names such as

[1] *Attila and the Huns*, by Edward Hutton (Constable, 1915), p. xi.

our home, we may best discover the character of England herself. For much of the greatness of England reposes in a continuous and classical rebuke to excess; and this more than any of her other qualities, founded though it is, not as with the Greeks, in a sense of beauty, but in a sense of humour, that is of proportion, and in common sense, has sufficed till now to save England. It has not saved her future. Will it suffice, will it even survive, in the darkness that threatens her to-day?

The great wars against Philip of Spain, against Louis XIV, against Napoleon, in which the hegemony of Europe was at stake, and through which England victoriously battled her way for her own liberty and the liberty of the world, were the wars of Christendom. Not till 1914 was she called upon to face the Barbarian.

In the long years of peace before the war of 1914 we were used to flatter the Barbarian or to laugh at him; to forgive his uncouth ways, to overlook his awkwardness and brutality, to forget that he could not make, but only destroy. Not till we saw his massy club, aimed at Paris, smite through Belgium and Northern France, destroying in its monstrous sweep, as the Hun destroyed, population and cities, field and fruit tree in organised outrage; not till he had set his mark on Rheims; not till he had defiled and overthrown the ancient churches of Northern France; not till we saw the fate of those he had overwhelmed, did we recognise the Barbarian, and England for the first time came face to face with Prussia.

Ignorant still of what she had outfaced and at last defeated, England as soon as possible returned to her old ways of life, the ancient ways of Christendom. But the war had bred very terrible things undreamt of till now, powers of darkness that presently began to make for an intense revenge. In the enormous ordeal that is coming, we openly and chiefly fear for the material civilisation of Europe, and, knowing now the Barbarian, for our cities and their people: men, women, children, all are one to Prussia. But more is imperilled than our material civilisation. Our spiritual civilisation is threatened as never before; and that in ourselves, and may even be destroyed. Have I, maybe, looked for almost the last time on that English landscape in all its perfection and beauty with its rebuke to excess?

THE

NINE·TEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*

No. DCCCXLVII—May 1939

THE SPIRIT OF ENGLAND

There are things in the world that seem to us so precious and so beautiful, that not one of us would dare to ask himself: If they perished, what should I do then? Such things have formed us and transformed us and are a great part of our souls, and that is perhaps why it is so difficult to say what we really feel about them.

So I thought as on a morning of this spring I stood looking across Sedgemoor from the height of Mendip to the far-away Quantock Hills. Beneath me lay Wells in all its mediæval perfection, while far off gleamed the wind-vaned towers of Taunton; and, all between clear meadows traversed by gentle streams, a landscape glorious with great trees and cool woods and peopled with quiet steadings and farms, numberless villages clustering about little ancient churches, great storied houses and old towns, and that grey towered city, whose roots bind the foundations of our world.

And I was thinking that chief among those things so precious and so beautiful, is the landscape of England herself. For the love of England is made up of such landscapes, the very name of England instantly evokes them, and they will perhaps remain in the mind in every thought of her, as they did with Falstaff, when all else has passed away into confusion.

And it seemed to me that it is in this landscape, which is

[illegible]

[illegible]

HAROLD NICOLSON (Daily Telegraph): [illegible] is the best of all [illegible] biographers [illegible] and therefore accurate; he is fastidious, and he [illegible] intelligent to being clever; he is self-assured, and has therefore no desire either to pity or to deride the illustrious dead; he writes the loveliest [illegible] prose."

TUMBLING IN THE HAY by OLIVER ST. JOHN GOGARTY 10/- net

SIR HUGH WALPOLE (*Daily Sketch*): "Gogarty is important because of his personality and because he writes so well. He writes here about his early medical days in Dublin, and he has a number of stories to tell. He can tell you anything, or, at any rate, he can tell me anything, and I can listen for ever. There is a kind of riotous fancy in the world he creates, and he kicks words about, throws them in the air, dances down the street with them. He moves so rapidly that you must hold on to his coat-tails or you will lose him. You must, in fact, take a little trouble with him. He's well worth it."

WELLINGTON IN CIVIL LIFE: Through the Eyes of Those Who Knew Him by his great-grand-niece MURIEL WELLESLEY (author of *The Man Wellington*) *19 half-tone plates* *18/- net*

Manchester Guardian: "Many readers who care not at all for political history will be absorbed in the vivid and clear-cut character that rises out of the many details on which the authoress has drawn for her picture of Wellington in his ordinary day-to-day life. . . . Miss Wellesley makes her reader go on to the end of the book always with fascinated interest."

LLOYD GEORGE 1863-1914 by W. WATKIN DAVIES

A. J. CUMMINGS (*News-Chronicle*): "Nearly all the biographies of Mr. Lloyd George have been either vicious partisan attacks or the narratives of uncritical hero-worshippers.

"This book is an agreeable exception. Mr. Davies comes, I think, nearer to the truth than any man who has yet attempted the task of summing up Mr. Lloyd George." *12 plates* *12/6 net*

NEW YORK PANORAMA

by various hands, with an opening chapter by SUSAN ERTZ *12/6 net*

EDWARD SHANKS (*Sunday Times*): "Here is something more than a guide-book. It really is what it claims to be, a panorama, and it brings its subject vividly before the eyes of the reader, being aided by a very large number of excellently chosen and reproduced photographs. The Englishman who has not been to America and wishes to form some intelligible picture of this phenomenon will find what he wants here. . . . There is an admirable introduction by Susan Ertz."

Constable

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

1877 — 1939

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

1939 MAY No. 747. Vol. CXXV

Price Three Shillings. *Annual Subscription 36/- post free.*

Published by

CONSTABLE & CO LTD, 10 ORANGE STREET, LONDON, W.C.2

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

mistakes was made in Prague rising from a mistaken appreciation of the new conditions.'

Two days later, on March 16th, the same paper writes: 'The fact of the annexation of an ethnically foreign State seems to indicate that Germany is from now on following the path of imperialism and conquest. It is to be feared that other annexations will follow which cannot be prevented except by a European war.'

Polska Zbrojna (March 16th), the organ of the Polish Army, contains the following comment: 'This is an occupation of a purely military character, carried out according to plans which were conceived long before, and there can be no question of a liberation of an oppressed German population.'

Robotnik (March 17th), the Socialist paper, writes: 'We are optimistic about the future because the Polish masses, workers and peasants, are ready to defend Polish liberty.'

[*Owing to great pressure on our space we have been obliged to postpone publication of Part 2 of 'Indian Constitutional Problems' by Professor Rushbrook Williams, which we hope to print in our May issue.—Ed.* NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER.]

recognise and face realities, and face them in the same spirit as in August, 1914, following the invasion of Belgium.'

The Star (Johannesburg) (March 18th), commenting on Mr. Chamberlain's speech, says: 'Mr. Chamberlain spoke not merely for the Government and people of Great Britain but for all the peoples of the British Commonwealth and all nations who value peace but value freedom more.'

Canada

The Globe and Mail (Toronto) (March 18th), discussing the question of Canadian support for the British Government, says: 'Mr. Chamberlain left little doubt as to the crisis democracy faces. Canada turns to its Government. Where do we stand to-day? Canadians individually have no doubt. When Britain calls for help the people will respond. The anger of the British people is rising and may give rise to dramatic political developments.'

Toronto Telegram (March 18th) writes: 'In the plainest speaking heard from a democratic statesman since 1914, Mr. Chamberlain expressed the horror of humanity at Hitler's conduct. He told the dictator that Britain would stand square across the path to conquest. . . .'

New Zealand

Auckland Star (March 16th) contains the following passage: 'The cancelling of the trade mission seems a feeble gesture against the solid fact that Hitler is in Prague. The question must soon arise whether Britain can afford a leader whose miscalculations are so costly. How much more must Britain spend to counter the advantages Hitler has gained for Germany in a single day?'

Poland

Reactions to the events in the Polish Press have varied considerably according to party outlook. The deep shock produced in Poland by Germany's *coup de force* may, however, be gauged by a comparison of two extracts from the

Illustrowany Kurjer Codzienny (March 14th) saying: 'After the tragic experiences of the past year the Czechs failed to adapt themselves to the new situation. Another series of

Le Populaire (March 18th) compares Mr. Chamberlain's attitude to that of M. Daladier, and says: 'Whilst M. Daladier reserved his invective for his countrymen, there were words which had got to be directed to Germany. And it was Mr. Chamberlain who uttered them. . . . The contrast between his attitude and that of the French Government is such that we do not hesitate to say that it is with bitter envy that we turn towards Britain.'

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New York Times (March 16th) writes: 'The rumble of German cannons through Prague announces to the world that Hitler has dropped the mask of "German patriot." He has put his robber hand on the gold he badly needs. He has also shown the world the value of a Nazi promise and the real purpose of the Reich.'

New York Times (March 18th) sums up Mr. Chamberlain's speech as follows: 'Mr. Chamberlain's rebuke of Herr Hitler's breach of faith was as severe as the statement made almost simultaneously by the State Department with the President's approval. The German Government will be poorly advised if it thinks that these are only words.'

New York Herald Tribune (March 18th) says: 'The issue of domination has finally been drawn. Faced with that issue, Britain and France will defend themselves. The Munich era is finished; a new and more realistic realism must now replace it.'

World Telegram (March 18th) writes in the same vein: 'Now Mr. Chamberlain has told the Nazis to halt or to take the consequences. Those consequences, as serious as they might be to the rest of the world, could hardly fail to be utterly disastrous to Adolf Hitler and his dupes, the German people.'

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Cape Argus (March 16th) prints an article under the headline of 'Hitler's Broken Promises,' and says: 'The valiant little Czech people, now forcibly enslaved within the most ruthless tyranny that modern times have known, deserves all sympathy.'

The Star (Johannesburg) (March 16th) writes: 'We must

needed. We preserve the racial principle as hitherto. The Czechs will lead their own lives.'

ITALY

Telegrafo (March 17th), the paper of Count Ciano, contains the following comment: 'Once again the British and French are backing the wrong horse. The two nations north and south of the Alps need each other. They are indispensable to each other. Each need the other to correct the harm done to both—to Germany in South-eastern Europe and to Italy in the Mediterranean. . . . Italy could not carry out the coups brought off by Germany without provoking a world war, but Italy knows where she is going. . . . Germany knows that she must remain bound to Italy by the vital necessity of solidarity. . . . Therefore Italy hails with pleasure any increase in power and prestige of Germany.'

The Italian Press, too, has not reported Mr. Chamberlain's speech. So far there has been very little comment on it. It is noteworthy that Signor Gayda has not even referred to Mr. Chamberlain's speech.

FRANCE

French comment on the German action has been striking in two ways: (1) *Before March 18th*, criticism of Germany was, on the whole, extraordinarily mild; (2) there was a marked preponderance of comments on the internal repercussions in France.

Le Temps (March 15th) says in a leading article: 'Less than six months after Munich Germany has overthrown of her own free will what she herself had built up. . . . International guarantees must not be applied in the case of a country which collapses from within. . . . but the international aspect of the new situation must be watched very closely.'

Journal des Debats (March 18th) contains comments which are typical of the general change of tone in the French Press: 'There is not one country in continental Europe whose security is not in danger. For Poland, the Baltic States, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia the time of conferences is past. . . . Marching with the step of a sleep-walker towards inconceivable adventures, Hitler no longer sees traces of frontiers nor the limit of the possible.'

Le Messager D'Athènes (March 4th) says: 'The rearmaments of Britain and the firmness of her foreign policy are directed against nobody. Mr. Chamberlain does not want England to find herself again in a position like that of last autumn. If at that moment he saved peace, he alone can know how much he had to pay for it.'

THE GERMAN CONQUEST OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

NOTE.—*This part of the survey was concluded on March 19th. It is evident that lack of space made anything like a complete and comprehensive survey of Press comments impossible. Therefore, the following selection had to be confined, in the case of each country, to such extracts as may be regarded as typical of the general trend of reactions to the recent events in Central Europe.*

GERMANY

In the German Press the military invasion of Czechoslovakia was hailed as 'another act of peace.' Foreign comments were given no space, indeed, the reaction abroad was officially described as 'nil.' Mr. Chamberlain's speech has not been reported.

Völkischer Beobachter (March 18th) contains a leading article by Dr. Goebbels, written before Mr. Chamberlain's speech: 'In a single night a State dissolved for which in the autumn of 1938 Paris and London allegedly were prepared to cast Europe into a serious international crisis, if not into war. . . . The night of Tuesday-Wednesday confirmed the correctness of the policy pursued by Chamberlain and Daladier on the Czech question. It is true that the professional inciters of nations stammered a few pathetic words and blatant insults to Germany in the international lying Press, but these are of no importance. . . . Germany's juridical position is too clear to be contested. Peace has been restored in Central Europe. We love this era because history is being made in it. We love this era because it has taught us to despise a calm and comfortable life free from danger. . . .'

Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (March 18th) contains one of the few editorial comments on Mr. Chamberlain's speech: 'Germany has no aggressive intentions against England. The Czech people themselves requested the protection they

been duly warned. They know that the free peoples have the means and the power to answer an attack by a war of long duration from which they would emerge victoriously.'

Echo de Paris (March 9th) writes: 'After much hesitation Britain is at last adopting a policy of land rearmament. . . . And, what is more important, Franco-British co-operation is inscribed as an essential chapter in this. These are facts which will have real and incalculable significance in the practical and political spheres.'

SOVIET RUSSIA

Moscow News (February 27th) contains an article under the headline: 'Not Armaments But Collective Security Can Ensure Peace,' saying: 'Authentic evidence is piling up both in the European and the British Press that the British Government is not sincere when it speaks of its intentions to prepare the country in order to talk to the Fascists as equal and to give them a proper rebuff.'

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Star (Johannesburg) (February 18th) states in a leading article: 'Europe now trusts Mr. Chamberlain sufficiently to believe that the mammoth armaments Britain is building will never be used for aggressive ends. British people know this already. Once Europe's other leaders know and believe this, the road to peace will unfold itself still more clearly.'

The two brief extracts taken from a GREEK and a HUNGARIAN newspaper must, for lack of space, suffice as examples of the two points of view expressed in the Press of South-eastern European countries. It should be added, however, that the Greek extract is more representative of the attitude of the majority of newspaper comments in that part of the world.

Pester Lloyd (February 16th) referring to a report in a British paper about Franco-British staff talks, writes: 'In any case, this report is typical of the atmosphere that is prevailing in Western Europe, and which is not very well suited to increase the confidence in the perpetual declarations that all measures taken are of purely "defensive" character. . . .'

Munich. The situation is now worse. The democracies are working towards the military and economic asphyxiation of the totalitarian States. The old Franco-British imperialist mentality is trying to spike the guns of the most genuine democracy the world has ever known. If the French, British and American democracies wish to drive the world to war they need only continue in their present way.'

Voce D'Italia (March 5th) contains an article from the pen of Dr. Gayda on the rearmament of the Western Powers. He says: 'Their armaments must have an offensive purpose, since no one could spend such vast sums without expecting some return for them, above all, in capitalist countries. . . .'

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

In the United States progress of British rearmament has made a deep and, of course, favourable impression, for which the following extract may serve as evidence.

New York Times (February 21st) writes in a leading article: 'There can be no doubt about the purpose of this programme. It is intended to correct the pre-Munich situation in which Britain found she lacked authority because she lacked the instrument of power. . . . It is a sign of the times, and of the changed values in the contemporary world that this greatest of all British armament programmes should cause no concern on our side of the Atlantic. We do not regard it with suspicion. We do not ask for "parity," as we once did, in this or that category of naval strength. We do not fear an increase of British power, We welcome it.'

FRANCE

Practically without exception, all sections of the French Press have welcomed the recent British White Paper with unmitigated joy.

Journal des Debats (February 16th), referring to the new British defence estimates, says: 'Simultaneously in London and Washington yesterday the will was shown, by deeds more than by words, to use every appropriate means against the threat directed at the free peoples and general peace by the Powers of the Rome-Berlin Axis.'

Jour (February 25th) says: 'The totalitarian States have

Pravda (March 2nd) writes in a leading article: 'Once again the world is called upon to witness a monstrous transaction concluded by British and French diplomacy with the Fascist aggressors, this time with the help of the artful Burgos adventurer, the lackey of the Rome-Berlin axis. The victim of this deal is not only the heroic Republican Spain whose people are courageously carrying on the struggle against foreign invasion. The immediate and vital interests of France and Britain—primarily of France—are in balance.'

II. THE REARMAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN

Germany

The following quotations speak best for themselves.

Lokal Anzeiger (February 21st) says: 'Britain wants to exercise an increasing pressure, and thinks, perhaps, that she can outdo the armed strength of other nations by her financial power and thus maintain her claim to domination. London would naturally deny that this is pure militarism. . . .'

Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (February 21st), referring to the Munich Agreement, says: '. . . Britain and France were not inspired by a desire for peace, and the angels of peace from the West brought with them an umbrella because then they had no sword. . . . The Western Governments are at present indulging in very marked activities—even at the risk of provoking others and causing inevitable counter-actions. The activity on the other side of the Channel and across the ocean is indeed so marked that one is forced to ask whether these countries desire an increase or a relaxation of tension.'

Frankfurter Zeitung (February 26th), writes: 'The British policy of rearming appears to us to be handicapping Mr. Chamberlain's policy of peace. The question is justified, whether we would not have advanced much further in Europe if the others had not deemed the armaments race a necessity. In view of all this, how shall the conditions be created for the peaceful solution of difficult questions? Economic talks alone will not suffice. . . .'

Italy

Relazioni Internazionale (February 25th) says in a leading article: 'Politically Europe has moved backward since

added, however, that many of the pro-recognition comments have made the most of the 'conditions' the acceptance of which was declared to be 'indispensable.' Not even the Socialist Press (unlike that of the Communists), has expressed its pronounced opposition against recognition with convincing energy.

Le Temps (February 15th) says: 'It is only natural that before taking a decisive step the Governments of London and Paris should wish to satisfy themselves that what they recognise is the new Government of a truly independent Spain, acting with unlimited sovereignty, not under any compulsion to accept foreign tutelage, and master of its own destinies. Assurances must be obtained that after the end of the civil war no foreign military forces will be tolerated on Spanish territory. . . .'

Intransigeant (February 16th) says: 'Nobody can have any doubts that it will be M. Bérard's task to prepare the recognition of General Franco within the shortest possible time. France and Great Britain cannot indeed continue without serious damage to themselves to ignore a Government controlling five-sixths of Spain's territory. . . .'

L'Œuvre (February 26th), well known for its anti-Fascist views, contains the following paragraph, which is characteristic of the reluctance on the Left to oppose recognition: 'What we wish to state quite simply is that Parliament has fulfilled its true function, which is to express the will of the country in hours of grave decisions. . . .'

United States of America

New York Post (March 1st), contains a comment that is truly representative of the attitude adopted by most newspapers: 'This (*i.e.*, the recognition) should neither shock nor surprise anyone, because recognition does not imply approval of a Government and because Britain and France (especially Britain) have done all in their power to assure a Franco victory. There are many who believe the real victor in Spain is Britain.'

Soviet Russia

The following quotation represents the official view taken by the Soviet Government.

noisy outcries which in democratic countries accompany the problem of recognising or not the Burgos Government are followed with complete calm in Roman quarters. . . . Responsible Roman quarters know the main lines of Franco's policy and its iron necessities. . . . It was on November 18th, 1936, that Italy, in conjunction with Germany, recognised Franco's Government as the Government of all Spain. The French and British then bet, and have for thirty months been betting—as usual—the wrong horse. . . . As regards the Italian legionaries—a few tens of thousands of intrepid combatants who have for so long been the nightmare of the great democracies—they will return to their Fatherland as soon as Franco makes known that their task is finished. Not before. This is the way of Fascist Italy to march with a friend to the end in any eventuality.'

Giornale D'Italia (March 10th) contains a significant article by its editor, Dr. Gayda, from which the following extracts were taken : 'Franco's victory means the collapse of Anglo-French military plans. They were based on the following calculations : the neutralisation of Ceuta opposite Gibraltar, free passage across Spanish territory for French troops from Africa, and the encircling of the Western Mediterranean, which France and Great Britain are now trying to bring about in Syria, Palestine and the East.

'If a world war broke out, Italy and her associates would provide for their defences by operating in all sectors of the world against her enemies' interests and with all military, political, and national means at her disposal. Italy, alone, can bring 10,000,000 men into action and add large forces of coloured troops to that number. She is ready to march at any time and in any direction. . . .'

France

It is noteworthy that the French Press, taken as a whole, has been far less divided on the question of Franco's recognition than might have been expected. An important section of the non-party, Centre, and Liberal Press, for instance, has treated the whole affair as an unavoidable, if painful, necessity. The papers of the Right, needless to say, have vigorously expounded the case in favour of recognition. It should be

'The sympathy of the democracies is quite frankly with the Bolshevist régime. Here is exposed the connection between Bolshevism and democracy, over which we have often theorised but which is here once more practically demonstrated.

'Having for years trampled the most elementary interests of Spain under foot the democracies now want to create the impression that they are the natural good neighbours of Spain. When they are waved aside coldly and scornfully they withdraw fawningly. . . . The worst of it is that there is not a single newspaper in London or Paris which is ashamed. These democratic owners of the patents of morality are so unscrupulous that they think the world public will not even notice when they attempt to make black white to suit themselves.

'Now Franco has been given by France and Britain the diploma of democratic legitimacy . . . while a few months ago it was legitimate, according to democracy, to destroy churches, arm convicts, rape nuns, and crucify priests. . . .'

Italy

Tribuna (February 14th) contains a leading article discussing the question of French and British financial help for Spain. It says: 'A dark flock of crows is hurrying to croak on the battlefield of Spain. At a given moment Britain and France, and another democracy farther off, will come forward and offer General Franco financial propositions by which they hope to decide his future political orientations. . . . Italy and Germany, who have defended the cause of Spanish independence in the moment of danger, will, they suppose, be set irrevocably aside. The calculation is false and can only lead to bitter defeat and disillusionment. The new Spain will know how to provide for its national reconstruction with its own means, and the more easily so when so many millions in gold stolen by the Reds are restored to her. . . . The contract between the democracies and totalitarian states is becoming one between mercantile and heroic nations. . . .'

Informazione Diplomatica (Official News Service) (February 16th), contains the following authentic statement: 'The

'The French sent Senator Bérard to Burgos in order to save what there still is to save. With the same aim in mind the British sent a warship to Minorca. . . . Again, as so often, the humanitarian conscience awakes only when it can be used for political purposes. London would like to see the new Spain under the rule of a good, fat Sancho Panza who, lazy and pliable, following their instructions, was pleased if he got enough to eat. They would like to forget that Franco is a victorious Cid. . . . With the question of recognition and enticing offers for the rebuilding of Spain, they want to bring the Trojan horse of democratic policy into the town and thereby create the preliminary condition for a later financial and consequently political dependence on the part of Spain.'

Hamburger Fremdenblatt (February 13th): 'We confess that everything smells too much of the moneybags for our taste in this matter of diplomatic recognition. . . .'

Der Angriff (February 14th), commenting on the French Government's efforts to induce General Franco to accept certain fundamental conditions prior to his recognition by the French Government, writes: 'Of course, conditions must be made. Yet, the more reasonable men of the democratic governments recognise with shame the ridiculousness of this comedy, and would be prepared for quicker and final decisions. . . .'

Völkischer Beobachter (February 28th) contains the first official admission of the presence of German troops in Franco Spain by saying that 'idealistic Germans, capable of enthusiasm, have given their blood and lives as well as the Italian legionaries.'

The same number of the *Völkischer Beobachter* publishes, in a prominent place, an interview given by the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Senor Suner, who declares: 'To-day, when our victory is established, the new friends are arriving *en masse*. We are absolutely clear about their motives. We receive them politely, but we know how to make the necessary distinction.'

Völkischer Beobachter (March 4th), on the occasion of General Franco's recognition by France and Great Britain, publishes an important article by Dr. Goebbels, the following extracts of which must be taken as an authentic expression of the German view:

WORLD OPINION

A Press Summary

During the past weeks under survey here, the topic arousing the greatest interest in almost all sections of the international Press were the numerous aspects of the final stage of the Spanish War. In particular, the activities of the Governments of Great Britain and France, in preparation of General Franco's final recognition, remained for some time the most widely discussed subject—in fact, to such an extent that comments on other (and equally important) current problems seemed to be 'crowded out' altogether. The Press of the two totalitarian countries, voicing, of course, the official views of their respective Governments, reacted to the *de jure* recognition of General Franco's administration by France and Great Britain with expressions of anxiety and resentment.

Second in prominence and space to comments on Spain were those on the recent progress of Britain's rearmament and of her general defence measures. As may be seen from extracts printed below, the visible increase of Britain's military preparedness has made a deep impression all round. Few, indeed practically non-existent, are the examples of 'straightforward' and impartial reporting. Public opinion, as expressed in newspaper comments, was (and is) sharply divided into loud praise and no less vociferous condemnation. Conspicuous was the general emphasis laid on the wider European implications of Britain's rearmament.

I. THE RECOGNITION OF GENERAL FRANCO

Germany

The following extracts may be taken as typical examples of the reactions of the German Press to the problem of General Franco's recognition by the Western Powers.

Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (February 12th) declares:

to history, but in these secret papers he returns to life in a scene he could never dream would ever reach posterity.

The richness of the collection can only be appreciated by historians working the mine. We notice especially an immense number from the Duke of Cumberland describing the last struggles of the Allies against Napoleon: letters from Lord Brougham, George Canning, Castlereagh; Captain Hesse's answers under cross-examination as to his intimacy with Princess Charlotte; and, not least, some outspoken pages from Sir William Knighton's diary.

Without this immense collection, how many writers on the Regency have written vainly or awry!

SHANE LESLIE

these terms of princely liberality: 'Let Wilkie make choice of the subject, take his time in painting it and fix his own price.'

Both Lady Jersey and Lady Hamilton applied for pensions as widows: the one as 'the widow of a faithful servant of Y.R.H.' and the other as 'an unprotected, unsuspicious widow not tinctured with parsimony.' It is astonishing that Lady Hamilton asserts that her relations with Nelson were Platonic. 'In vindications of this nature I feel as Innocence and Honor ever must'! But there is no end to the astonishing documents which may drift into the scrapbook of a king.

We have some letters of Captain Charles Hesse promising to restore some indiscreet letters which the Princess Charlotte had written him. It appears that the Princess of Wales in her fury of revenge threw her daughter into the arms of Hesse, who at most was a reputed son of the Duke of York. Professor Webster has felt like others when he writes: 'I confess I could not bring myself to believe this charge when I first learnt of it from the memoirs of the time and the reports of the ambassadors.' These letters leave very little room for doubt, and the character of the Princess Caroline now perishes beyond redemption by the historians. The most chivalrous of her supporters must now allow her moral character to descend the drain.

Correspondence with the old Queen Charlotte shows that she was on the very best relations with her son. They wrote charmingly to each other. Her breezy style is exemplified in a letter of 1814: 'Let us go to Paris and force Napoleon to surrender himself or let England be the means of restoring the poor Bourbons upon the throne and then I think this Island will be immortal'!

Amusing is the correspondence between the Queen of Würtemberg, who had been Princess Royal of England, and the Prince Regent after Napoleon began to lose hold of his power. The King of Würtemberg had been his slavish vassal, and thereafter had to make peace with the Allies. The interview of Sir Thomas Tyrwhitt with this royal couple is described in a memorandum worthy of *opera bouffe*: the Queen coughing a great deal to order, and the royal couple at one moment 'shook hands and went through a scene worthy of the stage.' We are told that this estimable monarch was believed to have poisoned his first wife! He has been lost

to escape arrest for debt. Sheridan writes that he was now free from every debt 'except the debt of gratitude which it will be the object of my life honourably and faithfully to discharge.'

This was a Prince who drew a Fox and a Sheridan about him. In the end Professor Webster thinks that Sheridan was impossible to help. As for the Earl of Moira, whose letters from India are both amusing and magnificent, Moira, 'like nearly all the most intimate friends of George IV., was a man of capacity.' He was the Curzon of his day.

Perhaps one of the most useful distinctions in a monarch is a proud humility in choosing more brilliant and intellectual men than himself. Hence the great services he could obtain from a Fox, a Sheridan, a Wellington and a Castlereagh.

There can be no doubt that he was judged very differently by his great contemporaries than by the posthumous critics, who entered into a literary conspiracy to destroy his reputation as a king as well as a man.

His moral character must be allowed to join the company of all amorous monarchs. The scandals and love affairs were obliterated as far as possible from his papers. There are no letters from Mrs. Fitzherbert, though her adopted daughter is represented in very filial guise to the King. Lady Jersey appears as a suppliant for a pension and is summarised as a Jezebel for her pains. The King's secret attachment for Mrs. Fitzherbert never died, but Sir William Knighton, his most private secretary, is permitted to express himself with little less than loathing for a lady whom he confesses he only met once. The possible reason is not given, which was that Sir William Knighton made an attempt to steal Mrs. Fitzherbert's marriage lines from underthe old lady's bed and was rewarded by her constant hatred, which was no doubt reflected in his.

Amid the statesmen and intriguers are the letters of the artists and painters. The Marchioness of Thomond, niece of Reynolds, lays 'the best portrait he everp ainted of himself at your Royal Highness' feet.' The royal accounts at the close of the third volume exhibit the names of Chantrey, Beechey, Westmacott, and, above all, Sir Thomas Lawrence. Thousands were spent on British artists. Cambridge was subsidised 'for printing Milton.' The Elgin marbles were cast for presentation to Liverpool. Canova was supported as 'the Pheidias of modern times.' The Prince orders a picture in

foreign financier fights shy of the intricate regulations involved.

This Baltic study is admirably provided with tables of all kinds; these, in their turn, are tabulated among the Contents, and the absence of an index is partially atoned for. It would, nevertheless, have been more convenient to be able to consult an index of at least names in a handbook of so valuable a kind.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

The Letters of George IV.: edited by A. Aspinall, and with an introduction by C. K. Webster (three volumes: Cambridge University Press, £3 15*s*.).

This correspondence is of first-rate importance, and only those who have toiled in the papers of the Regency will realise the immense industry and acumen with which Mr. Aspinall has completed his work. Professor Webster has summarised the papers with all his knowledge of the period, the Royal Archives have been opened, and the University of Cambridge has put forward her best press.

The result is admirable, and will immediately offer a good foil to the final edition of the Greville Diaries with which we are immediately threatened. When the sneak and the gossiper have had their say, it is interesting to read the private letters of some of their victims.

The immediate effect of these volumes will be to heighten the prowess and prestige of George IV. as a king and a multifarious man of State.

A small proportion of the letters come from his pen. They are generally prolix and emotional, but he could write a very fine letter, as when he sent Wellington the baton of an English marshal in return for that of a French one captured in the Peninsula.

The variety of letter received is interesting. To some extent the Regent and King can be judged by his correspondents: the Earl of Moira, Sheridan, the Dukes of Northumberland and Cumberland.

George IV. was much abused for letting his boon companion Sheridan die in misery, but it appears that in 1813 he offered him an apartment in one of his palaces to enable him

It is divided into two parts of about equal length: A. *Historical and Political*, B. *Economic and Financial*. In the first the constitutional development of these three small countries is examined, together with their minority problems; a development from the left to the right, from democracy to dictatorship, is traced out, with, finally, a slight tendency to turn round again. There is an extremely useful section on Foreign Relations, followed by an analysis of Lithuania's special problems, Vilna and Memel, where emphasis is rightly laid upon, for instance, the Vatican's recognition of Vilna as a Polish diocese in 1925, and 'the conclusion in 1926 of a Soviet-Lithuanian Pact of Non-Aggression in which the U.S.S.R. reaffirmed its recognition of the Lithuanian claim to Vilna.' 'Germany herself,' it is stated, 'has been pursuing, during the last few years, a policy somewhat similar to that of the Soviet Union after the war While, on the one hand, the Government declares its desire for friendly relations with the Baltic States, and has, in fact, since 1936, actually modified considerably its attitude towards Lithuania, the Nazi party, on the other hand, is actively engaged in the organisation of subversive movements within the frontiers of the three States.'

In the period from the end of the war until the world depression the main economic task which lay before the Baltic countries was, as in the case of the Danubian Successor States, to adjust themselves to economic independence after having been accustomed to function as parts of a great Empire; their railways, for instance, 'built in the time of the Russian Empire, bore little relation to the needs of the three national states.' Their post-war dependence upon foreign consumers made Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all very sensitive to the great slump of the early 'thirties. All three, however, again adjusted themselves with considerable success to the new set of circumstances, Estonia and Latvia increasing their production of cereals which they have therefore virtually ceased to import. Since 1934 it has been possible for Great Britain to absorb a large proportion of the exports of the Baltic States and upon this capacity their prosperity depends. Meanwhile State capitalism has developed very far, especially in Latvia, bringing with it the difficulty that, while foreign capital is very much needed, the

Mr. Hutton has two or three particularly interesting contributions to make. What he has to say about Germany's 'control over the outward and inward trade of Trieste' since Austria fell to the Nazis is illuminating and goes some way to account for Italy's dependence on Germany. Still more important is the point he makes about the threat of Ukrainian autonomy to Poland's economy. As the result of a self-governing Polish Ukraine under German influence, as he says, 'the Polish Silesian and Galician industrial region would be caught between the Reich proper, Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia, and Ruthenia Poland's "strategic triangle" would be surrounded on the west, south and east; and if at any time the Danzig and Corridor problems blazed up into an inflammation of Polish-German relations an autonomous Ukrainian province in Eastern and Southern Poland would be an inestimable basis for a German diversion.'

Mr. Hutton's is necessarily a hurried piece of work, and inevitably betrays this by a slip here and there. One would also have welcomed a little more information as to what capital investments Germany now holds in the smaller countries of Danubia as the result of 1938. It would be interesting, too, to be more exactly informed as to how much she has actually profited financially by her ruthless expropriation of Jewish wealth and by her financial demands upon Czecho-slovakia.

The Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Prepared by the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Oxford University Press (Humphrey Milford), 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Chatham House is to be congratulated upon this exceedingly competent and well-balanced study of the small States lying on the east coast of the Baltic. As the preface to this book points out, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 'are as much the potential battlefield for a clash between these two great ideological protagonists (Germany and Russia) as they are the potential victims of agreement between them for their partition.' And yet, great though British ignorance of Central Europe has been, British ignorance of the Baltic States is certainly very much greater. The study under review thus satisfies an acute need.

display of passionate and eloquent poetry. . . .' It was Mr. Blunden, we believe, who wrote the 'Undertones of War'! Must we all go mad? Never before has it been our misfortune and our humiliation to meet in a poem such depths of eloquence and such a cancer of passion. With characteristic arrogance the poet says of himself that he 'never yet in prophecy has failed.' Later he cries: 'I've got the future in my bag.' We believe he is laying up for himself an immortality very different from that which he envisages.

L. AARONSON.

Danubian Destiny, by Graham Hutton (Harrap, 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Mr. Hutton has provided with marvellous rapidity a survey of the state of Europe at the opening of this year. It is true that he proclaims himself to be primarily concerned with the fate of the Danubian area, but the whole theme of his book is that the relations of Germany and Italy on the one hand with Great Britain and France on the other are surprisingly dependent upon the social and economic substance of the successor States to the old Danubian Monarchy of the Habsburgs.

The economic section is undoubtedly the most admirable portion of this book, though a useful summary of recent political developments in the Danubian area is supplied. Mr. Hutton's analysis of the economic advantages and disadvantages accruing to Germany as the result of the stormy events of 1938 is of first-rate value—he makes it very clear that she has intensified her major economic problems for the time being. Mr. Hutton also lucidly sums up what Munich has meant for the Czecho-slovak economy and the consequent strain upon Czech finances. In spite of the paralysing losses—indeed, because of them—inflicted upon Czecho-slovakia, he is opposed to British financial aid being offered to her; '. . . the very nature of the dismemberment in favour of Germany made it imperative,' he writes, '. . . that the new Czecho-slovakia should enter into complete economic partnership with the Third Reich . . .' and credits to the Czechs must therefore, unfortunately, be regarded as credits to Hitler.

We multiplied its heads the more we slew
Although like side-show cocoanuts they flew—
And by Brunete you may see in stacks
Dead Charlies climbing on each other's backs
To make a huge paella of the plains,
A dish of rice, with corpses for the grains. . . .

But when democracy begins to soar
To whom the jail, the brothel, and the store,
Stands for the Church. . . .

When Christians gloried on the blood-lit sand
And the Arena was our native land. . . .

For the New artist is an Agent priced
To play on Man what Judas played on Christ. . . .

While running Charlies fall upon their face,
Some stop to fire, reloading as they race,
Suddenly doubling as you make their pace,
So where you thought to slash the bulging nape
It is a face you widen in its gape.

. . . . .

With the blood streaming from your nose and ears
And in your head the music of the spheres!

Are these quotations enough? We must horrify the reader with yet one more, a most terrible justification for the murder of the sensitive Spanish poet Garcia Lorca:

And what if Garcia Lorca died for this

. . . . .

Was Spain to let an enemy escape
Vowed to her Foe though in an angel's shape
And lovely as Lalanda with his cape?
It was his fate with his own age to die. . . .

Alas! how easy it seems in our age to put a gloss upon murder; but for a poet to do so seems to us to be the ultimate corruption. And in all these quotations we have forgotten the very title of the poem!

Mr. Campbell's heroic couplets sometimes have a poetic sweep and imagery, but 'though in an angel's shape,' this beauty becomes for us still more corrupt, more terrible, in the dark purposes it hides. Round our copy of the book there is a wrapper bearing the following quotation from Mr. Blunden, the poet: 'The whole thing is a wonderful

in vain, and pillories races, beliefs, aspirations, dreams, with terrible glee. Its passion is spurious, a worked-up passion, so that the shrill, spiteful, venomous, shrewish pitch of its voice defeats, after a while, its own object: we are disgusted and deafened by the overwhelming and monotonous spate. This is a Streicher article, poetised. Mr. Campbell talks of 'Jewish spittle.' His own work is full of spittle; not the fine 'spittle' of the Prophets, but of one resolved to make horrible shouting holiday amongst the dead

He has been, so he says in his Preface, 'at the front and in both rearguards' of the Spanish armies. Here we have the fruits of his experience. He makes this poem, quasi-didactic, quasi-Christian, but mainly satirical, a pæan of praise to the victor, a hymn of hate for the vanquished. But for didacticism, wisdom, serenity, depth, knowledge, are necessary, and he possesses none of these qualities, for satire more than the spleen, and for Christianity more than the reiterated names of saints, blind hate of the Jew, and the bombastic evocation of the Cross—but let these passages speak:

> And leaving them, when they had won the toss,
> Brained by the thundering hammer of the Cross!
>
> The sovereign Serum, bred in Jewish veins
> From Jewish poison, that with mortal pains
> The Good Physician suffered to procure,
> Against their venomed fangs to make us sure,
> And bore both Jewish flesh and Jewish hate
> To furnish that Celestial Mithridate. . . .

What, we ask, does the good Catholic think of this interpretation of the miracle of Christ, and the part assigned to the Jew in it?

We hold no brief for extreme Right or Left; but the horror, the ignoble malignancy of much of this book, begins to convince us that there must be a breeding death in a political creed that can make it possible. We remember, with sorrow, Mr. Campbell's earlier zestful, exuberant, Rimbaud-like rhythms and images, now degenerated into the mad delirium of:

> And facing there the hydra of the horde,
> The fauna of the steppes, the dregs of drains,
> From Ainus down to France's quadrumanes,

(*e.g.*, 'The Statue'), but very soon reveal themselves as having merely the properties of profundity. A careful examination of many of the images and epithets shows them to be extravagant, inaccurate or 'quaint.'

> The long experienced finger of the Gulf Stream (p. 26).
>
> The strap-hanging skeleton of what has been
> Is out of date forever like the crinoline (*sic !*) (p. 27)
>
> . . . the smug mountains counting the stars (p. 28).
>
> Out of the histrionic hug of evil (p. 37).
>
> The permanent way of English clouds on fire (p. 43).
>
> Like a cracked bicycle frame
> On which a short vocabulary is hung (p. 52).
>
> Into the shadow of the hangar, death (p. 58).

So much is rhetoric at its worst, since good rhetoric, run from a simple purpose and the single desire to persuade by assault, can be very exciting. We suspect in Mr. Allott a *will* to depth, but the weak hedonism of his subject-matter, the *straining* for depth, must retard his poetic growth. He seems to us to have so many words and so little essential to do with them.

The Year's Poetry, 1938, has some good things in it by the late W. B. Yeats, George Barker (a rather lovely, lonely contribution, 'Allegory of the Adolescent and the Adult'), W. H. Auden, of whom there is included, we are sorry to say, an ignoble and entirely unnecessary ballad, 'Miss Gee,' A. Young and E. Muir. On the whole we know no better and more illuminating exposition of what the 'modern' poets are doing ; but we do not understand why one of the editors, Mr. Grigson, has thought fit to include two pedestrian efforts of his own, and why we are asked to taste the dreadful stewpot of Mr. Philip O'Connor.

Flowering Rifle, by Roy Campbell (Longmans, 6*s*. net).

This long poem is *horrible*. Vulgar, rancorous, violent, malevolent, it hurts the heart. All humanity in it becomes monstrous, even its heroes become monstrous, under the pall of hate which lies above nearly every page. It thrives and quickens most where it hates most, takes the Lord's name

often 'modern' poetry seems to ignore the poetic heritage. This poetry appears to come full-blown in its technical dexterity and certainty; one finds here none of the early 'stupidities' and gropings towards experience and word-meanings of, for example, Shakespeare, Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats, Coleridge and Byron. Experience seems perfectly digested; but we suspect a good deal of coxcombry in this, a good deal of 'sidestepping,' a good deal of substitution of technical knowledge for the difficulties of experiencing. There is a plethora of modernistic imagery, easy 'man-in-the-street' language, words that do little work but are full of the strain of seeming to do much. Mr. Allott is obsessed with Time, with the ephemeral present, as were Omar and the author of Ecclesiastes; but he lacks Omar's florid sensuality, and there is no austerity and awe, no 'God-grappling' as in Ecclesiastes. The verse is, in fact, tenuous, delicate, without ardour, without the passion that by its own contradictoriness and self-questioning brings faultiness into a poet's early verse—and the quality of growth. We are continually being brought to the brink of apparently deep meaning only to find that the line means much less than it says. In 'Sunday Excursion' we come upon this line:

> Ponder how close to the houses the darkness begins.

That seems evocative; but the following line:

> Disaster and laughter are both Greek gifts to the air

dissipates all its possibilities. In 'Fête Champêtre' he cries:

> Though we are not as simple as we seem,
> *All men are candid in the act of dream*:

and on second thoughts we find that it is simply not true.

There is altogether too much of the 'euphuistic' element in the work, that Mr. Desmond MacCarthy quite rightly deplored in his recent correspondence with Mr. Spender on modern poetry, although it were well to point out that euphuism is sometimes the splendour of the illiterate—and there is no splendour here. 'Any Point on the Circumference,' a Donne-cum-Dylan Thomas poem, is very beautiful, but, re-examined, is seen to be merely beautiful 'fingering' without the hands and mind solidly round the language and its embodied thought. So many of the poems *look* profound

BOOK REVIEWS

The Year's Poetry (John Lane, The Bodley Head, 5*s.* net).
Poems by Kenneth Allott (The Hogarth Press, 5*s.* net).
Poems by Helen Foley (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 6*s.* net).

Messrs. Roberts and Grigson, who have compiled the anthology, say in their Preface to it, 'There is a smell of light verse about. . . .' Of these three volumes we might say, to mix our metaphors, 'There is a smell of "lightweight" verse about.' A large part of the verse presented is 'lightweight,' that is, lacking in strength, depth, real seriousness and memorableness. We must, however, add that this lack in the late Miss Helen Foley's work arises from causes other than those which are at the root of Mr. Allott's and many of the anthologised poets'. In *her*, the aspiration to poetry was immense; she had, as her quoted letters show, a real humility towards the real poets; and the 'pastiche' element that is everywhere manifest is a sort of homage to those whom she admired and loved. Unfortunately, she lacked originality and a power to appropriate to herself the language most suited to her purposes and experience. For sixteen years she did not write at all—the Biographical Introduction says that 'the impulse died away'—and we can guess there was never in her the undivided will to make words more and more the highest power of her waking and dreaming life, and to explore and mature that power. Her early verse has a certain lyrical sweetness but little to 'suspend disbelief,' to arrest the imagination; her later is full of the echoes of her favourite poets. In a happier, humbler age she would have been 'of the school of . . .' and content with that.

Mr. Allott is what we believe is termed to-day a 'modern poet.' His influences are manifest enough, and are, in the main, those of contemporary or near-contemporary poets: Auden, Yeats, Eliot, Spender, Dylan Thomas, MacNeice. Donne may be traced here and there, too. It is queer how

the various forms of persecution, mistrust of Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy, great anxiety to give shelter to children from large cities in the event of a war, and, above all, the great desire 'to do their bit' should the need arise. Mothers with sons of military age assured me they would be the last to hold them back from doing their duty, as their fathers had done in the Great War, the only exception being one woman who vowed that her son would only go if they came to fetch him; but was it to be wondered at when her badly crippled husband is still suffering great pain and still suffers from unhealed wounds brought about by his military career in the Great War?

ELIZABETH DASHWOOD.

wot we does that war *must* come. Well, I've done my bit, but I've got a gun up there on the wall and I'd be just itching to get out and shoot he off—be it Germans or their likes. I was with Kitchener out in Khartoum, I've been through some of the wars in India and I served with the Grenadier Guards in the Boer War. They only put me in the Labour Corps out in France, but I knew then how things would go and we'd have to fight the Germans again. I b'aint so old but what I could fire a gun now, and it's old Hitler what I wants to meet in the field over there. Anyhow, Missus, that's what I calls a gas mask: I could keep he on all day, not like them things we had in France that used to pinch your nose. I'm glad we'm all having 'em 'cos I knows what I be talking about. War must come, don't 'e make no mistake.'

Another lonely person, this time an old dame, said, when her measurements were taken: 'Although it wouldn't do to tell the Government so, I think a piece of wet blanket over your head would answer just as well.' War, in her old eyes, seemed to be inevitable. 'It's the greed for gold, the craving for power and the lack of faith in God which has brought all these troubles upon us. If people would turn to prayer and the rich give up all they possess, then would the peace of the world be upon us. If all those who think war, who prepare for war, and who want war would turn to God, but not necessarily in His House but on His soil and in His garden, *then*, and only then, would "The love which passeth all understanding dwell within our hearts."'

As a contrast to this, I should like to quote a remark made to me by one of the inmates of the local alms-houses, who, raising her voice in anger against Hitler and his confederates, ended up by saying: 'We bain't going to have no peace till we gets rid of he' (' he ' meaning Hitler).

My companion with whom I shared the duties of this A.R.P. work, during such intervals as we were alone, repeatedly expressed the view that war is inevitable, for, in his opinion, he sees it drawing nearer and nearer.

During our calls we found a very general tendency to scoff at the prospect of peace. Many of those we visited said they thought that Mr. Chamberlain had allowed Hitler and Mussolini to 'get away with it' in Spain. Intense hatred for Hitler was heard on all sides; compassion for the Jews and

A man who knows Germany well maintained that the Germans and Italians are much more afraid of a war than we are. If only we had a Government with some guts—a Palmerston or a Lloyd George instead of the Umbrella Man, we could dictate to the world. 'But,' he added, 'there must be a great national effort—all shoulders to the wheel irrespective of class or wealth.'

So much for the inn and the congenial company I had found. But there was still a considerable territory to cover, so once more out into the torrential rain and all the mire it brings with it in a district where the amenities of an Urban District Council are unknown. My road led me through a field where the mud rose well above the ankles. But for the high rubber boots with which I had fortunately equipped myself I should have fully qualified for the title of a realistic 'stuck-in-the-mud,' a title which, during the course of my rambles, I often found attributed to Mr. Chamberlain. The farm I visited housed a farmer, his congenial wife and a family of five. Mr. —— lost no time in telling me he was far too busy to bother about contraptions of any kind, and even if war did come Hitler could get on with it so long as he didn't interfere with milking hours. 'After all, if you can't protect the cows, what's the good of protecting us who've got to look after them? Once they've gone, there won't be anything for us to do; we've got to die once. Get on with Mother and the kids, but you'd best leave me out of it.'

'I don't know so much about that,' replied Mrs. ——, 'although I've got a feeling we shan't have war, but there, if it *does* come there's no harm in being prepared, is there?'

Mr. ——, however, remained adamant, but, with a cheery good-bye, assured me that if I liked to look back in twelve months' time he'd be pleased to see me.

I found that there was general relief amongst most of the people I called on that they were to be given protection by the Government.

A white-haired old man, living alone in his two-roomed cottage, reckoned war *must* come, for 'What's the good of all them armaments if we b'ain't going to use 'em. And if we don't use 'em for war, well, then—wot's going to happen to them wot's making them? Wot's the good of Chamberlain talking so much about peace? I reckon he knows as well as

service in France volunteered the remark: 'In case of war, the Germans wouldn't be a patch on those of 1914. A man who thinks he's a hero because he's kicked a pregnant Jewish woman in the belly will sing a different tune when he faces British bayonets.' A miller's lorry-driver was my next informant, and he volunteered the information that he'd never go into the Army again unless he was forced to do so; he'd had enough in the last war; he was promised all sorts of things, and when the fighting was over he was left to shift for himself. A farm labourer then joined in the conversation and said he didn't care much either way; he wouldn't be much worse off if the Germans *did* come here; it wasn't no joke keeping his missus and family on his pitiful wages whilst those who had most money never did any real work. Why didn't they stop fox-hunting? Trampling over the crops, and even breeding the foxes which robbed them of their poultry: 'They talk about compensation—but what is it when you get the —— thing? I reckon them who destroy foodstuffs and spoil our arable land should be put into prison. If Hitler would come over and wipe out them parasites then good luck to him.'

An intelligent and thoughtful dairy farmer and milk distributor told me that the crisis had 'put paid' to things. People who had had two or three pounds of cream or three pounds of English butter per week are now having only half a pound: they seem to have the wind up. Still, our rearmament is making them think on the other side. If only the people in Germany and Italy were told the truth, they would be up in arms. He had served in the Great War, and assured me that he didn't mind the shells and bullets, but bombing 'planes put the wind up him. He finished by saying: 'I don't think the German and Italian people will stand for it very much longer.'

A retired business man, who had silently listened to the conversation, said that he did not want friendship with Germany: the fiendish devilries perpetrated by the Nazis on Jews and others had put Germany beyond the pale. 'If we have another war, let's fight it out to a finish and wipe out Germany once and for all, but we must have compulsory service; this voluntary business is damned silly, but I suppose no Government dare bring in a Conscription Bill in peace time.'

tomfoolery, sez he, but there—if folk be so kind as to come and see I, they'm welcome to fit I.'

'Well, Mrs. ——, I think you can rest safely in your bed at night,' I replied cheerfully. 'Well, I b'ain't so sure; but there, if war do come it's them poor little children what worries I. As I sez to Mr. ——, 'tis them what matters, but so long as we looks after they, please God us will come through as us did afore. 'Tis a pity my man b'aint here this morning, but perhaps you'm so kind as to look back again, for he do reckon us all wants them things maybe sooner than wot us thinks, but don't 'e frighten Fayther for we be telling he 'tis to make he more comfortable like, for you see, M'm, he bain't so young as us be.' Remembering that 'Fayther' is the oldest male inhabitant in our parish, I came to the conclusion these were words of wisdom, and assuring Mrs. —— we would treat 'Fayther' very gently, I proceeded to make my next call.

The district allotted to me included the local inn. 'I see they're talking a lot about disarmament,' the innkeeper was saying. 'I only hope we don't disarm as we did in the past and then find that others aren't doing so. Then we'll be in the bally soup again.' It was not easy to get the customers to talk about world affairs because interest was concentrated in a cow named 'Cherry' which had broken the record for milk production. After a while the conversation turned to Football Pools (this form of betting has taken a vast hold in rural districts). The host pointed out that it was a great deal less harmful than betting on horses because the stakes had to be paid weekly and thus prevented people from running into debt, nevertheless he deplored the fact that money which was once spent on beer now finds its way into the pockets of the football pool promoters. The local carpenter had a lot to say about unemployment, and, in course of conversation, remarked: 'Give the young men six months' training in some service or other, and let's do away with this queue for the dole.' A dairy farmer, who had fought in the Great War, then joined in the conversation (having exhausted the virtues of 'Cherry' the cow). 'We should have gone to war in September and smashed the Germans once and for all. Then we could have tackled our own troubles at home. What's the good of all this messing about?' Another man who saw

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING

I LIVE in a small and remote village in Wiltshire, and visited some twenty-five homes this week-end assisting one of the A.R.P. wardens to take the measurements in connection with the issue of respirators. I admit I returned from my round with one impression—that people who live in this part of England think that war is bound to come sooner or later. There appears to lurk in the minds of the men and women scattered over our agricultural district the notion that 'they,' meaning the Government—are keeping 'something' back, and—however serious that 'something' may be: 'We'm the right to know *what* it be'

For example, the following conversation is typical of many I had over the week-end. Mrs. —— is a frail woman who, despite her old age, still goes out daily, through all weathers, to 'do for Fayther and Mother.' I found her at home and was greeted with the words: 'Be it coming—what do *you* think?' I suppose my somewhat blank expression led her to be more explicit, especially as, in the meantime, I explained I had just called to take her fitting for a respirator. 'War is what I means. You see, Missus, I feel sure there's summit they'm keeping behind somewhere: they just don't tell we where we be. Back in September I thought we was for it but I sez now as I said then, if it please God we'm to have war then let's get on with it.' 'Yes,' I replied, 'I suppose we must, but we've come to measure you for your anti-gas respirator; you'd like one, wouldn't you?' 'Ess, that I would, but there's Fayther—he be ninety-four come next November—keeps worriting me what 'tis all about when I told he you'm going to see he and bring he summit to help he when them Germans come over. Ah! sez he, what will them be leaving about after 'em then? I dursent frighten he so I tells he 'twould make his breathing easier as 'tis nasty smelling stuff they do leave behind. 'Tis all

'Aye, ye may weel look at me, Teenie! Ah'm a bad wumman! A bad wumman!'

Och, she was cruel to deceive a good man like Jock! Him that had never lost a day's work nor raised a hand against her since their marriage. Aye, this had been her unlucky day, right enough! If only she had stuck to *The Pink!*

'Curse the bloody *Blower!*' she exclaimed in real exasperation. 'Ah'll never back hoarses again!'

But supposing she had stood by *The Pink?* My, she'd have won a packet! Avarice lit up her eyes; her shawl slid from her shoulders over the back of the chair; feverishly she opened the table drawer, searched among the spoons and cutlery for a dirty, dog's-eared notebook and a stub of pencil and began making excited calculations. As she wrote she murmured: 'Noo, if Ah was to put thrippence oan a ten-tae-one shot that wad be twa-an'-sixpence! Twa-an'-sixpence comin' hame at twenty-tae-one wad be twa-poon-ten! Twa-poon-ten——'

And once again, like a little loom, her feckless mind began to weave a dream of Fortune.

EDWARD GAITENS.

Almichty, Ah've been huntin' high an' low for it! Whit hiv ye been daein' wi' it?' he demanded indignantly.

'Och, Jock——' she stammered helplessly.

'Och, Jock,' he repeated. 'Whit dae ye mean—Och, Jock? Whaur has it been?'

She was cornered.

'It's—it's—och, Ah pawned it.'

His exclamation smote the roof.

'Ye pawned it! An' whit in the name o' thunder did ye pawn it for?'

She lied weakly: 'Tae—tae pay a wee debt.'

He studied her, incredulous. 'Tae pay a wee debt? But ye've nae business tae hiv' wee debts wi' a' the money Ah bring in. Hiv you been backin' hoarses again? Heh? Hiv ye?'

She hung her head like a schoolgirl.

'D'ye hear whit Ah said?' he roared. 'Answer me!'

She felt herself getting smaller, while he seemed to magnify like something in a nightmare. 'Aye, Ah'm hearin' ye, Jock,' she whimpered, 'Ah'm hearin' ye.'

His roar detonated like a bomb. 'Ye're hearin' me, are ye? Didn't ye promise me ye'd never gamble again? Heh? Didn't ye? Is that where ma hard-earned money goes?'

She was crying now, with a corner of shawl at her eyes. 'Aye, Ah proamised, Jock,' she snuffled. 'Ah'll no dae it nae mair!'

He stepped nearer. 'My Goad, ye'd better no, or Ah'll turn ye intae the street wi'oot a penny! Jings, Ah've a guid min' tae knock the stuffin' oot o' ye! Ye damned wee twister! Here! Gie me that parcel. Ah'll be late for "The Biler-makers"!'

He snatched it and lunged angrily into the parlour. She went and sat at the kitchen table and looked very forlornly at life. In a few moments her man strode savagely ben for a last look at himself in the kitchen mirror.

'Guid nicht, Jock,' she said, in a small voice; but he did not look at her, nor answer, as he went out, slamming the door.

She was weeping now in honest contrition, sadly patting the bitch that gazed at her stupidly from the carpet.

Maggie passed her in the street. It was hard to credit that they came from the same womb. Maggie tipped the scales at a hundred-and-sixty-eight pounds, while Minnie never got beyond seven stone.

'Aye, it's me, Maggie,' she said moaningly, and explained her dismal errand.

With a disgusted face Maggie marched within her kitchen and returned with the five shillings.

'Mind ye, it's no for your sake Ah'm daein' this,' she said, handing the money to her shrinking sister. 'It's for Jock's. Ah widnae hiv him missin' "The Bilermakers' Social" through you. An' Ah hope Andy disnae get to hear o't or he'll tell Jock on ye!'

Disdain added another inch to her stature:

'Yer gamblin's a fair disgrace!' she announced, 'Ah canny haud up ma heid among the neebors for ye!'

But Minnie didn't hear; she was on her way to McGinty's.

She arrived, breathless, to behold Terence outside, directing his office-boy in putting up the shutters.

'Ye're too late, Minnie!' he said, without his charming smile. 'I'm shut!'

She felt it was her last breath which exclaimed: 'Aw, Terry, dinny let me doon! Ah must hae the suit. Ma man's tae be "Maister O' Cereemonies" for the Bilermakers' the night!'

Terence struggled to withhold a smile. 'Aye, that's all very fine, but I'm takin' a tart to a dance meself, an' I'm late as it is. D'ye think I can open up the whole shop for you?'

Taking her money and ticket, he went in half-sulkily, leaving her on the step, and returned in a few moments with the suit. Minnie clutched it, and for the first time for many hours drew a glad, natural breath.

When, somewhat hearteasy, she mounted the stairs to her own door, she inserted her key as silkily as possible and turned to slip into the parlour, but in the narrow lobby the parcel rustled and she was transfixed by a shout: 'Heh! Is that you, Minnie?'

Jock was at the kitchen door, towering over her: 'Whit hiv ye goat in that parcel? Is that ma suit? My Goad

she had been a member of the Rechabites. She told people with a laugh: 'My, Ah ken fine the smell o' it, but Ah've never tasted a drap in ma life! Ah hivnae the cravin', ye ken.'

She sipped her lemonade, quaking, her head turning nervously to look through the glass door at the big clock in the bar, whose minute hand seemed to be dashing with the speed of a racehorse towards seven o'clock. At a quarter to the hour she plunged at the fishwife:

'My, Mrs. Bills, Ah'm in an awfu habble! Ah pawn't ma man's suit the day tae back a cert an' it went doon. Jock has tae M.C. at "The Bilermakers' Social" the night an' Ah'll hae tae get his things oot! Could be len' me ten sheelins?'

Mrs. Bills drank off her gin.

'Certainly, ducks!' she exclaimed. 'I'd len' yer ten pounds! Yer as welcome as thee flowers in May!'

She produced a fishy purse and handed Minnie five shillings.

Minnie knew, despite the fishwife's easy nature, that the sum, beyond argument, was final. She excused her departure, leaving a half-finished glass of lemonade as a pale memorial, and headed straight for 'Big' Maggie's, her sister and wife of her husband's brother.

She was afraid of Maggie, who could swallow strong drink like a thirsty Clydesdale stallion sucking water from a trough, but who never got drunk, only sour.

'My, she's that nasty when she's taken a drop,' Minnie quavered, fervently praying that Andy Milligan would be out, because if he wasn't, with the tight fist he kept on the money, her chance of getting that five shillings was hopeless. She was genuinely puzzled, unable to understand why that 'feeling' about *The Blower's* double had betrayed her.

'Curse the bloody *Blower!*' she whispered vehemently as she arrived at the third storey of an adjacent tenement and knocked at her sister's door.

A tall, red-faced woman, built like a guardsman, opened, and regarded her with that granite aloofness which comes so easy to Scotchwomen.

'Oh, it's you, Minnie!' said Maggie, after a cold pause, without asking her in.

Their estrangement was a thing of local fame. 'Big'

shoppers and matinee queues for its two small cinemas, but the fat, witty Cockney fishwife wasn't there with her barrow, neither was she at home nor in any of her usual haunts. It was rumoured that she was still celebrating her big 'win' from *The Blower's* double of yesterday and at half-past-five, exhausted and hectic, Minnie returned to her own kitchen, convinced in her desperation that Mrs. Bills had been wiped from the face of the earth.

She almost swooned when Mr. Milligan rose after his large tea and observed lazily : 'Ah'll awa ben an' tak a look at me suit. Ah'll hae tae be shipshape for the "Social" in an' oor or so.'

It seemed as if a cascade of moth-balls was rattling on her head ; again she heard them popping on wood as they had this morning when she guiltily took the suit from the bottom drawer of the big parlour chest.

'Noo, ye needna' bother yersel', Jock,' she soothed hastily. 'Ah gie'd it a nice brush an' press this moarnin'. It's daein' fine!'

He yawned, stretching his thick, hairy arms.

'A'weel, Ah'll tak "Teenie" oot for her wee walk. Come oan, lass! Up ye get!' he said, addressing a corpulent bull-terrier lying at his feet, and attaching a heavy chain lead to its collar.

Taking the stolid bitch round the blocks and over 'the Green' of an evening, and colloguing with a solitary half-pint of beer on the way, was his one hobby. He slung on his jacket and the animal led him out. Minnie ran to the street window and watched him disappear round the corner, then she pelted downstairs, flinging on her shawl.

This time, as if she had smelt her out, she found her quarry in 'The Rob Roy Arms,' a dour-looking pub on the corner of the next block. The 'Ladies' Room' breathed forth a rich, rare smell of fish and gin, for dark-haired Mrs. Bills, who sat there like a rotund Scottish gipsy queen, with a brand new shawl of Gordon tartan arrayed around her on the seat, could never subdue the stink of her trade.

'Come in, me dear!' she cried. ''Ave a drop o' gin, ducks, t' warm yer cockles!' and she called for two glasses.

But Minnie said timidly : 'Ah'll hae a gless o' limonade.'

Minnie was a curiosity of the tenements. From girlhood

nothing with incessant interest. She was evading in herself any suggestion that her horses might lose, and with the expected twenty pounds was doing wonders, comforting herself with rosy plans. She had worked herself into a state of invincible optimism right up till ten minutes past two, when a tall thin youth came briskly round the corner, his white face bright with a smile, his thumbs held up in signal as he approached. Minnie's two interlocutors ran towards him, and she heard him say: '"The Sneaker"! Twenty-tae-one!' Whereat the two women linked his arms and literally romped up to the company with him. They and the youth and several others there had backed the outsider with threepences, sixpences or shillings, and a gay agitation immediately arose.

Minnie was astounded. She remembered 'Deefie' Maclean roaring the horse's name. 'Deefie' had told her to put her shirt on it, and *The Pink* had tipped it as well.

'Och, Ah'm a daft wumman!' she mourned, going up to the youth, who was gaily relating how he had scraped together a couple of shillings to put on the winner.

'An' what aboot "Rollin' Pin"?' she asked, raising a tragic face.

'Och, it's still rollin', Minnie!' he cried cheerfully. 'Right doon the pan. Ye should back winners, like me!'

His merriment was inane to her. Her heart shrivelled, a queer writhe spasmed her stomach. Her 'double' was down and she would have to find that ten shillings somehow, somewhere, before the pawnshop shut at seven o'clock. But there wasn't a woman here who would trust her with a sixpence. She was reputed to be a good borrower but a bad payer. She stood among them, silent, funereal, till one of them enquired:

'What's the matter, Minnie? Are ye no weel?' and another drove a dagger through her by remarking innocently: 'Ye should have followed *The Pink* the day. It was a cert!'

She was waiting with bleak curiosity for the two-thirty result. 'No that it matters noo!' she thought with woe. But 'Over Coat' also ran ignominiously, far down the course, and she wandered off in wild perplexity to try and find Mrs. Bills, the only neighbour likely to trust her with the enormous loan of ten shillings. She turned into Crown Street, busy with

found that *The Blower* was advising his clients to back 'Over Coat' and 'Rolling Pin,' then she made all speed to present her line and money to 'Dublin' Daly.

The portly little Irish bookmaker, with his eternal bowler hat, blue suit and flaring brown boots, was at his usual stance in a backcourt in Gordon Street. After his arrest on the previous day he had been bailed out, and was conducting his business as if nothing had happened. His rubicund grin changed to a stare of astonishment as Mrs. Milligan approached and offered him her bet with a trembling hand. She seldom dealt with him, and he was astounded at the amount of her bet. But he took it, saying nothing, as was his habit, and Minnie returned to the street gasping with relief.

When she mingled with the young and elderly women, youths and men at a close further down, she found several of them still elated with their winnings from *The Blower's* tip of the day before. A few of both sexes smelt strongly of celebration, and a stout, elderly woman was dancing and singing in happy inebriation on the pavement, her grey shawl flung on the ground before her, while a crowd of children imitated her antics, to everybody's delight. Minnie joined in the laughter at the jubilation of the woman who had won a couple of pounds, then doubt darkened her prospects when she learned that most of them regarded *The Pink's* tip for the day as a 'cert.'

She began to worry about Jock's suit. It was imperative that he should wear it to-night in his annual rôle of 'Master of Ceremonies' at 'The Boilermakers' Social.' Panic tittivated her thoughts. Och, she was daft to have given up *The Pink!*

'My Goad!' she wailed in herself. 'If ma hoarses lose Ah'll no ken what tae do!'

But again the emotion of certitude warmed her. Och, *The Blower* was sure to bring it off. She had felt like this when she had yon run of luck twenty years ago. And this time she would win twenty pounds! Unconsciously her fingers moved, as if they were sensing the comforting touch of Treasury notes, counting pound after pound.

'Rolling Pin' was in the first race and she remained with the loiterers for the next hour and a half, waiting for the result and gossiping, as she had done all her life, about so-much-

the bed-wall, she determined to desert *The Pink* and take a big chance.

Another blue day smiled on her ambitions as, round about noon, she entered ' McGinty's ' pawnshop in Thistle Street with a large brown paper parcel under her arm. She paused nervously in the narrow passage outside one of the doors of the four boxes where people hid their shame of poverty, then she pulled a door towards her and went in and placed her burden on the counter. The feeling that she was sure to win was flooding her whole being, and it was a sensation she always trusted. Young Terence McGinty, with his mocking, lazy smile that captivated all his lady customers, regarded her little dark head reaching just above the counter.

' It's a long time since ye put yer man's suit away, Minnie,' he said, undoing the wrapping.

' Aye, but Ah'll be takin' it back tae-night ! ' she exclaimed, her eyes shining with certainty.

Terence's smile broadened till a gold tooth gleamed, deep in his mouth. ' Ach, away wi' ye, Minnie, if ye had a pound for every time ye've said that ye'd be a rich wumman the day ! '

He turned the suit about, quickly assessing its value with a mind and eye well versed in the mathematics of deterioration. ' Nine-an'-six,' he said laconically, beginning to wrap the garments in a dustcloth.

' Aw, mak it ten, Terry,' she pleaded. ' Shure, ye gie'd me twelve-an'-six on it last time.'

Terence fastened the cloth with a large safety-pin. ' Aye, that was three months ago. It's frayin' a wee bit at the sleeves now.'

He pushed the bundle aside, wrote out a pawnticket and handed her ten shillings.

' I'll not advance ye more than eight next time,' he warned, smiling after her as she hastened from the box, clutching her ticket and money.

Her one desire was to place her big bet as soon as possible lest she should lose her nerve. This time she felt that Mr. Boyle might make her change her mind, and she went precipitately into a newsagent's nearby the pawnshop to buy her paper and *The Blower*. Immediately she came out she went up the adjoining close, tore open the small envelope and

six minutes past two, from a far-away corner, to one of his henchmen at the close, the result of the first race. 'Green Pastures' had passed the post at ten-to-one.

Minnie became the centre of congratulations. Her first horse had won and she was already regretful, roundly abusing herself for being so timid. They all said 'Hassan' was bound to come in at four-to-one. Och, how she wished she had plunged. Seven pounds for three-and-sixpence! But it was too late now, and while she gossiped through the long hour till the next race she clutched her purse so tightly in her chagrin that the coins bit into her hand. But 'Hassan' trotted home tenth on the field, and when she heard the result she felt simultaneously dismayed and relieved. She still had her three-and-sixpence! Priding herself on her caution she asked a six-foot-tall young woman, who came striding up the street in a brilliant tartan shawl: 'Whit d'ye think o' the Aggy Kan, Mrs. Bruce?'

The amazon, who had lost half a crown on 'Hassan' herself, hardly glanced at her.

'Tae hell wi' the Aggy Kan!' she cried uncivilly, marching up the close.

Minnie felt that the malediction expressed her own inmost thoughts, and on her way home to prepare her man's tea her cup of bitterness was overfilled by the news that *The Blower* had triumphed again with two winners.

Mrs. Milligan had been backing horses steadily for twenty years, since the day when a neighbour had tempted her to gamble for the first time in her life and put two shillings on a 'cert.' She had gone on winning all that week with amazing luck till she won fifty pounds, which quickly returned piecemeal to the bookmakers in several 'plunges' made with the hope of winning a fortune. Since that eventful time she had never won more than ten shillings, but the fever had got deeply under her skin and she continued making her daily sixpence or shilling bet, confident that her lucky star would shine out again.

As she lay wakeful by the side of her slumbering six-foot husband, thinking despitefully of 'Hassan' and gazing steadily in the glare of the incandescent mantle light—which she never turned out when feeling sleepless—at the framed woolwork motto, 'EAST, WEST, HAME'S BEST!' on

that a horse tipped by *The Pink* was in such esteem, but her distrust of any steed from the Aga Khan's stables was very deep, and she thought seriously of deserting her beloved tipster. It was almost two o'clock, the time of the first race, and she had to decide quickly, an exercise she detested. She hurried again round to Mr. Boyle's shop. It was one of her many queer notions that contemplation of his window helped her to make up her mind. With unusual speed she resolved, after a moment's stare at the Blessed Virgin, to stand by *The Pink* and double 'Hassan' with 'Green Pastures.'

She hastened with her 'line' to 'Tuppeny' Dan, the only bookmaker in the locality who took penny and threepenny bets. As she approached his regular pitch, a close halfway along Dixon Street, she knew instinctively, without the presence of Constable 'Mental'—nicknamed for his grossly stupid face—that Dan had been either chased or 'lifted.' The whole street throbbed with the event; the false casualness and subdued excitement of the crowd of men and women round and about the close told her everything and her heart shook with the fear that she would be unable to place her bet. Her manner also became casual as she joined the loiterers, to be immediately told by a neighbour: '"Dublin" Daly an' "Tanner" Tracy's been lifted b' the 'tecs, but they didnae catch Dan! Gie yer line tae wee Lizzie!'

She pointed a skinny finger at a gay-eyed girl of sixteen sauntering to and fro before the close, pushing a pram with a lusty child in it. Occasionally a man or woman passed, stopped to speak to the girl, made a fuss of the child and continued along the street. Minnie also approached and dropped her money and betting-slip into the pram. And at two o'clock 'Tuppeny' Dan's young sister wheeled the pram up the close and presented a bundle of betting-slips with several pounds in notes, silver and coppers to the sturdy, little bow-legged bookie who sat in a ground-floor kitchen, cooling himself with a strawberry ice, rejoicing at receiving all the bets which would have gone to his arrested rivals and gleefully rubbing his hands over the simple way he was tricking 'Auld Mental' and the detectives. And Minnie's heart soared like a kite when 'Tuppeny' Dan's tic-tac men signalled with odd gestures of the hands and arms at exactly

Mr. Boyle smirked with satisfaction as she went out and turned into Gordon Street.

Halfway down the short turning she stopped to address a tall, stout red-faced woman who stood at a closemouth, looking across the street with impervious vagueness.

'Whit dae ye fancy the day?' she enquired loudly.

The woman, known as 'Deefie' Maclean, leant with a hand cupped at her ear, stared vacantly at Minnie and roared: 'Nancy wha?'

Minnie stood a-tiptoe, reached her five-feet-three-inches to the rim of 'Deefie's' ear, and shrilled: 'Ah said, "D'ye fancy onything?"'

'Deefie's' answer clapped like thunder up the close: 'Aye, "The Sneaker"! Ma nephew was at Ayr yesterday an' goat it fae a trainer. He tell't me tae put ma shirt on it!'

Minnie opened her *Record*, pointed to 'Probable Runners and Betting' and yelled as one who knows: 'But it's no runnin'! It's scratched!'

With a look of infinite emptiness the deaf woman asked: 'Wha's no comin'?'

And Minnie shrieked: 'Ah said, "The Sneaker's" no runnin' the day!'

'Is it no?' said 'Deefie.' 'A' weel, it'll be runnin' the morra. Pit yer shirt on it the morra.'

They eyed each other vacuously a moment, while Minnie filed 'The Sneaker' in her memory for future reference.

'Ah'll away ower,' she said, leaving her and crossing the street to join a cluster of shawled women grouped round a newspaper at the opposite entry.

A buxom woman in a tartan shawl, nudging her friend who held an end of the journal, exclaimed with disgust: 'My Goad! Here's Wee Minnie. A' ma hoarses are sure tae go doon!'

Her friend relinquished the newspaper and they both walked hurriedly away. Mrs. Milligan was regarded by some of the lady 'punters' of the tenements as a bringer of ill-luck and they always carefully avoided her till the day's 'Racing' was over.

Immediately she had joined the knot of women Minnie discovered that 'Hassan' and the two selections of *The Blower* were highest in favour. She felt personally flattered

'"Green Pastures" is me fancy,' he announced with a pompous frown. 'Steve Donokew's ridin' it an' there isn't a foiner jockee on the Turf! An Irish lad on an Irish horse! It's a cert win, ye can take it from me!'

Mr. Boyle's belief in everything green was notorious, and whenever a horse with a name of that hue was running he always urged her to back it, but she remembered with keen regret her loss of five shillings on a horse called 'Sprig O' Shamrock' and she said timidly: 'Och, Ah think Ah'll gie *The Pink* another chance.'

With an air of offence, Mr. Boyle handed her a small, pink envelope and the *Record*, and dropped her twopence in the till.

'Ach, some people don't know when they're lucky!' he said. 'Shure, "Merrydyin" gives it in the *Record*. Ye should follow him. He's a darlin' tipster!'

She replied, almost stoutly: 'Och, Ah don't like "Merry-deein."'

Mr. Boyle persisted: 'He gives "Hassin" for his next best. That's the Aggy Kan's horse!'

Mrs. Milligan shook her head. She distrusted 'Meridian' and all racecourse journalists as individuals who got their information second-hand, and firmly believed that real tipsters, like *The Blower* and *The Pink*, lived all their waking hours on the 'Course,' slept in the stables and got their tips from the horse's mouth.

Mr. Boyle leant over as she opened the envelope.

'What's *The Pink* givin' the day?' he asked.

Mrs. Milligan spread the folded slip and revealed the word 'HASSAN' imprinted with a rubber stamp.

Mr. Boyle was triumphant: 'Now what did I tell ye? That's "Merrydyin's" tip! How much are ye riskin'?' he asked with excited interest.

'Ah'm tryin' a thrip'ny double,' said Mrs. Milligan.

He leant further and asked earnestly: 'Now will ye take my advice, Minnie? Will ye? Double up "Hassan" wid "Green Pastures" an' there's a shure ten bob for yer thruppence. Shure it's a small fortune I'm givin' ye!'

Minnie was shaken, but she answered weakly: 'Weel, Ah'm no fashed wi' the Aggy Kan, but mibbe Ah'll try yer double.'

Relaxed by her decision, she stepped back and read the newsboard slanted against the window. Between the 'Press,' in the middle of the board, three flysheets flaunted, almost atop each other: *THE PENNY PINK; MAY MOLONEY, THE LADY TURF ADVISER. 6d.*, and *THE BLOWER. 3d. The Blower* was waggish, delighted with itself, 'Who said "Winners"?' it asked. 'I have 'em! Gave yesterday Dandy Mick, 11 to 4; Miss Muffet, 10 to 1. Another snip for the 3-30, Newmarket! Follow *The Blower* and roll in the dibs!' *May Moloney* announced respectably, 'A Practical Certainty for the 2 o'clock, Chepstow,' and the *Penny Pink* promised 'A Good Thing for the 4 o'clock at Ayr.'

Mrs. Milligan thought hard about *The Blower*. It had given a winning tip on ten days within the preceding fortnight, but she believed that *The Pink* would suddenly produce an astounding winner which would recoup all her losses. Its ill-fortune couldn't last and she was certain that *The Blower* couldn't keep it up. As for *May Moloney*, she despised her and all professional female tipsters. 'A wumman tipster!' she thought scornfully, going into the newsagent's.

Danny Boyle sat behind his diminutive counter on a backless wooden chair, smoking a clay pipe and studying the *Noon Record*.

'Hae ye onything guid for the day, Danny?' asked Mrs. Milligan.

Mr. Boyle, startled, gave her a queer, wry stare through vast horn-rimmed glasses and exclaimed ill-temperedly:

'*Ach*, I wisht ye wouldn't come creepin' into me shop like a rabbit or a snail, an' me studyin' "Form"! D'ye want to frighten us into a coma or something?'

Mrs. Milligan looked apologetic as he stood up, producing a green handkerchief and dabbing his narrow cranium, bejewelled with sweat amid the frail stubble time had spared. Immediately perspiration welled up again, like resin on a pine tree.

'B'Jasus, it's a beezer the day!' he ejaculated. 'I wisht I was on the Lydo in me bathin' drawers, sunnin' meself like one o' them Monty Carlo millyunaires!'

He removed his glasses, placed them on a pot of jam on a shelf at the back and picked up his pipe and paper.

MINNIE MILLIGAN AND 'THE BLOWER'

MRS. MILLIGAN gazed into the window of 'Boyle's' newspaper and general shop on the corner of Dixon Street and Gordon Street, at a small statue of the Holy Virgin, functioning as a hanger for red-glass rosary beads, which were also for sale. But she was not in a religious trance. She was coiled inside, like a wound watch-spring, with apprehension and uncertainty. She pulled closer her fawn shawl, dim with long wear, moved one foot and stiffened again with indecision. Her look shifted and rested with the same apparent zeal on a cardboard box crammed with dusty, pink sweets, which a card entitled 'REGAL DROPS, 4 OZS A 1*d*' For a second her eyes delayed, then they moved to rest on a postcard—poised on the edge of a dingy carton of liquorice sweets—horribly printed with an alleged likeness of Saint Teresa and the instruction, 'Fix your eyes on this picture, counting sixty, then look up to the sky. Wonderful results!' Across this, with thick blue pencil, Mr. Boyle had sprawled the announcement, 'Was 3*d*. Now 1*d*.!'

It was early on a sunny Thursday afternoon, and Mrs. Milligan was counting her week's losses on the horses and trying to reckon how much she dared risk on her fancy for the day. She let loose her shawl, opened the purse which she had been clutching tightly, and scrutinised for the twentieth time a florin, one shilling, a smooth sixpence and fivepence ha'penny in coppers. At each look she had hoped to find another sixpence or shilling, and her finger jinked around the broken lining hopefully, but it met no corrugated edge or small circumference. She shut her purse and sighed. Only three and elevenpence ha'penny! And she had to buy her man's dinner to-night and something for his pieces to take with him to the shipyards in the morning. No, she couldn't risk a bob bet the day; it would just have to be a threepenny single or double and a penny for *The Pink*.

many a crude indicter
fell, under epitaph
of that warm fierce laugh ;
but, cowled in gloom or glory,
man has a common story—
his ever-fresh Te Deums
sheltered in odd museums,
no splendid thing is lost :
like a persistent ghost—
roar the gale—whirrs untossed,
freely forecasting,
a bee that stings,
swings, whets its wings
on the everlasting.

BLANAID SALKELD.

POEM

Not to be cast out by doubt
by prayer or fasting
nor undone with the sonnet,
this bee-in-the-bonnet,
of the everlasting.

Jungles to clear and drain,
wild beasts tamed or slain :
the good gorilla
sets up his villa.

Leaden skies, fields of snow ;
pulses its come-and-go
to the hid heather
in mild weather—
the unreal bee, verily
swift still to grope and gather
sweet for broadcasting
of the everlasting.

Digging for durable gold
spade clangs on stone ;
dark shuffle, metal bright—
villa is kept alight :
Cézanne, the banker's son ;
Gauguin, a bearded faun,
van Gogh, young chanticleer,
treading the first of the year,
bearing his latest picture
naked, under his oxter.

Who watched Nijinsky leap ?
saw, heard Chaliàpin weep ?
Yeats, now : the ready fighter—

sustains the part of Johnson with the greatest talent and fortitude.

• • • • •

March 22nd.

The Chamberlain umbrella, it seems, has in fact been blown inside out. Its ruined condition may be judged from the fact that Cabinet Ministers are now talking of 'resistance to ambitious schemes of domination'; and it appears that, in the process of living backwards, we have now re-entered the Napoleonic age.

In our attitude towards Soviet Russia, short-sightedness has been replaced by a diplomatic colour-blindness—even the *Daily Mail* is no longer seeing Red with its old certainty. A violent transformation-scene is in progress, and what the final tableau will be no one can yet say. At the moment the stage presents a somewhat confused spectacle of hurrying scene-shifters and half dismantled properties, with a State reception going on in the foreground. Some of the principals can be heard memorising their new lines in the wings—'coalition of the peace-loving nations . . . collective security . . . united front against aggression'—and if they should fail to get them right they can, at all events, rely on prompters in the auditorium, for these are lines in which the pit and gallery are word-perfect.

Alex Glendinning.

of mental health,' and that he was frightened by the 'refusal on the part of so many people to seek out anything but the most inane trivialities,' and by their 'fear of what is serious, searching and moving.'

This has for many years been the complaint of people known as 'highbrows'—a term which, in England, covers anyone who prefers the serious, searching and moving to the inane and trivial—and I well remember how Mr. Priestley admonished and pilloried the highbrows some years ago. He could not make out why they were so gloomy, and urged them to cheer up. Now, it seems, Mr. Priestley understands why highbrows feel depressed, and it only remains for some hearty best-seller to tell Mr. Priestley to cheer up. It is a good thing, none the less, that somebody who commands the popular ear should tell English people that their mental health is rotten. Highbrows could make no impression with a remark of this kind.

The withdrawal of *Johnson over Jordan* was announced, and subsequently so many people came to see it that it has now been put on again at the Savile. Its theme is the experiences of an average, decent man just after his death, while he wanders among various projections of his earthly hopes and fears and desires, yields to an average man's lust in a night-club, recovers with an average man's decent remorse, and before going off into eternity encounters again all the people he liked and loved, including Falstaff, Pickwick, Don Quixote, and his wife as she was before they were married. Apart from a few moments of nightmarish satire in the first act—by far the best of the three—there is little communicated fear or mystery in this limbo. We move for the most part in a rather humdrum atmosphere of average, decent reflections and emotions; even Death himself turns out to be an average, decent sort of fellow once his alarming mask is off. When Johnson puts on his bowler and goes off into the unknown we feel the pathos of his predicament—the average, decent man faced by mysteries he doesn't understand—and such gentle pathos is the dominating mood evoked by this piece. Mr. Priestley intends it to be deeply moving, and one respects his sincerity; but it must be said that he has penetrated little deeper than pathos and a rather easy sentiment. Mr. Ralph Richardson, who is scarcely off the stage for a moment,

Adler pays special tribute to a work which confirms many of his own theories, Vaihinger's *The Philosophy of As If*, and I think that would be a very good general name for the policy I have been trying to define, the policy of 'as if' outlined so revealingly by Sir Samuel Hoare on March 10th:

> Suppose that political confidence could be restored to Europe; suppose that there was a Five Year Plan . . . suppose that the people of Europe were able to free themselves from a nightmare that haunts them. . . .

The Policy of As If is rather an awkward title. The Policy of Let's Pretend is better, I think, and carries an appropriate reminiscence of the nursery.

* * * * *

I have just been reading an interview with Sir John Anderson, published in that enterprising journal, *Picture Post*, and have been pondering this remark: 'People cannot expect others—soldiers, airmen, the Navy—to take ghastly risks in their services, and then say, "We expect absolute safety for ourselves." This is fantastic.' In other words, I take it that even if it were possible to provide absolute protection for every civilian, Sir John would dismiss the idea with contempt, since it would be grossly unfair that while the soldier was running ghastly risks at the front, his wife and children should be living in cowardly security at home. Evidently Sir John will see to it, somehow or other, that we all run ghastly risks. It only remains for Sir John to give the nation a lead by transferring himself and his family and his staff to the upper storey of some tenement in Poplar, where, remote from trenches and steel shelters, the ghastliest risks can fairly be counted on.

* * * * *

One gathers from Mr. J. B. Priestley that, at a time of crisis like this, one might do worse than spend an evening at his new play *Johnson over Jordan*. This was produced a few weeks ago at the New Theatre, and appeared to be a commercial failure, whereupon Mr. Priestley wrote an article in the *News-Chronicle* in which he said that if his play failed to attract the public 'just because it succeeds in moving its audience very deeply' then the 'English are in a rotten state

personal mumbo-jumbo grouped under the spreading umbrella to represent a policy. We can recognise these elements, but how are we to explain them? Political theory will not help us, for under the umbrella we are in a world far removed from actualities. Reflecting on this problem, it occurred to me that the Government was, of course, suffering from a neurosis—the symptoms ought really to have been obvious enough—and that the key to its peculiarities must lie in psychoanalysis. With a view to psychoanalysing the Government, I consulted Adler's *The Neurotic Constitution*—in the circumstances an appropriate title—and found that our foreign policy is, in fact, there fully analysed and accounted for.

Adler's theory is based on the assumption that neurosis arises from a sense of inferiority or disability in performing the tasks of life (the application is clear), which causes the neurotic to build up a protective structure—what Adler calls a 'guiding fiction'—to secure himself against loss of prestige and self-esteem.

> At the onset of the development of a neurosis there stands threateningly the feeling of uncertainty and inferiority and demands insistently a guiding, assuring and tranquillising positing of a goal in order to render life bearable. Among these are especially prominent safety devices and fictions in thought, action and volition. . . . One will always find that neurotics cling tenaciously to their reassuring ideals.

The relevance of this need not be stressed; nor of the remark made elsewhere that 'the formation of apparently meaningless words is often among the performances of neurotics'; nor of this:

> The gaze of the neurotic is directed far into the future. All present existence is to him only a preparation. Moreover, this circumstance is largely responsible for encouraging his dreaming proclivities and estranging him from the world of reality.

At the moment, the Government's guiding fictions appear to have broken down, but neurotics do not as a rule abandon their fictions when this happens; they merely alter and adapt them. A cure is brought about by convincing the neurotic that his fictions are indeed fictions, and at the time of writing it is too soon, I am afraid, to say whether our Government is cured or not.

brink of a golden age ?) Its history belongs to metaphysics, perhaps, rather than to politics ; I have toyed with the idea that it might be based on a misapprehension of the works of Bishop Berkeley, but have concluded that its affinities, originally, lie much more with the doctrines of Mrs. Baker Eddy. The element of what might be called Eddyism was first introduced by the late Ramsay MacDonald, possibly after one of his trips to America. It was in America that he was reported as having said : 'War is *unthinkable*,' and the choice of phrase is significant. To Eddyism MacDonald added a mysticism of his own, and evolved a form of incantation— on and on and on and up and up and up—which, chanted at political meetings or over the wireless, served to drown the rumours and rumblings of a world falling into disorder. Mr. Baldwin took over the MacDonald-Eddy doctrine, but applied it in his own way, with more opportunism and less sentiment. He was to MacDonald, as it were, what Coué was to Mrs Eddy. Mr Chamberlain, omitting opportunism to a large extent, added Surrealism, 'appeasement' and the umbrella.

The umbrella is important, it came at length to stand for the whole policy, came, indeed, to stand for England, in place of the traditional British lion ; and as a symbol of policy it is exceedingly apt. The umbrella, it is true, was in ancient times a symbol of kingly power, a canopy borne over the heads of kings and princes in processions. Certain princes of India used to include 'lord of the umbrella' among their titles, and as late as 1855 the King of Burma described himself as 'the monarch who reigns over the great umbrella-wearing chiefs of the Eastern countries.' But the Chamberlain umbrella carries none of these implications ; it has been described by Mr. Chamberlain himself as 'this humble umbrella,' and its symbolic sense is closely related to its use : it is a thing, that is, which can be leaned on in fair weather, and which provides a small area of immunity in a downpour, and if tilted forward a little it restricts the view to what is just under one's feet. It has its disadvantages, too : in a storm the umbrella is apt to get blown inside out, and a person who holds on to his umbrella in a storm is apt to get blown after it. There is a highly topical moral here—but this is by the way.

We find, then, Eddyism, Surrealism and various kinds of

it is perhaps beside the point, for it seems to me that we do not really need either Secret Service or ambassadors, since most of the necessary information on what is to happen will be found in *Mein Kampf*, along with a detailed account of how it will be contrived. The whole history of Herr Hitler's dealings with Mr. Chamberlain, for example, is covered by the principle set out plainly in *Mein Kampf*, that it is always better to tell a big lie than a little one, for people do not believe a little lie but always believe a big one, and Mr. Chamberlain might have spared himself much distress if he had recognised this principle in action some months ago. We are in the fortunate position of knowing what Herr Hitler's ambitions are, and how he will proceed; and I hope that our Cabinet Ministers will now apply themselves to *Mein Kampf*, and that they will apply themselves in particular to the following passage, which explains the methods which have been successfully practised on them for five years or so, and are still in operation:

> A shrewd victor will, if possible, keep imposing his demands on the conquered by degrees. He can then, in dealing with a nation that has lost its character—and that means everyone that submits voluntarily—count on its never finding in any particular act of oppression a sufficient excuse for taking up arms once more. On the contrary, the more the exactions that have been willingly endured, the less justifiable does it seem to resist at last on account of a new and apparently isolated (though to be sure constantly recurring) imposition.

* * * * *

The general view now appears to be that we really have come to the end of an epoch in our foreign policy; and it may therefore be a suitable occasion to attempt, in retrospect, a brief summary of the policy which has brought us to our present condition.

In a Commentary last November I tried to explain this policy as large-scale Surrealism; but I have come to feel that it is not really as simple as that, though it obviously embraces a good deal of Surrealist doctrine. (What could be more Surrealist, for example, than the call for volunteers to save England, coupled with the assurance that England is on the

"another major crisis" in the middle of this month.' *Punch* must now wait a whole week to rehabilitate itself; and what a week to choose for proving the pessimists wrong!

* * * * *

Mr. Chamberlain's Birmingham speech has received a 'good press' in the civilised countries, and an angry press in the totalitarian ones.

> It seems to us that the methods adopted throughout these events call for the severest condemnation, and have administered a profound shock to all who are interested in the preservation of European peace. . . . His Majesty's Government emphatically disapprove, as they have always disapproved, such actions. . . .

These are strong words, and suggest that a resolute foreign policy is to be adopted, but these words were not spoken at Birmingham. They were spoken by Mr. Chamberlain almost exactly a year ago, and refer to the conquest of Austria.

It was at Birmingham, however, that we learned why we have lately been so optimistic:

> It is only six weeks ago that I was speaking in this city and that I alluded to rumours and suspicions which I said ought to be swept away. I pointed out that any demand to dominate the world by force was one which the democracies must resist, and I added that I could not believe that such a challenge was intended, because no Government with the interests of its own people at heart could expose them for such a claim to the horrors of world war.

We were so optimistic, then, because Mr. Chamberlain could not believe that any country would risk a world war. Six months ago Mr. Chamberlain, as he has often told us, believed that Germany would risk a world war for the Sudeten Germans. I find the logic of this very puzzling.

And I am at a loss to understand why our optimism reached its highest point of exuberance a few hours before Herr Hitler moved his troops. This is really very odd, and Mr. Chamberlain throws no light on it. Members of Parliament have been perplexed by this, too, and during the debate on the invasion some of them asked why we spent half a million pounds on a Secret Service, and kept ambassadors in foreign capitals, if we learned nothing of what was going on.

This question has still to be answered; but, on reflection,

There will be no September crisis atmosphere this March; no autumn jitters in the spring.

On Wednesday a crisis is admitted:

> What has been Britain's reaction to the crisis? The people kept calm . . . we are not shocked by stale news. Munich decided that Germany was the boss in Eastern Europe.

Thursday's editorial takes a different view of the boss:

> There is, there must be, consternation and alarm in Britain at the course which Hitler has taken. Stripped of all pretence and illusion, his action is a decision to continue his penetration of Eastern Europe by force.

On Friday the somersault has been completed:

> Fascinated and horrified, the British people look upon the succession of terrible events in Eastern Europe . . . make no mistake, the nation is conscious of the need for an unparalleled effort . . . knowing, too, that if the need was great last September it is greater far to-day.

The closing words of Saturday's editorial suggest an ingenious attempt to justify Monday's:

> Out of the Prime Minister's strong words will come a realisation of the situation in those quarters where that realisation is most urgently needed. And on that account a new term of peace will come to a troubled world.

This manœuvre in six operations, from 'Peace and Plenty' to 'a new term of peace,' is perhaps a record in journalistic acrobatics.

But newspapers have at least the opportunity of contradicting themselves from day to day. They are not in the sad predicament of *Punch*, which appeared on March 15th with a full-page cartoon entitled 'The Ides of March,' in which John Bull is shown sitting up in bed, stretching himself, while a nightmare apparition, labelled 'War Scare,' flies out of the window. John Bull is saying: 'Thank goodness that's over!' In case there should be any doubt about the date—the date on which German troops marched into Prague—a calendar on the bedroom wall displays it, and in case the point of the cartoon should be missed, a footnote explains, in brackets: 'Pessimists predicted

COMMENTARY

March 18th.

THE jitterbugs among us were fully prepared for this crisis. Jitterbugs have long memories, and they remembered that the crisis of last September was heralded by a wave of optimism, in newspapers and speeches, which would have done justice to the outlook before the Fall. So when, on March 10th, jitterbugs read the officially inspired statement in the morning papers about the brightness of the outlook, and the lyrical speech by Sir Samuel Hoare in the evening papers, invoking a golden age, they began to tremble all over. Even the jitterbugs had not realised things were as bad as that; and as the millennial theme soared upwards, like the Song of Joy in the Ninth Symphony, they covered their ears in despair. The climax, when it came, was as if all the fiddle-strings in the orchestra had snapped on a top note, and for a time there was the hollow noise of bows desperately sawing on the varnished wood; then silence, broken only by the wailing of the jitterbugs.

This rise and fall of exuberance, throughout the week beginning Monday, March 13th, is odd enough to be worth recording in some detail. Monday's editorial in the *Daily Express*, for example, is headed 'Peace and Plenty,' and begins:

> At the beginning of this year the *Daily Express* adopted a slogan. The year of peace and plenty. In the early days of the year many people thought our confidence was misplaced. For January brought forecasts of a crisis in February. February brought prophecies of trouble in March. The crises never arrived in time for the prophets. . . . And what of the crisis in the autumn? It will fade away like the crises of the spring. Peace is secure.

On Tuesday, having referred to Hitler's ultimatum, the editorial goes on:

the less afraid that their political freedom would inevitably be crippled.

In opposition to Schönerer, Wolf often spoke of the necessity of a rigid frontier between the Germans and Czechs in the Sudeten provinces. Yet he, too, knew that such a division would be meaningless if and when Pan-German notions should come to be realised because geography would ensure that the Czechs—struggle as they might—would be hopelessly submerged. On December 4th, 1908, in a speech in the Austrian Parliament, he said: 'With the solution of the German national question (the Czechs know that) they are bound to be crushed because a great German national State in the future will never be able to tolerate this Slav shaft [Pfahl] in its living body.' The conception of a Central European Customs Union is in itself admirable. It is a deplorable fact that keen German nationalists, and most of all the Sudeten Germans, have poisoned this conception, together with the idea of a greater German unity, by identifying with it both the imperialism and the primitive intolerance of Pan-Germanism. The unification of France is usually held to have been achieved in the days of the first French Revolution. No doubt many horrible things occurred at the time, but French national unity was based upon notions of liberty and rationalism, while, with the reversal of 1866 in 1938, the achievement of German unity seems to be inextricably confused with the triumph of persecution and obscurantism, with the strangulation of the Czechs and the decimation of the Jews. When the *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (September 1st, 1900) spoke of the 'imminent world struggle between a highly developed civilisation and a newly dawning epoch of barbarism,' or when the Nazi wireless has repeated similar slogans, it is difficult to remember that it is the people of Masaryk, Benesh, Hodža and Krofta, not the people of Schönerer, Karl Hermann Wolf and Adolf Hitler, which is denounced as barbarous.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

became the leader of a German Working Men's Party which warmly sympathised with K. H. Wolf; it was founded in 1904, and soon grew strong around Gablonz, in Northern, and Krumau, in Southern, Bohemia. With the beginning of the Pan-German appeal to the workers, the Sudeten Germans had added the last storey to the structure of Nazi ideology, when Adolf Hitler was only fifteen.

Meanwhile, after sensational successes in the 1901 elections, Schönerer and Wolf had quarrelled. Schönerer at last officially christened his followers *All-deutschen*, and not merely openly, but publicly, advocated the downfall of the Habsburgs and the union of their German or Germanised subjects with those of the Hohenzollerns. Wolf set up his own *Frei-all-Deutsch* Party, which he soon renamed German-Radical, and which rapidly and completely outdistanced the Schönerer rump; both the Wolf and the Schönerer groups in the Austrian Parliament were elected with scarcely an exception by Sudeten German constituencies. The German Radicals were a little more discreet than Schönerer, but they also gazed eagerly towards Berlin. Until the Habsburgs should make way for the Hohenzollerns, and as a stepping-stone towards a Great Germany ruled by the latter, Wolf's party—and indeed other groups of German Austrian deputies—insisted upon a close diplomatic alliance between Vienna and Berlin; they also pressed for a Customs Union between Austria-Hungary and Germany which was to transform Central Europe into at least an economic unit. This plan was manifestly to pave the way for the expansion of German political power and military strength, and economic pressure was so constantly used with great effect in the inter-racial quarrels within Austria that the Slavs set their faces against the Customs Union idea as spelling death to hopes for their own liberation. The plan for an economically unified *Mittel-Europa* was fortified, in the later years of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth, by the extending vigour of German capitalist enterprise towards the south-east. *Mittel-Europa* projects had the great advantage, in pre-war days as they have to-day, that they provided a path to the German domination of all Central and Eastern Europe up to the confines of Russia without openly advocating the de-nationalisation of non-Germans; the non-Germans were none

The assumption that the towns of Bohemia are fundamentally German may be regarded as the 'Sudeten German Myth of History,' and at least as fantastic as the Czech myth to which Henlein took such exception at Carlsbad in April last year. It lies at the base of a very favourite conception in the Sudeten German districts, a conception of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, not merely as lands which it is practically necessary to Germanise, but as an area which has all along been destined to be the heart of a Pan-German Third Reich in succession to the First Reich, the Holy Roman Empire. After the war, incidentally, this gospel was preached by Professor Spann in Vienna; it was also much written up by the Silesian group around the Troppau schoolmaster, Dr. Patscheider. These people constantly spoke of Moravia as a necessary bridge from Germany to Vienna and the Danube valley; they envisaged a Moravian corridor, as one can discover in the publications called the *Schlesische Jahrbücher*, which exactly anticipated the German roadway now under construction across post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia.

A policy of Germanisation requires for its justification the vilification of the Slavs, and it has been customary, both on the German wireless since Hitler has ruled Germany as among the Pan-Germans of pre-war Austria, to denounce them as unregenerate barbarians. In the heydey of Masaryk, Kramář and other Czechs of their calibre, the *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (September 1st, 1900) announced that, though the Czechs were the least backward of the Slavs and had had all the advantages of the close proximity of German culture, there was nothing to be hoped from them, and if there were it must never be given the opportunity to develop! No one doubted that the Slavs, through no particular fault of their own, were socially behind the Germans, and German employers were always ready to take on Slav employees who were willing to work for lower wages than Germans. This circumstance helps to explain the appearance of Pan-Germanism among the German working class in Bohemia and Silesia, though in the rest of pre-war Austria the politically conscious working man was usually with the Socialists and occasionally with the Clericals, but scarcely ever given over to excessive nationalism. A Moravian German, Hans Knirsch,

the tone of the teaching in the Sudeten German schools was, by all accounts, the tone of the speeches of Schönerer and Wolf, and highly unsuitable to the education of children who were to live in a multi-racial State where their own nationality was required to play a mediating rôle. In the German universities of old Austria, too, most of the professors, and of course the majority of the students, were now aggressively racialist. It was, moreover, well known that a high proportion of the professors even at Vienna, if they were not Jewish, were Sudeten Germans. Indeed, it would be roughly true to say that the members of the liberal minority were Jewish or partly so, while the illiberal majority came from the Sudeten provinces and Styria.

These men, Schönerer, Wolf and their followers, who anticipated so exactly the principles proclaimed by the rulers of Germany to-day were opposed on racial grounds to the acquisition by Austria of non-German—*i.e.*, Slav—territory in the Balkans; Schönerer had opposed the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, and in addition had wished to abandon Galicia and Bukovina. In cataloguing his aims in 1900, Wolf actually put *Los von Ungarn, los von Galizien, Bukowina und Dalmatien*, together with the familiar *Los von Rom und Juda* (Election Appeal, October 14th, 1900). But they regarded the mixed German-Czech and German-Slovene provinces as indispensable to Austria and believed that their problems could only be ultimately solved by ruthless Germanisation because they were too intricate to be met by compromise. In an election appeal in 1901 Schönerer declared, 'The Germans in Bohemia must decide whether they wish to become Slavs, or whether, in accordance with their destiny, they will Germanise. A third possibility does not exist.' The extremist Germans always regretted, as they do to this day, that their mediæval forefathers failed to colonise the interior of Bohemia more extensively. The German share in the history of towns like Prague and Budweis gives them, as they believe, the right to regard them as fundamentally German regardless of the overwhelming majority of Czechs among the population. And colonisation can be carried through, and educational and economic pressure can at any time be exerted, in such a fashion as to make up for lost time.

moral ruin.' This is the task which Dr. Goebbels has often informed us that he has successfully completed. The totalitarian standpoint was more fully expressed by Wolf upon other occasions, the claim that Pan-German politics are not to be restricted, but, on the contrary, are to imprison every other aspect of life, and indeed to provide a complete *Weltanschauung*. After the parliamentary dissolution of 1891 Wolf published a leading article on February 1st of that year in which he declared: 'The German-National Party [this was the official title of Schönerer's political followers at the time] is, indeed, not a specifically parliamentary party thirsting for power; it is rooted in the people and operates in this way—it is a party working to educate the people for social reform in the future and with the aim of making our national [*völkisch*], our social, and our economic conditions healthy once again.' The social health at which he aimed was, as we know, an aggressively German attitude towards Christian, Jewish, or Slav influences of any kind. In the spirit of what he wrote Wolf concerned himself, not so much with straight political activity, but with the invigoration of the so-called Defence Societies of the Germans, especially those in Bohemia. The most important of these, the *Bund der Deutschen*, was founded in 1894, with the object of helping Germans and hindering Czechs wherever their interests clashed. A large part of its activities, for example, were concerned with facilitating the acquisition of land or other property for Germans and preventing its acquisition by Czechs. Of the German Defence Societies besides, the *Turnverband* and the *Schulverein* were the most outstanding. The former, together with gymnastics, inculcated a 'healthy,' or in fact racial, attitude to life. The latter organised schoolteachers, and, in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia, was the open enemy of the parallel Czech organisation which was largely taken up with the problem of providing Czech schools for the Czech children in Northern Bohemia. The *Schulverein*, and indeed the Sudeten Germans as a whole, objected to the use of Czech in this region and held that the Czech children ought to be Germanised.

These German 'defence' organisations excluded Jews and were racialist and bellicose in attitude. The *Schulverein* exerted considerable influence in the teaching profession, and

About this time Schönerer, together with his lieutenant Karl Hermann Wolf, launched a definite campaign against Catholicism, and *Los von Rom* became the twin battle-cry with *Los von Juda*. Wolf had been elected a deputy in the 1897 elections. An Egerlander and a Protestant himself, he, even more than Schönerer, may be considered as the personification of Bohemian Pan-Germanism. His point of view may be fully appreciated by the perusal of his speeches in Parliament and elsewhere, or of the paper, *Die Ostdeutsche Rundschau*, with which he identified himself; it is interesting to find that he quarrelled with the censorship of old Austria, a *deutsch-geführt* State, just about as much as his spiritual children of the Henleinist *Sudeten-deutsche Partei* quarrelled with the post-war Czechoslovak censors. It is interesting, too, to find in the pages of the *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* an exact reflection of the modern Nazi's state of mind.

The *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* deserves to be quoted apropos various Pan-German principles. In the course of 1900 this journal was busily encouraging defection from the Catholic Church, and enthusiastically recorded conversions to Protestantism which was felt to be a more decently secular affair—Luther, after all, had accepted State control for his churches. Already, however, the idea of a German National Church was in the air, a Church which Schonerer would wish to see dedicated to Odin, and which would, in any case, pay little enough attention to the teaching of Christ. At a meeting at the manufacturing town of Aussig (in Northern Bohemia) on May 22nd, 1900, K. H. Wolf, as reported in the *Ostdeutsche Rundschau*, referred to 'the need for the German Church movement, which has made a victorious appeal to German hearts.' On the previous day, incidentally, a meeting he addressed at Hohenelbe, in North-eastern Bohemia, was closed with the singing of the *Wacht am Rhein*.

Already in 1890 a leading article by Wolf appeared on April 13th in which he referred to the social question as equivalent in its essence to the Jewish question, 'and to this we wish to add, that a most important part of the Jewish question is to snatch away the control of the Press from the Jews, so that it shall again be a means towards the education of the people (*Volk*), and no longer be misused by speculators in order to demoralise the masses and bring about their material and

women off, either,' was shouted at an unfortunate secretary. But by the time the police could be called, in the very manner of modern S.A. men, Schönerer's troop had discreetly melted away. In the course of his trial, as on many other occasions, Schönerer inveighed against the vile cultural corruption caused by the number of Jews in the journalistic world. The Austrian newspapers often amused themselves at the expense of what, in those days, appeared to be the crudity and folly of Schönerer's ideas; this he could only explain by the malevolent influence of the accursed race.

It has been seen that, after 1866, the Sudeten Germans resigned themselves with particular difficulty to the break between Austria and Germany; those who lived in the Egerland in the north-west corner of Bohemia, a district which many considered only to be mortgaged to Bohemia, were immediately inclined to become irredentist, though the German Liberal régime, in which some of their leaders participated, restrained them during the 'seventies. In the 'eighties they began to take up the attitude of Schönerer, and he and his Pan-German colleague, Karl Iro, became the Egerland deputies in the Austrian Parliament and held their seats for many years; indeed, Iro was re-elected as late as 1911 in the last elections before the war. Now the Egerland people were always the most vigorous of the Germans in Bohemia. The Germans of Troppau and other towns in Austrian Silesia had much the same spirit, but the influence of the Egerlanders among the Sudeten Germans was out of all proportion to their numbers, both in political life and—perhaps even more—in other directions. It was among the Sudeten Germans, as opposed to the Germans of Austria proper, that Schönerer found sympathy for the Odin and Valhalla cult which he adopted!

In the year 1897 the Viennese Government, in answer to the increase in the Czech vote in the elections of that year, agreed to acknowledge the full equality of status of the Czech and German languages in Bohemia and Moravia. This led to violent and prolonged Sudeten German protests, of which the most tremendous came from the Egerlanders; they now became frankly irredentist, and put this theory into practice by marching across the frontier into Germany in the course of forbidden demonstrations which had led to police interference.

The first politically active champion of the racial idea in stria was the Viennese squire, Georg von Schönerer, who ined the elegant anti-Semitic phrase *In der Rasse liegt die weinerei.* He entered the Austrian Parliament in the very ir of the financial crash in Vienna and indulged in naïve ndemnation of the crimes of capitalists, whom, inaccurately en in Austria, he chose to identify with Jewry. His early cialism caused him, like many Nazis in the post-Versailles riod, to co-operate for a time with the Social Democratic rty. But again, like many of the Nazis of to-day, the crude ntality of the average German student provided a more ngenial *milieu* than the more humane and intellectual nosphere which prevailed among the Socialist leaders; any case, their chief, Viktor Adler, was himself a Jew. nönerer's Socialism, moreover, was swamped by the fervent miration he developed for Hohenzollern Germany, with its harsh anti-Socialist laws.

Apropos his love for the Hohenzollerns, which in time de him frankly disloyal to the Emperor Francis Joseph, incident which occurred in 1888 deserves more attention n it usually receives. Schönerer was sitting in a café Vienna with a crowd of his followers at the time when first Hohenzollern Emperor of Germany, the aged lliam I., was lying on his deathbed. He read in the *ues Wiener Tagblatt* that, according to a telegram from rlin, the Emperor was dead. About half an hour later pecial edition of the *Tagblatt* appeared in the café with *lements* which had just come from Germany. Thereon Schönerer and twenty-seven of his friends, armed with avy lead-capped sticks, decided to punish the Jews of *Tagblatt* for the insult they were held to have offered to rmany and her rulers. Schonerer was afterwards tried this piece of violence and the record of the trial[2] reads ctly like an account of some brutal Nazi outrage in Berlin 1933 or in Vienna in 1938. For the evidence showed that Schönerer group broke into the *Tagblatt* offices to find editorial staff of eight or nine men, who were certainly vish, discussing the next day's edition. 'Down on your ees, Jews!' the invaders cried. 'The Day of Revenge come, you shall do penance!' 'We don't let the Jewish

[2] See 'Process Georg Ritter von Schönerer,' *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, 1888.

Austrian Silesia, all along the very frontiers of the new German Reich, felt very much more bitterly about the post-1866 situation than most of the Austrian Germans who lived further away. The indignant nationalism of the Germans of the Sudeten provinces was simultaneously stimulated by their increasingly difficult relations with the Czech population of these same provinces. If they could not set up one vast united Germany to embrace all Central Europe, they introduced a Constitution which ensured that the German minority within Austria's frontiers should overwhelm the Slav majority. Sudeten Germans, men like Herbst and Giskra, were the most active Austrian politicians of this time, and they administered the constitutional arrangements they had made in the spirit of their own provincial fear of the Czechs. Their passionate Germanism, therefore, laying stress as it did upon the sacrosanct nature of German soil and German language, readily incorporated the racial idea; to be a good German in their eyes one must be an enemy to the Slavs.

The racial argument was all the more welcome since it provided a new justification, distinct from the old confessional one, for the vague anti-Semitic traditions scattered up and down Central Europe. From the Sudeten German point of view things went from bad to worse, for the nationalist German 'Liberal' Government, in which they had been strongly represented, was, in 1879, replaced by a coalition supported by the German Clericals and the Slav groups in the Austrian Parliament. This further 'betrayal' of the Austrian Germans synchronised with a period of economic trouble covering the Vienna bank crash of 1873 and the unemployment of the 'eighties. The German Liberals had been sufficiently liberal to give the Jews legal equality of status in the 'sixties. Banking and, to a lesser extent, industry were largely in Rothschild and other Jewish hands, and it now became easy for Pan-German enthusiasts to stir up feeling against the new equality for Jews, and to discover that 1848 had been a failure because it had been too much based upon the idea of the equality of men. No, the Pan-Germans discovered, men are not born equal; on the contrary, there is a superior German race and there are inferior races like the Slavs, and, worse still, the Jews.

assembling on the Main. For their aim was to replace the old German Confederation of Dynasties by a unitary Great German State to embrace Austria, Prussia and all the old confederates. The Austria of the 1815 Confederation had included, together with Austria proper and the Alpine provinces, Bohemia, Moravia, Southern Silesia with their Czechs, and also the Slavs of Styria and Slovenia. If the Czechs refused to become Germans at this point, the new united Germany would find itself with a big Slav salient separating Munich from Breslau and Vienna from Dresden; the dream of a Central Europe which the German People[1] should take over from the German dynasties would be destroyed. It soon appeared that the liberty which the German revolutionaries loved was German liberty only; and it was the Bohemian German, Hartmann, who demanded that military measures be taken to coerce the Czechs.

In 1849, however, thanks in part to the Slav populations of Austria, the Habsburgs recovered their position, and with them the Hohenzollerns and the other German dynasties re-established themselves and the hope of Great-German unity was dashed to the ground. But this was not all. Seventeen years later the *Grossdeutsch* had a heavier blow to face. In 1866 Prussia went to war with Austria. As the result of her victory she severed her federal connection with Austria, and set up a new *Kleindeutsch* Empire with a northern orientation. In those days the Prussians did not much indulge in Great-German ideas and were proud of their own military successes. It was the Austrians who, accustomed to regard Vienna as the capital of Germany since mediæval times, were horrified to find that a new German unity had been created without that city. Not only had grand-scale German unity proved a fiasco in 1849, but now Germans, they felt, were evicted from Germany. Their chagrin intensified the Great-Germanism of many Austrians; it was made ready to ripen into Pan-Germanism; they would at any rate never rest till the 9,000,000 Germans of Salzburg, Bohemia, Styria, and the other Habsburg provinces should be reunited with the Germans of Saxony and Bavaria. It was natural that the Germans who lived in Bohemia and

[1] The special implications of the German word *Volk*, which obscurely combines the meaning of folk, people, nation and race, should not be forgotten.

THE FATHERS OF GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM

MODERN National Socialism is almost identical with pre-war Pan-Germanism, to which it has merely added an efficient, a more ruthless, technique; it was necessary, as Hitler saw, to implement the masses and also the outlying minorities, if the ideas of Pan-Germanism were to triumph. It is, however, not generally realised that the political ideology of contemporary Germany owes nothing else to Adolf Hitler and relatively little to Houston Stewart Chamberlain. It was the Germans of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia who created the 'essentially German' political tradition which has become grimly evident to-day. The German minorities in these mainly Slav 'Historic Provinces' have only been known as Sudeten Germans since 1919, but it may be convenient to indulge in anachronism and to refer to them by their post-war name in considering some of their pre-war performances.

When the revolutionary wave of 1848 swept across Europe the inhabitants of these three provinces indulged in a general enthusiasm for the downfall of Metternich and the rise of liberty. The German Bohemians immediately envisaged the absorption of the Historic Provinces into a new united Germany, and hastened to send their representatives to the all-German Parliament summoned to Frankfurt. What was their astonishment when they discovered the Slav majority regarded liberty as something quite different; it proceeded to enjoy the new freedom of the Press by launching new journals written, not in German, but in Czech; its leading spokesman, František Palacký, refused an invitation to the Frankfurt Assembly on the grounds that the latter was, after all, intended to represent the unification of Germans and Germans alone. Palacký's standpoint was reasonable enough—too reasonable, perhaps, for the *Grossdeutsch* idealists now

Asiatic Power factors. The intervention of the Anglo-Saxon Powers, if it ever comes, can be expected only at a much later stage, when the combinations of power in the Western Pacific will be more clearly discernible. The alternatives which there remain to be settled are the old ones, those which were set by Kublai Khan in the thirteenth, and Hideyoshi in the sixteenth centuries: Eurasia or Panasia. The further the Chinese Armies are pushed to the West and cut off from all access to the sea, the more will they be thrown back on help from Russia and the more probable will become a close political and military co-operation between Moscow and the Government of Marshal Chiang.

The incorporation of China in the Japanese sphere of power will ruin Russia's position as an Asiatic Great Power. And Russia to-day, in view on the one hand of the industrialisation of the huge district between the Ural and Altai Mountains and on the other of the actual incorporation of Chinese East Turkestan and Outer Mongolia (together nearly 1,500,000 square miles) feels much more an Asiatic Power than she did twenty years ago. A Sino-Russian alliance, the victory of which would realise the old Eurasian Mongolian Empire of Genghiz Khan and Kublai Khan, is therefore within the bounds of possibility.

The Pan-Asiatic solution, as envisaged by Hideyoshi and Tanaka could only be achieved by the overthrow of Russia and her destruction as an Asiatic Power. The incorporation of Eastern Turkestan and Outer Mongolia in the Japanese sphere of control would threaten Russian domination in South Siberia and Central Asia. There is, however, another possibility, namely the partition of China between Japan and Russia. As things are to-day this would mean a complete elimination of Russia from the Pacific Coast and thus the conversion of the Sea of Japan into a Japanese inland sea, the relinquishment of the coast territories and possibly also the Amur province to Japan, Russia, however, retaining her lordship over the Mongolian-Turkestan provinces. This would, according to past experience, lead to a stronger pressure of Russia in Central Asia and in the direction of the Indian Ocean.

GREGORY BIENSTOCK.

a perfectly definite Russo-Japanese front was formed against the American attempt to make Manchuria a buffer state under American control (Taft-Knox proposals). The Russo-Japanese approach reached its closest point during the World War, in the last year of Czarism, with the Sazonov-Motono Agreement of July 3rd, 1916, which was clearly directed against America. In the same year Berlin, as well as Tokyo, played with the idea of a separate peace and a threefold Russo-Germano-Japanese entente.

During the World War and in 1919–1920 Japanese expansion in the Far East reached its highest point. China and Russia were completely paralysed, the whole Russian Far Eastern possessions as far as Lake Baikal were occupied by Japan. Only the intervention of England and America (Washington, 1922) forced Japan to evacuate the occupied positions. A new Japanese approach to Russia, at this time similarly isolated, became possible in 1925 with the Karakhan-Yoshizava Agreement. The problem of China, however, then as now, stood between Tokyo and Moscow. The unification of China was carried out between 1923 and 1926 with Russian help, and this unification was directed not only against the Western Powers but against Japan. Still, even in 1926 the tendency to an approach of Russia and Japan was clearly noticeable, and even the old idea of a triple entente between Japan, Russia and Germany seemed to be coming to fruition. The close relations between Berlin and Moscow as shown in the Berlin Treaty of 1926, could only be favourable to the 'Eurasian Axis' (Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo).

With the advent to power of Baron Giichi Tanaka in the summer of 1927, the pan-Asiatic tendency once more asserted itself, combined first with an attempt at an approach to England, but after 1931 with gradual dissociation from all connection with the Anglo-Saxon Powers. This 'totalitarian' continental policy beginning with the occupation of Manchuria presupposed a more or less complete 'aloofness' on the part of England and America towards any Western Pacific policy. Tokyo assumed this Anglo-Saxon aloofness as a matter of course, but reckoned equally as a matter of course with Russian 'presence' ('presenza'—Italian) in the Western Pacific.

The fate of Asia will in all probability be decided by

colossal curve. Russian advance towards the Black Sea was paralysed by the British counter-attack between 1853 (Crimean War) and 1878 (Congress of Berlin). The Central Asiatic expansion of the Czarist Empire which between 1860 and 1885 reached its most successful period, was also halted by British counter-activity in Afghanistan and Baluchistan. In 1885 border conflicts between Russia and Afghanistan nearly ended in a war between Russia and England.

In the 'nineties the Russian offensive on the shores of the Pacific, brought to a halt between 1860 and 1870, was renewed. Checked on both the other sectors of her world political arc, in the west on the Black Sea, and in the centre in Central Asia, she turned her attention to the Pacific sector. Here, however, the Czarist Empire came into conflict with Japan, substantially supported by Anglo-American co-operation.

The conflict between Russia and Japan in the Pacific was a typical Power conflict, economic difficulties between the two Powers being merely of secondary importance. The Japanese as well as the Russians had proved indifferent colonisers on the coasts of the Northern Pacific. The real colonisers had been the Chinese, whose settlement of the North Pacific territories had, however, been checked by political considerations. From a purely political point of view both Moscow and Tokyo had favoured grandiose projects for colonising the North Pacific territories with, respectively, Russian and Japanese settlers. Nothing came of these plans, however, owing to lack of colonising energy in the settlers themselves.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 left Japan an Asiatic Great Power, and gave her dominion over Southern Manchuria and Korea. The victory of Japan was only made possible by Anglo-Saxon support, chiefly that of England (the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902). After this time, however, a shifting in the direction of Japanese foreign policy is noticeable: from an attitude of acute opposition to Russia, covered by an alliance with the strongest ocean power, Tokyo's policy veered gradually towards an understanding with Russia, while attachment to the Anglo-Saxon Powers was loosened. Russia and Japan approached each other on a programme of the partititon of China. Agreements on the division of spheres of influence in North China were made no less than four times—in 1907, 1910, 1911 and 1916. In 1910

Russo-American Company on the lines of the English and Dutch Colonial Companies was formed, and proceeded to annex and administer Alaska in the name of the Russian Empire. Russian explorers appeared on the Marshall and Caroline Islands. In 1812 Russian agencies were started in California which at that time belonged to Spain; in 1815 an attempt was made to bring the Hawaiian Islands under a Russian protectorate. As late as 1821 the Czar Alexander I raised a claim to the Oregon province which lay like a wedge between British and American spheres of influence. When, in the summer of 1823, George Canning made to the American Ambassador, Richard Rush, the proposals for common diplomatic action which led soon afterwards to the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, it was this Russian offensive in the Pacific, too, which was foremost in his mind.

Russia's oceanic ambitions were far-reaching: the Bering Sea was to become a Russian inland sea; in 1825 Russia and Spain made an agreement on the division of their spheres of influence in California. This, however, proved to be the summit of Russia's achievements in the oceanic sphere. The proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine was the first Anglo-Saxon counter-stroke with the aim of finally pushing Russia off the American Continent. With the sale of Alaska in 1867 the dream of a Pacific ocean kingdom under Russian domination faded once and for all. It is true that seven years earlier Vladivostok—' Stronghold of the East '—had been built on the coast of the Sea of Japan. The geographical position, however, of this sea fortress proves that Russia had given up extensive oceanic ambitions: Vladivostok was in no sense planned as a point of departure for oceanic conquests, but rather as a base for continental development and defence against possible attack from the sea.

Russian world policy unfolded itself along a strategically powerful line from the Carpathians to the Great Hingan Range (Manchuria), from the Black Sea to the Pacific. Behind this line lie the Eurasian steppes, and the immanent tendency of Mongolo-Russian ' steppe-imperialism ' is to seek an outlet in a southerly direction towards the ' warm waters '—the Mediterranean, the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Russia's world political energies have in the course of centuries been concentrated now on one, now on another section of this

fetters of scholasticism. But feudalism and scholasticism were a good school for the Japanese spirit as they had formerly been for that of Europe.

Japan's 'awakening,' or rather a powerful rousing by American cannon in the year 1853, forced the acceptance of European-American civilisation. But this acceptance was simply used as a stick with which to beat Europe. Hideyoshi's pan-Asiatic programme once more came to the front. Japan now began where Hideyoshi left off, and made up for the defeat of 1597 by a blow at the Chinese 'hereditary foe' in 1894–1895. It turned out, however, that in these two and a half centuries the world situation had fundamentally altered: between the victorious Island Kingdom and defenceless China stood Russia, backed by France and Germany. Japan was thus robbed of the fruits of her victory over China.

The advance of the Island Kingdom towards the Continent, the pan-Asiatic doctrine of Hideyoshi, was countered, as 250 years before, by a Eurasiatic programme. The Russians appeared as the political heirs of the Mongols.

The Mongol Empire, founded in the thirteenth century by Genghiz Khan and his successors, included on its extreme west the Russian principalities; on its extreme east this Empire sought to incorporate the Japanese islands. In the fifteenth century the Russian principalities, under the leadership of Moscow, threw off the Mongol yoke; in direct connection with this the Russian counter-offensive began right across the whole Eurasian Continent from the Volga to the Pacific. Moscow gathered under her overlordship the northern part of the decaying Mongol Empire. In the middle of the sixteenth century the Russian conquerors marched across the Ural mountains; a century later the coasts of the Pacific had already been reached by Russian adventurers and traders.

In the middle of the nineteenth century (1858–1860), China, greatly weakened by the war against England and France, was forced to relinquish the Amur Province and the coastal territory to Russia. The Russians, however, were no more prepared than their Mongol predecessors to be satisfied with conquests on the Asiatic Continent. At the end of the eighteenth and the first thirty years of the nineteenth centuries Russian sailors and adventurers displayed exceptional activity in the north and south of the Western Pacific. In 1798 the

Sea. Naval supremacy is as necessary to continental domination in the Far East as elsewhere.

Japan at that time, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, escaped the fate of India because Spain, the world power which might have threatened her, then suffered defeat at the hands of England and France. Philip II's Armada was destroyed in 1588; nine years later the Chinese general Li Yu-sung defeated the Japanese fleet. Shortly afterwards began the Thirty Years' War in which the energies of all European Powers were fully engaged. The colonial wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took place in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, the rôle of the Western Pacific being of little or no importance in this connection. Japan therefore remained in these centuries outside the circle of European world policy, and was able undisturbed to devote herself to the experiment of self-consolidation and political and economic 'autarky.'

The epoch of seclusion (1637–1853) which covers seven generations, is the time of the final formation of the Japanese national character. It was ushered in by vast anti-ideological struggles: both ideologies which claimed domination were eventually discarded. Political Buddhism first received a death blow, in dealing which the Government claimed the support of Christianity, which was already exerting a powerful influence upon the masses. In its turn, however, Christianity was suppressed, foreigners thrown out of the country, and all communication with the outside world cut off. The sense of national disappointment at the failure of Hideyoshi's pan-Asiatic plans produced in a hypersensitive nation the tendency to self-examination and self-consciousness. Thus are explained the turning against foreign ideologies and in general the inclination to self-limitation. The outward manifestations of life were toned down, increase of population checked by abortion and child murder. The apparatus of a centralised bureaucracy was planted on a feudal social order, spiritual life was dominated by a scholasticism imported from China which attained in Japan its highest florescence towards the end of the eighteenth century. In the epoch which for the West was the period of discovery and invention, of the first great victories over Nature, of English emperical philosophy and French encyclopædism, Japan remained in the

also falls into this period. On the other hand, Japan at this time was straining every nerve to subdue the Chinese-Korean Continent (Hideyoshi, 1536–1598). This tension between ocean and continent in the sixteenth century contains the kernel of the whole future foreign policy of the Island State even to the present day.

Japan has twice adopted European arms technique in order to turn it against China. In 1542 occurred the first importation of Portuguese firearms into Japan. Fifty years later, in 1592, the Japanese troops in their continental campaigns were already equipped both with European firearms and those manufactured at home from European models. Three hundred years later the same process was repeated. In 1853, after a long interruption, Japan again came into contact with European arms technique, and with this same technique just forty years later succeeded in overwhelming China.

For Hideyoshi the conquest of China and Korea was in line with ancient tradition: already in the seventh century Japan made an unsuccessful effort to establish herself in South Korea. After the repulsion of the Mongol Chinese Emperor Kublai Khan's attack on Japan at the end of the thirteenth century, the plan for a counter-attack on the Continent at once emerged. This plan, however, could not be carried out owing to the incessant feudal disputes in which Japan was engaged for forty years after the last Mongol invasion. It was only after Hideyoshi succeeded, in the second half of the sixteenth century, in settling the feudal wars that he could once more turn his attention to the conquest of China and Korea.

For Hideyoshi, however, the subduing of China and Korea was only a stage. His aim was the conquest of the whole of the Indo-Pacific area. Apart from the Far East, India, the East Indies, and Persia were to fall to the Japanese conquerors. The capital of this pan-Asiatic kingdom was to be Peking. Hideyoshi may be regarded as the spiritual father of Giichi Tanaka (1863–1929) whose famous *Testament* of 1927 repeats more or less accurately this programme of Japanese imperialism.

The Seven Years War (1591–1598) waged by Hideyoshi against China and Korea ended with a disaster in which the Sino-Korean fleet defeated the Japanese armada in the Yellow

formed and influenced Japanese life in the course of the centuries. As, therefore, in the middle of the nineteenth century Japan adopted European civilisation, she had already had considerable experience in assimilating foreign influences.

Tension in two directions—continental and oceanic—has always defined Japan's attitude to world politics. The influence of the Continent on the Island Kingdom has not been merely cultural: in the thirteenth century the Mongol Chinese dynasty attempted to extend their dominion to the Japanese islands. Decisive factors in the failure of this grandiose campaign were, first, the breakdown in the unaccustomed conditions of the 'amphibian' warfare, of the military technique of the Mongol cavalry, planned for land warfare, and, secondly, the unexpected toughness of the Japanese resistance. The invasion of the Island Kingdom by the Continent was thus finished once and for all. Three hundred years later came Japan's attack on the Continent. In the meantime, however, the former's political horizon had been greatly enlarged. In 1542 the Islands for the first time saw 'Southern barbarians' in their harbours: the Portuguese landed on the Japanese islands.

The sixteenth century is, generally speaking, the epoch in which Japan's political energy reached its first culminating point. In this period the Japanese first appeared as an ocean-going people, as pirates and traders, and attempted, using the southern island Kiushu as base, to obtain a footing in the whole of the Western Pacific. This was the first foreign political appearance of the Satsuma Clan. The Malakka Peninsula represents the most southerly point of the oceanic advance of the Satsuma people. Here, however, the Japanese sailors already came against the Europeans advancing from the west (the Portuguese Indian traveller, Albuquerque, in 1511).

The elasticity of the Island Kingdom's foreign policy at this time can be judged from the ocean encompassing plans of the Japanese statesmen of the period. On the one hand the attempt was made to extend Japanese trade to Mexico in the East Pacific where Spain had already established a sphere of influence. The South Japanese embassy to the Pope (Hazekura Tsunenaga), an attempt to establish friendly relations with the Occident, above all with Spain and Portugal,

displaying certain 'amphibian' characteristics, has as its goal, in accordance with tradition, the actual domination of the East Asiatic Continent.

To the Occident, which came into close contact with Japan for the first time in the middle of the nineteenth century, everything that took place in the following eighty years, the whole mighty uprising to the position of a world power, appeared as an example of the economic, social, cultural and political transformation brought about by European-American capitalism in the backward Orient. In this connection, however, it remains inexplicable that while Japan's reaction to Occidental capitalism was the development of power on a vast scale, the other two Asiastic kingdoms, China and Korea, through contact with the same capitalism, have declined and forfeited all or part of their independence. It must be assumed that the Japanese have brought out of their long history into modern times a certain mental attitude which has made possible their unique success.

'To be widely open on the one hand to outside impressions, and on the other to turn them to good account in the safe shelter of a closed personality'—it is thus that Friedrich Ratzel characterises one of the historical advantages of the Island State. In the course of their thousand years' history the Japanese have succeeded in absorbing various foreign ideas and forms of organisation, have tested them and skilfully tried out one against the other. Statesmen of imposing pattern have appeared at decisive turning points of Japanese history, men who have not been afraid to oppose the passive resistance of the masses, and, despising the old, deep-rooted prejudices, have led the State into new paths.

The astounding elasticity and adaptability of the Japanese, their capacity for absorbing outside ideas while at the same time preserving their own personality, these traits in the national character, which explain Japan's remarkable success, are the result of the history of this island people. The Japanese, racially and culturally, are a mixed people. Malays of the South Seas, Altaic Mongols, Caucasian Ainus, colonised Japan in prehistoric times and helped to build up the Japanese national type. Still more heterogeneous are the influences which have shaped Japanese culture. Chinese Confucianism, Indian Buddhism, Catholicism of the Jesuitical type, have

inter-penetration, of cultural co-operation and of sanguinary conflict. Even in the times of Genghiz Khan and Tamerlane, from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century of our era, and up to the time of the last Turkish wars in the seventeenth century, it had been by no means decided whether Asia should dominate Europe or whether the great Motherland should be conquered by its European peninsula. The decisive factor in the issue of this struggle was the fact that by the sixteenth century Europe had achieved the conquest of the seas.

Asiatic conquerors have been essentially bound to the land. As Gibbon, for example, remarks about Tamerlane: 'Asia was in the hand of Timour: his armies were invincible, his ambition was boundless. . . He touched the utmost verge of the land; but an insuperable, though narrow, sea rolled between the two continents of Europe and Asia, and the lord of so many thomans, or myriads, of horse was not master of a single galley.'

It was, however, not possible to conquer even Asia by means of a frontal land attack The circumnavigation of the African Continent and the subsequent advance of the Europeans into the sphere of the Indian Ocean, and later of the Pacific, represent a large-scale flanking manœuvre. The colonial empires founded by the Portuguese, Dutch and British are Ocean Empires, created from the sea. The existence of these empires rests to-day upon one hypothesis—Anglo-Saxon naval supremacy.

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, however, the white colonial powers were confronted by an entirely new phenomenon. A thalassocracy of purely Asiatic origin arose in the Pacific, and became at the same time the centre of an 'opposition colonisation' ('Gegen-Kolonisation') of the first rank. A hundred and fifty years after Russia, Japan accepted European civilisation in order to beat Europe at her own game. For the first time for 300 years an Asiatic Power once more set out to achieve world conquest.

Japan, like every thalassocracy, sought to influence the neighbouring continent, and here the Island Kingdom came up against two Great Powers—China and Russia. The substance of modern Japan's foreign policy consists essentially of the adjustment of relations with these two continental opponents. But this foreign policy, although no doubt

RUSSIA AND JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC

In these days when all that is most changeful, evanescent and self-destructive in history thrusts itself more and more upon the mind, it may perhaps be of value to remember that the fabric of this world is woven not alone by chance but also by necessity. The noise of the European conflict is to-day so deafening, the vibration of the telegraph wires so shrill, that it is certainly none too easy to catch beneath all the confusion of sounds the rhythm of world history. Half a century ago this was much easier. At that time two Anglo-Saxon statesmen had very clearly realised the significance of Asiatic policy in world events. 'He who understands China' said John Hay in 1890, 'holds in his hand the key to international politics in the next five hundred years.' And about the same time George N. Curzon, then a young member of the Lower House, pointed out that:

> the future of Great Britain . . . will be decided not in Europe, not even upon the seas and oceans which are swept by her flag, or in the Greater Britain that has been called into existence by her offspring, but in the continent whence our emigrant stock first came, and to which as conquerors their descendants have returned.

There are obvious things which tend to be overlooked simply because of their obviousness. The relatively peaceful development of the world in the century between the Napoleonic wars and 1914 was based on the naval supremacy of Britain, a fact which was accepted by all as a matter of course. After the World War, world equilibrium, in other words the, to a certain extent, peaceful and continuous development of our planet, rested on the fact of the silently acknowledged condominion of the two Anglo-Saxon world powers over the seas. It is Anglo-Saxon naval supremacy which is now questioned in the Far East.

Relations between Europe and Asia in the course of centuries took the form of thrust and counter-thrust, of mutual

Merchant Navy will continue to decline and more shipyards will become silent.[1] The rearmament programme has reacted unfavourably on merchant shipbuilding, raising the cost of new tonnage by 20 per cent., while shipowners, with lower freights, have to meet operating charges which are from 25 to 30 per cent. greater than in 1935. In these circumstances shipowners, exposed to uneconomic competition on every trade route, cannot replace their ships as they become old and inefficient. By some means the gap between the shipbuilder's price and the shipowner's price must be bridged, and only the Government can do this. And not only must this task be undertaken, but conditions of fairplay must be created so that the new ships, when built, can be efficiently manned and trade at a reasonable profit so as to attract investors to an industry which has been seriously weakened by the economic war which has been made upon it for nearly twenty years.

Until measures to secure these ends have been adopted, the rearmament programme will remain unbalanced. The chairman of the United States Maritime Commission, which proposes to apply State funds to stimulate the building of five hundred merchant ships in the next ten years, has defended that decision by claiming that merchant shipping is 'the lifeline of the United States Navy.' If that be true of a country which is so largely independent of overseas supplies and has as defence, on the one hand, the 3,000 miles of the Atlantic Ocean and, on the other, the 6,000 miles of the Pacific Ocean, how much more true is it of a country that could be overrun by an enemy if the Royal Navy were immobilised by lack of auxiliaries and could be starved if its sea communications were severed?

ARCHIBALD HURD.

[1] Eleven shipyards are already without any merchant shipbuilding

The best that can be done in the crisis which has arisen as a result of years of procrastination is to make it possible for existing ships, as they reach twenty-five years of age, to be replaced. That will involve an annual output of 1,250,000 tons from the shipyards in future years. When the peak of the rearmament movement has been passed it might be possible to increase the tonnage. But, in the meantime, the President of the Board of Trade can suggest no other solution of the problem of the shortage of tonnage if an emergency should arise than that old ships, as they are replaced by new ones, should, at the expense, of course, of the State, be kept in reserve instead of being broken up in accordance with the usual practice. Owing to the failure of successive Governments to adopt measures of defence, we have reached the humiliating position when it is proposed that old ships, discarded because their owners regard them as no longer efficient, should be placed in reserve. That policy will be an expensive one, because such vessels will have to be maintained in efficiency and all the money which is spent in this way will be wasted unless crews are available for them in case of emergency.

Thus Ministers have by devious paths reached the point at which their critics set out three or four years ago, when it became evident that the plea for recognition of the economic doctrines, as applied in the past to shipping as an international industry, was falling on deaf ears. The best that the Government, with the support of Parliament, can do is to ensure that the decline of the shipping and shipbuilding industries is arrested, that British shipping is assured of fairplay in future on the trade routes, and that the shipbuilders are placed on an equal footing with their competitors, favoured by lower wages, longer hours, barter arrangements, exchange depreciation and other factors. When the rearmament movement has been completed it may be possible to develop a long-range policy for the restoration of the maritime industries, but apparently the hope must be abandoned of regaining the position they once occupied when 80 per cent. of the ships afloat under all flags were British built and half the world's sea-borne trade was carried on in British ships.

Unless the Government immediately intervenes and Parliament endorses its proposals without delay, the British

Thus the President, by implication, surrendered, with a courage deserving of full recognition, to the challenges to action which had been thrown down in past years and admitted that the solution of the problems of the shipping and shipbuilding industries were matters of great urgency.

Unhappily the conversion has come too late. Whatever aid Parliament may decide upon, British shipping cannot be restored, within measurable time, to its former strength, nor can the shipyards be enabled to provide employment on anything like the same scale as in the past, because a smaller Merchant Navy necessarily implies less replacement tonnage as ships become obsolescent, while it must be a matter of great difficulty to regain the allegiance of foreign shipowners. Owing to the absence of orders for new tonnage and the depression of freights, craftsmen in the shipyards and engine shops, as well as officers and men in the merchant service, have been seeking employment in the industries which are engaged in rearmament work. There is a shortage of skilled men in every skilled trade in this country, and in none is it more serious than in those concerned with shipbuilding and equipment.

If the necessary number of ships could be built, they could not be provided with crews. Lord Essendon recently recalled that under the guidance of the Board of Trade, and with the co-operation of the Shipping Federation and the National Union of Seamen, a great deal had been done to make the Merchant Navy a more attractive occupation than it was in years gone by. He claimed that British ships to-day were manned by officers and engineers of a very high standard of education, and the seamen were provided in the modern ships with a standard of comfort and living far in excess of the conditions even of 1914. In spite of all that had been done to improve the pay and conditions of life on board ship, the personnel of the Merchant Navy had decreased, he added, by a number which it was impossible to state with accuracy, but it was probably between 50,000–60,000 since 1913. So it is useless to speak of restoring the Merchant Navy to its former strength because, if the ships could be built, they could not be manned, and, unless Government support is assured, they could not trade at a profit.

things were, 'but also from the point of view of security.' He explained that the shipowners had suggested to him certain remedies and the Government were considering them 'as a matter of urgency.' There were, he added, many different problems and many points of view to be taken into account. The Minister, in spite of all that had been said by the spokesmen of the Government in the past, made this admission :

I should like to add one comment. It is not only the Royal Navy which has turned this country from an island into an Empire ; it is the merchant fleet as well.

We have seen in the course of our economic history a great many industrial changes—the disappearance of the iron and steel industry in Sussex, the wool industry of Norfolk, and a great part of the tin industry of the West country, and we have been able to survive them all But there is one great industrial change in this country which I think we could never survive, and that is the decline and disappearance of our merchant shipping.

But the President was not content to confess that something had to be done for the shipping industry.

If you can do something for shipping, then shipbuilding automatically in course of time will come right too. That would be all right if you could afford to wait, but although the Government are concerned with the questions of unemployment and financial loss in shipbuilding, they are also concerned at the loss of security which comes from this great decline in our shipbuilding and at the potential loss, therefore, of the skill of the shipbuilders.

Therefore, *the securing of a ship almost immediately is worth two or three ships five or ten years hence.* This aspect of the situation has to be considered in solving a very difficult problem, because you have at the same time to consider the question of the reserve of tonnage.

From the point of view of security, if you build one ship and as you build it you scrap another, although you have modernised your fleet, the net gain of tonnage is practically nil, so the net gain in security is diminutive. Therefore, consideration of the problem must include the question of a reserve of tonnage which would not be used for ordinary economic purposes but would be there in the case of emergency. If in 1934, when we were concerned with plain economics, the motto was 'scrap and build,' to-day, when we are concerned with security, the motto is 'lay-up and build.'

to watch old clients in foreign countries, tempted by barter arrangements, exchange advantages or subsidies, place orders in continental yards. It was proved that both British industries were languishing since private individuals could not fight successfully competitors supported by all the strength of their Governments and their national treasuries.

Thus it came about that all the excuses of Ministers for inaction were shown to be excuses and nothing more. But another issue remained. Having about 3,000,000 tons less ocean-going ships than twenty-five years ago, would the losses in a war be less serious than they were in the Great War? It was complacently assumed for a long time that, the counter-offensive measures being more efficient, fewer ships would be lost. But any probable enemy will have far greater numbers of submarines at his service than the Germans could keep at sea even at the period of their most intense and destructive campaign.[2] In addition, account has also to be taken now of bombing aeroplanes directed against ships at sea and, with even greater chances of successful attack, against vessels in port. The ports on the east and south-east coasts, including London and Southampton, are within bombing range of any enemy on the Continent. West coast ports may have to be used. However complete the wartime organisation, there will be a loss of carrying power, and even serious traffic jams, and hundreds of merchant ships may be immobilised for weeks at a time.

In face of a mass of evidence against a complacent attitude towards the problems of shipping and shipbuilding the Government capitulated. In the course of a debate on unemployment in the House of Commons on February 16th—too late in the evening to be reported in the newspapers next morning—the President of the Board of Trade had the courage to surrender. Challenged once more on the facts and figures which had been submitted to him, he admitted that the decline of the maritime industries had to be considered not only 'from the point of view of economics, of employment, of profits, of exchange,' important as these

[2] There are now in the service of the principal naval Powers the following submarines, the vessels building being shown in brackets in each case: British 54 (15), United States 87 (19), Japan, 95 (2), Italy 104 (7), and Germany 43 (22). The Italian and German navies also have 115 destroyers and 32 are building. 'Fleets (British Commonwealth of Nations and Foreign Countries), 1939,' *Cmd. J.* 956.

It is true that between June, 1914, and June, 1938, the tonnage, including the smallest ships, owned in Great Britain and the Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates increased by nearly 200,000 tons, but, on the other hand, over the same period the number of ships decreased by over 1,000, and numbers are of first importance. Apart from this consideration, is it conceivable that, in the event of war, any considerable number of the vessels in distant parts of the Empire would be placed at the disposal of this country? These ships are engaged mainly in coastal trades and were designed for such trades. What would happen to the inter-State trade of Australia, most of which is transported by sea, if the ships which carry it were withdrawn? What would happen to the trade on the Western seaboard of Canada or to her trade on the Great Lakes if she surrendered her ships? Would there be no dislocation of the Indian coastal trade, of Burma's river trade, of the coastal trade of the Straits Settlements, of Britain's trade on the China coast, if the ships rushed home in order to feed the people of the British islands? The excuse that any considerable number of the ships of the overseas parts of the Empire would be available for maintaining our supplies does not, it will be seen, bear examination.

As a result of this process of cancelling out the several pleas for doing nothing, the President of the Board of Trade was at length brought, in July last, to admit that something should be done to arrest the decline of British shipping and shipbuilding and to defend both industries against the attacks which had been made upon them over a period of twenty years. He was disinclined, perhaps wisely, himself to propose remedial measures, and asked the leaders in the two industries to make proposals. As a result of this invitation shipowners, under the leadership of Lord Essenden, collected all the relevant facts and figures and submitted them to the Board of Trade in January last, and the shipbuilders also carried out an investigation and sent their brief to the Department. The distresses of shipping and shipbuilding, as a result of these enquiries, were exposed as even more grievous than had been expected. Lacking the support of the Government, shipowners had been forced to surrender to State-aided rivals services which they had themselves established and maintained successfully, and shipbuilders had been compelled

Coast and Channel ports were within bombing range of a continental enemy, shipping might have to be diverted to Western ports, where the facilities for berthing and discharging are more limited, with the probable consequence that traffic jams would occur, reducing the carrying capacity of the ships. Again, the increase of speed would count for less in time of war than under peace conditions, owing to the adoption of convoy, in which the speed of the slowest unit is that of the whole convoy, and in menaced areas captains would have to navigate without lights and, therefore, at less than normal speed.

With obvious reluctance this plea for inaction was abandoned. It was then claimed that if a shortage of tonnage was experienced, neutral tonnage could be chartered, as it was during the Great War. There was no gainsaying this suggestion—*if* there were any neutral maritime Powers in future which would be prepared to show benevolence to us at the risk of offending the enemy, possibly a close neighbour, and *if* we could afford to pay the high rates of charter which would be demanded if that risk were incurred. During the Great War, when we commanded the coal supplies without which most neutral ships could not be operated, this country paid many millions of pounds for such tonnage and this money so enriched competitors that they were enabled to build more ships and better ships than in the past. Oil has now largely replaced coal, and in another war we should have no magnet to attract neutral ships to our aid, while the presumption is that the charter rates would be far higher, resulting in even more lavish payments to competitors. After a time this plea was also abandoned.

But the will to do nothing had not been subjugated. Ministers interested in the matter pleaded that, though there were about 2,000 fewer ships of 100 tons gross and upwards on the register of the United Kingdom, 'the Empire block tonnage' was not less than it was. The implication was that the ships designed and built mainly for the coastal trades of the Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates would be at our service in time of war. This plea for inaction is dangerous, perhaps more dangerous than the others, because it is more plausible, being based on figures extracted from Lloyd's Register of Shipping, the accuracy of which is unquestionable.

country would resemble sitting pheasants, nothing could be done by way of counter-offensive to make air raids costly to the raider. Saner and sounder councils eventually became ascendant, and Ministers once more spoke in the confident terms befitting a nation which, in a thousand years, should have learnt that there is no form of offence against which an appropriate form of defence cannot be contrived and that, in face of air attacks on this country, we, with France as our ally, could organise air attacks against any aggressor, with all the traditional advantages of a supreme fleet to deny use of the seas to him and a mobile army ready for any offensive-defensive mission.

Ministers had regained their equilibrium when a fresh issue was pressed on their notice. Were they satisfied that when the Navy of Defence, provided by the taxpapers, had been rebuilt, the Navy of Supply, hitherto maintained by private enterprise, would prove adequate? For several years mosquito-like critics had been endeavouring to sting Ministers to answer this question. At last they succeeded in gaining attention, when a new member of the Government—the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence—was appointed. This matter came within his sphere since neither of the fighting services could operate without supplies from overseas, especially of oil fuel, apart from the fact that the country would starve in idle impotence unless merchant ships in sufficient numbers were available to supplement the home supplies of food and raw materials.

When challenged on this issue, Sir Thomas Inskip, speaking, no doubt, on the brief furnished to him by his advisers, admitted that there were fewer ships on the register than there were before the Great War, but pleaded that, owing to the larger size and higher speed of the modern ship, the carrying capacity of the Merchant Navy was no smaller than it was. This fallacious excuse for inaction was speedily exposed. The population, it was recalled, was larger by 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 and the nation consumed more per head. The cargoes which the country needed had to be carried for longer distances owing to the preference shown to Empire countries at the expense of nearer foreign countries. The longer hauls and, therefore, longer time occupied by voyages involved more shipping. Moreover, since the East

was enacted under the influence of President Wilson, can escape blame for misreading the signs of the times.

The awakening came when the League of Nations, with the approval of the British Government, decided to enforce sanctions against Italy for her invasion of Abyssinia. The possibility of war between this country and Italy revealed that the Royal Navy was not equal to the task which a rupture would have cast upon it, and that there were other gaps in our defences. It is to the credit of the Baldwin Government that it did not try to evade its duty. In the White Paper which was published in 1936, the broad outlines of a programme of rearmament were set out; the Royal Navy, it was explained, had, in effect, to be rebuilt, the Army strengthened and the Royal Air Force increased. Without recrimination for past mistakes—for the majority of the electors had acquiesced in the mistaken policies of the post-war years—the decision of the Government was approved by the country as a whole and endorsed by Parliament.

The White Paper was in every respect an admirable recital of facts in accordance with the offensive-defensive doctrines which were orthodox before the aeroplane, with its bombs and poison gas, had robbed these islands, in some measure, of their freedom from the peril of invasion. But the Royal Navy remained the first line of offence as well as of defence by reason of our dependence on sea-borne supplies of food and raw materials, apart from the inability to employ the Army in operations overseas unless it could be transported in safety.

But the development of air power had introduced a new factor which, in a word, cancelled out the immunity from invasion. Conviction that far-reaching measures were necessary for the protection of the population from air raids came slowly and unwillingly. But once the gravity of the position was appreciated, something in the nature of a panic occurred. The pendulum swung rapidly from the offensive-defensive doctrine to one of passive defence. Vast schemes of anti-air-raid precautions were initiated, and for a time millions of people in this country existed under the impression that they might be annihilated and that there was nothing to be done except seek such shelter as was available.

It seemed to be assumed that while the people of this

tankers, which are unsuitable for ordinary cargoes) as compared with 4,304 ships (16,419,000 tons gross) at the end of 1913, a decrease of 1,696 ships and 2,976,000 tons gross, equivalent to a shrinkage of tonnage of 18 per cent., while the number is smaller by 39·4 per cent.

The Great War proved the inadequacy of the much larger Merchant Navy that existed at the end of 1913. That is a point which there is a tendency to overlook. Owing to want of merchant tonnage food in this country had to be severely rationed, so grave was the crisis which eventually developed, and appeals had to be made to the United States and Japan for aid in replacing the losses at sea if the Allied cause was not to be defeated. The submarine, the mine and the raiding cruiser nearly proved our undoing, more nearly as Lord Jellicoe has stated,[1] than the present generation realises. To such a desperate state were we reduced in 1917 that there was a possibility that we might, after all, have to sue for peace instead of dictating it.

We are now called upon to pay the penalty of a series of errors of judgment by the Governments which have been in office during the past twenty years or so. The Washington Conference was the first of these. It was assumed that this country, ultimately responsible for the safety of an Empire embracing one-quarter of the land surface of the globe, could not compete, in spite of its vast resources, with the United States. So the trident was surrendered. It was also confidently declared that, if we gave a lead in naval disarmament, other countries would follow our example. What happened was that rivals concluded that we were either trying to trick them or were unable to bear the burdens inseparable from naval supremacy. So they strengthened their fleets. The second error was that it was assumed that we had little to fear from air attack. In spite of warnings, little effort was made to strengthen the Royal Air Force or to provide for the defence of the crowded populations of our great towns against high explosive bombs and poison gas. The third error was the credulous belief that the shipping industry would survive in face of the war which was being waged against it on every trade route with State-aided tonnage. No Government, which has been in office since the folly of Versailles

[1] *The Submarine Menace*, by Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe. (Cassells.)

THE NAVIES OF DEFENCE AND SUPPLY: AN UNBALANCED PROGRAMME

The decline of shipping and shipbuilding, in respect of both *matériel* and *personnel*, has brought this country once more face to face with the possibility of defeat by starvation in another war against one or more maritime Powers. That is the humiliating and dangerous position which has been reached as a result of years of inaction in face of uneconomic competition by foreign countries, which have paid subsidies amounting to about £1,000,000,000 (one thousand million pounds) and resorted to a variety of expedients in order to expand their merchant fleets.

For three years past the task of rebuilding the Royal Navy has been going forward with great rapidity. Naval construction has now reached its peak with 659,000 tons of men-of-war, a greater volume than ever before, in various stages of progress in the shipyards. But simultaneously the Merchant Navy has been getting weaker. The latest figures show that there are available only 2,608 ocean-going ships (13,443,000 tons gross) (excluding vessels of less than 1,000 tons and oil

STEAM AND MOTOR TONNAGE, 1913 AND 1938 (Oil Tankers excluded)

Gr Tons	December, 1913 No	December, 1913 Gr Tons	August, 1938 No	August, 1938 Gr Tons
1,000– 4,000 . .	2,706	6,908,000	1,006	2,154,000
4,000– 6,000 . .	1,114	5,241,000	934	4,668,000
6,000– 9,000 . .	336	2,414,000	413	2,959,000
9,000–12,000 . .	86	884,000	135	1,381,000
12,000 and over . .	62	972,000	120	2,281,000
Total . .	4,304	16,419,000	2,608	13,443,000

ference a few days later, to deny that he had made the statement about America's frontier being on the Rhine. Again the President had retreated from a strong position, just as in the days before Berchtesgaden, apparently fearful lest his audacity result in an isolationist reaction among the people. In short, his policy of drawing Americans away from isolation still consists in taking two steps forward and one backward.

But there is little doubt that the President has been successful in drawing the people away from an isolationist attitude. Practical, rather than ideological, considerations, however, seem to have hastened the process. There is a wide feeling in the United States that, unless a balance of power in Europe is maintained, a situation may result which may affect American security. In official circles in Washington one hears less about 'Fascism' and 'Democracy,' and more about 'American security.' Many now consider France and Britain no longer as Powers 'trying to get us into war,' but as 'our front-line.' If this 'front-line' fell, 'we would be next' on Hitler's expansion-by-war programme. On the other hand, many Congressional leaders—particularly from the Middle-West, believe such talk unfounded and 'alarmist,' and cling strongly to isolation.

In short, the United States still remain undecided about what course of foreign policy to pursue. Americans are still isolationist, but much less so than during the Czechoslovakian crisis. In response to a feeling of insecurity, they support a heavy increase of defence expenditures, and, with a sense of the strategical implications of America's position, they are willing to sell arms to France and Britain. While they decline to make a definite alliance with Britain and France, the course of American foreign policy appears to be leading in the direction of such an alliance. Only another major European crisis will definitely test how far the United States has actually gone towards such a position. Should such a crisis arise, a new and more realistic formula, based on eventual American security, may prove more potent in determining America's attitude than the old ideological appeals of a 'democratic front' or 'solidarity of English-speaking peoples.'

FRANK C. HANIGHEN.

to see the United States come to its defence?' Seventy-three per cent. of the voters answered 'Yes' for Canada, 46·3 per cent. for the Philippines, about 43 per cent. for Mexico, 27 per cent. for Brazil, 27·8 per cent. for England, and 22·1 per cent. for France. In short, an extremely contradictory net response, although showing that Americans had considerably modified their isolationist prejudices.

Several developments in the following two months served to accentuate this tendency to move away from isolation. In January, the crash of a United States Army aeroplane in California, in which a French officer was injured, revealed the fact that the American Government had actively collaborated in assisting the French Government to purchase some new model American aeroplanes. A sharp reaction in Congress followed, with strong criticism of the Government for allowing an American military secret to be revealed to a foreign Power. The reaction, however, took the form of criticism of the secrecy of the Government's policy rather than of the actual sale of aeroplanes to France. Apparently the Congressional representatives of the American people did not object to re-arming a 'democratic' Power. But, quickly following this incident, another, of far greater importance, threw a spotlight on the nature of American foreign policy.

In February, President Roosevelt, during a secret conference with the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, was said to have declared that the United States should assist in re-arming the 'democratic Powers' because 'the American frontier is now on the Rhine.' Inasmuch as the Senators called to the conference were pledged to silence and could make no official statement on the proceedings, it was impossible to verify the statement. But responsible American newspapers, whose reporters had talked with Senators following the conference, insist that some such statement was made by the President. If this is true, the statement was of the highest importance, coming from the chief executive, and certainly represented a wide departure from traditional American policy. The inevitable reaction in Congress followed, but it was notable that the reaction was not as strong as isolationist advocates desired. Yet even this moderate reaction provoked the President, in a Press con-

a foreign policy very finely attuned to their real desires—however contradictory these desires might be. At least this was the tone of American opinion within six weeks after Munich.

But events and forces were to alter this tone during the months of November and December. For one thing, German-American relations worsened. American revulsion to the Nazi pogroms in November was far stronger than in Britain and France. It provided a favourable atmosphere for Washington's drastic step of ordering Ambassador Hugh Wilson to return to Washington from Berlin (not technically a recall, but very near it). This atmosphere also supported Secretary Ickes' strong speech, obviously aimed at Germany, against which the German Government protested and to which protest the State Department gave an unprecedentedly sharp rejoinder. For another, the Lima conference had produced no magic formula for repelling German and Italian penetration in South America. Indeed, the resolutions of the conference had become so watered down by compromises between the various republics that the result proved somewhat disappointing to American opinion. Also, the American attitude at the conference had drawn fire from the German and Italian Press. This, together with further revelations of the penetration of the dictator countries in the southern hemisphere, sharpened the antagonism of Americans towards the dictatorships. Consequently, American opinion began to pivot on South America in the direction of greater intervention in European affairs.

Hence, by the end of December, American opinion registered a movement away from strict isolation—although with characteristic contradictions. In a 'straw poll,' sponsored by the magazine *Fortune*, the first question was: 'Should the democratic Powers, including the United States, now stand firm together at any cost to prevent Hitler or Mussolini from taking any more territory at the expense of other nations?' To this 56 per cent. of the voters answered 'Yes.' From this one might jump to the conclusion that Americans had renounced isolation. However, the other questions muddled this picture. *Fortune* asked: 'If a major foreign Power actually threatened to take over any of the following countries by armed invasion, would you be willing

Washington felt the least alarm. They claimed that the United States, if necessary, could easily ward off any attempt by military, naval or air means to establish German or Italian influence over any Latin-American republic. They pointed out that naval power was essential for such an attempt and that it would be many, many years before either Germany or Italy possessed a 'blue-water' fleet strong enough to challenge the predominant power of the American Navy in Western waters. The same, they said, went for Japan. Meanwhile, the United States Navy would increase far beyond any chance of these countries overtaking them. The admirals and generals therefore saw no necessity for alarm, nor for any extraordinary defence preparations.

But the generals and admirals had little to say in framing foreign policy. The politicians, New Deal advisers and State Department officials apparently launched a campaign and oriented American foreign policy with other considerations in view. For one thing, Latin-American trade loomed as a possible assistance to reviving United States economy in the recession (especially since it was now seen that the Anglo-American trade agreement could not immediately work wonders). Next, the ambitious rearmament programme, linked to wide schemes to gear the industrial equipment of the country to the exigencies of large-scale war mobilisation, would, they hoped, achieve certain domestic aims. It would sanction heavy Government spending (then under attack by the Conservatives) for patriotic, and therefore unassailable, motives. This would help unemployment and stimulate business according to orthodox New Deal principles.

Thus rearmament, spending, foreign trade and internal politics were all combined in the shaping of the Government's new line of 'hemispheric isolation' The combination was admirably designed to draw popular support. The Institute of Public Opinion polls following Munich showed that Americans were overwhelmingly in favour of: (1) rearmament, (2) spending, (3) defence of the Americas against foreign aggression, (4) foreign trade, as typified by the Anglo-American trade agreement, (5) strongly arrayed, in sympathy, against Germany, Italy and Japan; yet, finally, (6) desirous of isolation within the Western hemisphere. It would look as if the people of the United States were getting

uropean chess-board; or that, even if they gathered themlves together for a great effort of rearmament and strong plomacy, the economic results would still be unfavourable American participation in European affairs. To really -arm, England and France, they claimed, would have to giment their economies, their capital investment and foreign ade, and hence American foreign trade could not prosper om such an arrangement. This made the fruits from the nglo-American trade agreement look unpromising. The reement, in fact, was signed early in November, but many its sponsors were disappointed with it.

The first real symptom of a crystallisation of official titudes on foreign policy appeared on October 19th. On at date the united Press reported that a 'high member of esident Roosevelt's official family' gave out an important rvey of the orientation of American foreign policy. (The nember' is said to have been Secretary of State Hull.) ie spokesman revealed that the future foreign policy of the nited States would be based on an All-American axis and terest, but not active participation in European affairs. indicated that the real goal of the policy would be concenition on furthering efforts by all American republics to feguard and maintain their democratic institutions and rms of Government. Aside from that, the United States ould be, he inferred, more or less a spectator. In short, at the spokesman suggested was a line of 'hemispheric lation.' Why 'hemispheric'? For some time there had en a revival of interest in Latin-American republics. In preceding six months there had also appeared a luminous literature on the characteristic intrigue of Nazi d Italian Fascist organisations in South American countries. Brazil, these intrigues took the form of a revolt, which Dictator Vargas easily suppressed. Along with these rigues had gone an immense increase in German and lian trade with these countries, in some cases at the expense American trade. Was there not a real danger of Germany d Italy extending spheres of influence into the Western misphere, thus menacing the security of the United States elf?

This question received no rational answer, at least from politicians. Significantly, the generals and admirals in

The first reaction of Mr. Roosevelt appeared the same morning in a declaration from his secretary which said that the Munich conference did not correspond to the intentions of the President. The President, it said, looked to a conference of all nations interested—France, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Hungary and Poland—to be held in a neutral country. This announcement clearly illustrated the bitter disappointment of the President and his advisers.

The first reaction, however, was succeeded by another. When the Presidential advisers noted the enormous feelings of relief engendered by the Munich peace move among the people, and the spurt in the popularity of Mr. Chamberlain, they changed their tack and sought to employ the occasion to reinforce the prestige of the President. They tried to do this by suggesting that the intervention of the President at the last moment had much to do with saving the peace—although the peace was not to his satisfaction. Some even went so far as to suggest that it would enable the President to triumph at the November elections. It seems, however, that this bit of opportunism met with little success, particularly after the results of the Munich settlement became known and public disillusion spread. The time had come again to dissassociate the President completely from the odium of Munich. The time had also come to reconsider the position of the United States in the very much altered world which has come about through the epochal Munich agreement. One school of thought among Presidential advisers and State Department officials believed that the Munich agreement would not last as a pacifying element. They took the stand that Hitler and Mussolini would go from blackmail to blackmail at an increasing tempo. They insisted that 'appeasement' leaders like Chamberlain and Daladier would inevitably be succeeded by 'patriotic' advocates of a 'strong front' against the dictators—possibly Eden in England, Reynaud in France. And that, in the end, Hitler and Mussolini would not dare to fight. Ergo, the United States should continue with the policy of the past year.

Another school held that the Munich agreement altered the balance of power in Europe. They claimed that either Britain and France would have to fall back into more and more appeasement until they became impotent pieces on the

determination to remain neutral. More time was needed to 'educate' them away from this view.

This situation did not prevent, although it did condition, his extremely interesting policy during the second crisis in the few days preceding Munich. On Tuesday, September 27th, Mr. Roosevelt and his Cabinet were said to have listened in a body to Mr. Chamberlain's very affecting radio speech. They were informed at the same time that Hitler's troops had orders to march in twenty-four hours It looked like war loomed. That afternoon the State Department sent a personal and confidential appeal to Mussolini, and instructions were sent to all American diplomatic representatives abroad to announce the opinion of the American Government that no step should be omitted which might contribute to peace. That evening, at 10 p m. American time, the President sent a message to Hitler, appealing to him to leave no measure untried which might bring peace.

Although the message was sent in an atmosphere of quite natural haste, it was shrewdly framed with several objectives in view. First of all, it sought to stop an outbreak of war—to this no American, isolationist or not, could object. Second, it followed the Roosevelt 'anti-German' line by being addressed to the chief world aggressor, thereby assigning responsibility for starting a war and further invoking American feeling against the aggressor Third, it proposed a conference in a 'neutral' country which might extend the scope of problems, thus creating a real world conference on all vital matters. Finally—from the personal standpoint—if Hitler should accept, it would move Mr. Roosevelt to the front part of the world-stage as 'peacemaker' (said to be an ambition quite near to his heart). The political advantages of this at home would be considerable.

The advantages never accrued. The next morning, Wednesday the 28th, Washington learned with astonishment that the Munich conference had been decided upon. Needless to say, Mr. Roosevelt did not relish the spectacle of Mussolini being given the rôle of world peacemaker to which he himself has aspired. Nor did he like the four-Power character of the meeting. It was, to say the least, humiliating, and no one who has followed the turns of Mr. Roosevelt's temperament can imagine that he will easily forget the incident.

experienced a sharp reversal. On September 10th, Mr. Roosevelt held a Press conference. At this conference newspaper men asked a question: 'Is there any justification for the growing impression that this country has allied itself morally with Britain and France?' To this the President replied that the Press had misinterpreted statements made by him and his aides. The Press, he said, should realise that they were '100 per cent. wrong' in this interpretation. In short, Mr. Roosevelt suddenly backed down on the spirit of his foreign policy of the preceding eleven months—and at a very critical moment. Were Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier affected by this extraordinary backdown in the critical decision they were to make in the following few days? Or were they prepared for such a backdown? In any case, it was not unnatural that Mr. Roosevelt should execute this sudden about-face. For, in spite of his success in arousing American opinion against the Japanese, Italian and German Governments, he must have realised that he had not affected the profound desire of the American people not to be involved in a foreign conflict. The 'straw vote' polls, such as the surveys of the Institute of Public Opinion, had shown that, while the American people disliked and disapproved of the policies of the aggressor Powers, they still adhered strongly to an isolationist policy in case war broke out. (Undoubtedly this isolationist attitude would weaken as the conflict spread, but it would take time to line up public opinion behind a real alignment on the side of Britain and France.)

Moreover, this attitude was reflected in the current and extremely important political campaign preceding the November Congressional elections. In this campaign, Mr. Roosevelt had taken sides with certain Representatives and Senatorial candidates. Some opponents also were making a strong appeal to the electorate, asking the voters if they wanted Congress to follow the White House blindly on the question of war. There was a danger that the Republican Party might make this a national issue. Some of these candidates won in the following week, indeed were already slated to win at the time of the President's 'reversal' statement. Mr. Roosevelt undoubtedly realised that while he had aroused the sympathies of Americans for the democratic Powers, he had not budged them very far away from their

April and May, 1938, reports from Washington indicated that perhaps the United States might allow shipments to the Loyalist Government as the only legal Government in Spain. This was a move well designed to embarrass official British policy and harm the effects of the Anglo-Italian Pact. Washington, however, failed to follow through. Yet this momentary flare-up played a tactical rôle in the progress of the trade bargaining.

The tactics continued. More and more American officials adopted the Roosevelt 'line' of October, 1937 (minus, of course, the dangerous 'quarantine' suggestion), in what appeared to be a concerted campaign. The President, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Woodring, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, Ambassador Kennedy, made speeches along the line of 'respect for international law and agreements,' 'the danger of aggressors,' 'democracy against dictatorship,' etc. It was notable that these speeches brought forth political echoes in Britain. Leaders of the Labour Party, the Liberal Party and prominent members of the Eden wing of the Conservative Party responded with expressions of hope for closer political and economic co-operation between the two countries. The import of these tactics was undoubtedly not lost on Premier Chamberlain. It may or may not have affected his basic attitude on foreign policy. But he could not easily rebuff these American tentatives or their British support, nor allow the trade negotiations to come to an unsuccessful end. He could not lose a chance of aligning so formidable an ally on the side of Britain in the world-struggle.

All this laid the background for the American attitude during the momentous international crisis of last fall. Mr. Roosevelt and his subordinates had certainly aligned the United States morally with the non-Fascist 'peaceful' Powers. He had met with great success in affecting American opinion in this respect. But had he prepared American opinion sufficiently for a distinct break with the neutrality policy, for active participation on one side in case of war?

The Czechoslovakian crisis brought the answer. The American policy continued in speeches and public pronouncements during the early days of the crisis. However, as the crisis approached its first peak — Berchtesgaden — it

negotiations for an Anglo-American trade pact, which had been hanging fire for some time; (2) he sought to align the United States with the biggest of the 'Have' Powers in the world-struggle with the 'Have Nots.' One drive, it seemed clear, would help the other. If the United States had a bigger economic stake in the great 'Have' Empire, it would, naturally, have a great political stake in helping to defend it. Also, if the United States gradually assumed political partisanship in the world-struggle on the side of this 'Have' area, it might count on a reward in the shape of greater economic benefits therein.

This double drive gave shape to American foreign policy from October, 1937, down to the present day. The tactics employed have made history. From the first, United States' eagerness to start the trade negotiations drew from Mr. Chamberlain, in November, promise that trade negotiations were 'contemplated.' The American policy, thus advancing, met prospects of a check in December, when the F.B.I. and British farmers protested against concessions which might harm their interests. The United States returned to the fray with renewed and rather sensational tactics. In December, the Japanese sank an American gunboat in China, and the Administration, with stern protests and playing up of excited public opinion, appeared to offer a new and really earnest opposition to Japanese aggression in China. This policy was nicely calculated to please London, then very worried about the future of British interests in the Far East. Some political observers, both in Washington and London, claim that the State Department—behind this smoke-screen of anti-Japanese agitation—gave the British Foreign Office in effect the following ultimatum: 'Either start the trade negotiations or we shall stop this agitation in the Orient against Japan.' True or not, Britain announced opening of the trade negotiations, and by February the negotiators were meeting.

This international by-play was complicated by the Spanish War. In 1936, under pressure from the British Foreign Office, the United States had unofficially adhered to the spirit of the Non-intervention Agreement by declaring an embargo on shipment of arms to both sides in the Spanish Civil War (Congress, in fact, hastily passed such an embargo measure since the Neutrality Act did not cover civil wars). Yet, in

fanned, and the President was obliged to make reassuring statements to the effect that the United States would not be led into war. Nevertheless, he held to his purpose. For the break on October 6th, 1937, was important and decisive. It resulted from more factors than Mr. Roosevelt's traditional desire to run American foreign policy and his leaning towards political co-operation with England. These additional factors were definitely dynamic.

The personal element played a big part. Mr. Roosevelt, after his extraordinary success in the elections of 1936, suffered a serious—and humiliating—defeat in the fight over the Supreme Court reform which raged from February, 1937, up to the late summer. His defeat in this struggle also threatened his control over the Democratic Party, with such an ominous prospect as failure to name his own successor in the next Presidential election. A strong and dramatic foreign policy offered an excellent chance for an executive to recoup his losses. All the more so that foreign policy is less subject to the checks of Congressional opposition.

Another factor no less weighty was the beginning of the economic recession, which appeared at the end of the summer of 1937 and by October was giving political leaders serious concern. Could not this recession be cured by a large increase in foreign trade? Had not foreign trade brought prosperity to the United States on two other notable occasions —in 1915, when war orders from Europe stopped a serious depression, and in the 'twenties, when sales abroad immensely augmented the great economic boom? And where could the United States more successfully turn for such foreign trade than the British Empire? The closed economies in Central Europe and the Far Eastern war precluded drives in these quarters. But the British Empire did offer trade possibilities. Significantly, in August, 1937, the Ottawa agreements, which hampered sale of American products in the Empire, expired (except in Canada, and the United States could be depended on to reach an agreement with her next-door neighbour). The time was ripe for the United States to get a larger share—perhaps the optimists looked forward to an enormous share—in the greatest market in the world.

Mr. Roosevelt then proceeded to develop a double drive abroad: (1) He revived demands for the commencement of

Act. This Act required the President to declare American neutrality on the outbreak of war and to embargo shipments of arms to both sides. He was given discretionary powers to declare an embargo on materials other than arms. This represented the high-water mark of a compromise between the innate isolation of the American people, which wanted complete isolation from warring Powers, and Mr. Roosevelt, who clung to the theory that the United States should take sides in the world struggle.

It was Mr. Roosevelt, indeed, who influenced Congress to limit the embargo to weapons of war alone, and to allow him the discretionary powers. Mr. Roosevelt and the State Department depart widely from the prevailing view of the Senate that there should be no distinction made between 'aggressor' and 'peaceful' nations. Mr. Roosevelt further has long sought, although it has never been officially made clear to that effect, a co-operative policy with Great Britain against aggressors. The President fights fiercely any move to limit his direction of American foreign policy. The proposed Ludlow Act—calling for a referendum to take place on the question of American participation in war—met vigorous opposition on the part of the President when it was proposed in December, 1937. Although it was overwhelmingly popular throughout the country, Presidental pressure on Congressmen led to its defeat.

With this background, it is easier to understand that, while the United States seemed to remain sternly aloof in the interval between the 'morning after' of the Hoare-Laval affair and the fall of 1937, a distinctly non-isolationist attitude on the part of the executive was being held in reserve. The break in this reserve took place on October 6th, 1937, and the policy announced on that date has guided American foreign policy ever since.

On October 6th, 1937, President Roosevelt made a speech in Chicago in which he denounced the breaking of international treaties by aggressor nations, and suggested a policy of what he called 'quarantine' to stop their aggressions. 'Quarantine,' although not elaborated by the President, suggested 'sanctions,' and therefore taking sides in international quarrels. This was an audacious break with the neutrality policy laid down by Congress. Congressional opposition immediately

MR. ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY

It is very difficult for a European to understand the contradictions of American foreign policy. The United States entered vigorously into European politics by her declaration of war against Germany in 1917, yet two years later abruptly withdrew into 'splendid' isolation. After almost two decades of this aloofness from European political matters (broken, indeed, by financial intervention), the United States again, in 1937, seemed to resume an active rôle in the struggle across the Atlantic. Yet at the same time the evident desire of the American people was to stay out, and few doubted that the United States would—at least at first—maintain neutrality in event of a European conflict. What are the trends which have dictated this confusing course?

Political observers in Washington plot these shifting interests in rising and falling curves. They recall that the United States, through Secretary of State Stimson, sought to line up Great Britain in a strong front against Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931; that Sir John Simon's reluctance to accept this policy led to a process of disillusion with a strong foreign policy which lasted several years and was marked by a policy of economic non-co-operation—*i.e.*, scuttling of the World Economic Conference in 1933, the United States silver policy, etc. In the Abyssinian imbroglio, the curve rose again. It is no secret that Mr. Roosevelt was prepared to take drastic steps which would, in effect, have enforced American sanctions against Italy if France and Britain had seriously done so. It is also known that Mr. Roosevelt was keenly disappointed with the Hoare-Laval affair, and reproached representatives of France and England on that occasion. After this disillusion, the United States turned sharply towards isolation. Congress engaged in prolonged examination of various methods to keep the United States out of war, which culminated in the Neutrality

Of such a League of Law, the three great surviving democracies—the United States of America, the French Republic and the British Commonwealth of Nations—are the indispensable foundation. If any one of those three should be destroyed the cause of law, justice and freedom would be doomed to extinction for many generations. On that foundation, securely cemented by a firm Triple Alliance, could be erected a potent and impregnable structure of law-abiding and peaceful States who now tremble in helpless isolation in a world wherein at the moment lawless violence is dominant.

F. J. C. Hearnshaw.

law by the methods of lawless violence. There can be no future peace or security in the world until the reign of law is re-established.

Hence the essential Triple Alliance of America, France and Great Britain should be not merely a union for mutual defence; it should also be the foundation of a new League of Law—a League to membership of which all Powers should be invited who are prepared, on the one hand, to repudiate the employment of force in the case of any dispute which they may have with any fellow-members, and, on the other hand, to join their fellow-members in resisting with all their might any attempt on the part of any Power whatsoever to achieve its purpose by means of war.

International society is to-day in the same anarchic condition as civil society was before the establishment of strong central Governments. The bandit, the pirate, the blackmailer, the bully, are at large and rampant. In civil society these pests were not exterminated by mild 'peace-pledge unions' or amiable 'fellowships of reconciliation.' They were exterminated only by means of strong kings, vigorous police and invincible armed forces. The League of Nations which, twenty years ago, seemed to foreshadow the development of an effective international Government, failed because it could not—or at any rate did not—curb the violence of powerful aggressors. It failed to check Italian violence in Corfu (1923); it failed to save Manchuria from Japanese spoliation (1931–1933); it failed to preserve Abyssinia from Italian conquest (1935–1936); it failed to exercise the slightest restraining influence when Germany decided to annex Austria and to destroy Czechoslovakia (1938). The League of Nations, from its palace in Geneva, can continue to do useful work in various minor spheres, *e.g.*, the sphere of public health, the sphere of economic organisation, the sphere of intellectual co-operation. But for effective international police-work, for the enforcement of international justice, it urgently needs to be supplemented by an invincible League of Law, pledged to suppress with all its might every attempt in every part of the world to alter the *status quo* by means of violence; and equipped with all the necessary machinery for the administration of international justice and the enforcement of international law.

II

Such are the main menaces to the peace of the world at the present moment. And the Great Powers primarily threatened are the United States, France and Great Britain. If the three aggressive States—Germany, Italy and Japan—acting in concert can divide their prospective victims and strike them one by one it is difficult to see how these victims can escape destruction. If Germany and Japan combine to attack America, and America fights alone, her power both in the Pacific and in the Southern Hemisphere is doomed to extinction. If Hitler and Mussolini, with the assistance of the grateful Franco, combine to invade France, not the most heroic resistance of the devoted French nation by itself can save it from subjugation. If Italy and Japan join in a challenge to the British command of the Mediterranean and the Pacific, not even the mighty British fleet (which dare not leave the North Sea undefended) can suffice to wage at one and the same time two such tremendous and widely separated wars.

No: the only possible way of safety is a close and comprehensive Triple Alliance of the three menaced democracies. Each should be pledged to come to the help of either of the other if attacked. But this mere defensive alliance for mutual protection is not enough. For the menace of the totalitarian States is not merely a menace to the territorial *status quo*. It is a menace to every principle of law and order in the world. It is the challenge of might to right, of violence to reason, of barbarism to civilisation, of the argument of force to the force of argument. Japan may have had cause of complaint against China, but it is intolerable that, acting as judge in her own case, she should seek redress by wholesale massacre and spoliation. Italy may have had legitimate grievances in respect of Abyssinia, but every principle of justice was outraged by her arbitrary and merciless method of removing them. Germany may have had ground to protest against the treatment of the Sudeten Teutons by the Government of Czechoslovakia, but her violent coercion and dismemberment of that unhappy State had no sort of relation to the redress of any legitimate grievance. In every case the alleged removal of wrong has resulted in the inflicting of wrongs immeasurably vaster: it has involved the supersession of the methods of

Germany suffers acutely, although not so severely as Britain or United States of America, from Japanese militarism and mercantilism. Moreover, Japan, while sympathising with Germany's demand for African colonies, proclaims her fixed determination *not* to surrender the former German islands in the Pacific—Caroline, Pelew, Mariana, Marshall—which she holds under the mandate of the League of Nations. The Powers immediately threatened, however, by Japanese ambitions are America and Britain. The American possessions which Japan has marked out as her own are the Philippines, Guam and Hawaii. The Philippines, rashly acquired from Spain thirty years ago, are, by reason of their remoteness from America, quite indefensible. Japan can take them whenever she cares to go for them. It is probable indeed that the United States Government, recognising their indefensibility and also their uselessness, will before long—in order to obviate the humiliation of having them taken by force—announce to their unwilling subjects the gracious grant of 'independence.' Guam is another matter: it is much nearer America and it could be made impregnable. But at present it is almost undefended and, except as a base for the defence of the Philippines, it has but little value. It will probably be evacuated at the same time as Manila. Hawaii is both valuable and important. The comparative nearness to the American littoral, moreover, makes its continued possession by the United States imperative. But the Japanese intensely resented its appropriation by America in 1898, and they are resolved to secure it. So far, its defences have been grossly neglected by the American Government. Their task of defending it, too, will be seriously aggravated by the fact that nearly one-half of the 250,000 inhabitants of its islands are Japanese. If America has to fear a Japanese seizure of the Philippines, Guam and Hawaii, not less gravely must Great Britain face the possibility of Japanese attacks upon her Pacific Islands; upon Hong Kong and Singapore; upon Malaya generally and even upon Ceylon. Still more formidable, too, loom visions of expeditions against New Zealand and Australia, those great and glorious outposts of British civilisation, which nevertheless are as yet but thinly populated and almost devoid of local defence.

over the southern half of the New World. The United States themselves are inundated by German propaganda, infested with German spies, kept in a state of seething unrest by German intrigue. No wonder that President Roosevelt announces a gigantic rearmament programme, stages dramatic trials of Nazi conspirators, and seeks to establish a strongly defensive Pan-American Alliance !

Italy, too, has her ambitions. Her aim is to restore the Roman Empire, and, in particular, to convert the Mediterranean into what it was during the first five centuries of the Christian era, namely, a wholly Italian lake. Ultimately, of course, the realisation of this ambition will bring Italy into violent conflict with Germany. The possession of the Tyrol, the command of the Adriatic, the control of the Danube will be at issue. But the immediate menace of Italy's designs more directly affects Spain, France and Great Britain. Spain sees the Balearic Islands passing into Italian occupation. France perceives her communications with Morocco and Algeria threatened, and hears the organised claque of Fascist firebrands clamouring for the Italian acquisition of Tunis and Corsica, Savoy and Nice. Great Britain, for her part, beholds her position and power in the great inland sea imperilled as never since the date of the Battle of the Nile. Her possession of Gibraltar is challenged ; her naval base at Malta is threatened with destruction by means of aircraft and submarines ; the Italian fortification of the island of Pantelleria (wholly carried out since 1935) portends the complete closing of the Eastern Mediterranean to any Western foe of Italy ; hence British interests in Cyprus, in Palestine, in Egypt, in the Suez Canal and beyond, are marked out for entire extinction.

Japan, moreover, far away in the extreme East, has aspirations that profoundly affect both the United States and Great Britain. Her avowed intention is to expel the white races from Eastern Asia, to secure complete command of the Pacific, to reduce China to entire subjection, and to close her ports to the commerce of both Europe and America. Already Japanese operations on the Asiatic mainland have involved European and American merchants in losses running into millions of money. Here again there are numerous probabilities of an ultimate clash between Japan and Germany. For

of the Prussian militarist when he says: 'We confess it is an attractive prospect for us to imagine and sketch out the downfall of this proud and secure people, who will be made to obey foreign lords as they have never done since 1066, or at least will be compelled to surrender their lucrative colonial empire.' Moreover, the British Dominions, lightly held and almost undefended, present an irresistible lure to a Power eager to expand beyond the seas and far from likely to be content with even the complete return of her former unprofitable and unattractive colonial possessions.

As to the United States: Germany has long resented the hegemony claimed by the great Northern Republic over Latin America. Even in the Emperor William II's day German penetration of Mexico and Brazil clearly portended a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, and one object of the building of the German battle fleet from 1898 onward was undoubtedly the determination of the Kaiser to make this challenge effective. Since the establishment of the Nazi régime in the Reich, German activity beyond the Atlantic has been far more intense and widespread. Details of its remarkable extent and organisation are given in a recent important American publication, namely, Mr Carleton Beals' *Coming Struggle for Latin America* (Lippincott, 1938). From this we learn how in Berlin a central bureau for 'organisation and colonisation in the Americas' is set up; how Krupps have developed a large steel and munitions plant in Chile; how Hugo Stinnes has bought extensive oil tracts in the Argentine where already 100,000 Germans are domiciled; how Germany has developed a most efficient air service between Berlin and the leading Latin capitals; how she has secured control of the Press and the picture theatres; how she supplies South America, at a price which defies commercial competition, with radio sets that receive none but German broadcasts, and how 'German broadcasts fill the air sixteen hours a day in Central America, Chile, Brazil, and all South America'; and, finally, how German trade with Latin America has increased fivefold during the past five years. The German demand for African colonies is primarily a demand for naval, military and air bases on the West African coast—and in particular Nigeria—so that when 'the day' dawns she may be able in force to denounce the Monroe Doctrine and establish her hegemony

Germany, Italy and Japan, under their present rulers, are unsatisfied and insatiable States, whose ambitions, swollen by the consciousness of the possession of measureless military might, are a menace to all the rest of mankind. Germany's programme has been displayed with amazing candour by Herr Hitler in his remarkable manifesto, *Mein Kampf*. No item of that programme, published originally fifteen years ago, has been withdrawn, although several new ones have been subsequently added. Already Germany has realised some of the more important of her purposes, namely, complete and colossal rearmament; the reoccupation and refortification of the Rhineland; the absorption of Austria; the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. There still lie immediately before her the seizure of Memel and the destruction of Lithuania; the recovery of the 'Polish Corridor' which divides East Prussia from the West; the acquisition of the Ukraine from Russia. Beyond these tasks there loom more distantly the reconquest of the Southern Tyrol from Italy; the reclamation of Alsace and Lorraine from France; the re-establishment of the German Colonial Empire by means of the defeat of Britain in the air and on the sea, followed by an invasion of the British Isles; and finally the challenge to the Monroe policy of the United States with a view to the setting up of a German hegemony in South America. The full realisation of this tremendous programme involves the final overthrow of France, the dissolution of the British Empire and the successful defiance of the United States of America. None of these three things seems to the Nazi imagination beyond the limits of attainment.

As to German designs on France, nothing is more clearly revealed in *Mein Kampf* than the ardent German desire, at all costs, to have revenge for the defeat of 1918 and for the humiliations of 1919–1923. Nothing will satisfy German military pride save the wiping out by means of blood and fire of the stain imposed by the Armistice, the Peace Treaty and the occupation of the Ruhr. As to Britain, she remains entirely unforgiven for the part she played, by means of her unconquerable fleet, in blockading Germany, cutting off her supplies of food and munitions, and reducing her finally to surrender through starvation. Professor Banse in his *Raum und Volk im Weltkrieg* does but express the passionate longing

THE ONLY WAY TO SAFETY

I

NEVER since the close of the Middle Ages have the peace of the world, the reign of law and the very existence of human freedom been so formidably menaced as they are at the present moment. Never at any period whatsoever in the history of mankind have the lords of war, the powers of evil and the forces of merciless tyranny been so potent as they are to-day, or so manifestly ascendant. Science has placed in the hands of the lawless aggressor—the despotic ruler of the non-moral totalitarian State—resources which make him almost invincible. He can crush all resistance within his own borders; he can suppress all criticism of his policy and his actions; he can keep his people in abject ignorance of world-movements and world-opinion; he can inflame their passions by lying propaganda; he can and does conscript his young men into armies whose equipment makes them capable of slaughters and devastations compared with which the wildest excesses of the savage hordes of Attila or Tamerlane appear but as the amiable exuberances of schoolboys on holiday.

The three totalitarian States whose rulers to-day are holding the whole human race in apprehension and terror are, of course, Germany, Italy and Japan. Moreover, at the moment, their alliance in a so-called 'anti-Comintern' pact makes them trebly dangerous. I say 'at the moment' because their alliance is not likely to be long-enduring: there is no permanent room for three cocks in one midden. And I speak of the 'so-called anti-Comintern pact' because professed resistance to Bolshevism is merely a cloak behind which are concealed immense schemes of conquest and spoliation. For all totalitarian States are bankrupt, and only by means of banditry on a gigantic scale can their existence be maintained.

ment has taken place more or less since the beginning of this century only. It is safe to assume that, although never specially mentioned, a preliminary period of political training was understood to supplement the Pittsburg Treaty from May, 1918, which is the Czechoslovak Magna Charta. The moderate Slovaks, who held this opinion, have been proved right by recent developments. Only a fundamental lack of political understanding can explain the Tiso policy which, instead of pursuing the constitutional way without regard to foreign propaganda, disrupted the Slavonian collaboration, thus helping the Greater German policy to an overwhelming success.

It is not yet possible to forecast the effect which the German annexation of Czechoslovakia will have on the development of Central European policy. The independence of the Central European States has disappeared overnight, even more completely than it did at the end of the Hussite War. Once again—in the words of the old chronicler at the time of the battle of the White Mountains—the historic land of Bohemia has become a 'region of blood, sorrow and deep despair.' This may not affect immediately the Western Powers, whose Governments were responsible for the Munich decision, which paved the way for the present disaster. So far the Gestapo and the S.S. are establishing headquarters only in Central Europe. Only there is starting the new boom in concentration camps, personal persecution and pogroms. So far the German army, Hitler and his staff are marching with their tanks and aeroplanes to the East and the South-east. The West has only to take over refugees, accept blocked marks instead of real currency, write off liabilities as bad debts—in short: foot the bill for Hitler's gains. And what gains! Territory, armaments, raw materials, gold, food!—all things which more than offset the recent British and French progress in rearmament. There now remains only one more question:

When will Hitler turn to the West?

DANUBIAN OBSERVER.

THE ONLY WAY TO SAFETY

I

Never since the close of the Middle Ages have the peace of the world, the reign of law and the very existence of human freedom been so formidably menaced as they are at the present moment. Never at any period whatsoever in the history of mankind have the lords of war, the powers of evil and the forces of merciless tyranny been so potent as they are to-day, or so manifestly ascendant. Science has placed in the hands of the lawless aggressor—the despotic ruler of the non-moral totalitarian State—resources which make him almost invincible. He can crush all resistance within his own borders; he can suppress all criticism of his policy and his actions; he can keep his people in abject ignorance of world-movements and world-opinion; he can inflame their passions by lying propaganda; he can and does conscript his young men into armies whose equipment makes them capable of slaughters and devastations compared with which the wildest excesses of the savage hordes of Attila or Tamerlane appear but as the amiable exuberances of schoolboys on holiday.

The three totalitarian States whose rulers to-day are holding the whole human race in apprehension and terror are, of course, Germany, Italy and Japan. Moreover, at the moment, their alliance in a so-called 'anti-Comintern' pact makes them trebly dangerous. I say 'at the moment' because their alliance is not likely to be long-enduring: there is no permanent room for three cocks in one midden. And I speak of the 'so-called anti-Comintern pact' because professed resistance to Bolshevism is merely a cloak behind which are concealed immense schemes of conquest and spoliation. For all totalitarian States are bankrupt, and only by means of banditry on a gigantic scale can their existence be maintained.

ment has taken place more or less since the beginning of this century only. It is safe to assume that, although never specially mentioned, a preliminary period of political training was understood to supplement the Pittsburg Treaty from May, 1918, which is the Czechoslovak Magna Charta. The moderate Slovaks, who held this opinion, have been proved right by recent developments. Only a fundamental lack of political understanding can explain the Tiso policy which, instead of pursuing the constitutional way without regard to foreign propaganda, disrupted the Slavonian collaboration, thus helping the Greater German policy to an overwhelming success.

It is not yet possible to forecast the effect which the German annexation of Czechoslovakia will have on the development of Central European policy. The independence of the Central European States has disappeared overnight, even more completely than it did at the end of the Hussite War. Once again—in the words of the old chronicler at the time of the battle of the White Mountains—the historic land of Bohemia has become a 'region of blood, sorrow and deep despair.' This may not affect immediately the Western Powers, whose Governments were responsible for the Munich decision, which paved the way for the present disaster. So far the Gestapo and the S.S. are establishing headquarters only in Central Europe. Only there is starting the new boom in concentration camps, personal persecution and pogroms. So far the German army, Hitler and his staff are marching with their tanks and aeroplanes to the East and the South-east. The West has only to take over refugees, accept blocked marks instead of real currency, write off liabilities as bad debts—in short: foot the bill for Hitler's gains. And what gains! Territory, armaments, raw materials, gold, food!—all things which more than offset the recent British and French progress in rearmament. There now remains only one more question:

When will Hitler turn to the West?

DANUBIAN OBSERVER.

restrain the German and Hungarian ambitions, which had a decisive influence especially in Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia. The German policy of having two irons in the fire during the whole Czechoslovak crisis, namely, protection both for the German and the Slovak minority in Czechoslovakia, proved to be very clever. There is not much doubt that Germany's interest in Slovakia is to be considered as a means to an end only, which has very little in common with national Slovak aims. The politically inexperienced and credulous Slovaks were in fact the very pawns required in the German game to break up Czechoslovakia, a task which would have been more difficult if undertaken merely against the Czechs.

There is not much doubt that in the long run, in spite of all difficulties, the reconstruction would have been accomplished provided the promised guarantee relieved the second republic from all disturbances from without. The constitutional problem of the new Czechoslovakia was the establishment of federalism for Slovakia and Carpatho-Russia, and the provision for their co-operation in the central government. The nationality issue was no longer controversial. Prague fully recognised equality of rights in this respect, which was in fact perfectly guaranteed by the Slovak and Carpatho-Russian autonomy laws of November 19th, 1938.

The difficulties which appeared later did not originate from the provisions of the autonomy law, but from the different Czech and Slovak views of the Munich agreement and the Vienna award, from the lack of Slovak and Carpatho-Russian administrative ability and from the continuing intervention.

For the Czechs Munich represented one of the greatest setbacks of their history. The Slovaks, however, although their territorial losses were considerable, valued their autonomy. Moreover, the Slovakian pre-war independence movement was only directed against the Hungarian domination and was not related in any way with the Germans. The traditional Czech-German fighting tradition is therefore non-existent in Slovakia.

Relations between Czechs and Slovaks always suffered from the different political standard of the partners. The Czechs looked back on a thousand years' history, and a long fight for their independence, whereas Slovak political develop-

was an immense disappointment for the Czechs to find themselves without friends after Munich. Faced with not only reconstruction, but this large propaganda which interfered mostly with the efforts to erect a new constitution and economy. It made them feel that the huge sacrifices they had made for the maintenance of European peace were not appreciated and did not prevent the great Powers from writing off Czechoslovakia from their books.

Czechoslovakia did not want actual help from the Powers apart from the financial side. She would have been quite content with the British loan—although the amount was far below expectation—provided she had been left alone to rebuild her own house. The implication that Munich did not only mean partition, but her complete incorporation in the German *Lebensraum* gave her, therefore, a profound shock since she had hoped, by complying with Munich, to become again complete master of her own affairs. Had the guarantees promised under the Munich agreement been duly enforced, the whole situation would have changed considerably. This, however, was not the case. In the light of the latter developments, it seems, moreover, almost certain that the resignation of London and Paris in this question became complete as soon as both realised that a new factor of disturbances in their relations with the Axis Powers might arise therefrom. Although Czechoslovakia complied with the orders of the Ambassador's Conference and the paragraphs of the Vienna award, although, furthermore, she proclaimed herself willing to accept complete neutralisation, negotiations on the guarantee question never started in earnest. On January 31st the public learned for the first time from a statement of the Prime Minister in the House that Signor Mussolini connected the idea of a guarantee of the Czechoslovak frontier, to which he had agreed in September, with the settlement not only of the frontier delimitation and the establishment of Czechoslovak neutrality, but furthermore, with the question of the internal constitution of Czechoslovakia. It is not known how Mr. Chamberlain reacted to this new point, which represented the German view, and was not included in the Munich agreement.

For Czechoslovakia, however, the missing guarantee was an element of increased instability. There was nothing to

Central Europe. Her political, economic and financial structure was incomparably sounder and more elaborate than in the other States created by the peace treaties. The extraordinary superficiality, however, which characterised the different regulations of the Munich agreement, and consequently of the Vienna arbitration, shook Czechoslovakia in her foundations, disturbing all State functions similarly. Faced with the alternative of sacrificing either a considerable part of the State, or of the whole nation, Czechoslovakia had decided in favour of the first. The failure of the international treaty system, however, and of their friends, was a tremendous setback to the Czech feeling, which may be compared to a sort of national mourning. The creation of some kind of Czech isolationism was the immediate consequence. It proved, however, to be a considerable obstacle in the severe task of establishing, both externally and internally, a new policy of collaboration. This psychological reaction seems perfectly understandable as a natural consequence of the deep shock which Czech national feeling had suffered in the course of events. The Czech people representing the chief organising power of the State considered themselves justified in asking for time in order to regain their equilibrium. Such a breathing-space seemed all the more due to them, in view of the demands for political, constitutional, financial and economic reconstruction, which confronted the country.

It can be presumed, without any doubt, that they would have succeeded but for constant and deliberate propagandist intervention from abroad. It has to be remembered that the Munich Agreement forced Czechoslovakia not only to comply with the territorial claims of her neighbours, but to reorganise completely her relations with them. Understanding on their part would have greatly facilitated this task. Unfortunately, however, there prevailed the idea of force and power policy on the winning side. To give in to force proved fatal once more. Instead of helping or at least keeping a neutral attitude towards the Czechoslovak efforts for reconstruction, constant influences, primarily German, but Hungarian and Polish as well, were at work. Although partition was claimed on purely ethnological grounds, aiming to fulfil the much misinterpreted principle of national self-determination, strategical and economic ends were aimed at, to a great extent. It

were demanded. With all the extraordinary skill which he commands, President Hácha tried to improve conditions, save face, and spare the country a military occupation. He was not listened to. Hitler was resolved to finish once and for all. Besides, he was fully aware of the advantages the incorporation of the Czech Republic would mean, not only for German economy and finance, but for German prestige in Sudetenland and in the Ostmark, where opposition and critics were steadily increasing. The decisive point was, according to trustworthy reports, the hint of Ribbentrop, that the efficiency of the German army, especially in view of competition with British armament, would be immensely increased by the disarming of the Czech army and the unrestricted control of the Czech armament industry. As President Hacha, in view of the importance of his signature, refused to sign, he was given a polite hint of armed intervention upon Prague, and the possibility of an early air bombardment of the city, and the consequence for the Czech people in whose favour nobody would move.

The Czech statesman, worn out by the strain of the preceding events, deeply depressed by the tragedy of the Czech nation, and physically broken by the ordeal of those night-long negotiations, finally gave in and signed. This is the story of how legality of action was achieved, 'unprovoked aggression' avoided, and Hitler entrusted with the protectorate over the Czech nation.

The end of the young State, which the Czech and Slovak people won after the World War, is a tragedy of inconceivable magnitude. Historically, nearly seventy years of the last century of Czech political development was determined by their fight against German and Hungarian hegemony in what is called 'East-Central Europe.' The peace treaties decided the fight against the German-Hungarian predominance in the Danubian Basin, and in favour of the Slavonic influence. It was the historic chance given here to Czechoslovakia to take the lead in the reconstruction of Danubian collaboration. The fatal failure of the foreign policy of Dr. Benes to achieve this end has been paid by Czechoslovakia with the loss of one-third of her territory as fixed by the Munich agreement and in the Vienna award. Czechoslovakia has, up to the beginning of 1938, been regarded as the model post-war State in

finally became aware of the consequences of his action and hesitated. But once in Berlin the play was over, he was powerless against the overwhelming *force majeur*. Under the impression of his Berlin experience he convinced the Slovak Diet that only a unanimous vote in favour of independence could save the Slovak politicians from a dangerous fate, but not the country from German military occupation.

Meanwhile the Sudetic-Germans had done a good job in Bohemia and Moravia. Minor incidents and clashes between desperate Czechs and provocative Nazis, who took advantage of the Czech despair over the Slovak crisis, were answered by two German ultimatums; one delivered shortly after the other. The final revealed unmistakably the real intentions of Germany. As the Czech Government had failed to establish an atmosphere of confidence and collaboration between the nationalities, especially in relation to the German minority, which was required by the spirit of Munich and the German Reich, the German Government was forced to restore order by her own action. In case no agreement could be arrived at with the responsible Czech statesmen, the Reich could feel free to take any action which might seem to her appropriate. As a quick decision had to be taken, the immediate departure of the President of Czechoslovakia and the Foreign Secretary to Berlin were regarded as indispensable. The ultimatum was handed in Prague at the same time as German troop movements from all sides against the Czech border were reported. Once again, as in September, a bombardment of Prague, exactly timed, was threatened. Once again, as in September previously, prominent German nationals were ordered to leave in time and cross the border, which, anyway, was not so distant as then. So President Hácha accepted the summons to Berlin.

It is known with what precise ceremonial all formalities of this 'visit' were kept. All honours were given, beginning from the arrival at the station, the diplomatic ceremonial, the company of honour, the lavish display of flowers in the apartments in the Adlon Hotel, to the reception by Hitler and the final departure. Even the Schuschnigg visit and the way the then Austrian Chancellor was treated by Hitler amounted to an act of kindness against the contrast between this precise upholding of forms and the conditions of surrender which

and then the Fuehrer would march in. Meanwhile, they would get not only the dole, but also support from the German *Winterhilfswerk*. In the capital, Prague, where cries of 'provocation' and 'shame' always played a big rôle in the Czech-German differences of opinion, the German High Schools and the professors and students imported from the severed Sudetenland were chosen for the front line with much success.

A most careful, almost scientific, Press campaign in favour of extreme Slovak nationalism was published in German periodicals. Slovakia proper was invaded by political agents, from Vienna headquarters, whose large financial supplies proved extraordinarily efficient with the young Slovaks, whose lack of money was just as evident as their predeliction for good living and gambling The rapidly increasing number of German cars gave visible evidence of the activities displayed here. The militarism of the Nazi organisation, most faithfully copied by the Slovaks, showed equally satisfactory results on the awakening Slovaks. Uniforms, decorations, titles, flattered their self-consciousness in the same way as did the frequent reports and pictures in the German Press, which was lavishly distributed to the intelligentsia. The inner story of the final Slovak action, however, is intimately connected with the close collaboration between Dr. Seyss Inquart and the leader of the so-called Carpatho-Germans, Ing. Karmasin, both natives of Olmütz, who saw an excellent opportunity to shine and earn promotion.

The plans worked even more quickly than it had been foreseen by Berlin, which did not expect the climax before early in April. But as all necessary preparations of a military nature had been going on for some long time—they had never actually been interrupted since the autumn—there appeared to be no obstacle for a decisive blow. The Czech attitude of well-considered deliberation and abstention from unconditional engagements with the Axis had long been used in Berlin as evidence for the necessity of pursuing a policy of annexation. Incidents among the German minority of Czechoslovakia could easily be started. This was done jointly with the fanning of passions among the young Slovak leaders, whom the very inefficient Tiso Government feared to suppress. All the facts which followed are known. Tiso

The tactics adopted differed considerably, as regards the historic countries of the old kingdom of Bohemia, Slovakia or the Carpatho-Ukraine. It was a matter of course that the old trump of Sudetic-German activity and grievances had to be employed, although, after Munich, the value of this card was no longer considered decisive. It was agreed upon, however, that the Slovak case opened far more possibilities of successful intervention if the political immaturity of the Slovak Radical Youth Movement was skilfully used. The fact that Dr. Goebbels long ago had embarked on a pro-Slovakian policy was regarded as particularly fortunate, and a proof of his almost unfailing instinct in propaganda matters. For the Carpatho-Ukraine the policy holding out the brightest prospects seemed that which took advantage of differences between the leaders and their well-known incompetence and weakness, a knowledge which inspired Prague (during the first Czechoslovak Republic) in her well-considered policy of postponement of the Carpatho-Russian autonomy.

It goes without saying, and it was more and more clear from the attitude later adopted in leading German circles against the second Republic, that there was no change whatsoever in the intentions of Berlin. After a short interval, active and provocative Sudetic-Nazi activity started again in Prague under the guise of the only feasible policy of the *Deutsche Volksgruppe*. Although almost extra-territorial status was given by the Czechs, whose desire to get rid *as much as possible* of the Sudetic Germans did not materialise, they were never satisfied, moreover never allowed to be satisfied. There is good evidence to believe that the remaining stock of Sudetic Aryans who took advantage of the right of option in favour of Czechoslovakia was most carefully selected from Berlin from among old trustworthy fighters. The same moral pressure as after the Austro-German union was ruthlessly applied, opponents energetically overruled. This internal Sudetic propaganda was remarkably outspoken. As early as at the end of November, and the beginning of December, Sudetic-German M.P.'s informed the remaining German workmen and clerks, in meetings which took place in different Brown houses, that there was no reason to fear loss of employment or Czech reluctance to employ Germans in their enterprises. They had only to wait until March,

monstrosity, from whichever point of view it is looked at. It is the most perfect example of an extreme display of power and utmost cynicism which Nazi policy, so prolific in this respect, has ever provided. The contemporary public has learned by experience that such things as sanctity of treaties or duties arising from freely given promises no longer exist. It is aware that the revolution caused by Nazi ideology and practice, in the field of international law, has created such a confusion that the greatest abuse has become possible without any breach of the letter of the law, when dutifully interpreted. There is nothing in the action of Germany which might be explained as 'unprovoked aggression.' How could it be, when the victim has put his signature to the terms? But it is not only the word, it is the word and the spirit in which an agreement is concluded which gives the full possibility of legal interpretation. The Nazi conception of legality and the way it is manifested is a challenge to the whole world.

This is what actually happened. For months—immediately after and even during the Chamberlain-Hitler negotiations which preceded Munich—the Radical Nazis were resolved to accept any agreement only as a temporary solution. The instructions issued by responsible personalities of the Propaganda Ministry, the Ribbentrop Bureau and other leading quarters were without exception to carry on subversive propaganda as soon as this would be possible.

The annexation of Czechoslovakia, the complete break-up of this State, was irrevocably decided upon. It is significant, although it is a well-known practice of the Nazis, that all this was done more or less without much secrecy. Even Hitler himself, it was argued, had revealed his final aims in this question in his interview with Ward Price, published in the *Daily Mail* on September 19th, in which he openly hinted that the incorporation of the Czechs in the Third Reich as an autonomous community would be the appropriate solution. It goes without saying that this reflected fully the ideas of the Nazi Radicals, who always have regarded Bohemia as a historic German region, in which only the German colonisation mattered, but not the Czech.

Comprehensive orders on behaviour and procedure were given to all whose activity might help to achieve this aim.

THE END OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

THE Ides of March are acquiring a special meaning in contemporary Central European history. In March, 1938, Hitler's troops moved into Austria. In March, 1939, the German army occupied the old kingdom of Bohemia, the heart of Europe. In March, 1848, there was fighting on the barricades in Vienna, Prague and all the principal towns for democracy and against absolutism. March, 1938 and 1939, marked the extinction of the last remaining democracies in the centre of Europe. Mind you, there is no war; at least not with rifles, cannons, tanks or aeroplanes in action. We live in peace and are anxious to preserve it, although its symbol has changed from the holy flame to a worn out and three times freshly covered British umbrella. Are we not progressive? We are, however, mostly engaged in the manufacture of armaments and preparation for what is called 'defence.' *Si vis pacem para bellum.* This is ancient wisdom. The so-called 'peaceful conquest,' however, is an invention for which we have to thank the Fuehrer. Its effects are far-reaching beyond all expectation, but so far only Central Europe has had to learn the lesson. It changes the map of Europe, it extinguishes national sovereignties, it creates, wherever in operation, extreme might and power, frenzied excitement and jubilation as well as the very deepest misery and fear. As peace is at present divisible, this applies for the time being not to Western Europe. The Swastika, however, flies from the Vienna Hofburg, and from St. Stephen's Cathedral. It is hoisted by now on the historic Hradiin Castle in Prague, the residence of the Bohemian kings, and on the tower of the ancient Prague town hall above the beautiful old clock where death dances when the hours strike—a very fine symbol to-day for the broken Czech nation.

What has happened is an outrage of almost incredible

coming in the economic ultimatum presented by the Reich to Rumania. And without doubt the German leaders have other good reasons, apart from the Rumanian 'resistance,' for giving careful attention to the preparation of the 'march on Rumania,' and for deciding, in the present situation, to postpone the carrying out of their proposed action.

Even if the Rumanian question is 'shelved' for the duration of the present phase of the international situation, the events of last week still provide us with valuable illustrations of the Nazi 'plan' and 'methods.' It has once more been made brutally clear that neither treaty obligations nor assurances of the most solemn kind will deter the Nazi leaders from armed assault upon a neighbouring State if that armed assault is considered as dictated by the demands of Germany's 'imperial destiny.'

The annihilation of Czechoslovakia, the threat to Rumania and indirectly to Poland and Hungary, have produced a deep revulsion of feeling both here and in France and the United States of America. Conversations have already begun between these countries. Above all else, these events prove one thing: that an effective barrier against National Socialist Germany (and Germany, in spite of sporadic discontent, remains a National Socialist country) cannot be built in the West alone. Great Britain, France and the United States have refused to recognise the German disruption of Czechoslovakia. If this non-recognition is to be more than words—disregarded now and easily forgotten a month hence—it must be made the basis of a decisively drawn line of resistance. This line no doubt runs through Prague, though symbolically. The effective barrier, however, cannot be considered as complete if it embraces merely Warsaw, Budapest or Bukarest. Swift action, based on a deep and firm understanding, will be necessary if London and Paris are to convince Berlin (and perhaps in a few days Rome) that they have been successful in securing the adhesion of the Soviet Union to the bloc of Powers ready to meet the next imperial demands of the Axis countries with a decisive 'No.'

M. WOLF.

Rumania. From the new Slovakian and Czech aerodromes the German bombers are less than two hours' flying time from the Black Sea. Of greater strategic importance, at least for the moment, is the fact that the Reich is now able to threaten Poland from a fourth direction. The German plan of attack against Poland was, until yesterday, based on a simultaneous threat from East Prussia, Schneidemühl and Silesia. To these the threat of an attack from the south is now added. Poland is in effect to-day 'encircled' by the Reich. (Polish attempts, already under way, to conclude agreements with the Baltic States and Hungary for common military action, while important in themselves, sufficiently indicate the nature of the reaction in Poland to the recent German conquests.)

In spite of the achievement of the joint Polish-Hungarian frontier, and in spite of the German sanction of this frontier, the ultimate attitude of National Socialism to the Ukrainian question must still remain an open question. The Ukrainian question can be used simply as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Poland, Hungary or Russia, for example, to secure the neutrality of these countries in the event of a German blow delivered in the west. If it is desired to use the Ukrainian issue as something more than a mere instrument of pressure, Germany has every opportunity of making the Ukrainian home rule movement a live issue in either Poland or present-day Hungary. Now that Germany has so improved her strategic position as against those countries likely to be involved by a pan-Ukraine movement, and now that Germany has so increased her war potential by the military occupation of important manufacturing and raw material producing areas, the Ukrainian question naturally takes on a greatly heightened significance in the political counsels of the Nazi leaders, for here, when the present phase of shock foreign politics is brought to a close, is a new issue offering vast possibilities for future development along the path of German aggrandisement. Viewed narrowly, as an issue in East European politics, the Ukrainian problem is perhaps of little importance. Seen against the background of the German march towards world domination, it takes on a very great significance.

How does the present leadership in Germany regard this problem, and the greater problem of revisionism generally in South-eastern Europe? The answer has been swiftly forth-

central and Balkan territory is, according to Hitler, Rosenberg and Ribbentrop,* the first step towards placing the Reich, from an economic and military-economic point of view, in possession of the 'base' from which Germany's imperialist policy can be conducted—a policy which looks out towards the Mediterranean and the Soviet Union, towards the Near East, India and Africa.

The destruction of Czechoslovakia, the threat against Poland and the plan to seize Rumania, are necessary to create the preconditions, military, economic and political, for achieving the ultimate aims of German power-politics. The German action carried through against Czechoslovakia leads neither to a truce nor to a period of consolidation. It is a 'stage'—the stage that inevitably follows Munich—on the road to German domination of the world. Only looked at in this light, seen as the consistent and tenacious pursuit of long-term but clearly defined aims, is the political and technical working-out of the German action against Czechoslovakia to be understood, and the brutality and shock-character of the method employed to be explained.

The extent of Germany's gain and the more remote consequences of the victory cannot yet be appreciated in detail. What can be affirmed at once, however, is that strategically the road to the south-east is open, and that the Reich has decisively strengthened its raw material and food-stuff resources. The reduction of the Czechs to a condition of vassalage will allow Germany to make good its shortage of skilled workers for the arms industries, for agriculture and building construction (work on the new fortifications). The seizure of Czech war material of first-class quality, and the control of the world-famous Czech armament industry (even if one admits that certain difficulties will have to be overcome in the process of adapting Czech materials and enterprise to German requirements) together constitute an appreciable increase of the Reich's military resources and will help to keep Nazi rearmament a jump ahead of the Western Powers.

The strategic advantages that have been won are perhaps more immediately obvious. While the splendidly trained Czechoslovakian army now disappears (or even—suitably sifted—furnishes German militarism with auxiliary troops) the German armies now move to within striking distance of

tion of the Czech Premier, Dr. Hacha, with the brutal alternative: submission—or the total destruction of Prague. This threat was the culmination of a course of policy, deliberately and consistently pursued from the day of Munich, designed to render stability impossible to the new Czechoslovak State. In the field of foreign policy Germany maintained the preconditions for her guarantee of the Czechoslovakian frontiers could not yet be regarded as fulfilled; and at the same time the Reich, by the diplomatic pressure she brought to bear on Rumania, Hungary and Poland, and naturally on Czechoslovakia as well, exerted herself to hinder the development of satisfactory foreign relations between the new State and the rest of Europe. In the field of internal policy Germany slowly forced Czechoslovakia into a condition of serfdom, forced the Prague Government to accept the German minority as a separate 'state within the State,' furthered the autonomous strivings of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, and finally, by her increasing demands, forcibly opposed the political and economic consolidation of the country. When the day for action had come, when the political and military preparations of the past months were at length completed, the German propaganda machine experienced no difficulty in proving (just as in September of last year) that immediate action by Germany was necessary to rescue German racial compatriots from a danger so great that it threatened their very lives. Once again the columns of the German newspapers were crowded with atrocity stories from Czechoslovakia, stories vividly remembered from the crisis weeks of half a year before. The historically incontrovertible fact that there was not, and could not be, any oppression of Germans in Czechoslovakia did not alter the equally incontrovertible fact that, while the Czech Premier was actually engaged in conversations in Berlin, to which he had been summoned by the Germans, the troops of the Third Reich were already crossing the frontier of his country under arms.

The path that leads through South-Central Europe and the Balkans has always dominated the imagination of the Nazis. The hegemony of the States lying along this route, the control of their raw materials and agricultural production, would perhaps be decisive in strengthening Germany's 'immunity to blockade.' For this reason the domination of that South-

Rome-Berlin axis had once again shown its real face to the world.

Disregarding treaty obligations and pledges and assurances solemnly given, Hitler marched. Disregarding the famous 'racial principle' and other similar catch-phrases of National Socialist policy, Hitler advanced anew towards the realisation of the purpose which National Socialism has, from the very beginning, set itself—world power. The plan of campaign for which, under the cover of the 'policy of appeasement,' the most minute preparations had been made, preparations of a propagandist, political and military character, was carried through without the slightest hitch, thus falsifying the view widely (though secretly) canvassed in high political circles in England and France that the internal state of the Reich, psychological, political and economic, forbade her any such 'adventure.' Reports, derived only in part from Nazi official and semi-official propaganda sources, had encouraged the belief in Germany's weakness and the hope that she was too weak to embark on any new forward policy. The more objective accounts of level-headed observers had only confirmed the original reports. The state of affairs inside Germany was one-sidedly interpreted as ruling out further adventurism. The same facts lent themselves as easily and as convincingly to a demonstration of the absolute necessity for some new adventure. For the 'law of motion' of Nazism excludes one possibility: National Socialism cannot retreat; nor can it, by internal consolidation, bridge over its internal difficulties. This 'law' of National Socialist dynamics must now at least be regarded as completely demonstrated.

As far as method is concerned, the recent German assault to the south-east can hardly be distinguished from the earlier campaigns of the Reich. All begin with a clarion call by Hitler for world peace (compare the speech of January 30th, 1939: 'I believe in a long period of peace'). All continue with conspiratorial activity on the part of German military and political agents within the threatened country. Here the purpose is to render the victim rotten-ripe for assault. All end with the threat of armed violence, brutally applied to secure an immediate decision. And thus and no other it was with Czechoslovakia. The last phase of the campaign, immediately before the military invasion, was the confronta-

ment have not been backward in fortifying their arguments by appeal to these statements of Nazi principle. Moreover, as against the extravagant propaganda of the 'more extreme Nazis' must also be set the peaceful declarations which Hitler, on September 30th, exchanged with Great Britain, and on December 6th with France. Even if we do not over-estimate their importance (and in general their importance was over-estimated), even then it still seemed that Hitler was bound at least to the procedure of mutual consultation by these pledges. The contributory factors making up the political situation seemed, viewing them as a whole, to offer guarantees that Hitler would regard himself as morally and politically bound in that sense. The danger of continued 'surprises' in foreign affairs seemed ruled out. One could go even farther than this. Were not the conditions and limitations already accepted a sign that National Socialist expansion had now reached its ultimate bounds, that Nazism was 'sated,' that grandiloquent plans of world domination had been repudiated? Would it not be possible, now that of all Germany's territorial plans 'only' the colonial question remained outstanding, to canalise National Socialist development into the more peaceful and conservative path of 'consolidation,' and at the same time create for Germany certain possibilities for economic expansion within the framework of a general settlement?

Some of the happenings of recent months, it is true, belied the peaceful prospect. One was the German mobilisation that began towards the end of December, but this was either denied, ignored or belittled. The calling of older and not yet fully-trained men to the colours, the systematic building-up of military units whose officers, N.C.O.'s and men were picked for their ability to withstand tropical climates, the transfer of large quantities of war material to Italy, the presence of Reichswehr formations in North Italy and Libya, and the strengthening of German military air bases in Spain, while not leaving the objective observer in much doubt as to the true state of affairs, was yet insufficient to open the eyes of the general public to the fact that a new crisis in Europe was approaching. The policy of appeasement was brought to a definite close only after Hitler had again struck. Disillusionment became general only after the

by the fact that the declaration of the German conqueror at Munich appeared to guarantee in the most decisive way the new system of Europe, and therefore the peace of Europe. Although, only a few months after the September crisis, Germany was interpreting the events, the methods and the consequences, of the Munich agreement—and so of the policy of appeasement—in ways that furthered the attainment of her imperial goals, and although the manifold propaganda of the Reich, both overtly and by hints, treated the new order of things rather as the point of departure for further conquests than as the culmination of a campaign that was now ended, yet in London and Paris these activities were regarded as emanations from an uninfluential Propaganda Ministry, and were for that reason considered of little importance. In fact the German policy was explicitly stated as early as last November. I quote the following as merely one example selected from an extensive list :—

> The Fuehrer's declaration that Germany has no further territorial claims to raise in Europe is not to be questioned. It would however, be incorrect to deduce from this declaration that Germany renounces her interest in the German peoples living beyond the frontiers of the Reich. Greater Germany has never, and will never voice any such renunciation, for she regards as a matter of first interest to herself the protection of every single German racial comrade. And no Power in the world to-day, however much they bewail and mourn the passing of the 'old order,' is strong enough to deny or deprive the Reich of its right to take under its protection the German 'folk' beyond the frontiers. (From the official *Presse-Korrespondenz des Deutschen Ausland Instituts Stuttgart* on November 20th, 1938.)

As against these propagandist activities the appeasement policy set the solemn declaration of the Fuehrer that Germany has no more territorial claims to make in Europe, that Germany wishes to live 'alone' and 'by herself,' that a German 'imperialist' policy is consequently an impossibility, that German policy is based upon the 'race' or 'folk' principle, which is the underlying principle of National Socialism, and that Germany therefore rejects all idea of incorporating non-German peoples into the German State and rejects equally all idea of 'germanising' peoples of alien race. And naturally, the advocates of the policy of appease

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

No. DCCXLVI—April 1939

HITLER MOVES ON

The Prime Minister in his Birmingham speech has not attempted to conceal the fact that the policy of appeasement now lies in utter ruin. The events that formed the prologue to the speech, the destruction of Czechoslovakia by Germany, necessarily shattered many illusions and shook men's faith in the moral and political content of this policy. The collapse has been the more significant owing to the fact that large sections of the people in the democratic countries believed, no less than the British and French statesmen who composed the governments of those countries, in the policy of appeasement and the methods of Munich. They believed, moreover, in the repeated and solemn pledges and assurances that had been given; and it seemed inconceivable that the undertakings made before, during and after Munich, undertakings clearly stated and solemnly affirmed, could simply turn out to be the prelude to a new and great imperial advance on the part of Germany.

The responsible leaders of the Western Powers seemed not to have been shaken in their faith, although, after September, an increasing volume of criticism of the 'Munich spirit' and of its political consequences was making itself felt among wide masses of the public. This conviction of the correctness of the Munich policy was sensibly strengthened

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

1877 1939

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

1939 **APRIL** No. [illegible]

[illegible]

menace for France. Signor Mussolini has promised to withdraw them. . . . Politeness demands that we should recognise this promise. Nevertheless, the future of Spain ought not to depend solely on the goodwill of the Italian dictator. Would it not be wise for France also to take the guarantees in Spain which she considers necessary? The position taken by France and Great Britain does not mean that all action is impossible. . . . The first step should be diplomatic and concerted.'

Figaro (February 10th), like all other papers of the Right, welcomes the mission of M. Léon Bérard to Burgos. It says: 'It is of course necessary that the excellent contacts which M. Bérard has been able to establish are at once given official character and that France should be accredited to the government which is to-day the only real government of Spain.'

Petit Parisien (February 10th) says: 'The logic of reality demands the appointment of a diplomatic agent in Burgos. It would be vain, and indeed useless to delay it. . . .'

L'Œuvre (February 10th) contains an article discussing the recognition of General Franco's Government which is remarkable as it indicates the support of even outspoken anti-Fascist circles in favour of immediate recognition. The paper says: 'Whether one likes it or not we have at our south-western frontier an effective government. . . . We cannot ignore it.'

Le Temps (February 10th) reflects the official French attitude as well as the views expressed by the majority of French commentators on international affairs. The following is an extract from one of the numerous articles of this kind that have recently appeared in this paper: 'The government must come to a decision—and it must take that decision quickly. . . . Spain is about to find her way back to peace and what our government has to do is to establish a normal relationship with the Spain of to-morrow. . . . No time must be lost. . . . The discussions which M. Léon Bérard has had, have certainly clarified the situation. For better or worse—all parties will accept the government's decision. We do not believe that it will be spared criticism. But at this moment the government should act as if these critics of to-morrow did not exist, and, above all, without listening to the critics of to-day.'

Gayda which gave rise to excited comments all over the world because of its far-reaching conclusions: 'There is no difference between a military and a political victory by Franco. The two are synonymous. Franco's victory cannot be complete until the demobilisation and dispersal of the two hundred thousand Reds now gathered in France. The Reds in Spain and on her borders must surrender.' Referring to Mr. Chamberlain's declaration of Anglo-French collaboration, Signor Gayda goes on to say: 'No one in Italy ever doubted that in case of war Britain and France would stand shoulder to shoulder, but there is doubt whether the present British Government would back unconditionally the uncompromising French policy against Italy and Germany. That policy is in opposition to the policy of appeasement which up to the last few days was favoured by Mr. Chamberlain, and it may yet become a source of open international conflicts.'

Il Telegrafo (February 9th): 'The possibility of a Paris-London-Washington axis does not convince us that Italy, Germany and Japan ought to shut their shop and, in particular, that we Italians ought to bury our natural aspirations. The Paris-London-Washington axis is an agreement between the three capitalist States of the world with a view to monopolise the raw materials, the gold, and the colonial territories in such a way that all other nations will be left outside. It means the defence of injustice based upon strength.'

France

Before the fall of Barcelona the common feature of all French Press comments on Spain was a distinct apprehension of the dangers to France's security arising out of an Italian victory in Spain. Of late, these considerations have been largely replaced by a passionate discussion of the pros and cons of an immediate *de jure* recognition of General Franco's administration.

L'Ordre (January 19th): 'Should Franco win, Mussolini will remain in Spain just as long as is necessary for the satisfaction of his Mediterranean interests. He will not, without a fight, give up a base, for the gaining of which he has counted no expense too great.'

Paris Soir (January 19th): 'The presence of Italian troops in Spain, Morocco, and the Balearics constitutes a threefold

Messaggero (January 18th), referring to the demand made by French Left-wing newspapers for active support of the Spanish Government, says: 'So far Italy's action has been confined to the limits strictly necessary for her volunteers in order to balance the help given by men from all over the world to the Reds. But on the day when threats assume different proportions, Italy will have to act according to the seriousness of the situation.'

Informazione Diplomatica (January 15th) writes in a similar vein: 'It is perfectly true that the first Italian aeroplanes were sent to General Franco at his request, but only many days after the arrival of French aeroplanes. . . . If a French intervention in Spain was in point of time the first . . . the Soviet intervention has since assumed spectacular proportions.'

Giornale D'Italia (January 25th) contains what must be regarded as an open threat to France: 'French occupation of Minorca or Spanish North Africa will be regarded as an unprovoked aggression against Spain and as a direct and open intervention in the Spanish war, against which Italy cannot remain indifferent, and as fresh violation of the Mediterranean *status quo* which other Mediterranean Powers, in the first place, Italy, would not let pass in silence.'

Corriere Della Sera (January 26th). The following passage is quoted as one example of literally hundreds of almost identical statements in Italian newspapers: 'Not that Italy desires either to monopolise the credit for the victory or the profits of victory, but it is Italy's victory because from the first day Italy took part in the struggle with confidence in the Spanish Nationalists' fight for religion and order. It is Italy's victory because Italian blood was shed to achieve it.'

Tevere (January 27th): 'It is a moral and also a strategic defeat for France. France had three routes uniting her forty million citizens on the Continent with her sixty million inhabitants in her African empire. The first two were the Atlantic route and the Mediterranean route. Now, thanks to the Italian Navy, not a single boat nor a single French soldier will be able to cross the Mediterranean. There remained the Spanish coast, with the ports of Cartagena, Valencia and Barcelona. Henceforth this route is also lost to France.'

Voce D'Italia (February 7th) contains an article by Signor

Voelkischer Beobachter (January 28th) contains an article under the headline: 'A new situation for England.' Referring to what it calls 'the Jewish Press lie that General Franco is a tyrant enjoying the support of Italy and Germany,' the paper says: 'It is slowly being realised in England that facts speak a harder and clearer language than all vain efforts of Britain and France to plunge themselves into new and uncertain Spanish adventures which threaten the peace of Europe.'

Another article in the same number of the *Voelkischer Beobachter* contains the following interesting remark: 'According to the new law which the new Spain is giving herself, all those must be regarded as rebels who turn against Franco, his army and his State; . . . a rebel is therefore everyone who acts on behalf of a foreign power in Spain and who turns that country into a playground for un-Spanish ideas.'

Hamburger Fremdenblatt (February 8th) contains a leading article, extracts of which may be quoted as typical examples of the more recent attacks on Great Britain: 'The Nationalists hold all the trumps and do not need to buy diplomatic recognition by France and England at a high price.' The article refers to Britain as the country 'which out of pure unselfishness appropriated Gibraltar and whose traditional policy has been the reduction of Germany and Spain to second-class powers.'

Voelkischer Beobachter (February 9th) contains a leading article the aggressiveness of which is typical of all other Press comments: 'The Spanish question has for some days been characterised by the continuously growing intervention of British and French diplomacy. . . . London and Paris are acting purely from consideration of power politics because of Spain's special position in the Mediterranean. They seriously believe that they can wipe out, with a few thousand pounds and few cargoes of grain, the memories of the injustice done by them to National Spain.'

Italy

Italian comments on the recent development of the Spanish war are invariably found to be connected with the question of Italy's territorial claims on France.

WORLD OPINION

A Press Summary

THE POWERS AND SPAIN

Germany

The Spanish problem has, of course, figured very prominently in German Press comments on international affairs. In connection with Spain, Germany's 'moral support' of Italy's 'historic aspirations' has been voiced in terms that were stronger even than those employed previously. One point deserves particular attention. Before the fall of Barcelona, 'warnings' addressed to France, that French support for 'Spanish Bolshevism' would cause German counter-action, had become a daily feature in all important papers. After the fall of Barcelona (and, more particularly, in the latest comments), Great Britain (rather than France) has been attacked for 'interfering in the Spanish war.'

Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (January 16th) writes: 'Mussolini has not yet spoken and he will not do so before the Spanish question has been settled by the final victory of General Franco. . . . Italy has good reasons for postponing a discussion with France. It is . . . the realisation that in the Spanish affair France can be taught only by facts. This view, long held in Italy, has been strengthened by the latest French intervention. . . . If France . . . should try again to play a last card in Barcelona, she would be ill-advised.'

Frankfurter Zeitung (January 25th): 'Now that arms will decide the destiny of Spain, it would not only be bad politics but also a dangerous game if France were to try to seek compensation in Spanish Morocco. Such an enterprise would be an invitation to Mussolini to grab as much as he could in the region between the mobilisation lines of France, between Southern France and Northern Africa. . . . In the long run France cannot hope to evade the justified claims of Italy.'

cultural life westward into Galicia and Volynia. The unpleasant truth is that only later under Polish pressure did Ukrainian culture, especially the Orthodox faith, suffer blows and degradation. To combat the proselytism of Polish Jesuits, there were established various centres of learning, outstanding among these being the academies in Ostroh and Kiev. Russian scholars themselves admit that most of their cultural influence came from these Ukrainian centres of learning. Ukraine never copied from Moscow or Novgorod. The latter copied from Ukraine and years later tried to adopt their tutor

I regret to say that there is little fact attached to the statement that 'the Ukrainian revolt in East Galicia found no large appeal among the population, and Poland crushed it, although not having at that time a regular army.' Dr. Grabowski must know how spontaneous and general was the response of Ukrainian peasants in Galacia when they had to defend their native land. To this day Polish chauvinists in Galicia spill venom by desecrating the graves of Ukrainian peasant soldiers. It is still a fresh historical fact that Poland received assistance of a very extensive kind so that she might be reconstructed *grande et forte* Since Dr. Grabowski brought up the subject, can he explain why Haller's army went against the Ukrainians in Galicia when it was supposed to go against the Bolsheviks ?

But to return to this matter of culture. Maybe this argument can be used to justify the colonial status of Bushmen and Hottentots. It is the height of nerve to try and use it against a nation with cultural roots that are as deep, if not deeper, than those of Poland. One can speculate how much greater would Ukraine's cultural achievements be if she did not have to worry about impediments from Moscow and various 'lex Grabski' from Warsaw. Growth of culture requires sunshine and fair weather. Poland and Russia are not the ones to supply these essentials to Ukraine. Both would rather see her and her national culture relegated to a museum of historical relics.

In conclusion let me say only this. Nations are reborn in pain and blood. It was Poland's good fortune to be attended by expert obstetricians who were well disposed to the newly born ; it was Ukraine's misfortune to be attended by those determined on still-birth or death by suffocation at the earliest possible moment.

Yours faithfully,

STEPHEN DAVIDOVICH (B.A.)

10 Kensington Hall Gardens,
London, W.14.
February 11th, 1939.

CORRESPONDENCE

'GERMANY, POLAND AND THE UKRAINE'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—In a letter published in your February number, Dr. Z. Grabowski, of the Polish 'I K.C.' Newspapers Syndicate, complained that he learned nothing from Mr. Paneyko's treatment about the real feeling in Soviet Ukraine. Let me assure him that it is not the fault of the data available. The 'Great Stalin' himself has said that the greatest danger to the U.S.S.R. is nationalism in Ukraine. Is it really necessary to catalogue the various uprisings and subsequent purges and pacifications which took place in Ukraine from 1921 to 1939? Must we recall the 1926 purge of the Communist Party in Ukraine for what Moscow considered to be nationalist-communism, the employment of Red troops and artillery against Ukrainian villages for resisting collectivisation in 1930, the fate that befell Skrypnyk, Postyshev, Kossior, Liubchenko, Bondarenko, Porayko, Kotsiubynsky and other high officials in Ukraine, the fate of hundreds of officers and generals of the army, obkoms, raykoms, directors and secretaries of the Comsomol, especially from 1933 to 1939? Is it necessary to mention the several revolts in the Ukrainian regiments in the autumn of 1938? Of all people, a Polish journalist should know there exists a permanent revolution in Ukraine against the overlordship of Moscow. If Dr Grabowski wishes to learn let him read some of the works of Khvyliovy, Yanowsky, Kosynka, Pidmohylny or many of the other writers under the Soviets—they all paid the supreme penalty for Ukrainian nationalism.

Dr. Grabowski must remember that government by terror is infinitely more specialised and thorough in the Soviet Union than it ever was in the days of the Tsars. How much 'protest' were the Poles capable of in those days? How long were the Poles obliged to wait and plot before their freedom came? Does he wish to imply that Poland gained independence 'by virtue of its own power'? We, of course, know better.

If I am not mistaken, culture is a mental and moral quality pertaining to a sense of values, a sense of appreciation and a way of living. To have destroyed Ukrainian national culture, the Mongols, or more accurately the Tatars, would have had to destroy the Ukrainian race. This, of course, never happened. What the Tatar invasion did was to shift the centre of Ukrainian political and

Delamarche and his mistress the vast Brunelda. From this he escapes—we are never told how—to the fantasies of the Nature Theatre of Oklahoma, where we abruptly leave him. Allowing for a fundamental unreality, this makes, so far as it goes, a coherent tale of its type and one that is in places amusing. It is possible, as Mr. Muir suggests, that Karl is a symbolic study of innocence undefiled; but it seems equally easy to suppose that the whole thing is merely Kafka's idea of a lark.

It is written with what can only be described as gusto, and one is not surprised to learn from Mr. Max Brod that the author 'worked at it with unending delight'—though he apparently tired of it very suddenly, nor that he hardly revised the manuscript at all. It has the familiar Kafka characteristic of *The Castle* and *The Trial*—an overwhelming vision of minute detail so clear and comprehensive that it leads the author into long irrelevancies which may be tedious interruptions or may be little independent jewels. An idea occurs—you can almost see the fortuitous word that first suggests it; it takes hold of him, away he goes, imagination at full steam, piling up the details. And always—though here much less than in the two previous translated works—there is the irresistible urge to slip away, as in an increasingly fantastic dream, from exaggeration to extravagance, from extravagance to sheer nightmare. The country house in Chapter III. has just the progressively maniacal character of one of Alice's experiences in Wonderland; the final scenes in the Nature Theatre of Oklahoma have lost touch with earth and reason altogether.

Reviewers—and readers—of translations have an ungrateful habit of ignoring the indispensable translators. The present work bears the respected names of Edwin and Willa Muir and presents what appears to be a sensitive, lively, and convincing version of the original. Edwin Muir's Introductory Note must command the interest of all Kafka devotees, though I am not sure that the rich resources of his own intellect have not caused him to discover—in the case of the present work, at least—more than was ever there.

HILTON BROWN.

derive from the present age. It is the most awake publication in England. No one interested should fail to buy it.

G. F. GREEN.

KAFKA'S COMEDY

America, by Franz Kafka (Routledge, 300 pp., 8*s*. 6*d*.).

A lengthy explanation inside the jacket, an Introductory Note by Edwin Muir, and an Afterword by Max Brod testify to the 'difficulty' usually attributed to this formidable author. But—at any rate, until the last chapter—there is no particular difficulty about this, the third of Kafka's major works. True, it opens with a verbose and tedious story about a stoker (separately published in 1913) which has no connexion with the sequence, and it ends, so far as it ends at all, in a rarefied atmosphere of allegory; but in between is a fairly straightforward extravaganza in the picaresque which at times—notably in the episodes in Brunelda's flat—is not a little reminiscent of our old friend *Juan*, whether in America or China. (Indeed, this book which is called '*America*' might just as well be called '*China*'; Kafka never saw America, and his imagination of it was nobly unreal.) The book was never finished, and indeed, as Mr. Muir points out, there is no reason why it ever should have been; it could easily have gone on for ever. The Afterword suggests that Kafka had some scheme for a conclusion, but, as this was apparently going to involve us in 'celestial witchery,' it might have been very 'difficult' indeed.

The German youth Karl Rossmann is seduced at the age of sixteen by his father's maidservant, aged thirty-five—a process described with an instructive wealth of detail. Exiled by his righteously indignant parents to America (taking the stoker *en route*), he is there adopted by his millionaire Uncle Jacob, by whom he is in turn cast out in a fit of jealous pique. Falling in with two remarkable hoboes, Robinson and Delamarche, he proceeds for a time in their company, but is rescued from them by the good-natured manageress of the Occidental Hotel, where he works for some time as a lift-boy. But the fatal Robinson reappears in a state of grave intoxication. Karl is sacked (I found some sad *longeurs* in this portion) and goes off with Robinson to the lunatic flat inhabited by

But to affirm—something, if the merest indication to life—is the poet's essential task. There lies the delight. Without it the conflict is reiterated, dully or painfully, to no end. Comparison between Mr. Spender's poems and the rest here shows this. His first, *At Castellon*, written in doggerel form, goes far beyond mere didactic verse, for its content is more than the episode, more than it seems to state. He has used the tone of the *Lyrical Ballads*, but the thought is his.

> Beside him stands a working man
> With cheeks where suns have run.

In *Port Bou—Firing Practice* he makes the prose form sing, though the end where the moral (the roots) show, as in Wordsworth's poems written in this form, might be cut. Mr. Spender excels here because his thought is ultimately poetic, its expression his own. There is the true poet.

The stories, excepting the translations, have more grasp. Mr. Stern, whose slight fault is using too many words, is one of the most interesting present writers. His story here is typical. Mr. Sommerfield seems a good Left reporter, till his last sentence with its one word 'then,' reveals him a story writer. The poem, *Drinking in Bolton*, the essay, *Whistle while you work*, the story, *Street Corner* (printed consecutively) illustrate the critic's pre-eminence. This does not say that Mr. Harrisson's excellent record of dance halls is 'better' than Mr. Burns's very good story; they cannot be compared. But it is more successful in its class. So with the other criticism. Mr. Philipps and Mr. Harrisson clearly record action; Mr. Goldman and Mr. Spender comment constructively on writing. Mr. Herring surveys French films, though to conclude '*c'est la vie*' is to say nothing. *La Grande Illusion* is no more 'life' than *Gold Diggers of* 19—. Anything is 'life' if truly expressed. Mr. Rickword ends his interesting account of André Malraux's progress, on the Party dogma, 'In the wholly integrated world-system of to-day, egotism is not a philosophical fallacy, but treachery or a dreary pose.' If the critic, however, wins interest from the story teller and the poet—the process more attractive than the result—the growth from the roots is not yet achieved.

New Writing contains much that is good. Even the unsuccessful is here stimulating, since its gains and losses

simply roots. Mr. Goldman, in his interesting essay on 'Literature and the East End,' says, 'The human drama has so many more factors than the one of Poverty. . . . Wealth or Poverty do not in themselves constitute this drama. They are its background, its stage scenery. Upon the social worker has devolved the not unimportant task of scene designer. To others has been left the more responsible task of introducing the cast upon the stage.' A man may be poet and politician, but the poet must increase far above the roots, where the politician is busied; '. . . true art,' Mr. Goldman says, 'demands detachment.' It is perhaps harder for the Left bourgeois to combine these two activities without mutual harm, as Mr. Yeats does, for his understanding of the lower class is unsound. Mr. Spender comments on this defect in the dramas of W. H. Auden and Christopher Isherwood. Here the social worker or 'politician' is faulty. On the other hand, the mere knowledge, as presumably the proletarian has, does not make a poet. 'It is this attitude of mind,' Mr. Goldman says, 'that is partly responsible for the introduction of the ridiculous term "left-wing" into the literary field. It is a term implying a restricted outlook.' Where the Creed is substituted for lack of social knowledge or poetic insight, the result is necessarily restricted. For Politics is not enough. Where the creed has led further, as in several contributions here, it matters no more that *New Writing* derives from Left Politics than that *the Yellow Book* derived from Fin de Siecle notions. Results, such as Stephen Spender's poems or Henry James's *The Coxon Fund* are enough.

New Writing never admits the fakes, found in certain very Left (or Right) periodicals, their strident language betraying their ineptitude. But between that falsity and success lie the Doldrums, where words fail to voyage. Here the poetry seems becalmed, whilst often the stories merely illustrate the historical, exact criticism. Many of these poems, particularly those of Mr. Madge and Mr. Richardson's translations from Spanish, are disguised prose, whilst others, as Mr. Auden's sonnet in his own manner, do not awaken. There is doggerel enough, from Mr. Waller and Mr. Brown, stirring lines by Mr. Bronowski, and one good poem (his first published) by Mr. Yates. This poetry has no affirmation, 'the sun,' as Mr. Harrisson says, 'goes down, not up.'

The Gospels, it may be said, will live as literature and that is probable enough. It is more than can be said of Hall Caine's *Life of Christ*. Nothing could be further from the simplicity of the Gospels than the pseudo-simplicity of the author. The treatment of St. John's account of the raising of Lazarus is characteristic. No special theological approach is necessary to an appreciation of the 'pathos and sublime' of this story. 'Lord, if thou hadst been here my brother had not died.' It is magnificent in its reticence. What scope for a romancer in the unique experience of Lazarus. 'He told it not, or something sealed the lips of that evangelist.' But Sir Hall Caine tells us that 'the story is not at all well told,' and one of the critical problems discussed by the author of *The Deemster* is why the beloved disciple told the tale so badly.

REGINALD J. DINGLE.

New Writing, New Series I, edited by John Lehmann (Hogarth Press, 6*s*.)

The new series of *New Writing* is an advance on the old. It remains skilfully edited, improved now by well-chosen photographs. Its contents are grouped, where appropriate, in sections as *Island Views*, *In France*, the rest being varied interludes, which saves it from a random anthology, giving the more compact interest of a 'one man' book. It is directed rather than edited. It is then no more impartial than, say, a James Hanley volume, where a Powys-type story would hardly be expected. Mr. Lehmann, with his assistants, Mr. Isherwood and Mr. Spender, are politically interested. Their book is representative of Left literature. Where the writer has grown through the creed to the attainment of general wisdom (as, at times, Mr. Spender), or where he displays or comments on this growth (as Mr. Philipps, recording war; Mr. Goldman, criticising slum literature) it succeeds; where he confuses creed with wisdom, unaware of the arduous, necessary growth (as Mr. Madge poetising the worker's scene) it is stilted, untrue or, since facile, trite; it fails.

Lower-class conditions, derivation of Left views, are

of exact scholarship in the writer. Finally, there is the classic attempt of Renan who felt the charm of the Gospel story but wanted to take it out of its supernatural setting. It is unlikely that this will ever be done better than in the *Vie de Jésus*, which has been called 'that gracious fifth Gospel, the Gospel according to St. Thomas.'

The work of the late Sir Hall Caine cannot be placed in any of these categories. He is not concerned with a pious embellishment of the Gospel story, and we find it difficult to understand the announcement that his aim was to do from the standpoint of a believer what Renan had done from that of unbelief. Apart from the gulf which separates the writing of Renan from that of Hall Caine, it is hard to see in what respect one stands nearer to traditional Christianity than the other. Nor could Sir Hall Caine discuss Christian origins from the standpoint of historical scholarship. He adds the late Archbishop Ussher to the canonical writers by telling us more than once that the Old Testament fixes the creation of the world about 6,000 years before the Christian era!

The value of this book depends entirely on the importance we attach to what Sir Hall Caine was and was not able to believe. To most Christian readers the patronising tone must surely be offensive. 'Jesus and nearly everybody who witnessed it,' we are told in one connection, 'regarded the event as a miraculous occurrence.' The 'nearly everybody' is intriguing. One would like the source of the writer's information and it would be interesting to know who was the contemporary Hall Caine who knew better.

The standpoint of the book is that of the non-supernatural Christianity which has worn less well than any of the intellectual fashions of recent years. The reasons for this are obvious enough and lie chiefly in its failure to attract youth. To the orthodox this type of theological liberalism is a cheerless unlighted inn on the high road to unbelief, but it is comprehensible that this is as far as the intellectually timorous will stray from tradition. The untrammelled will have none of these half measures. If Jesus of Nazareth was no more than this, they will very properly regard the importance attached to Him as disproportionate. Non-supernatural religion will soon cease to be Christo-centric.

The other two are Thomism and what is now called natural science. This again shows a misunderstanding. Scholasticism is a speculative philosophy, and if its devotees enter the field of action it is not as philosophers that they do so.

We look in vain in this book for any evidence that Professor Haldane's own work in the field of biology or that of any other scientist has been influenced in the slightest degree by acceptance or non-acceptance of the tenets of Marx and Engels. The business of selecting scientific discoveries and showing that they are not inconsistent with a particular *Weltanschauung* is too easy to be worth while, but the conscientious Marxian who tries to explain science in terms of the economic interpretation of history will find himself compelled to agree with a contemporary physicist that 'if science was devised to meet social needs, it started in a most unpractical, unsocial way.'

The philosophical criticism of Hegelianism lies outside the scope of a review of this book which professes to show a special relationship between a particular philosophy and positive science and completely fails to do so.

The Life of Christ, by Hall Caine (Collins, 10*s.* 6*d.*)

It would be against the spirit of this more humane age to apply to any author the harsh test of Matthew Arnold, that his book should have 'a proper reason for existing.' Nevertheless, the appearance of a new Life of Christ prompts a question, if not about the propriety at least about the necessity of the proceeding. Here, at any rate, it might be felt, is a story that has been told for all time as well as it can be told. What are the grounds for rewriting it? One is a pious discontent at the severe economy of language practised by the evangelists. 'Little is said of this incident in the Gospels,' wrote a schoolboy, presumably unconscious of irony, 'but a full account will be found in Dean Farrar's *Life of Christ*.' Another is a desire to apply to the scriptural records the methods of the scientific historian. From this motive springs the literature of the Higher Criticism. We may disagree about its usefulness and feel that the learned Schmiedel with his 'pillar passages' if much younger than the Pauline epistles is far less fresh. Whatever our estimate of its value, this class of literature demands an equipment

BOOK REVIEWS

The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences, by Professor J. B. S. Haldane, F.R.S. (George Allen and Unwin, *5s.*)

Professor Haldane writes with all the zeal of a convert. 'I have only been a Marxist for about a year,' he tells us, and his work supplies one more demonstration that the Marx-Engels philosophy, if not exactly a first-class vintage, is a very heady brew. Those who have had little occasion to move in the realms of abstract thought from Aristotle to Hegel appear to experience a strange exaltation when they find themselves presented with something which professes to be philosophy and is quite easy to understand. Some of the contemporary Russian philosophers remind us of the nigger in one of Maitland's lectures who discovered a top-hat and a walking-stick and proudly believed he had all the equipment of western civilisation.

The author of this book is far too well trained in the method of the special sciences to fall into any of these absurdities. It is equally evident that he is no philosopher in the sense in which philosophy implies something other than those sciences. Their method is the patient collecting and co-ordination of facts, and it has yet to be shown that any philosophical approach in the Aristotelian sense of the study of being in its necessary properties and relations will make any difference to the results of scientific investigation. Science refuses as resolutely as poetry and philosophy to follow the flag.

A superficial analogy might be drawn between the positions of Marxian philosophy and Thomist scholasticism, but it would be inexact. When Lamennais advanced the proposition that the sciences should find their first principles in revelation, he was condemned by Pope Gregory XVI, and any conscientious scientist would endorse the condemnation, but it may be doubted if the orthodoxy of Moscow would be as friendly to scientific independence as that of Rome. Professor Haldane speaks of Marxism as one of three philosophies which 'issue in action to a very considerable extent.'

unemployed for doing nothing they can afford to pay me at dole rates for doing important national work. I call it miserly.'

A number of people at the bar-counter heartily agreed with him, and the publican put this point of view quite well. 'You should always give a volunteer something for his pains. Money for choice. You can't spend thanks. He will enjoy getting money like that better than his wages. And he will work twice as hard for it. And don't forget you can't make an unpaid volunteer attend to his volunteer work regularly. And if his enthusiasm goes, you can't even make him continue to do it at all. But give him only ten bob a week and you can talk to him. You can tell him if he don't come regularly he won't be paid at all. And there are thousands who would find ten bob a week a godsend. These sort of folk have got just as much good sense and patriotism as the rich, and it would be a fine thing for them, and for all of us, if they were coaxed to exert their talents with a little cash. Be as patriotic as you like, you must admit we all like a little extra to spend. Extra work for no extra pay don't attract. There's no *taste* in nothing.'

JOHN SHAND.

that it was quite possible that all theatres would be closed at once, he was so upset that I did not pursue the subject. Another elderly actor, who has some interests outside his little world, said he would be willing to do any defence job, however humble, if the Government made the National Service Register compulsory. 'Why all this cant,' he said, 'about voluntary service being democratic? It is not democratic unless the volunteers are at least 90 per cent. of the total. And that is an ideal unlikely to be realised in peace-time. As it is peace-time organisation that counts, obviously compulsion is more democratic, since everybody will then have to do their bit. In this sense, the dictator countries, who are bringing out even the cripples to serve their turn, are more democratic than we are I am patriotic enough, but like all those whose wages depend entirely on the amount of work they can secure, it takes most of my spare time looking for jobs, and I cannot *afford* to give up that time while my competitors remain free to take my chances of an engagement.'

A great many people, I found, were in favour of compulsion as being the fairest way of organising civilian defence, but I give the actor's words pride of place because they seemed to me to give one point of view on compulsory service with great frankness and sincerity. And since Government has decided to give the volunteer system a trial, the point arises whether at least a token salary ought not to be paid to those who volunteer. In my favourite tavern I talked to an Australian who left his country in 1914 to fight in France and who is now living in London on a pension. He is a self-reliant, intelligent man who gained a practical experience of gas-warfare and aerial bombardment. After the usual disappointments of going to wrong departments and officials, he found someone who, on hearing his story, told him he was the very man they wanted for a full-time air-raid warden. 'Right,' said the Aussy, 'how much am I paid?' 'Why, we don't pay anything,' answered the official. 'Then I don't do anything,' he replied, and walked out. As he explained to me, his pension was not enough to live on and he eked out a living with odd jobs. He would have thrown his heart and soul into the warden's job for £1 a week. 'Sure, if the Government can afford to pay the

The third man is a clerk with a wife and one child. He prefers home life to any other pleasures, but is sacrificing some of his little leisure to be an air-raid warden. He is a serious-minded man with a vivid imagination, and he told me it was a nightmare to him to think of the horrors of a modern air attack on London. He was staggered, he said, not so much at the slowness of Government and municipal authorities to make complete preparations, as at the lethargy of his acquaintances 'Why, good heavens!' he exclaimed, 'they laugh at me as a scaremonger. They simply seem to have no conception of what may be in store for them. Some of them actually argue that enemy 'planes will never get past our defences in any numbers I wish the Air Ministry would organise some large-scale attacks on London and frighten the wits out of them while there is yet time.' Meanwhile, this clerk has found a disused cellar under the concrete pavement of his tiny backyard and is now saving up to buy a steel shelter which he intends to fit inside it and to fix two long 'chimneys' of lead piping for ventilation shafts. But he has decided that if Finsbury persuades the Home Office, and the Home Office persuades the Treasury, to let them carry their local architects' magnificent scheme into effect, he will move his family at once into that area. Finsbury's air-raid shelter exhibition really excited him, and he was so indignant that his daily 'national' paper hardly mentioned it that he cancelled his order at the newsagents' and now takes in another paper which devoted whole pages to it.

As a man who met representative people in his area, I asked the vicar of a London parish whether he found any enthusiasm for National Service. 'Very little,' he replied, 'but God will look after us.' I had no answer to that, but suggested that a sermon on the subject might do some good, and that a sermon in all the churches would do better still. He said he would have to reflect on the idea, but would it be wise to frighten people?

In the course of my work I meet many people in the London theatres. The actors have done very well collecting money for food for Spain, but I could not find one who was interested in joining National Service. One said: 'My dear chap, I may be on tour when war starts. How can I be of use when I'm moving about the country?' When I hinted

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING

WHAT are people saying about the National Service Register? What they are doing may be gathered from Ministry of Labour figures for the Greater London area which showed that during the early days of February about 3,000 recruits a day were volunteering In the middle of the month the total was about 35,000—a small proportion of a population of roughly 8,000,000.

Of my immediate acquaintance only three have joined the civilian defence service, apart from the territorials and other auxiliary units of the forces. Two are Jews, and they have both joined the Auxiliary Fire Brigade. Both gave the same reasons for joining—that they wanted to be of service and that the danger of fire from explosive and incendiary bombs seemed to them the most urgent problem in crowded areas. 'If there are enough Londoners willing to learn now how to organise themselves to help the fire brigades and to risk their skins in time of war rushing about to extinguish every fire as quickly as possible, they will be doing as fine a service to their country as soldiers and sailors in action. They will be saving lives and property, but best of all they will be helping to avert panic—the most horrible danger of all.' That is how one of them put it

Both these Jews work with the same firm and both have to submit to chaff from their Christian colleagues who ask them if their relatives are fire-assessors, inquire if they are going to put out the fires they start themselves, call them 'the arson twins' and other facetious remarks. They take these jokes in good part and when the laughter has subsided, try to persuade their colleagues to join up too. And they succeeded in doing so after describing with enthusiasm what they were being taught and how the Fire Brigade authorities put rooms at their disposal for 'social evenings' of darts and billiards when work is over.

BA COTTAGE

THERE at the watershed I turned
And looked back at the house I burned—
Burnt, too, by many another tramp
Who sought its shelter, dry or damp.

For come from the mist-levelled hill
I made my door a window-sill
And, wet incendiary, tore up wood
And fed the grate's wide mouth with food.

Then leaning on the mantelshelf
As though a mountain now myself
I smoked with mist and dripped with rain
That slowly made me dry again.

ANDREW YOUNG.

A DEAD MAGPIE

BIRD, though on brightest morning
    And on your nuptial flight
You always wore half-mourning
    Of a staid black and white,

Of death you had no care,
    Not even when your own
Feathers fell through the air
    Surer than a stone.

THE STONE EAGLES

PURPLE and gold and wet
  To Toller Fratrum, Wynyard Eagle,
Both roads in the sunset
  Shone with a light so rich and regal,
Which choose without regret?

Chance led me by the one
  Where two lean-headed eagles perched
Rain-pitted to the bone
  And the last dregs of daylight searched
With their blind eyes of stone.

What were they watching for?
  Wild eagles that again would fly
Over a waste land or
  Scything wide circles in the sky
Mechanic birds of war?

POEMS

THE BLIND CHILDREN

GREEN caterpillars ate their fill
On hazels' mealy leaves until
The boughs were stript half bare
And leaves hung riddled with clear holes of air

I met with children who upturned
Blind eyes to where the blue sky burned,
Some screwed to the sun's glare,
Some looking up with a white open stare

From their blind eyes I borrowed sight
To see those leaves against the light
No longer ruinous
But set with diamonds on fire-fringed boughs.

them with 'a leading-article sort of poetry' which they might conceivably use in moments of excitement; but the difficulty remains, and because of this imposed poverty of speech, this necessary 'commonness,' naturalistic drama is reduced to a progress of 'situations,' to the demonstration of some simple motive, some psychological point. When the curtain falls on *Nora*, something true has been said about human relationships; its final 'point' is the substance of the play, and it is arrived at with great ingenuity; but how frugal this art seems when compared with even the minor works of the poetic tradition. How to escape its limitations is a problem which some of our younger writers are trying to solve; but meanwhile—though we have many superficial or argumentative plays—the drama offers little scope to the creative artist.

ALEX GLENDINNING.

and the Hebraic or 'gagah' type is causing Europe a good deal of inconvenience. It is comforting to know that reticence and inaudibility, qualities in which we are just now pre-eminent, are attributes, also, of the 'aloos' who invariably conquers.

* * * * *

In their revival of *A Doll's House* at the Duke of York's, the producers have preferred to call it *Nora*, because in their opinion the more familiar title is associated with the forgotten issue of 'women's rights,' and, as they remark, 'the tragedy of Nora is not merely localised to the places and times in which "Women's Rights" were the burning question—something deeper and ageless is involved.' One can just see how Nora's final speeches might have struck audiences of the day as controversial and topical, but as a whole the play does not date. It is excellently cast and produced. Miss Lucie Mannheim succeeds brilliantly in suggesting the 'little squirrel' she seems to be to her husband. The only weakness in her charming performance is that she is so convincing a little squirrel we cannot altogether believe in her transformation in the last act. The ineffable banality of Torvald is conveyed relentlessly by Mr. Austin Trevor.

Judged by what it sets out to do, there is little fault to be found with *Nora*. One's criticism of it is finally a criticism of the tradition it represents. The scope of naturalism is more limited in drama than in any other medium, and Yeats, who detested Ibsen's work though he did not underrate it, suggested its limitations very well when he wrote :

Of all artistic forms that have had a large share of the world's attention, the worst is the play about modern educated people. Except where it is superficial or deliberately argumentative it fills one's soul with a sense of commonness as with dust. It has one mortal ailment. It cannot become impassioned, that is to say, vital, without making somebody gushing and sentimental. Educated and well-bred people do not wear their hearts upon their sleeves, and they have no artistic and charming language except light persiflage and no powerful language at all, and when they are deeply moved they look silently into the fireplace.

He saw how Ibsen had tried to get round this difficulty by making 'all his characters a little provincial' and providing

more trenches than we have to provide interment on the scale which will be necessary.

* * * * *

Last month Londoners had a brief opportunity of seeing the dances of Java and Bali, at two performances given by a group of Indonesian dancers at the Phœnix, in aid of the International Peace Hospital and the International Students' Service Aid to China.

Watching these dances, I was reminded of a remark of Mr. Gordon Craig's, who suggested that our ballet dancers ought to rehearse in heavy armour, so that, instead of bobbing and bouncing about the stage, they would learn to give to each separate movement its proper importance—learn, in fact, to dance like the Indonesians. Here every gesture and attitude is significant, and managed with such delicacy of emphasis that the tiniest movements, even of head and fingers, have dramatic value. The Indonesian dance is like a poem translated into movement word by word—much of it is in fact based on a traditional sign-language—and if we cannot fully understand its 'meaning,' we can delight none the less in its exquisite precision. Yeats would have loved this dancing, as he loved all ancient ceremony.

I was interested to read, in a note accompanying the programme, an account of 'the distinction between two types of dancing: the "fine" and the "strong," words which only approximately convey the sense of "aloos" and "gagah".'

> The 'aloos' dancer never lifts his eyes, legs or arms beyond a certain level, and if he conquers in fight, as he always does, behaves with extreme reticence and restraint. If he speaks it is in a voice so low as to be almost inaudible. The 'gagah,' or strong type, is expansive and loudly vocal. He lifts his legs high, takes huge, swinging steps, and is always vibrating with hardly contained fervour.

Here, more or less, is Arnold's thesis of Hellenism and Hebraism, the opposition of the forces of 'sweetness and light' and the forces of 'fire and strength.' It is a contrast, or conflict, with which we are painfully familiar in the West,

have been put forward, for the Home Office has stated plainly that the Finsbury scheme goes 'far beyond the standard of protection envisaged by the Government,' and it has refused to supply the Finsbury Council with information about the effect of heavy bombs, though pestered by the Council to do so. It could not, naturally, prevent the Council from conducting its own investigations, in Spain and elsewhere.

The total cost of the scheme—for fifteen shelters, to be used for car-parking and market storage in peace-time—is estimated at £1,387,760, or £10 a head for the population of Finsbury. If the scheme goes through, and there is a war, thousands of jitterbugs will skulk unharmed in the Finsbury shelters, while brave men and women and children elsewhere are dying for their country in the steel kennels provided; but no doubt the Government can be relied on to circumvent these mischievous proposals.

* * * * *

There is one serious criticism to make of the Government's list of trades and professions exempted from national service in war-time: it does not include undertakers. In the event of war it is clear that the number of civilians to be undertaken will be very high—in this respect our arrangements are almost perfect—and it is something of a scandal if proper provision has not been made for their disposal. The situation would seem to demand not only our regular services working at full strength, but also volunteers; and Mr. G. A. Hotter, Secretary of the National Association of Funeral Directors, has lost no time in drawing attention to this lapse. 'We have taken the matter up with the Government,' he states, 'and understand that it was merely an oversight.' It remains for some responsible Minister to say so in public and put our minds at rest. Time is short.

I was discussing this matter with a jitterbug acquaintance the other day, and he said that in his opinion the Government was counting on its A.R.P. trench system to solve the undertaking problem. After a raid the trenches would simply need to be filled in, and if necessary tombstones could be erected at either end, with A.R.P. on them. This seems to me an improbable theory, for obviously we should need many

time activities. He gets hopelessly involved in technical controversies about which he is not entitled to have an opinion—bomb-proof shelters, for example. 'Why haven't we got deep shelters?' he keeps asking, and if some official loses patience and remarks in public that there isn't *time* to start digging deep shelters, the jitterbug begins at once to jitter and chatter. 'Not *time*,' he says. 'Oh dear, oh dear, things look bad,' and before the mistake can be corrected, before a word can be said about appeasement or easing of tension or good faith, off he goes jittering and chattering and lowering everyone's morale.

With so many jitterbugs about, the recent exhibition of model A.R.P. shelters at Finsbury Town Hall was surely ill-advised, for on this subject of A.R.P. the jitterbug is in an unusually suspicious frame of mind. He has been ordered to come up out of his refuge room with his spade and bucket, and to prepare to sit in a steel kennel in his backyard, and he doesn't like the sound of it at all. 'If they were wrong the first time,' he thinks craftily, 'they may be wrong now, too,' and the Finsbury Council has to choose this moment to open its exhibition, to allow the jitterbug to see a drawing of a man and woman being blown over a roof, steel kennel and all, and to read an announcement about the steel kennel which says:

> The danger is not confined to a direct hit, but explosions at some distance away may be fatal through shock waves. Added dangers are lack of anchorage to the soil and risk of its being completely buried or squashed by falling *débris*.

'Oh dear,' thinks the jitterbug, teeth chattering. 'Oh, how awful!' and then his eye falls on another announcement, which reads: 'Complete Bombproof Protection can be Obtained at Reasonable Cost' and under the announcement are models and drawings which show jitterbugs placidly reading newspapers and listening to the wireless in underground compartments, while the bombs do their worst overhead. 'Spacious, bombproof, gasproof, soundproof, safe, comfortable,' reads the jitterbug, and suddenly he stops jittering and his face is all wreathed in smiles; you wouldn't know him.

It is no fault of the Government's that these proposals

should be obliged to read Herr Hitler's speeches with desperate attention; and there is a certain irony in the fact that the age of psycho-analysis should be dominated by the phobias of the unanalysed. History has become case-history, a record of aberrations and systematic delusions. These are of a kind well-known to psychiatrists, and clinically uninteresting, so that the consistent banality of our age is preserved: we cannot claim to be the victims of even a first-class neurosis.

* * * * *

A friend of mine, who has a wide knowledge of foreign affairs, tells me that he is rung up from time to time by stockbrokers who are alarmed about 'the situation.' What used to puzzle him, he says, was the fact that their alarm did not necessarily coincide with a serious state of affairs, but always with a wet week-end. His theory is that, when it rains, stockbrokers are unable to spend the week-end playing golf, and they sit indoors reading the Sunday papers, and what is brought to their notice in this way alarms them so much that he has to spend Monday answering the telephone.

* * * * *

Thanks to Sir Samuel Hoare, we have now a word for people who display anxiety of this kind: they are 'jitterbugs.' As Sir Samuel explained, jitterbugs are people with white faces and chattering teeth who go about talking of war and feeling afraid. They not only create an atmosphere of gloom which is unwarranted, Sir Samuel said, but even if they are right and there *is* going to be a war, their attitude towards it is a very poor one. It is my misfortune to know several jitterbugs personally, and I can confirm all Sir Samuel says about them.

Perhaps the most notable characteristic of the jitterbug is suspicion. Unlike the six hundred at Balaclava, he is forever reasoning why. When Sir Samuel Hoare or some other authority tells him there is no likelihood of war, he is not satisfied. 'Well, then,' he says, 'what's this National Service handbook for? What's A.R.P. for? What's all this about laying in food and bottles of water?' and no amount of reasoning will convince him that these are normal peace-

An aged man is but a paltry thing,
A tattered coat upon a stick, unless
Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing
For every tatter in its mortal dress,
Nor is there singing school but studying
Monuments of its own magnificence;
And therefore I have sailed the seas and come
To the holy city of Byzantium.

Yeats is hampered in this later poetry, as in all his work, by what he calls 'the phantasmagoria through which I can alone express my convictions about the world.' In his youth he took the Symbolist movement very seriously, and symbolic figures from his early work, such as Michael Robartes and Owen Aherne, reappear in the later poems along with other symbolic apparatus, and seem an unnecessary complication in work which shows such mastery of the normal resources of language. But when one has allowed for all the disabilities to be expected in a poet struggling against such odds as Yeats, his achievement remains triumphant and unique. In the best and latest of his poetry we are aware of that 'sense of musical delight,' that power of the imagination which, in Coleridge's words,

> reveals itself in the balance or reconcilement of opposite or discordant qualities; of sameness, with difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion with more than usual order; judgment ever awake and steady self-possession with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement.

At the age of seventy-three he was still capable of great poetry, and his death is something we cannot afford.

* * * * *

On the day when the death of our most distinguished European was announced, the streets of London were hung with news-bills which asked: 'What Will Hitler Say?' This is the kind of problem we have now to accept as of major importance; and there is a certain justice in the fact that a generation which has put a premium on bad writing, which remembers Yeats as the man who made a living out of fairies,

in *Dejection* he laments the disappearance of 'the wild witches, those most noble ladies' and 'the holy centaurs of the hills':

> The holy centaurs of the hills are vanished;
> I have nothing but the embittered sun;
> Banished heroic mother moon and vanished,
> And now that I have come to fifty years
> I must endure the timid sun.

At the time it did seem as though Yeats had spent himself in an impossible task. *Michael Robartes and the Dancer*, which appeared in 1921, contained such splendid poetry as *Easter, 1916* and *A Prayer for My Daughter*; but I think no one could have foreseen that superb rallying of pride and energy which was to produce *The Tower* and *The Winding Stair*. Yeats himself attributed it to the intervention of spirits through the medium of his wife. One result of the spirit communications, he tells us, was that he was sent to Plotinus and other writers he had not read, and became better educated. His account of this 'incredible experience,' now included in *A Vision*, is one of the oddest things in literature.

But whatever his inspiration, in *The Tower* Yeats showed that he was able to emerge boldly into the world of the embittered sun and make his own terms with it. The substance of more than half his poetry might be summed up in that phrase from Villiers de l'Isle Adam which he was so fond of quoting: 'As for living, our servants will do that for us': the rest is a savage repudiation of all the phrase implies. In *The Tower* the revolt of an old man against old age is expressed with positive, youthful energy:

> What shall I do with this absurdity—
> O heart, O troubled heart—this caricature,
> Decrepit age that has been tied to me
> As to a dog's tail?
>   Never had I more
> Excited, passionate, fantastical
> Imagination, nor an ear and eye
> That more expected the impossible—

This is the poetry of a man discovering the full measure of his genius when it is almost too late, but there is exaltation in the discovery:

which he sought to create a dream-world which might take the place of the Victorian world he detested, and if such a world could have been realised somehow, I think Yeats would have done it. This dream-haunted poet, it is worth remembering, was also the purposeful, practical man who built up an Irish national theatre out of nothing.

His most characteristic poetry at this time, compounded of Celtic mythology, occultism and an unhappy love, has the effect of a powerful incantation:

> O, women, kneeling by your altar rails long hence,
> When songs I wove for my beloved hide the prayer,
> And smoke from this dead heart drifts through the violet air
> And covers away the smoke of myrrh and frankincense;
> Bend down and pray for the great sin I wove in song. . . .

Exquisite in its limited way, it is essentially a drug-poetry, and highly efficient as such—its efficiency is a reminder of how much Yeats might have done with his genius had his aspirations been different—but, like other drugs, the satisfaction it offers is precarious and impermanent. As Mr. Eliot has remarked: 'You cannot take heaven by magic, especially if you are, like Mr. Yeats, a very sane person,' and towards the beginning of the century he began to turn away from the dream-world he had tried so desperately to believe in. Abracadabra had failed him, and so had Ireland.

> Romantic Ireland's dead and gone,
> It's with O'Leary in the grave

is the refrain of a poem written in 1913, and in a poem published some three years earlier he includes among his youthful preoccupations 'The seeming needs of my fool-driven land.' The following lines, from the same volume, are entitled *The Coming of Wisdom with Time*:

> Though leaves are many, the root is one;
> Through all the lying days of my youth
> I swayed my leaves and flowers in the sun;
> Now I may wither into the truth.

In *The Wild Swans at Coole*, published in 1919, disillusion has become despair. 'I am worn out with dreams' he writes in a poem called *Men Improve with the Years*, and in *Lines Written*

COMMENTARY

On January 30th the *Daily Express* announced the death of W. B. Yeats under the headlines: 'Scoffed at Fairies, but They made his Living: Won £7,000 Prize,' and printed above his photograph the words: 'Wrote "Innisfree."' This is the epitaph of our most popular daily on our most important poet, and I suppose the astonishing facts of Yeats's career are not 'news.' How the contemporary of Wilde and Dowson lived to become the greatest poet of our own time none the less deserves some attention.

In *Autobiographies* Yeats tells us what gave him his direction in literature.

> I am very religious, and deprived by Huxley and Tyndall, whom I detested, of the simple-minded religion of my childhood, I had made a new religion, almost an infallible church of poetic tradition, of a fardel of stories, and of personages, and of emotions, inseparable from their first expression, passed on from generation to generation by poets and painters with some help from philosophers and theologians. I wished for a world where I could discover this tradition perpetually. . . .

The cultural atmosphere of the 'nineties favoured the elaboration of such a project, and it must have been with a sense of solidarity with his fellow-poets that Yeats turned his back on the contemporary scene, fixing his imagination on the heroic past of Ireland, and on a supernatural world which he sought to realise not only in poetry but in the operations of magic. Along with Irish folklore, he studied Madame Blavatsky and Eliphas Lévi; he was interested in horoscopes and séances; he belonged to the Order of the Alchemical Rose and the Hermetic Order of the Golden Door, and for years he played with the idea of creating a new mystical order and providing it with a new ritual. His dabblings in magic were not affectation; they were proof of the earnestness with

But another point has become obvious 'The sentiments ' international mistrust and suspicion are heightened, and ar, which is an important obstacle to general appeasement :tween nations, is accentuated' (Mr. Taylor, at Evian). is not the fact that 700 ramshackle sheds made of kerosene ns are still inhabited by Armenian refugees, and that ousands of Jews from a civilised world have nothing better expect than to live under similar conditions; it is not the umber of refugees—altogether only a small fraction of each ountry's population—it is the state of mind which is angerous. It is the state of mind which makes a habit of rning out helpless minorities irrespective of the burden ey may become for their humane neighbours.

We have to face the fact that we live in the mentality of ar, the meanest of all wars, the war of the strong and violent gainst the weak. In war, charity is limited to the nursing f the wounded and crippled and to caring for the widows nd orphans, as if this could make up for the loss of healthy outh. At present the papers are full of protests and the ommittees are swamped with applications No doubt harity will do her share.

But we cannot assume that we have peace merely because he big guns are not yet in action. If war in history has the unction of disposing of surplus population then there is no war more effective than this.

MARGARET FISCHER.

committees were appointed 'to hear in confidence the statements of laws and practices of the participating Governments and the statement of the number and types of immigrants each is prepared to receive.' Further, to consider the 'documentation' of refugees. Certain countries indicated that they were willing to consider plans of settlement for refugees in their territories when such plans were presented by official or private organisations. Certain countries stated their willingness to accept selected classes of workers for whom suitable employment was available. Others expressed their willingness to receive experienced agricultural workers. But all the countries were reluctant to receive more than a strictly limited number of destitute refugees, and it became more and more evident that steps had to be taken to induce the German Government to allow Jews to take at least some of their property with them. The general opinion was that 'if countries of immigration were to do their best to facilitate the admission of refugees, they were entitled to expect that the country of origin would be prepared to contribute.'

The answer to this was the German pogrom and the imposing of the £83,000,000 fine upon the Jews. The latter had been calculated several months previously when all Jewish fortunes of over 5,000 Mk. were registered (5,000 Mk. are now exempt from the fine). The death of the unfortunate Herr von Rath was not the signal for violence, the signal was the realisation that the rest of the world had finally discovered what this blackmail really meant. In August, 1938, it was made clear that Germany had 'deliberately created a problem for the nations of the world that are moved by human sentiments—and nobody can take from the shoulders of Germany the consequences that will follow the relentless persecution and segregation of a large element in this country. . . .'

But there is an error. Germany is not afraid of bearing the responsibility for what she is doing. She has been determined from the start to annihilate one part of her population, just as the Turks were determined to exterminate the Armenians. The Germans have been successful in their foreign policy, and now, strengthened as they are, they are not afraid of interference. No commission will obtain Germany's support.

centralisation. Much goodwill and kindness is wasted in amateurish efforts. But at least the thirty charitable organisations represented at the London Inter-governmental Committee for Political Refugees form an efficient body which, however, has to deal with an almost insoluble problem.

When, in August, 1938, the Conference at Evian (suggested by President Roosevelt) was opened, the atmosphere was so unpromising that, as the *Manchester Guardian* said: 'Everybody hoped that somebody would do something about it.'

The Governments had always worded strong protests and promised help in each new case. They laid the responsibility largely upon the League of Nations. The League of Nations' first assembly, in 1920, unanimously resolved 'That something must be done to put a stop to the terrible Armenian tragedy as soon as possible, and to safeguard the future of the Armenian nation.' In 1921 the second Assembly adopted unanimously Lord Cecil's draft emphasising the desirability that 'the Council of Powers should safeguard the future of Armenia, and especially give the Armenians a national home.' In September, 1922, the third Assembly again passed an unanimous declaration concerning the necessity of founding a national home for the Armenians. Nevertheless, when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923 it did not contain a word about a home for the Armenians.

The High Commissioner for German Refugees, James McDonald, resigned from his post in 1935 on the grounds that a situation so menacing could not be met solely by relief measures, but must be tackled at the source; 'this is a political function which properly belongs to the League itself.'

The Munich Agreement safeguarded the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. But despite this fact it had no power to compel what has remained of the Czechoslovak Republic to keep the rules of democracy against the pressure of her taskmaster, and fresh expulsions have become possible.

The Evian Conference brought considerable progress in so far as for the first time the necessity was fully recognised of 'taking precautionary measures and of considering the collaboration of the Governments who expelled their citizens, as well as the collaboration of the countries who were able and willing to receive them.' The technical sub-

the Russian relief was provided by the Russian emigrants themselves, mainly by the Nansen stamps, a tax of 5 gold francs to be paid on each of the passports for the stateless, whenever the emigrant was able to pay. In 1930 the sale of those Nansen stamps and of surcharged post stamps (sold at a higher value) issued by Norway and France were the only source which might have been regarded as providing the regular revenue. The Nansen office developed a far-reaching scheme of reimbursable credits and the repayments eventually amounted to about one-third of the income.

All of the Jewish funds were provided by the Jews themselves. Even the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, Jewish and others, received only a small advance sum from the League for his office expenses, which he repaid before the end of the first year. In England, for instance, the Jewish community guaranteed that no Jewish refugee admitted to this country would become a burden to public assistance. If the resettlement of Jewish refugees in oversea countries has to be financed it will be done exclusively with Jewish money and some countries even expect to derive benefit. It is believed that some of the Latin republics of South America will try to extract some payment for whatever liberality they may show towards refugees.

Even the agricultural settlement of the Jews in Soviet Russia has been financed by the Agro-joint, which means mainly by American money. Millions of pounds have been spent on relief work. Unfortunately no organised system for mutual help among the refugees themselves had been introduced at the time when the German Jews still had a chance of taking with them part of their property. Recently the Czech Government suggested that emigrants from the Sudetenland be allowed to take out a certain sum on condition that 30 per cent. of it should be deducted for the benefit of destitute refugees. On this basis a saner emigration scheme could have been evolved from the beginning. However, the Nazi Government restricted donations of money from the very start because they assumed that it might be used for the transfer of more than the permitted amount.

Social workers of all countries tried, of course, to organise rescue activities and to turn pity into practical support. They are considerably hampered by lack of authority and lack of

Many economists deny that an increased influx of foreign workers would mean that the same number of workers in the country would be thrown out of work. Or, on the contrary, they contend the admission of refugees decreases unemployment, because each foreigner has to buy goods, shoes and clothing and food for himself and for his family, and the production of those articles gives employment to others. Undoubtedly well-planned immigration could lead to this result. The example of the Greek settlement shows the possibilities. But the world is governed by fear, and unemployment is one of her chimeras.

In principle the democratic Governments were sympathetic, and in some cases extremely generous. France opened her frontiers to the greatest number of refugees, without discrimination—White Russians and Socialists from Italy, fugitives from Spain, Armenian orphans as well as Jews, rich and poor. Switzerland provided shelter for many, but later she introduced restrictions and the atmosphere became less favourable. The same happened in Holland and Belgium. Czechoslovakia was naturally inclined to help the Russians who had supported their national liberation and with whom the Czech Legions had fought. She provided schools and posts for intellectuals, but later showed the same hospitality for the German Jews and the political victims from the Third Reich. Great Britain was cautious, admitted selected immigrants, encouraged the raising of funds and opened the door for children to be trained for the colonies. In this way it was possible to provide a small number of refugees with a prolonged stay in the hope that they would be assimilated.

The bulk of the financial help was left to charity. The Governments contributed in some ways to the costs of immediate relief, shelter and transport, and had, of course, to bear the burden of increased administrative costs. When, in 1921, the League of Nations took charge of the refugees the financial aspect of this work had to be specially considered.

The Greek settlement was based upon a loan, securities for which could be provided by the Greek Government. Greece, of course, had not only a vital interest in the success of the enterprise but also had a chance of repaying the investments. Thanks to the ingenious organisation of Nansen the greater part of the administrative expenditure for

fact that the settlement had needed considerable help from outside cannot detract from the moral success. Even the dangerous influx of less adaptable elements resulting from the hasty immigration since 1933 has not affected the spirit of pioneers and the will to create a real homestead.

But it has become increasingly less important what kind of profession the emigrants have had. For most of them, in any case, the world has no use.

At first the admission of refugees to other countries seemed less difficult. After the War nearly the whole world still felt the loss of able-bodied men. France in particular, was so short of labour that she needed the influx of foreign workers. Germany received a great number of well-to-do Russian immigrants, who lived there cheaply during the inflation; after that most of them moved on. The same happened in France in 1927, following the stabilisation of the franc, when the tourists became scarce and most of the luxury trades and industries were at a standstill. Great Britain absorbed a number of enterprising business men and small artisans, who found shelter and familiar surroundings in the London East End. There Russian Jews had settled after the pogrom of 1905; the pogrom of 1919 in the Ukraine added to their number, but they were never felt as a burden, even when the fear of unemployment and the restriction on foreign labour started in various countries.

All this changed completely after the economic crisis in 1929. One country after the other introduced restrictions of foreign labour. The difficulty of finding work was increased by mutual exclusion from the markets. The protection of home industry cut down the opportunities for export, the uncertainty of currency in various countries had disastrous results. Naturally those suffered most who had no right to support or protection against dismissal, or even against deportation.

When, in 1933, the Jews poured out from Germany, they found work already so scarce that admission became extremely difficult. At present all over the world the fear of unemployment is closing doors to aliens; even the colonies hesitate. The British Dominions, too, are approaching the problem very cautiously. It is not established that this fear is justified.

by the reclamation for cultivation of pasture land and of previously undeveloped land, by the establishment of co-operative and marketing schemes, by road building, modern irrigation, drainage, sanitation and water supply, both in the agricultural and the urban settlements. By the transfer of industries from Asia Minor and specially by the development of small industries through new capital and cheap labour.'

But the Russians, apart from those who live or starve in the Far East and overseas, came to Western Europe. The Refugee report divides them in three groups: displaced politicians, officials, intellectuals, business men and members of the socially privileged classes; Jews and peasant refugees from the famine areas, and members of the military forces, the latter group being numerically the strongest. Therefore an unusually great proportion were men, most of whom were unmarried or had been separated from their wives. For the same reason most of them were able to live under difficult circumstances and to do hard manual work although they had not been used to it. Nevertheless their circumstances at present are disheartening:

> Conditions ruinous to health and work of exceptionally heavy type have, after twenty years, left many exhausted, invalid and unemployable, and the Russian refugees as a community have to face during the next ten years an increasing proportion of aged unemployables together with a rapid decrease of the community's internal economic resources for mutual help

One of the excuses offered by the Nazi Government for the elimination of the Jews from German life is that their part in business, in the law and the medical profession, and in intellectual life generally, was too high. Actually the refugees are mostly urban. As long as they were able to emigrate in an organised manner there was hope for a controlled and, for about half, an assisted migration. Recent events have destroyed all these plans.

The great achievement of Zionism is that in Palestine the Jews have really overcome social prejudice and have been unified by collaboration. This is the only way of turning the misery imposed upon the refugee into a positive gain. In spite of the political menace brought about by the Arab question the result of Palestine is most encouraging. The

some respite and even certain facilities during the first years, until, after the Austrian *Anschluss* in March, 1938, and the arrangements of Munich in September, the Government felt strong enough to carry out the plans for a thorough 'purge' of the undesired element in the population.

In 1933 the League, of which Germany was still a member, found it impossible to include the refugees from Germany in its programme. Therefore a High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany had to be appointed separately. For the same reason the political refugees from Italy and Spain did not come under the protection of the League.

The definition of the term 'refugee' adopted by the League of Nations includes all categories: 'Any person who does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protection of the Government (of his country of origin) and has not acquired another nationality.' With regard to the absorption of refugees in various countries, it is essential to understand the different types of refugees and the conditions which they had to face. The majority of the Armenians were farmers, some were skilled artisans, many merchants. They were by nature adaptable. Furthermore, their need was so desperate that they had to accept whatever form of living was provided for them. They are now partly settled in groups in Syria and Lebanon and in various European countries, occupied with all sorts of trade. In the Soviet Republic they live in their own province. Everywhere else they have become almost exclusively urbanised, and their family life and their original structure of village community has suffered.

The Greeks from Anatolia, as well as the Turks with whom they had to be exchanged, were mainly peasants. As they were received in their own country and there was room for them to develop the land, it was comparatively easy to find the balance for their stabilisation. The organisation by the League introduced new branches, such as tobacco growing, vineyards, carpet-weaving and new industries. To-day, the report of the Sir John Hope Simpson Commission can state: 'The absorption by a small and impoverished country of an army of almost entirely destitute refugees in number equal to almost a third of the original population' can be claimed. There is even considerable gain for the country by the 'cadastral, hydrographic and geological surveys:

during the War afterwards found themselves in a difficult position among the Turks, to whom most of the land inhabited by them was assigned. Their number had already been considerably diminished after the Russian armistice, which left them exposed. The British Government had assumed the obligation to find a settlement for the Assyrians when they had found refuge in Iraq under British mandate. Unfortunately, their settlement had not been achieved when, in 1929, Iraq's independence was decided. The final Anglo-Iraq Treaty did not include any special provision for the protection of minorities. In 1933 the fear of persecution drove a group of 800 men to Syria to ask for French protection. When they were sent back by the French authorities they created an incident with 'local detachments of the Iraqi army.' In the course of these events a massacre broke loose, destroyed sixty villages and ended with the death of the men. The survivors were left to charity.

At first charitable enterprise tried to rescue the victims. The local missions fought a desperate battle against death in the Armenian districts. Private organisations provided for shelter, and the first relief for the Greek and the Russian refugees. But when the need surmounted the individual means the League of Nations stepped in and created the post of 'High Commissioner for Refugees' to organise systematic relief work. There is no room to describe the work done in detail. To mention only the results it must be said that the re-settlement of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian population has been achieved. Some of the Armenians have found new homes, the Assyrians' problem has been tackled with some success, and hundreds and thousands of Russian refugees have been given work and shelter in countries which would otherwise not have kept them. If a final settlement has not been reached it is not the fault of the Nansen office.

In 1933 the newly created Third Reich started to rid itself of the Jews. At the same time a number of political opponents had to fly from persecution.

The expulsion of the Jews began in a comparatively mild form. Economic pressure, threats, and humiliation made their life in Germany unbearable. There was little doubt that this 'cold' pogrom would gradually increase and finally break out in violence. The emigrants, however, enjoyed

blazing hatred of the Turkish rulers, reported also his hopeless struggle against German bureaucracy.

Russians began to leave their country after the Peace Treaty of Brest Litovsk and after the assumption of power by Lenin. Some had fled first from the terror to non-Bolshevist Russian territory until it, too, became a battlefield of civil war. But at the same time large numbers of non-political refugees tried to escape the famine. The intervention of the Allies prolonged the civil war, but by and by the various provisional Governments collapsed and the armies retreated. Therefore the exodus of 1919–1920 included the military forces of Denikin, Yudenitch, Wrangel and Koltchak and carried refugees to Turkey, Roumania and Poland as well as to Scandinavia, Finland, Germany and through Manchuria to the Far East. One hundred and twenty-six ships with 136,000 passengers came to Constantinople within one month in 1920. Among them were 70,000 soldiers of Wrangel's army, but also Jews who had escaped the pogroms in the Ukraine.

The stream of Russian refugees diminished after that, but did not cease. During the following years members of the former bourgeoisie left with or without the consent of the Soviet Government. Moreover, the mass exodus did not stop in the countries of asylum, but spread slowly from east to west until it became a part of the general European unrest.

The Russians were the first refugees who by their social and intellectual standards conveyed the shadow of danger to the settled populations of the West. The propagandists of nationalist movements saw their chance, and the nightmare of Bolshevism was presented to the world in the picture of the unfortunate refugee. But the cruel methods applied by this country in evicting its citizens were later adopted by those who had complained of these methods.

The number of Russian refugees has never been correctly estimated. As none of the countries of refuge kept records of the people arriving, they were either registered as often as they came to a new place, or they were not registered at all. Statistics were more or less arbitrary and gave a total of 1,000,000 to 1,500,000. The real figure was probably about 700,000.

The Assyrians of Iraq, who had fought with the Allies

The Armenians were deported by the Turkish Government into the interior of the country 'with the deliberate intention of eliminating the Armenian population.' The Armenians were unpopular among the Moslems because of their superior industry and thrift, which had enabled them to acquire land and become generally wealthier than their neighbours; by their superiority in intelligence, due to their thirst for knowledge, and—according to an eye-witness of the massacres of 1894: 'Because of the traditional feeling among the Moslem neighbours that they had the right to plunder Christians.' Outbreaks of such feelings occurred frequently. When petty persecution and the impossibility of obtaining redress led to the emigration of many Armenians to Russia and America, and to the formation of revolutionary committees outside Turkey, this fact gave the excuse for massacre. In 1914 the Armenians were accused of sympathy with the Allied Powers and were persecuted. They were taken from their vilayets and evacuated to the Syrian desert and to concentration camps in Mesopotamia. They were herded together and had to march towards the Euphrates, without any means of transport, without food and water, chased by their Kurdish 'guards,' who shot most of the men and boys. About one-third of the whole Armenian population survived. Eighty thousand starved in camps round Erivan, the new Armenian republic destined to shelter them, because they did not dare to harvest their fields. But the fire of Smyrna in 1922 saw fresh scenes of cruelty. 'It could hardly be otherwise, when a nation, whose public morality was that of the Middle Ages, became possessed of modern appliances and methods,' wrote Fridtjof Nansen. In 1923 all goods of Armenians living abroad were confiscated by Turkish law as 'goods abandoned by fugitives.' The Armenians became stateless by decree and by administrative decision. Passports were issued to them on condition that they would never return to their native country.

Thus the creation of the outlaw began.

During the War, British and French journalists, and even noted scientists, blamed the Germans for the Armenian atrocities, which was not justified, as the Central Powers had been unable to stop their Turkish allies. But the Parson Lepsius, who described his desperate efforts to modify the

United States of America and some of the South American States—are reluctant to receive a further influx. Scandinavia and the other smaller countries in Europe may offer shelter for transmigrants, but the practice of naturalisation has become increasingly restricted, and in many countries has virtually ceased since 1933.

The refugee problem was considered one of the after-effects of the War. In fact, the method of evacuation has been used on a large scale since 1914, when the Russian Government deported about 1,000,000 people—Poles, Jews and others suspected of sympathy with Germany—from its western frontier to Siberia. The sad fate of the deportees remained almost unnoticed: nearly two-thirds perished, partly when they were forced to join General Koltchak's beaten army on its flight, partly when they tried to get home during the famine and the civil war. There is the pathetic story of one of the trains which left Kazan with 1,948 passengers, and after many weeks reached Poland with only 649 surviving, of whom forty-three were ill and sixteen dangerously so. The rest had died of epidemics and starvation.

War refugees from Belgium were the first to reach England, but their number was small and they were able to return to their native country. The history of forced migration really starts with the Greeks.

The exchange of Greek and Turkish populations was originally suggested after the Balkan War for an appeasement of both territories. Thrace, Macedonia, parts of Asia Minor had changed hands. Greeks had to leave Bulgarian territory, were expelled by the Turks, thousands were deported during the war into the interior of Bulgaria; only 50 per cent. survived to return after the war. Bulgarians from Turkey, Serbia and Roumania suffered a similar fate. The final disaster resulted from the defeat of the Greek army in Anatolia in 1922. Altogether nearly 1,000,000 refugees arrived in Greece within a few months in a desperate condition.

Among them were a number of Armenians who had escaped the evacuation from Turkey, and also Russian refugees and Jews who had fled from the Ukraine after the pogrom in 1919, in which 90,000 people had perished.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

WHEN, in 1915, accounts of the deportation of the Armenians reached the West the civilised nations regarded this as an unheard-of cruelty in a backward and barbarous country. After the Armenians came the Greeks, the Bulgarians from Macedonia, the Assyrians from Iraq, then the Russians. In each case the causes of disaster were slightly different, and the results were similar. Nevertheless each national refugee problem was dealt with separately. Even the measures taken by the League of Nations were of an administrative kind, as though to meet an emergency and not a uniform development. The Jews from Germany were regarded as merely a part of this development. Not until the Conference of Evian, in the summer of 1938, did the Governments become 'concerned with taking precautions against what they now perceived to be a new migration comparable with the great migration movements of history, which has become a serious menace to them.'

The striking fact, characteristic of all refugee problems, is that none of them has been finally solved; with the exception, perhaps, of the Greek repatriation which, as we can show, had a different basis. The people who had been made homeless during the War, and after it, were, in many cases, forced to move on. A large-scale outpouring from one country was followed by a long period of slower dispersion. Even if the victims had found temporary refuge the next economic or political upheaval set them in motion again.

At present there are still 300,000 Russians, 120,000 Armenians and tens of thousands of other political refugees who must be settled, while at the same time the number of Jews and political refugees from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia is still growing. The few remaining countries still open for immigration—that is, the British Empire,

about the remarkable *Herrgottskirche* at Creglingen, with its inimitable carvings by Tilman Riemenschneider, insisted on showing us the way to it. She was typically full of information and curiosity, asking if we knew that it was 'maize' growing there. It had been introduced during the 'war,' for the fowls. And she would stop to ask a peasant what he was doing to his fruit tree and why. And after we had seen the church she insisted on accompanying us back to the station as we were taking a short stage by train. And there was the stranger at Bamberg, who, just because he saw that we were strangers, stopped in the street and insisted on showing us to a suitable lodging. And there was general anxiety to help in directing our route, combined with queer ignorance about places beyond the immediate locality, due, no doubt, to lack of transport and illegible signposts.

The internal struggle is truly there, and there is growing consciousness of its fundamental moral implications, of the choice between Christianity and individual liberties on the one hand, and the religion of Power and totalitarianism on the other. And whatever may have been the defects of the old Particularism, with its 'free' towns and petty states, and the economic burden of its corrupt and luxurious courts, these did prove that Germans could appreciate and take fruitful advantage of the scope for individuality which they offered. Appreciation of this makes it hard to believe that German culture will accept the living death of Nazuism. It was a desperate economic situation that drove them to a temporary submission. They are beginning to appreciate that though Naziism has given them work they receive but little wage—spiritual or material—for it. But there are no effective means of opposition within Germany. Help *must* come from outside. And the democratic and Christian countries can help best in two ways. They must refrain from doing anything to encourage or assist the ruling clique. They must, in their own lands, abolish the anomaly of unemployment side by side with poverty, and show that under the liberties of democratic institutions 'work' can be fruitfully given for the alleviation of mankind's lot, and its ultimate uplift.

A. S. Elwell-Sutton.

much eye-signalling, we were offered a couple of beds, but it was all too primitive even for us. Eventually we were received at an inn which was no other than the Nazi headquarters! The cause of the tension, we found out, was the establishment in the place of a large Nazi training camp. We passed it next day, its portals guarded by uniformed Brown Shirts. Meanwhile, whilst at a frugal evening meal, we observed a heavily built, truculent-looking man, who came in with a swaggering air of importance and proprietorship. He stared at us, spoke abruptly to another customer, who answered obsequiously, and then joined the innkeeper (a pleasant old gentleman) and his family at their supper. Having finished ours we went out, giving a '*Guten Abend*' (instead of '*Heil Hitler*'). The 'Leader' (as he obviously was) looked round sharply, fixed us with his eyes, and then recovering a little, asked whether we were foreigners. On our replying '*Engländer*,' his manner changed. He sprang up and came after us, speaking effusively, partly in German and partly in broken English, with a queer combination of sentences that bade us welcome and questioned us as to our doings. There was much about that all-to-be-desired '*friendship*' between England and Germany, expressed with an emotionalism that doubtless came the more readily through his being a little drunk. And then, suddenly, perhaps because of some lack of enthusiasm in our responses, he left us with hopes that 'we should enjoy our evening.' Unfortunately the place didn't provide any facilities, other than beer, for that!

But it would be churlish to make no reference to the real friendliness so often received from 'ordinary people.' They helped to make one conscious of that very real division between 'Party' and 'People,' the outcome of which is always a matter of hopeful speculation for the rest of the world. There was Herr ——, for example, at the little unfrequented 'port' on the Neckar. He was responsible for stopping the Heidelberg boat by waving a white flag. As it was very late on our morning he took us into his little garden by the river, with its vine, and rockery decorated with little plaster gnomes looking out of caves or fairy houses. And there was the lady who introduced herself to us in the *Reichspost* omnibus leaving Rothenburg, and after telling us

the reactions of visitors. It is the same even at such places as the Roemerberg at Frankfurt, during the performances given there. The setting is marvellous, but production and acting, by our standards, poor. But watching Brown Shirts are on the look-out for adverse criticisms, and so everybody is concerned to be enthusiastic, and perhaps is so. It is best not to have 'ideas.' The Press reports confine themselves to raptures over the lighting effects under the full moon.

The following true story perhaps speaks more than volumes. We had called on some acquaintances in a country town, and a discussion was interrupted by the entrance of the serving-woman. Presently the hostess observed: '*Ach*, you can say anything you like in front of Frau ——, she is anti-Nazi.' Then she proceeded to tell us why. The woman's husband had been an employee (for over thirty years) in a firm in a neighbouring town. He had taken no interest in politics, but one day a number of 'opposition' leaflets had been pushed in at his door He had thrown them aside, but foolishly not destroyed them. The police had come. His pleas had been rejected on the grounds that he had made no report. He was given a year's imprisonment, and lost his job. Some seven 'suspects' altogether had had the same experience. 'And,' proceeded the hostess, 'we know who was responsible.' A man of education and some position, a manufacturer in a small way of 'luxury metal articles.' He was anxious to show his zeal and stand in well with the Party. 'And,' she went on again with dramatic unexpectedness, 'just fancy, he committed suicide only last week!' 'Remarkable, indeed . . . remorse, no doubt?' we remarked. '*Ach, nein*,' she answered. 'It was thus. He was a manufacturer of luxury metal articles. And the Government had cut short supplies as they wanted the metal for armaments. So his business was going to ruin. So he committed suicide.'

Once we arrived at a small town in the Odenwald rather tired after a long day's foot-slogging. There was a queer air of tension about the place. The first two inns refused lodging, though it was unbelievable that they could be full. Another was filled with rough-looking 'workers' in a state of nervous tension. After some comings and goings, and

suggested that lack of Fascist progress meant that England was becoming 'judified' (*verjudert*). 'Were not Simon and Eden obviously Jews?' The 'obviousness' is held to derive from the names, to which curious importance is attached. A certain publication solemnly announces the discovery of the Jewish origin of various prominent Britons by an examination of their names. Thus Kitchener was originally Koch; David Lloyd George, David Levi Loewit; Balfour (Baal); Buchanan (Baruch Chanaan); Benn (Benjamin), and so on. It is difficult to know how to deal with these 'accusations.' Taken seriously denials only rouse fresh suspicions, scarcely quelled by a readiness to drink out of the interlocutor's beer-mug. Then comes the familiar theme that England and Germany ought to join together to rule the world.

This young man offered to take us to the Buergerbraeukeller, whence the march on the abortive *Putsch* of November 1923 began. Old gentlemen of whom he asked the way bowed obsequiously to the Brown uniform, just as they used to do to the *Kaiserliche* ones in the old days. But presently he was accosted by three admiring *Dirndl*, and went off with them, rather to our relief. At the Buergerbraeu the pot-boy showed us the great hall where the meeting took place on the eve of the *Putsch*. Von Kahr, the State Commissar for Bavaria, was there. Excitement ran high. Hitler only obtained silence by firing his pistol into the ceiling. The hole, marked by a Swastika, is pointed to reverently. The boy repeats the story mechanically, concluding with the grim charge of treachery against von Kahr. That is the legend, anyhow, and von Kahr suffered for it on June 30th, 1934. By the Odeons Platz, where his police fired on the demonstrators, is the *Mahnmal* or memorial to the victims, which every German must salute as he passes. The Loggia above has the inscription in huge letters: '*Gott mach uns frei*,' with the aggressive implications already indicated. Below it are wreaths dedicated to the *geraubte* (ravished) territories. It is a long list: Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein, West Prussia, Danzig, Memel, Silesia, Austria (the Sudetenland, curiously, is not mentioned, but is doubtless 'included'), South Tyrol, Colonies. . . . The reiterated injunction to young Germany is not to forget. . . .

And there are always 'Party members' about, watching

thing anyhow. Passers-by, when asked for directions, always seemed concerned to send one to familiar places where they thought we ought to go rather than where we wanted to go. Rather characteristic.

Munich, for all its Catholic tradition, is now significantly the real Mecca of Nazidom, a veritable symbol of the hegemony of the South over Junkerdom. Ardent Party members, as a reward for zealous service, receive free railway passes, and free admission to the theatres, the conventional sights—picture galleries, Residenz, Deutsches Museum. (The latter, by the way, has a characteristically different implication from our 'British' Museum. It *is* always a *German* one, with exhibits devised by German hands and brains.) And, of course, they visit the Brown House and the little museum in the Sternecker Braeu. The latter is the room where, in December 1919, the Party began to hold its meetings. There are original posters and notices, and the first cash-box—an old cigar-box. You may see the book with the signatures of Hitler, the seventh on the list, Goering and Goebbels. Each member had a number, but at first, *pour encourager les autres*, two oughts were added. Thus 5 became 500, and his first recruit 501. The anti-Semitic origins of the whole movement are manifest. The original rubber stamp used to authenticate notices and other documents was in the form of a comic Jew's head, of the coarse bloated kind such as Communist Russia still associates with 'capitalists.' There was doubtless a double appeal—to anti-Semitic bourgeois, and anti-Capitalist proletariat. It inspired the addition of the fateful words National-Socialist to the original D.A.P. (*Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei*). We got into conversation here with an ardent young Brown Shirt from Mannheim having a free jaunt. He came up to us afterwards, whilst we were having 'coffee' in the public part of the restaurant, in such a business-like way that we felt he must have been put on to us by the custodian of the Museum, a former organising secretary of the young Party. He told us that he had been a correspondent for the Fascist movement in England, and asked directly how that movement was progressing. Our lack of enthusiasm about it at once awoke or revived suspicion. Nazi mentality expects a favourable reply to its political questions, the truth being a subordinate consideration. He

may pick up a *Reichspost* motor-bus, running perhaps once or twice a day on three or more days of the week. Whilst making inquiries we suddenly came on a *Lager* or Labour Camp, contrived about an old ruined castle, and guarded by Brown Shirts, who regarded us suspiciously. However, nothing happened that night, the chief excitement apparently being caused by a request for butter to assist the corn coffee and sour bread. We had to wait till 9 p.m. for it, and carefully husbanded some for the morning. There would be a post-bus leaving at 6.30 a.m. At 6 a.m., as we came down to tackle some more 'corn coffee' and bread with what was left of the butter, we were accosted by a police-sergeant, who bustled in with an air of threatening importance. He spoke no English, and could make nothing of our passports. There was a stream of questions. 'What were we doing?' 'Why had we come?' Then, with a specially knowing air: 'We had come to learn something about Germany?' 'What sort of things?' Time was getting on. The coffee was getting cold and soon there wouldn't be even time to finish the precious butter. Still the questioning went on. 'What were we going to do?' 'Had we really walked so far?' 'Were not our packs very heavy?' (He was obviously itching to examine them.) We answered smilingly, saying with respect to the last that one didn't think anything of such feats in England. A crowd of gaping and grinning peasants was gathering, and feeling that a little display of firmness was necessary, we turned to our breakfast, and began to consume it with a detached air. More questions followed, to be answered between mouthfuls. The worthy official was obviously distracted between his zealous desire to make a scoop and a fear of exceeding his duty with troublesome foreigners. At last, exasperated perhaps by the audible tittering of the crowd, he suddenly exclaimed: '*Have you any weapons?*' Our smiling negative was echoed by a loud guffaw from the back of the crowd. The policeman looked round angrily, and then stamped away. But he saw us into the motor-bus, to catch which we had to abandon some of the precious butter.

One gets a good deal of similar questioning by the wayside, especially when in out-of-the-way parts, as is no doubt to be expected. Out-of-the-way parts don't seem to be the

by the spectacle of little groups of bustling uniformed men, or carefully shepherded bodies of sightseers, that the Hofbraeu has now another attraction for the good Nazi. Its meeting hall saw the birth (November 4th, 1921) of the S.A. men. The Communists tried to break up the meeting then, and the resultant fight (in which the Communists were worsted) led to the organisation of the drilled and uniformed stewards —the Brown Shirts.

As distinct from the still flabby *bourgeoisie*, the 'workers'—that is those engaged on hard physical labour, such as road making—have a sullen air of being underfed and overworked. They get little beyond a single midday meal of soup, bread and potatoes. At the same time the traveller cannot but feel grateful that something has been done to remedy the extraordinarily backward condition of German roads. But a hardship for all is the poor quality of clothes. People joke about it, but with an uneasy air that announces again the stirrings of inferiority complex At the same time peasants, innkeepers, labourers, are all eager to assert, but without conviction, that everything is well in the new Germany. And they ask embarrassing questions—to be answered with discretion—as to what England thinks of her.

Discretion is always necessary because of those ubiquitous 'Party Members.' Our first acquaintance with one was at the primitive inn in a little village in the Main Valley. Local inhabitants dropping in were friendly and communicative—up to a point. But there was one stolid round-headed gentleman who sat steadily drinking beer when we arrived (about 6 p.m.), and was still doing so when we went to bed. We noticed that our chance acquaintances kept a cautious eye upon him, and he an inscrutable one on them. Presently he announced that he wanted us to be introduced to him. He was the local *Gauleiter* (district party leader). He questioned us about England, expressing effusive friendship for her (according to orders !), and seemed disgruntled at our inability to express corresponding love for the 'new' Germany. Next day we had, by direction, gone off the beaten track, to a remote and unfrequented village about 20 kilometres from Würzburg. We were behind on our time-table, and were searching for an omnibus. Such services are still extremely rare in rural Germany, but you

unconsciously, they expressed her present plight. Of course the undoubted food shortage makes it harder to wear an air of gaiety. The ordinary tourist, indeed, staying at the big town hotels may not notice it much. But for the villages and private people the frequent lack of eggs, butter, milk, coffee, vegetables is serious, and must eventually affect physique. Meat is of poorer quality than it used to be, and that is saying a good deal, and bread is decidedly nasty. People have to make up with soups and potatoes that fill but don't nourish. The young can manage thus for a few years, and undoubtedly Nazism, by stopping loafing, and compelling various physical activities, or work, has done something to improve physique. Indeed, the time of youth is now so occupied in Labour Camps or disciplined 'sports' that parents complain that they never see anything of their children. They certainly have little influence over the formation of their characters. And what leisure there is comes chiefly o'nights, when there is much rowdiness of an unpleasant kind, speaking plainly of the absence of any self-discipline. There is a true story of an English parson who, from a balcony overlooking a street, was waxing enthusiastic over the 'fine bearing' and 'hearty singing' of a band of youths and girls. 'Do you know what they are singing?' asked his German friend. It was that delectable song with the refrain, 'When the Jews' blood flows from the knife. . . .' And both physical fitness and suchlike 'lightheartedness' wear off after about twenty-five, when the unsuitable food and over-indulgence in beer begin to have their effect. It is still rare to see a fit-looking German much over thirty, and the slender middle-aged Englishman is still an object of secret envy, stirring the ever lurking inferiority complex. But certainly the German is not yet deprived of his beer. In the great Hofbraeukeller at Munich the *petite bourgeoisie* still congregate, seemingly all day long to drink strong dark beer in litre pots. You can only get the dark kind there, and not less than a litre at a time, as the Kellnerin informs you contemptuously if you ask for a 'light' or lesser quantity. Some seem to get through two or even three litres at a sitting, and sometimes husband and wife of the frugal kind share a mug, the wife taking an occasional sip between mouthfuls of bread and sausage. And watching them all one is reminded

The demonstrators, on the other hand, announce themselves as the 'political army of the Führer,' and 'the basis' whereon the State rests. And they cry *Heil dem Führer* and *Gott mach uns frei*. But *Freiheit* in their ears does not mean what 'Freedom' means to us. It just means freedom for Germany to have her way with the weaker nations. The 'people,' to whom this inspiring slogan is addressed, seem mostly, indeed, apathetic. Nobody dares, or thinks it worth while to make any counter-demonstration in public. But there is always a number of youths, and especially girls, who wave and cheer enthusiastically. The latter, needless to say, make a great display of 'blonde locks.' There is said, indeed, to have been a remarkable increase in this Aryan feature amongst the Bavarians. It has even been caustically whispered that a Jewish firm supplies the hydrogen peroxide. But more seriously, one asks again, Which way is youth going? One does hear of recusants from the Party—individuals whose idealism led them into it, and who have suffered disillusion, but cases are few apparently. Of course it takes a lot of pluck to be a recusant.

The same thought crops up continually over the matter of greetings. The older people almost invariably responded gladly to the beautiful old South German one of *Grüss Gott*. A few—the bolder ones—even took the initiative with it, and once, in a restaurant in Munich, some obvious young rebels seated at the same table, passed it to us with defiant meaning. But for the most part the young people respond almost aggressively with the incongruous *Heil Hitler*. They make a slogan of it, and older people use it, too, when the young are within earshot. One recalls one old peasant working in his field who apparently took us for Party members trying to catch him out with our *Grüss Gott*. He retorted with his *Heil Hitler* several times, and the breeze carried the unpleasant phrase after us as we passed on our way.

But uneasiness and tension are characteristic and expressive of the growing schism. So much of the old comfortable joy of life has gone. It is positively rare to hear music in the cafés and parks, and when one does, spirit and quality are poor. This was especially true of the Viennese airs, popular after the *Anschluss*. They weren't reminiscent of Vienna at all—not as she used to be. But perhaps,

the event, however, the peasant is finding himself being even more exploited by the Government agents than ever he was by the Jew. He is inclined to echo that cry that in the Middle Ages followed periodical expulsions or repressions—'Give us back our Jews!' This is even more marked in Württemberg and Baden, where the people have retained more of the Liberalism of the French Revolution. (It will be recalled that Baden proved one of the toughest propositions for the Reactionaries after 1848.) Anti-Semitic notices have not been so prominent or frequent in those regions. And it was chiefly there that the anti-Catholic posters received rough handling. These have been most scurrilous, and were usually affixed aggressively opposite the churches. (The wall in front of the Jesuit church at Heidelberg was plastered with them.) They asserted that Catholics had desecrated altars, chapels, pictures, and other sacred objects 'in indescribable fashion,' in order to throw suspicion on the Nazis as the perpetrators! They appealed to the 'German people' to note the matter, and observe how Catholic Bonzen were trying to sabotage the national unity, and frustrate the Führer's efforts to save the culture of Europe. And one could read almost daily in the papers of quite long terms of imprisonment imposed on monks, priests and laity, who had torn down the posters in protest. Yet these posters were not strictly official. They were put up by the Party.

A more effective, and indeed, more Christian method of protest, of course, is to attend the churches. And congregations are in fact usually good—better than one sometimes sees in England!—so that optimists foreshadow a great religious revival to follow the purging experiences of persecution. The onlooker can only try, however, to measure the rival forces. There was an immense congregation one Sunday to hear a perfervid monk hold forth, with great sincerity and eloquence, on the essentials of Christian doctrine, whilst emphasising the dangers to them. And there is reason to believe that he was the one announced a couple of days later as having been arrested for preaching a 'seditious' sermon. And meanwhile these same Sunday mornings are favourite occasions for demonstrations by drilled and uniformed gangs, wherein Jews, Catholics and Protestants are all equally held up to scorn as 'enemies of the people.'

of the great Jewish synagogue was made to appear as dominating the whole mediæval town. This was a preliminary to the campaign for the destruction of the synagogue, now accomplished. Curiously, when seen from Hans Sachs Square, the dome had a rather aggressive dominating aspect, but if one climbed to the ramparts of the 'Burg,' the castle on its hill overlooking the city from the north, and got a view of the whole town in true perspective, the synagogue was hardly noticeable, and the dominating feature was the towers of the great church of St. Sebaldus. Now St. Sebaldus was the companion of St. Boniface, the Apostle to the Germans whose coming, according to Herr Rosenberg, announced the day of misfortune for the German people. So, though the accepted 'slogan' is still '*Die Juden sind unser Unglück*' (The Jews are our misfortune), the darker implications must sooner or later come to the front. St. Sebaldus' towers may have to go the way of the dome with its Star of David.

The thing crops up continually, sometimes in surprising quarters. It was, for example, queerly epitomised in a little Bavarian village within fifty miles of Nuremberg. The two English visitors who had arrived on foot and were putting up in its solitary inn were invited in very friendly fashion to join the group of typical Bavarian peasants drinking the home-brewed beer there. Bavarian patois offers some difficulties—even the German visitor to Munich is offered a glossary of the vernacular!—but within ten minutes or so it was being explained to one, with much earnestness, that Christ was not a Jew, but a Nordic upholding Nordic warrior ideals; whilst the other was being asked by an equally earnest gospeller why the English and Germans (racially kin) did not join together—then they could conquer the world. Deprecation of this unholy aim somewhat chilled the proceedings. Yet these people were, according to their lights, pious Catholics. But there are signs that some are beginning to grasp the incongruities of the situation.

It was not, of course, difficult to fan the flames of always latent anti-Semitism amongst the peasants of Bavaria and Hesse. They knew the Jew only as the middleman who often exploited them unfairly—or they thought so. The crude appeals of the *Stürmer*, with its sweeping accusations of immoral or bestial conduct, fell on fruitful ground. In

Prussianism, indeed, had already won its victory over the South in Bismarck's time. South German romanticism had then allied itself with Prussian realism to cast a characteristic glamour over the lust for power. The Great War confirmed the alliance. But Prussia, as represented by its Junkers, at first understood little of the new Romanticism of Paganism and anti-Semitism. Like some in Britain it accepted the common cant that proclaimed Hitler to be the heaven-sent shield against Bolshevism, and it naturally welcomed the prospect of a 'realist' military policy. But it was (and still is) shocked after it began to perceive the full pagan implications of the new dynamism. For neither anti-Semitism nor the new paganism are in fact particularly congenial to the Junker mind. The Junker, for all his belief in material force, is anxious to be called Christian. He exhibits the Lutheran capacity for separating his ideals of the next world from his action in this one But the ideals did set certain limits of decency on his action—even in the case of Bismarck. And racialism didn't appeal to the Junker very much either. He was conscious of being a bit mixed himself, and some had even taken Bismarck's advice and acquired a little Jewish blood—to quicken intelligence and bring a little of the wherewithal to withstand agricultural depressions. . . . Hence the various abortive attempts at resistance. Junkers were mixed up in the notorious affair of June 1934, that saw the murder of von Schleicher, von Bredow and von Kahr. Junkerdom has never forgiven that event. There has been a continued underground struggle, culminating in the widespread oppositions—almost amounting to mutiny—of February and November 1938, when hundreds of officers were arrested or dismissed. But so far Southern romanticism has proved too much for Prussian 'realism.' It is a strange turning of the tables.

Anti-Semitism is, of course, fundamental to Naziism. It is not merely an attack on Jews on economic and racial grounds. It is an essential preliminary to the assault on the whole moral basis of Christian ideology. For the 'new' Germany must definitely reverse Christ's decision to reject the devil's offer of world power.

The *Stürmer* recently displayed what purported to be a bird's-eye view of Nuremberg, in which the oriental dome

SIDELIGHTS ON NAZI GERMANY

What do the German 'people' really think about Nazi doctrines? Are their minds and wills really so acquiescent in the policy of the 'Leader' as the 99 per cent. votes in the various 'General Elections' declare? Do they reflect upon doctrines and resultant policy in such a critical way as we imagine most British electors do? Have they any capacity for political thinking at all? Does their Christianity mean enough to enable them to understand and withstand the attacks being made upon it? Do they relate the intensified anti-Semitism of to-day to the fundamental attack on Christianity, or do they regard it merely as a fresh expression of traditional economic antagonisms? If there is opposition, is it political or religious? Can it make itself felt? If the older generation is still sceptical about Nazi doctrines, how far is the rising one showing itself able to withstand the intensive propaganda and 'closed teaching' of their formative years?

Questions hard to answer, and unanswerable indeed through the sole authority of any one observer, however well versed in the essential knowledge of German history, literature and philosophy. One can only offer contributory evidence for a judgment. What follows here is the result of personal observations and experiences in the course of wide wanderings partly on foot, about the country south of the Main, and covering the two key centres of Nuremberg and Munich.

It must be remembered that Naziism is characteristically born of the romantic South. Hitler brought his anti-Semitism from Austria. Munich saw the birth and organisation of the 'Party.' The first *Putsch* was there. Herr Streicher of the *Stürmer* holds sway in Nuremberg. These places with historic Augsburg, Bamberg, Würzburg, Rothenburg and the rest claim to be the repositories of the true German spirit.

It is quite a mistake to attribute Naziism to Prussianism.

The Dutch Army would form a constant threat on the flank and rear of an invader intent on pushing his way through with the minimum of delay. Meanwhile the other nation, or nations, which automatically would become Holland's allies, could utilise Dutch territory on which to form aerial bases. From these they could strike at the industrial towns of western Germany from comparatively short distances. The Dutch army, 500,000 strong on a war footing, and reaching a total, with all possible reserves, of about 1,680,000 men, would withstand the attack as long as possible in the border zones, and then retire to 'Stronghold Holland.' This is the name given to a vast fortified zone, which has been built up to embrace most of the western part of the country. Comprising the greater part of Utrecht, a part of Guelderland and the whole of the North Holland and South Holland Provinces, it includes within its confines the cities of Amsterdam, The Hague, Haarlem, Dordrecht, Rotterdam and Delft. Not only does 'Stronghold Holland' possess a general system of flood protection, but inside it section after section can be independently flooded, making possible a series of defence actions.

For use along her shallow and dangerous coasts Holland is preparing a fleet of motor-boats armed with machine-guns and torpedo tubes. These craft could play a valuable part in foiling attempts at landing hostile forces. They are easily operated, and develop very high speeds. An order for a further twenty powerful motor-boats has just been placed with an English firm. With this new fleet of 'hornet craft' for close-quarter work, while trusting to the British leet to keep the North Sea defended, Holland keeps the ulk of her 60,000 tons of warships in the East Indies.

An aggressor would not find Holland a very pleasant hort-cut. Her citizen forces, imbued with dogged courage, ghting in defence of their soil, armed with modern weapons, rotected by the encroaching sea, would give a good account themselves against any adversary. To the south there ould be the army of Belgium, which, although not a formal y, would be taking 'simultaneous action.' The forces of se two small, but doughty, democratic States, acting in ncert, might well play a memorable rôle in a future ropean drama.

arrangements by which every bridge, over even the smallest canal and most insignificant stream, could be blown up within the first few minutes of the outbreak of hostilities. These preparations are backed by a well-trained army of excellent spirit, whose numbers are being increased. The length of military training was extended recently from six to eleven months. At the same time the annual draft called to the colours was increased from 19,000 to 32,000. It is to be further increased to 42,000.

Simultaneously every effort is being made to increase Holland's air strength. Her domestic aircraft industry, although it includes factories of such international prestige and technical value as those of Fokker and Koolhoven, was not in position to supply the demand for both Holland and the ~~East-Indies~~ when the rearmament drive got under way. Orders were placed in the United States of America for airplanes intended for the defence of the overseas empire. The domestic industry concentrated on home defence. At present the Dutch Air Force consists of about 600 machines, bombers and fighters, the majority of modern construction. Supplies of anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, machine-guns and munitions are being quickly increased. Large orders for these and other weapons were placed in Central Europe and Sweden. Batteries of modern anti-aircraft guns are in position along the frontiers.

Although the main Dutch plan of action would be to inflict as heavy losses as possible on an enemy, while keeping their own forces intact, and this would necessarily mean withdrawal in the face of what would undoubtedly be overwhelming numerical superiority, yet an invader would find every mile of his path stubbornly contested. According to Jonkheer W. Roell, who was until recently the Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch Field Army, Holland mus on no account succumb to the temptation of adding to th number of 'Maginot Lines' now in existence. Some Dut experts have urged the construction of a massive line underground fortresses, but the country has not suffici man-power to garrison them. Jonkheer Roell favours w he describes as the 'cement guerrilla warfare,' the inv being harassed and distracted by a multitude of scatt 'pill-boxes,' and other small but powerful posts.

best, and enriching it with rare force of character and perceptiveness of mind, stands Dr. Hendrikus Colijn, the Prime Minister. Holland is fortunate that at so critical a period she has as her leader a statesman of his calibre. Of great physical strength and proven personal courage, Colijn possesses, moreover, shrewdness and circumspection inherited from peasant-farmer ancestors. But although liberally endowed with restraint, he has nothing of timidity in his make-up. He is a man of action. He despises drift and *laissez faire*. Basing his country's policies on his own far-seeing judgment, he unobtrusively started Dutch rearmament four years ago. He speaks English well, and is a warm admirer of English culture and ways. He has said: 'I consider Britain's rearmament the best hope we have for peace, not only in Europe but all over the world.' When he thinks and talks of a possible war, his calculations range not only over Europe, but to the East, where lie Holland's rich overseas possessions.

The main aim of an attack on Holland would be to cross her territory in the shortest time. Delay of only a few days would rob the attack of most of its value. In an age of airplanes and tanks, Holland will rely to a great extent on the classic defence which she used against the Spaniards in her fight for independence. The same element which has been her bitter enemy, held at bay with dykes, could be used as a friend in need. At the first alarm of invasion the waters would come sweeping in, and an attacker would find his troops and transport trapped in an inland sea. The latest indications are that Holland is about to extend her water defences along the eastern border. A new network of canals is to be started soon. The canals already in existence constitute a strong defence system.

The Dutch first lines of defence are the rivers. These run in such a way as to provide admirable positions for a defending force seeking to delay a south-westerly thrust into France. The entire frontier region is strongly protected with heavy artillery in concrete casemates, and small concrete 'strong points' scattered in a broad belt, extending back deeply from the border. Over a year ago Dr. Colijn spoke of this as 'a line of considerable strength.' Behind it run the canals. The Dutch military authorities have made

Holland, to turn the flank of the French armies, grown in attractiveness. It was time that the two partners in the Low Countries should know exactly where they stood with one another, and that any minor differences that still persisted, such as navigation rights for Belgian shipping on the lower reaches of the River Scheldt, and difficulties arising from the Flemish Separatist movement, should be cleared away while there was still time.

At the end of November 1938 King Leopold went to The Hague on a State visit. He took with him his Prime Minister, M. Spaak. In an article published in Holland on the day of King Leopold's arrival, Dr. Colijn, the Netherlands Prime Minister, wrote:

> This visit will do much to strengthen the solidarity and close co-operation of Holland and Belgium. As liberty-loving countries they will conduct a policy which has for its goal the preservation of their integrity. . . We wish to see the ties uniting the two nations become even more binding.

The ardent desire on the part of Holland to remain neutral to the last in thought and deed rules out any possibility of a formal pact being signed with Belgium for mutual defence. Not an alliance, but a steadily strengthening *rapprochement* is sought. Each country will retain full liberty of action. But, as a result of last year's conversations in The Hague, it is agreed that should war break out in Western Europe, both Holland and Belgium would 'pursue identical policies and take simultaneous action.'

Holland's determination to give no hostages to fortune, nor any excuse for complaint to even the touchiest of neighbours, is shown in her attitude towards possible violation of her frontiers by foreign troops. Holland refuses to commit herself on this question before she has to. It was declared in the Senate that the Netherlands Government reserved to itself the right of deciding whether foreign troops should be allowed passage across Dutch territory. Although in practice no Dutch Government would acquiesce to invasion, the question of what should be done if a foreign Power were to ask right of way to hurry to the help of a third party has been left open.

This caution in international affairs is typical of the Dutch temperament. Epitomising that temperament at its

THE DEFENCE OF HOLLAND

The anxiety with which the nations of Europe await the future is shared to the full by Holland. Long gone are the days when neutrality could be enjoyed merely by proclamation. In a sombre world the Dutch, too, must arm, make formidable financial sacrifices, and exert steady vigilance if they are to retain the peace and prosperity they so deservedly enjoy, and keep inviolate the frontiers of their highly civilised and cultured land. The reluctant distaste with which the average Englishman has forced himself to contemplate another great war as more than a remote possibility, and to accept as part of his life a multitude of warlike preparations makes him the more sympathetic to the Dutchman.

In the rising turbulence of international relations the Dutch look southward to another small nation, whose situation in many ways resembles their own. In the years immediately following 1918 there was no love lost between Holland and Belgium. Flushed with victory and the annexation from Germany of Eupen and Malmédy, Belgium was not in an accommodating mood. Friction between the two countries arose on many points. The passing of two decades has produced profound modifications. A milestone was reached in the autumn of 1936 when King Leopold made his resounding declaration of neutrality. The Dutch are a canny race. Did Belgium really mean it? Could the Belgian renunciation of military alliances be accepted as permanent? For two years the Dutch pondered the question. The exigence of events in 1938 helped to hasten their decision. Austria and Czechoslovakia crashed before their eyes. The growth in strength of France's Maginot Line, and of similar fortifications along Belgium's eastern borders, has meant a lessening of Dutch security. As a frontal attack upon France has become more unfruitful, in the estimate of the German General Staff, so has the idea of an invasion of

freedom of communications with North Africa. Great efforts are at the present moment being made to improve the state of territorial defence in the air, and of aviation generally. These efforts will be continued without relaxation, and the renewal of plant in war industries is also being undertaken, with a view to increasing output.

France has already incurred and covered defence expenditure amounting to :—

143,857,000,000 francs on the land army from 1919 to 1937.
43,444,000,000 francs on the navy from 1919 to 1937.
29,480,000,000 francs on the air force from 1929 to 1937.

or, say, 216,781,000,000 francs in all [1]

But the conclusion is unavoidable that, in view of the limits set by financial and industrial capacity, and by the numbers of her population, France will scarcely be able to do more in future than maintain the effort, without being in a position to increase it appreciably.

Without being in the secret of whatever the masters of the Rome-Berlin axis may have in mind, one may suppose that their design—in the event of its not being possible to achieve success, once again, without the use of arms—is to crush their adversaries successively by employing, this time, all their fighting forces.

In the event of France being exposed alone, at the outset of a sudden conflict, to an assault of the Rome-Berlin axis designed, by concentration of force, to bring about a swift decision, it would not portend well for subsequent operations if she were deliberately committed to the wastage of a defensive war, in which the best of her resources might be used up before the massive intervention of her possible allies. On the other hand, given her peculiar position, prompt aid, on a sufficient scale, brought to bear at the appropriate point, might enable her to achieve, within a relatively short time, a victorious conclusion of the conflict. This last point deserves consideration.

GALLICUS.

[1] These amounts are calculated without taking into account the successive devaluations of the franc.

accurate estimate, but they are certainly considerable. What is more important is the output capacity of German factories, which have been able to produce at the rate of a thousand aeroplanes a month since September 1938. In these circumstances it seems likely that the effective size of the Axis air fleets will be limited rather by the difficulty of training pilots capable of handling fighting aeroplanes which fly at 500 kilometres an hour.

France, as we have seen, has been preparing ever since 1935 to meet eventualities which have become more and more disturbing. If France were attacked by the forces of the Rome–Berlin axis on all fronts, which extend from the North Sea to the confines of Tunisia, one may suppose that Holland, Belgium and Switzerland would side with her, provided that their frontiers were also threatened. We have made a short inventory of the Axis forces; but what are the resources, all things considered, which France could instantly command?

As regards the land army her peace-time effectives amount to a total of about 600,000 men at home and overseas, including both French and native troops. This total will be increased by about 100,000 by a Bill to continue, beyond the 'lean years,' the system of two years' military service. With these effectives it will be possible to maintain in peace time, at home and in North Africa, a number of larger or smaller units detailed for the continuous occupation of the permanent fortifications. Further, it should be possible to prepare for a war-time army to take the field in sufficient strength to guarantee an effective defence of our frontiers. But there seems to be no prospect of exceeding the figures given above.

Any lengthening of the period of compulsory service in France would lead to an equivalent increase of military obligations by the Axis Powers. The disparity which now exists would still remain, but the cost of maintaining an armed peace, which already bears heavily upon our people, would be increased.

Thanks to the fortifications with which she has had the wisdom to protect herself, France is in a position to face any attack and to safeguard the integrity of her domains. Her battle fleet, which amounted to about 514,000 tons on July 1st, 1938, and which is highly trained, is able to ensure

efforts have been made to provide this army with up-to-date material and equipment, and to accumulate the stocks required for mobilised units. The Rheinmetall and Krupp factories are working three eight-hour shifts in order to make full use of their plant. The Skoda factories, though on Czechoslovak territory, will shortly pass, for practical purposes, under the control of the Reich and will enable production to be increased still further. Moreover, in order to have her hands free in the East, or in the South, Germany has, since last spring, accelerated the preparation of defensive positions extending from the Dutch frontier near Aix-la-Chapelle to Basle. These positions are believed to have been organised in great depth and to include thousands of concrete earthworks.

The German peace-time army is still tending to increase, and will probably equal the effectives of the Imperial Army which, in 1914, comprised fifty divisions, some of which could be duplicated on mobilisation. Italy, who cannot face a long war with her own resources alone, has formed a land army, equipped, as far as possible, with modern material and trained with a view to rapid and concentrated action. In September 1918 it comprised forty divisions at home and six divisions in Libya. It may accordingly be estimated that the combined forces of the Axis might succeed in launching against France, at the very outset, a mass of 150 divisions.

Communications are assured between the Reich and Italy directly by way of the Brenner; between Italy and Africa they require a sea passage of only a few hours and cannot in practice be cut, for the naval forces of Italy and the Reich are formidable and are being rapidly increased. The tonnage of ships in service and under age on July 1st, 1938, amounted for the Italian fleet to about 393,000 tons and for the German fleet to about 135,000. The building of ships of the line, now actively proceeding, will enable the Italian Navy to muster, by January 1st, 1943, four cruisers of 35,000 tons apiece, and the German fleet will comprise, at the same date, a minimum of two of 26,000 tons and two of 35,000 tons. In addition, the Italian fleet, which now contains a hundred submarines, will probably have 140 afloat in 1941 and would thus constitute a very real danger, in time of war, to the security of navigation in the Mediterranean.

As regards air forces, it is more difficult to make an

The Present Position and Future Prospects

The annexation of Austria, and especially that of the Sudeten territories, has profoundly modified the situation in Central Europe. The incorporation in the Reich of the Sudeten territories was, indeed, no more than an exploitation of the unprecedented success achieved by realising the Anschluss without striking a blow. The system of the Little Entente, patiently built up by France, was thrown out of gear at one stroke, and it would seem that the economic influence of the Reich must be expected to extend rapidly over Czechoslovakia, now deprived of her industrial districts, and over Hungary, which is an immense granary. There may be greater difficulties in the way of the formation, on the instigation of Germans, of an independent Ukraine, which would encroach alike upon the U.S.S.R., Poland, Roumania and Slovakia.

Poland and Hungary, supported by Italy, have attempted to obtain a common frontier in Slovakia, which might have become a barrier to the eastward extension of German influence. The attempt has apparently failed, but the difference between the German and Italian points of view on this question does not seem to have affected the solidity of the Axis. The Mediterranean and colonial claims of Italy have, in fact, been supported by the Reich.

Now that the liquidation of the Spanish question may give rise to fresh international complications, the Fuhrer appears as holding in his hands the destinies of Europe. He is variously supposed to be meditating an eastward extension of his successes or an early descent upon the West in order to take advantage of a favourable situation. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, even if he should first assure himself in the East of those resources in grain and oil which the Reich would need in time of war, he will eventually round upon France, which remains the one element of continental resistance, and attempt to bring her to her knees by every means that the Axis can command. What do these means amount to at the present time?

As regards land forces, the Reich, whose population has risen from 65,000,000 to 80,000,000 inhabitants, now has a peace-time army of more than 900,000 men. Considerable

a two years' period of service for the period of the 'lean years,' that is, until October 1st, 1939.

In each domain, on land, by sea and in the air, vigorous action is to be taken, and the expenditure voted for national defence during the period, including the Budget for 1939, amounts to about 116,000,000,000 and 600,000,000 francs.

The land army, as mentioned above, has completed and extended the Maginot line, in view of the possibilities of a sudden assault. Particular provision has had to be made for the permanent occupation of that line, and the difficulties which it occasioned, from the point of view of the effectives, have been solved as they arose, with the help of a temporary increase in the period of military service.

In the light of the somewhat fragmentary evidence provided by the Spanish war regarding the use of modern weapons, and particularly of anti-tank and anti-aircraft devices, fresh equipment has been perfected. Our system of tanks, based upon weight of armour, has proved to be the only one which gives results in a pitched battle, and it represents a decided technical advance upon the German and Italian material which has been seen in use on the side of the Spanish nationalists.

As regards the Navy, great efforts have been successfully made. Already, in 1932, it had been decided to build two battle cruisers of 25,000 tons apiece, which are now in service. In 1935 it was decided to build two more, of 35,000 tons, and still more recently two ships of the line of 35,000 tons have been added.

In the Air army there has been a series of plans, but a faulty conception, combined with bad organisation in the French auxiliary air services, left us, in 1938, in a relatively weak position which is in course of being remedied. The expenditure voted for the Air arm in 1939 amounts to more than 11,500,000,000 francs out of the 40,000,000,000 assigned in all to national defence.

Finally, the passing of a law, in July 1938, for the 'organisation of the nation in time of war,' has provided the opportunity for dealing with a great number of problems hitherto left in suspense, particularly the organisation of a War Cabinet of the High Command, and of 'passive defence.'

the use of the Air Arm and its decisive rôle gave rise to difficulties which subsequently caused the organisation of the High Command to become a very acute question indeed.

In the course of the post-war years, the conception of a 'totalitarian war,' which came to be accepted by everyone, was made the subject of comprehensive studies, but the organisation of the nation in war-time was scarcely begun, and practical progress was delayed for a long time, which only came to an end when, in 1935, a period of unprecedented crisis began.

The Period of Crisis

From 1935 onwards, events acquired a momentum which nobody in France could have foreseen.

In 1935 compulsory military service was re-introduced in Germany. The German professional army was soon to be transformed into a national army with large effectives—a transformation which had long been prepared. Some French conceptions, favouring the creation of a motorised and mechanised force consisting chiefly of professional soldiers, and designed to keep our possible enemies in check, ceased to be tenable in their original form. Such a force would no longer have been sufficient by itself.

In 1936 the re-occupation of the left bank of the Rhine brought the enemy into contact with the Maginot line, which just at that time—as we flattered ourselves—was on the point of being completed. This not only facilitated a sudden assault, but also increased, to an appreciable extent, the risks of a successful surprise attack from the air, which the rapid development of German aviation portends.

In 1937 the Abyssinian affair provided the occasion for an Italo-German rapprochement which paved the way to 1938. In the course of this year the Anschluss and the annexation of the Sudeten territories entirely changed, to our disadvantage, the situation in Central Europe and disturbed the balance of power.

In face of German rearmament and the Italo-German rapprochement, the necessary counter-measures are being taken. Already, in 1935, it had been decided, as confirmed by the passing of a law dated March 11th, 1936, to return to

detailed schemes and to various controversies about the extent of the line and its essential constitution.

In 1928 concrete experiments began which resulted, finally, between 1930 and 1933, in the construction of fortified areas in the Nord (Raismes–Mormal), at Metz and on the Lauter, besides defensive works along the Rhine and on the Alpine frontier.

As early as 1934 the prolongation of the north-eastern fortifications was envisaged, in the neighbourhood of Rohrbach, Montmédy, Maubeuge and Condé; and, in addition, the first draft plans were begun for the fortification of Southern Tunisia.

From 1935 onwards, the execution of these previous designs was actively pursued and a new extension of the northern fortifications was planned, from Maulde to the sea, and, eastwards, in Alsace and the Jura.

The extent of the fortified areas constructed from 1930 to 1933 was 80 kilometres in the Lauter districts, 120 kilometres around Metz, 30 to 40 kilometres (discontinuously) in the Nord, and 150 kilometres for the defence of the Rhine. These various fortified areas are now linked by field works, and it may be said that from the Jura to the North Sea we have a really continuous line of fortifications. The organisation of these positions has now been completed, and they are in a fit state to meet any attack.

The Navy used up its fleet in the course of the 1914–1918 war, and it had not been possible to replace units in time of war. At the Washington Conference of 1922 France ranked fourth, together with Italy, among the Naval Powers. The disappointment felt by the French Navy at that time was great, but did not prevent its vitality from finding expression in the reconstitution, to begin with, of its lighter craft, by dogged and silent work. In 1924 the representatives of the French Government in London refused to accept a revision of the Washington percentages as regards ships of the line, and in 1932 it was decided to proceed with the renewal of our line-of-battle fleet.

Until 1928, aviation was covered by the Ministries of War and Marine, so that up to that date a maximum of co-operation was assured. In 1928 the Air Army came into existence. It developed rapidly, but its theories regarding

The Post-war Period

On the morrow of the war, France commanded great military power and her security appeared to be amply assured for a long time to come by reason of her occupation, together with her Allies, of the left bank of the Rhine. In deference to the system of armament limitation, military establishments were adapted accordingly, and the period of compulsory military service was reduced, on April 1st, 1923, to eighteen months, and again, on March 31st, 1928, to one year.

The introduction of short-period service, and, in 1930, the evacuation of the Rhineland before the due date, had the effect of increasing the expenditure on national defence and of hastening the completion of a fortified barrier, close up to our north-eastern frontier, designed to protect the great industries in frontier districts and to mask the mobilisation of the nation in arms The result was that the expenditure sanctioned for national defence between 1919 and 1934 has been estimated at about 137,000,000,000 and 870,000,000 francs. The money was mainly applied, in the three domains of land, sea and air, to the purposes which may now be described.

The land army had a double task to fulfil. It had to serve as an unfailing reservoir for the forces engaged in operations abroad, and it had to adapt itself progressively to short-term service by preparing the mobilisation of the national army, of which, from now onwards, it was itself to be no more than the nucleus and the shield. The long series of campaigns by which complete pacification has been achieved in the Levant and in Morocco provided the younger generations of our effectives with a training which makes of them, together with the veterans of the 1914–1918 war, the flower of our army.

To compensate for a reduction in numbers, increased attention has been paid to quality, to the improvement of infantry armaments, and to motorisation and mechanisation. In this way the characteristic conception of 'French tanks' came gradually to be established. But the masterpiece of this period was the design and construction of the Maginot-Painlevé line. The idea goes back to the first days after the war, and between 1919 and 1927 it gave rise to a number of

THE FRENCH MILITARY PROBLEM

The position of France, at the western extremity of the European continent, entails the defence of land and sea frontiers which, though not equally exposed, are still considerable in relation to the extent of her territory. In addition, the integrity of her possessions in North Africa, and their communications with the Mother country, must be preserved, and the remaining colonies also need to be defended. The French, therefore, have to deal with a complex military problem which requires considerable forces on land, at sea and in the air.

From the end of the Great War until 1934, while conforming to changes of circumstance and to the trend of international policies, France always assumed the financial burden of maintaining her armed forces in the three domains of land, sea and air, at such a pitch of efficiency that she could face any contingency likely to arise. But during this period the problem presented itself in a comparatively simple form. Germany was, in effect, the only country to be considered—for the first period of Franco-Italian tension was never really acute—and Germany had not yet openly rearmed.

Since 1934 a series of events, following upon one another in rapid succession, has placed France in a new and more difficult position. In order to cope with a progressive aggravation of the international position, France has been compelled to put forth very considerable military efforts. This could not have been done by improvisation ; and when, in the near future, these efforts are brought to fruition, a great deal will be due to the laborious and often unrecognised preparations made in the years which followed upon the war. They were made, despite adverse currents of opinion, and they need to be explained if any clear account is to be given of military developments in France and of the present state of the military problems which are the subject of this article.

the German Admiralty, said: 'As soon as the enemy was compelled to adopt the convoy system, merchant shipping would become a legitimate object for attack, and thus a campaign by aircraft could be conducted without infringing international law.' He visualised the air arm as paralysing the economic system of an enemy by the destruction of harbours, dockyards, arsenals and fuel depots.

Colonel E. J. Carter, an officer of the Royal Tank Corps from its creation, later responsible for initiating the first cross-country formation of such machines in Egypt, and now a settler in East Africa, has recently emphasised the military dangers of extension of the Berlin-Rome Axis *viâ* Libya to Ethiopia and Tanganyika. Whereas the Italian troops in Libya could be readily reinforced in war, it would be extremely difficult to bring help to Egypt, since the Mediterranean would be closed by submarines to British troop transport. Yet the Valley of the Nile would be controlled by the force victorious in actions in the western desert. Tanganyika, if restored to Germany, would become the southern flank of the Axis, and the Dictator partnership would then control an unbroken line from the Baltic to the Indian Ocean, except for the intervening territories of the Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, which could easily be mastered, for the last two territories would find themselves between the German hammer of Tanganyika and the Italian anvil of Ethiopia—where Italy maintains a military force of some 100,000 Europeans and almost as large a number of Africans. In this way, and by sweeping clear the Indian Ocean and jeopardising the Cape route, the Axis Powers would cut into two inert halves the British Empire and the trade on which it lives.

F. S. Joelson.

for so young a Dominion, but its efficiency, and even its great expansion, could not prevent determined men from reaching targets the destruction of which would for long periods paralyse the transport, and therefore the whole co-operation, of virile communities which, if not so hindered, could be counted upon to make a valuable contribution in time of war.

The objectives given as examples would be from eight to fifteen hours' flight in good weather from the supposed aerodromes in the Cameroons, and the enemy plan would obviously be to descend as low as possible with the first streak of dawn for the dual purpose of escaping the unwelcome attentions of any defence and of giving the bomb-droppers the maximum prospect of success. For raids upon the great harbours of East and South Africa, the Germans could traverse the continent by flying-boats during the night, alight some miles at sea in the Indian Ocean, take to the air again before dawn, and, with engines shut off, power-dive on their objectives at daybreak without warning. Aircraft are developing wonderfully—as was strikingly shown at the end of last year when a British bomber formation flew some 7,000 miles non-stop—and within a few years flights more difficult than those indicated above will have become commonplace. It has also to be remembered that by reducing the bomb load the flying range can be considerably augmented; the general policy would doubtless be so to regulate the load as to enable the machines to return.

If Tanganyika Territory reverted to Germany, the above distances would shrink markedly. Mombasa and Nairobi could be reached in less than half an hour from German aerodromes, the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia in a couple of hours, Beira in about five hours, and Durban in ten. Thus, by suitably reducing the bomb load, even that last objective could be attacked without having to count on the loss of the machine.

Another consideration is that even to-day Italian bombers operating from Ethiopia and Libya could do a great deal of damage to vital points, including the Suez Canal, Alexandria, Cairo, Mombasa, and the Kenya and Uganda Railways.

What of the rôle of aircraft as destroyers of sea-borne trade? Admiral Gladisch, writing recently in the organ of

war in China, which has established her on the mainland opposite Hong Kong; thus it has been made feasible for her modern aircraft to bomb Singapore, which is still more seriously threatened by the occupation of the island of Hainan.)

The contingency of the development of a German naval base or bases in West Africa has not gone unnoticed in the United States of America, whose own Atlantic Fleet is based on Norfolk, Virginia, some 2,600 miles from the mouth of the Amazon. So long as the Atlantic Ocean has been controlled by the British Navy—that of America being employed chiefly in the Pacific—no fears have been felt, but the possibility of British capitulation to German Colonial clamour has aroused the feeling that, as a direct consequence, the Monroe Doctrine might one day be challenged. Americans are not likely to forget that Germany is already strongly entrenched in Brazil, where 1,000,000 men of German race are settled, that Germany has been allowed considerable scope in Brazil for development and organisation, and that trade relations have grown rapidly between that State and Germany.

To take aircraft, the leading Powers have in service to-day bombers which, flying at 200 miles an hour or more, and carrying at least a ton of bombs, have a range of fully 3,000 miles. Ignoring the important and easily reached harbours, towns and mines of West Africa, from the Cameroons to Mombasa, the only port of entry to Kenya and Uganda, or to the Sennar Dam, of such importance to the Sudan, is some 1,750 miles; to the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo (tremendously important in war) the distance is well under 2,000 miles; to the great gold mines of the Witwatersrand, 2,500 miles; to Beira, the ocean gateway to the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, rather less; to Delagoa Bay, Durban, Port Elizabeth or Cape Town, under the limit of 3,000 miles. In other words, given the willingness to sacrifice machines—but not necessarily their crews, who could take to their parachutes after performing the destructive duties assigned to them—it would be by no means impossible for modern aircraft operating from the Cameroons to destroy the vital ports, railways, bridges, dams and towns throughout the whole of East, Central and South Africa. The Union of South Africa, *it is true, is building an excellent Air Force*

exist in the Canaries, could be made most hazardous, perhaps impossible, if a neighbouring stretch of coast were in German hands. The cession of Togoland and the Cameroons, which would carry the projection of the Berlin–Rome-Libya Axis to the Atlantic, would encourage Germany to engage in new naval schemes and to build up great African armies as a counterpoise to the Colonial forces of France, which sets upon her African citizens a military value seldom recognised in this country, but not overlooked by the Dictator States. Whereas the metropolitan army of France is 300,000 men on a peace footing, the peace establishment of her Colonial forces is 260,000 men, and their strength would be quadrupled soon after the outbreak of war. To immobilise those reinforcements would be the task of the Italian Navy operating in the Mediterranean, and of German naval vessels in West African waters.

The Great Powers have to-day ocean-going submarines with a cruising speed on the surface of 9 knots, ability to travel submerged for about eighty miles at 4 knots, a radius of between 15,000 and 18,000 miles, and the capacity to stay at sea without relief for as long as four months.

From the Cameroons—which I take because it is the farthest removed of the West African territories from the ocean highways, and therefore least favourable to the plans I am about to postulate—to Pernambuco on the coast of Brazil is under 3,000 miles, so, even assuming that traffic from Asia, Australia and South and East Africa had been diverted as far west as the Brazilian coast, under-water craft from Duala or other convenient West African lairs could make the journey across the South Atlantic and back and still have an operating efficiency of from 9,000 to 12,000 miles. It has also to be borne in mind that while the range of submarines has been so greatly extended since the last war, the vulnerability of merchantmen has not been reduced.

It is approximately 4,000 miles from Tanganyika Territory, formerly German East Africa, to Singapore, and the great British naval base in the Far East would thus be well within range of action of German craft if any British Government permitted Germany to regain a hold on the East African coast. (Japan is about the same distance from Singapore, but her striking power has been brought much nearer by the

none but the gullible will be misled by the excuse that Germany is reluctantly driven to action by the wickedness of Russia. Is it surprising that informed opinion should interpret the German decision as the first move in a challenge to that naval supremacy which is the first condition of British survival? Is it rash to conclude that the objective is to reinforce Germany's ability to menace the sea communications of other Powers, particularly of Great Britain, France and the United States?—which, incidentally, must be immediately committed to a large expenditure for a corresponding increase in destroyers, escort vessels and patrol craft.

A very significant fact is that the controlled German Press has emphasised that the strengthened fleet—to which two more 'A' class, 10,000-ton, 8-inch-gun cruisers are likewise to be added, in addition to three such cruisers now building and due to be completed in 1939–1940—would 'ensure the security of the German *Lebensraum*,' a term of most convenient elasticity, used at times to mean Greater Germany, on other occasions to designate the south-eastern European territories which Germany covets, and quite often to embrace the former German Colonies.

The British Press, on the other hand, has almost ignored two facts of the deepest significance, namely, that during the crisis of September German submarines were identified in the South Atlantic, and that more than thirty Italian submarines were known to be off the Somali coast and in the Red Sea, making the approach to the Suez Canal a death-trap and threatening all shipping on the Indian Ocean. Thus, even with present territorial dispositions, arrangements were made for a renewal of that maritime barbarity which brought the United States into the last war, and which at one time brought Great Britain to the verge of famine.

If an adequate U-boat fleet were based on a new German West Africa, incalculable damage could and would be done to shipping bound between the Cape and Europe and South America and Europe, two highly important sea routes for the provisioning of Great Britain and France.

Again, the French West African Colonies are a reservoir from which France counts on drawing a great volume of man-power in dire emergency. The transfer of those troops, already threatened by the German submarine bases known to

she would then plead the need for new tonnage with which to defend such distant territory. By the 1935 Agreement she undertook to restrict her naval tonnage to 35 per cent. of that of Great Britain, and that same ratio was accepted generally for each category of warships, though there was a clause entitling Germany to equality of tonnage with the British Empire in respect of submarines; while holding out for that right of parity, Germany gave an undertaking not to exceed 45 per cent. of the British tonnage unless in her opinion changed circumstances made an increase necessary, and in such an event to discuss the subject with Great Britain. Now, on the pretext that Russia has concentrated on submarines, and perhaps because the stiffening of British opinion as a result of Nazi persecution of the Jews has persuaded Herr Hitler and his *entourage* that there is no present hope of success in the campaign for Colonies, Germany has announced her intention to construct more under-water craft, though she already possesses seventy-two (and Italy seventy) against Great Britain's sixty-nine built, building and authorised.

The German submarine tonnage is 31,000 and the British 74,000, and it was at first persuasively hinted that the Reich desired only a 10 per cent. increase in the form of ten new vessels, but that pretence was soon discarded. Thirty-three of her submarines, with a displacement of 250 tons, are classed as coastal craft, but that inoffensive description clearly discounts their capabilities, for some of them have visited Spain and Portugal, and are known to have carried out exercises in the neighbourhood of the Canary Islands—in other words, on the direct route from Europe to the Cape and at the western extremity of the Mediterranean. Then there are twenty-four so-called sea-going submarines in the 500-ton class, and fifteen ocean-going U-boats of 740 tons displacement. If the extra 43,000 tons now claimed were devoted to the present ocean-going category, fifty-seven more boats would be added to the submarine fleet, or eighty-five more if the sea-going type were preferred. In practice the extra tonnage will almost certainly be divided among the different classes, and the result may very well be that Germany will in time have a submarine fleet of considerably more than twice the number of ships possessed by Great Britain.

Submarines, however, do not fight submarines, and so

have a cruising range of 10,000 miles, and speeds of between 26 and 30 knots. The Reich has five such battleships—one brought into commission only a few weeks ago—whereas we have only three of similar speeds, and they are all much less modern than their German counterparts. Since they could obviously not be spared for duty in West African waters, the Germans would start with an enormous advantage at the outbreak of war.

Immense damage was done to British shipping in 1914 until the few scattered German cruisers operating from distant bases were sunk. That toll of havoc would be magnified many-fold by these much more formidable vessels and by modern submarines, and on account of the serious shrinkage of our mercantile marine we are far less able to stand the loss than we were twenty-five years ago. Prompt institution of the convoy system, far from reducing the hazards, would actually magnify them in the waters in which these swift battleships of the *Deutschland*, *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* classes were at large, for with their 11-inch guns and high speeds they could without risk to themselves easily sink both the convoying and the convoyed vessels.

The destructive capacity of these commerce-destroyers is to-day circumscribed by the need to return to German harbours for fuel, provisions, overhaul and docking; if, however, refuelling facilities were once made available in African territory under the German flag, their offensive power would be enormously intensified. So overwhelming is the danger, indeed, that Vice-Admiral C. V. Usborne, writing recently of the effects upon naval defence of the transfer of Colonies to Germany, and dealing only with this question of capital ships, arrived at the conclusion that, after taking into account the assistance which France might give, 'the naval balance could not be restored without new expenditure (by Great Britain) running into *hundreds of millions of pounds*.' Yet certain politicians and publicists, and many ill-informed but well-intentioned members of the general public, light-heartedly recommend the readmission of Germany to Africa!

It has long seemed evident that the Anglo-German Naval Agreements of 1935 and 1937—to which Herr Hitler has so often pointed as evidence of his pacific intentions—would be denounced if any Colony were granted to Germany, for

that even men prominently associated with African development have argued: 'We can give Togoland and the Cameroons to Hitler without jeopardising British safety.' That is an untenable proposition.

If peace is one and indivisible, so must be resistance to German Colonial claims. Give way in regard to one territory, and you have capitulated in regard to them all; for how can it be contended that it is morally justifiable to retain Tanganyika Territory if the Nazi claim—to my mind a purely cynical one of bluff and bluster—has been admitted in respect of, say, the Cameroons?

Strategically, it would be a great crime against the Empire, against France, and against the free nations of the world to allow the Swastika to be raised in either East or West Africa. There is much loose talk about the re-establishment of Germany in her former Protectorates under 'guarantees,' but I have never yet seen a definition of adequate safeguards, or met anyone who could explain how they would be enforced —or, indeed, anyone who professes a conviction that Germany could be trusted not to utilise African bases for military, naval and aerial purposes.

The grant of African territory to Germany would forthwith bring German militarism to Africa, and those who suggest that peace in Europe could and should be purchased by the cession of areas in Africa, are really asking that the sacrifice should be borne in the first instance by the populations which would exchange the freedom of British institutions for the harshness of totalitarianism, and, in the second place, that all States within striking distance of such German zones should add to their annual budgets enormous sums for their own defence, and still know that they would be in mortal danger. A great deal is written to-day about the perils of soil erosion: give Germany any foothold in Africa and she will begin to erode British, French, Belgian and Portuguese security.

To simplify matters, let us assume that Germany is permitted to re-hoist her flag in the Cameroons. Duala would at once become a fortified naval base, in which would be stationed ocean-going submarines and other commerce-raiding craft, including, say, one or more of the latest German diesel-engined battleships, which are recognised by our own naval authorities to have been built for commerce-raiding,

GERMANY'S COLONIAL CLAIMS: A BRITISH VIEW

IDEALISM and realism alike demand that Great Britain shall refuse to traffic in African populations and African territories.

First of the many strong arguments against surrender to Germany's strident claims to Colonies must be that of the welfare of the inhabitants, African, European and Indian, who would be greatly prejudiced by being brought under German administration, and whom we cannot honourably sacrifice in any such transaction. A few British publicists—none of whom has lived under German Colonial rule—busily propagate the idea that it was and would still be on a par with that of this country. My experience in East Africa certainly contradicted such comfortable theories, and there is a great volume of authoritative testimony, German no less than British, to support the view that German Colonial administration left so much to be desired that it would be nothing short of a crime to transfer to it once more millions of Africans who have now been under British, French or Belgian rule for approximately as long as their countries were under effective German administration; in the last two decades they have enjoyed a freedom and an expanding experience of local self-government of which it would be callous in the extreme to deprive them. Though my task is to depict the grave strategic dangers of the return of Germany to Africa, humanitarian objections need to be registered before attempting to deal with another vital factor: the dictates of self-preservation justify a British refusal to countenance the German pretensions, and the same policy is demanded by our trusteeship for the wellbeing of the inhabitants of the territories which Germany covets.

How urgent is the need to awaken attention to the grave risks entailed in the proposals of some schools of thought favourable to German ambitions is illustrated by the fact

The tradition of the Spanish army has always been pro-German and anti-French. Anti-British feeling, too, has always played a part in those circles where imperialism predominates. And whether Spain dreams of reconquering Bearn and the Roussillon, muses over the possibilities of expansion in Morocco and in West Africa in general, or plans the pacific penetration of Spanish America, it is always the democratic Powers it meets as its natural antagonists. A Conservative Spain intent upon reconstruction within its own borders might easily keep friendship both with the Axis and with the democratic Powers. An imperialist Spain hardly can. It may have to put up with much more foreign interference within its own borders than a modestly Conservative Spain might have to do. But, in exchange, it can struggle after the alluring reward of a sort of sub-empire under the Axis Powers, with no limits to its aspirations. Imperial dreams have always exerted a tremendous attraction upon the traditional rulers of Castille. After the defeat of 1898, J. Costa, the great reformer, challenged his countrymen 'to lock the tomb of the Cid with three keys and go and learn from Europe,' but the advice has not been heeded. Simple reconstruction appears to many as the drab business of despicable merchants. And imperialism constitutes the only firm link between Fascist Italy and Germany and Nationalist Spain. It is an essential link.

As it is, therefore, the forces of Fascism and Conservatism seem to be nicely balanced. In addition to exhaustion, this balance of forces is apt, for the time being, to work for the maintenance of the *status quo*, in other words of the personal rule of General Franco. He is as yet the best common denominator of forces which it might be difficult to keep united in any other form. There may be a restoration, and there may at the same time be formal steps towards Fascism. But at present it is very doubtful whether either the one or the other can be more than formal. The real destiny of Spain will work itself out very gradually, and not at first in the open. The final issue will depend not so much on forces working inside Spain as on those forces which, in the international arena, are preparing for a decision.

F. BORKENAU.

ploughs nor cows, and with no experience in the management of a real farm, needs not only tremendous capital investment but a long period of mass education. Besides, it is bound to meet solid resistance of vested interests. The Nationalists here are up against the same problem at which the Republicans failed.

The Church, the aristocracy, and the more conservative section of the army might be much strengthened by a restoration of the monarchy, and this mainly owing to the agreement reached by the two hitherto hostile monarchist groups, the Carlists and the Alphonsists. The Alphonsists have resigned their belief in a constitutional monarchy. The Carlists, or at least the majority of them, seem to have put up with a pretender of the Alphonsist line. Thus the conservative forces, hitherto split, are now apt to act as one solid block.

If Spain were left to herself, a restoration, and the more or less complete victory of the Conservative over the Fascist forces, would therefore be a fairly safe forecast. But the fact is that Spain is not left to herself, and that not always for those reasons which are most strongly emphasised. Franco will probably *not* need Italian garrisons to keep the country in subjection. In this respect the collapse of the Left from within has done his job. And Nationalism, in so far as it is primarily the desire of getting rid of foreign interference, will not become inoperative on that score. The internal difficulties within the Nationalist camp are perhaps more serious, but must not be overrated. The Fascist element among the Nationalists is naturally weaker than the Conservative one, and might completely collapse without foreign support were it not for one special reason: Spain's international aims. The Spanish Church, it is true, has always been more preoccupied with the desire of keeping heretical influences out of Spain than with the task of imperial expansion, and the Carlists have carried this attitude to the degree of aiming at a sort of Japanese seclusion. But the army was always strongly imperialist, and this is the point where the most conservative officers agree with the most extreme and revolutionary young men of the *Falange*. Moreover, on this point the aristocracy has always been with the army. On the economic side it is a remarkable fact that Spain, and especially Catalonia, is a capital exporting country.

Church and the higher and lower aristocracy are no weaker than the army itself. And an eventual restoration of the monarchy would add one more corporate body to the three already existing.

It is only the geographical distance between Germany and Spain which has allowed Spanish prelates to co-operate with German Nazis without any very serious hitch. The Spanish Church can brook the foreign Fascists as allies, preferring naturally the Italian version of Fascism to the German one. But never could the proud Church of Spain, used to laying down the law to kings, put up with a totalitarian régime in Spain itself These incompatibilities will become clearer after victory. The Church herself claims, and claims successfully, the right to decide in matters of faith and morals. The Spanish Church has always claimed schools for herself. One essential measure for every Fascist régime would have to be the nationalisation of the schools. The Church did, and again wants to supervise literature according to the rules of the Index congregation. It could not submit to a propaganda ministry. Besides, the Church, while constituting a solid block in matters of doctrine, is split up into a secular and regular clergy, the latter consisting of various orders, some of them, such as the Jesuits, extremely powerful and with strong international ties. A *Gleichschaltung* of the Spanish Church is inconceivable. A compromise after the Italian model is unlikely. The Spanish Church wants to rule.

The landed aristocracy represents a different problem, but a no less serious one. First of all the magnates, especially in the south, are still *de facto* feudal lords, who control the political administration through a system of local bosses, the *Caziques*. To break the economic and political power of these local rulers would need no less than a social revolution. Yet in a way the problem is urgent. Many of the generals and the modern-minded young vanguard of the Nationalist movement want to transform Spain into a strong imperialistic power. It could never be done on the basis of the wretchedness and illiteracy prevailing in more than two-thirds of Spain owing to the existence of *latifundia*. It is for this reason that many Nationalists, especially of the younger generation, are sincere partisans of an agrarian reform. But such a reform, in regions of dry farming with a peasantry owning neither

during the war has evolved a rough and ready military administration, but gradually, faced with broader problems, had step by step to extend its hold over civilian life. Hence two problems: first, to find the civilian elements apt to transform the rule of an army in revolt into a stable political system; and second, to make the army itself, the original master of Nationalist Spain, comply with the inevitable limitation of its functions. It is the second problem which so far has constantly come to the surface, because the army holds the immediate material attributes of coercion. A Fascist leader, once he has successfully caught the imagination of the masses, can hardly have serious competitors within his own party. A general, and especially a Spanish general, heading a *pronunciamento*, is apt to be regarded by his colleagues as only a *primus inter pares*. Franco has had lots of trouble with various commanders, especially with General Queipo de Llano in the south. These personal rivalries, so characteristically Spanish in their strange lack of co-ordination within the army (contrasted with excessive *esprit de corps* as against all civilians), may at any time become politically significant as exponents of various political conceptions and groups.

It is true that the term 'political group' in the ordinary sense of the word does not apply in Franco Spain. Not only has the formation of political parties been formally prohibited, but, and this is more important, there are no mass movements likely to disagree and to divide. It is not any rift within the mass following of the official party which Franco has to fear. For it is not the masses who in his camp are vocal and articulate. His real backing, strength and problem consist in the old established orders, whose authority and cohesion has not been shattered in Spain as in other countries by a century of Liberalism and democracy. Spain, with the exception of Catalonia, Valencia and the Basque country, remains half medieval and half feudal. It is full of independent forces never fully subdued to the State. If Spain were ever to become Fascist it would have to make a clean sweep of all these forces of the past. That the Franco movement would never do, however much some elements in the Nationalist camp may want to do it.

The army itself is one of these traditional orders. The

imbued with the proud Castilian spirit of militancy, will remain unforgotten. But Madrid, a purely administrative and intellectual centre, with no industry, and the surrounding countryside a real desert, cannot have any political strength of its own, unless representative of other sections of the country.

Thus it is the hour of the Nationalists not only in the physical and military, but equally in a political sense. The masses who fought against them may not receive them with enthusiasm, but will tolerate them rather with acquiescence than with subdued hostility. The Nationalists have now a real chance of ruling the country. The problem is: how will they use this chance?

The first and main question naturally is: of what nature is their movement? Are they Fascists? Do they represent the extreme wing of political Catholicity? Is their movement merely a covering for a military dictatorship, one of the many traditional Spanish *pronunciamentos?* It is not an abstract problem of political sociology. A correct forecast of political developments in Spain depends on a correct answer.

The propaganda on both sides is agreed to describe the Franco camp as 'Fascist.' Yet, in these times, if Communists and Nazis agree upon some point the chances are that it is just the contrary of the actual position. The Nationalist camp acknowledges General Franco as the supreme leader and recognises only one party, the unified *Falange nacional—tradicionalista.* The trade unions have been subordinated to the administration, the Press has been more or less transformed into an obedient mouthpiece of official propaganda. But here the analogy ends. General Franco, as already said, is not a political leader, but a successful general; the party, not his personal following, but a combination of the political groups backing the army. Here lies the crux. The Nazi formula is 'the party rules the State' (including the army). The formula of Nationalist Spain would be: the army rules the State (including the party). This is no small difference. Political systems are best defined by their origins. Franco Spain originated in the rising of the army.

It is from this fact that spring the crucial problems of the Franco régime, totally different in kind from those of any Fascist country. Here is a military dictatorship which

But they never lost sight of the fact that their aims differed essentially from those of other sections of the Left, and they regarded themselves not as subordinates to a central Government, but as allies of other political movements. When the last stretch of Basque territory had been conquered the remnants of the Basque army capitulated, refusing to defend Socialist Asturias. As likely as not their heroic defence and their cohesion to the last moment will leave a mark upon the history of their little country, but one of local importance only.

Catalonia represented the opposite case. There nationalism fostered constant jealousies between the Catalan and the central Government with the result that Catalonia decidedly refused to pull her full weight in the struggle. One of the reasons for this entirely negative attitude was the absence of a common ideal uniting all classes of the population. Catalonia has always been the chosen ground for the class struggle in Spain, with the result that Catalonia, while unwilling to contribute her share to the common struggle, was at the same time paralysed within her own borders. Here lies the root of the failure to develop a strong armaments industry, an inexcusable omission which contributed to the final disaster. The insufficient output of munitions, in its turn, affected disastrously the food situation, because funds went to the buying of armaments which might have gone to the importation of food. While the Anarchists were playing at social revolution during the first half of the war, the Catalan Government, during its second half, was constantly on the look-out for opportunities of a separate peace with Franco. In the end essential positions proved to be unfortified and those troops which seriously defended Catalonia during the last weeks were almost wholly non-Catalan. The surrender of Barcelona, the traditional centre of Spanish Leftism, without a fight is in itself a major disaster for the Left. Without a strong mass movement in Barcelona the Left can never have any chance in Spain. And the political forces of Barcelona have been wrecked for a long time, as much at least from within as from without.

At the moment of writing the fate of the central zone is not yet decided. Madrid, with a small proletariat, little class struggle, a Liberal tradition of long standing, and

would Franco rule these, his former enemies, after his victory?

There is little doubt that in the outcome he will find this task easier than it appeared at any time during the war. For there is little doubt that the way in which the Republican régime collapsed in the end has ruined the validity of its ideals in the eyes of large masses. The last act of the tragedy was doubtless due to sheer hunger and to the material superiority of the Franco army. Yet material defeat is not everything. The really great ideals in history have invariably lived through many defeats without perishing. It is legitimate to doubt, however, whether any of the groups on the Spanish Left will survive the shock of disaster. Their negative record is too great, their constructive achievement too insignificant, their final collapse was too sudden and shattering. It would be disastrous if the undoubted material superiority of Franco's army were now made an excuse for not looking these unpleasant facts in the face

The fate of the Left is due to two main causes: to national and to class antagonisms. Under the first heading fall the difficulties of Basques and Catalans with the central Government; under the second the interminable rifts between Anarchists, Communists and Liberals. Let us take the national problem first.

Among the Republican forces, the Basques, to everybody's surprise, have undoubtedly the best record; surprisingly because nobody would have expected a very stubborn resistance on the part of a national movement which was only just emerging—Basque, like Irish and Hebrew, has been largely artificially revived during the last two decades—and at the bid of a party such as the Basque autonomists who, before 1936, were regarded as belonging much more to the Right than to the Left. Yet the Basques offered resistance no less heroic than Madrid, and with this difference, that they had no International Brigades to help them. The fact is that Basque nationalism aims much less at the independence of a linguistic community than at a well-defined social ideal. The Basques went to war because they stood for conservative democracy and for a co-operative ideal in the face of military dictatorship; they would have gone to war with the other side had they been threatened with an Anarchist rising.

THE SITUATION IN SPAIN

AMONG the many characteristics which distinguish General Franco's movement from Fascism and Nazism, his method of winning power is perhaps the outstanding one. Hitler and Mussolini rose to power on the crest of a violent mass movement, with little or no physical resistance on the part of their adversaries. As against this *political* conquest of power by the Fascist dictators, Franco has come to the top by *military* means as leader of an army, conquering the country against tremendous mass resistance in a long drawn-out civil war. If the demagogic appeal of a leader to the masses is an essential element of Fascism, then Franco's régime is certainly not Fascist. He acquired power with little talking and much fighting; they with an enormous amount of talking and practically no fighting at all.

This military method of solving political problems seemed, however, to involve serious political difficulties. As a result of the civil war it was estimated Franco at the decisive moment would find the masses united, not behind him, but against him. The rising of the army found a real and enthusiastic mass backing only in Morocco and in a few small and thinly populated regions such as Navarre, where Carlist influence predominated. The *Falange*, the Fascist party proper, consisted at the moment of the rising of not more than a small nucleus of younger officers, university students and similar elements, many of them dashing and well-meaning, but uninfluential and inexperienced. It has since been swamped by hundreds of thousands of recruits of dubious sincerity and forced into a formal merging with the Carlists at the bid of Franco. The real forces behind Franco were not the masses but the classes, the army, the Church, the aristocracy, the police and civil service, the Guardia. The masses were, to a very large extent, on the other side, bombed, machine-gunned and executed. How

Governors; the meticulous reservations; the safeguards for the minority communities; all the elaborate machinery for obviating breakdowns which bulks so largely in the relative sections of the Act—these have proved to be for the most part exactly what those who designed them hoped that they would turn out to be, namely, unused weapons relegated to an armoury as provision for an emergency which may never arise. The actual day-by-day working of the Provincial Constitutions has satisfied the Congress that, whatever constitutional theory may have to say, the substance of real power vests with the popular representatives. For this reason the attitude of the Congress leaders towards the federal sections of the Act has undergone a certain modification, although the election of Mr. Bose must be taken to show that this process has not yet greatly affected the attitude of the rank-and-file.

But it is important at this stage to remember that no very precise parallel is to be drawn between Provincial and Central conditions. Congress opinion points out that in the Provincial Constitutions there is no Upper House which shares the power of the purse with the Lower House; that there are no reserved subjects in the Provinces; that no subject in the Provincial range, corresponding in importance to railways or currency and exchange, is handed over to outside authorities like the Federal Railway Board or the Reserve Bank of India; that the provisions for financial stability which figure prominently in the Central Constitution do not appear in the Provincial Constitutions; and that in the Provinces both Houses of the Legislature, where they exist, are directly elected. There can be little doubt that these distinctions have been drawn with perfect honesty, although Congress is probably concerned to dispel the comfortable belief that because it consented to accept office, after delays, hesitations, and wranglings, in the Provincial Governments, therefore its ultimate acceptance of office in the Federal Constitution laid down by the Act may also be considered inevitable.

(To be concluded.)

L. F. Rushbrook Williams.

even by those who enunciate them; but the very fact that they are being publicly put forward testifies to the degree of alarm and uncertainty which prevails in the minds of many Moslem leaders in India.

The developing antagonism between the Congress and the Moslem League has had important consequences for the regimentation of Indian opinion. Congress has had to give up, for the present at least, any hope of enlisting organised Moslem opinion as its ally in the conquest of further fields for popular administration in the Central Government. Indeed, it now seems clear that such sections of Moslem opinion as are controlled by the Moslem League must be reckoned, for the present at any rate, among the strongest opponents of Congress policy. This is a serious matter for the Congress 'High Command.' At the moment there is very little effective political opposition to the Congress throughout India. The opposition in the Provincial Legislatures is largely an opposition of groups and classes, and were the Congress Ministries to be defeated, there would, in the majority of the Provinces where they are in power, be a real difficulty in securing a stable government. But should the forces antagonistic to Congress policy and Congress ideals be given a solid nucleus round which to rally, such as might be provided by a strongly organised Moslem League, the position might become very different. The danger has become more acute with the approach of federation.

It is no derogation from the political acumen of many Congress leaders to remark that, although they continue to protest with great vehemence that they and their followers will never accept office under a Federal Constitution such as is envisaged by the Act, they nevertheless proceed to form their long-term plans on the assumption that something like this type of federation will materialise, and that, when it does, they must be ready to take advantage of it in a thoroughly practical manner. There can be little doubt that, despite protestations to the contrary, the experience which the Congress has undergone in the control of Provincial Governments has exerted a very marked effect upon the approach to the Constitution as a whole. On the face of it the structure of the Provincial Governments looked extremely unpromising from the Nationalist standpoint. Yet the discretionary powers of the

exponent of Indian Moslem views would entail the virtual abandonment of the numerous Moslem supporters of the Congress, whose loyalty to Nationalist ideals, as set forth by that body, had hitherto prevented them from joining the Moslem League.

The negotiations between the Moslem League and the Congress thereupon broke down, and relations between the two bodies have since been very strained. The Moslem League has redoubled its activities and has increased its membership. It has vigorously espoused the cause of Moslem minorities in Provinces ruled by Congress Governments, and has not hesitated to denounce any instance which it can discover of alleged differentiation to the disadvantage of members of the community. It is particularly critical of what it calls the 'Fascist' and 'undemocratic' character of the Congress 'High Command,' and, with the traditional leaning towards unit-autonomy which we have noticed as characteristic of Moslem opinion, it has vigorously denounced as oppressive, dictatorial and unjustifiable the attempts of the Parliamentary Sub-committee of the Congress to ensure that Provincial Congress Governments do not depart from the broad lines of All-India Congress policies. It has even threatened to turn against the Congress one of Congress' most favoured weapons by initiating campaigns of passive resistance against the Governments of Hindu-ruled Provinces and States. This threat has already succeeded in terminating Hindu passive resistance—which has been widely condemned—in the excellently administered State of Hyderabad.

Indeed, the genuine alarm now characteristic of Moslem opinion in India has gone further. There is talk of an attempt to draw the predominantly Moslem Provinces together into an organisation which shall be distinct from the rest of India. One proposal envisages a confederation of the Moslem Provinces, with its own organisation at the top, which would subsequently be prepared to negotiate with the (assumed) predominantly Hindu federation of the rest of India. Another scheme goes further, and would attempt to translate into terms of reality the old Islamic dream of Pakistan—a federation, extending beyond the confines of India, of the Moslem States of the Middle East. It is not clear at the moment of writing how far these projects are taken seriously,

between Hindu and Moslem opinion, which is now so painful a feature of public life in India, is in large measure an unexpected by-product of the successful working of Provincial autonomy. For an appreciable period there was a prospect that the Congress and the Moslem League might make common cause and draw together in an alliance to put pressure upon the British; first, with the object of securing what was called 'real responsibility' at the Centre; and, secondly, for the exclusion of the Indian States' representatives and the remodelling of federation on a purely British Indian basis. But when the Provincial elections took place, and Congress secured an absolute majority in five Provinces, and found itself the largest single party in two others, the focus of opinion, both Hindu and Moslem, began to alter. As a result of the instability of non-Congress Ministries in two further Provinces, Congress was in virtual control in the course of the year 1938 in nine out of eleven Provinces, leaving only Bengal and the Punjab as specifically Moslem-ruled units. Lively apprehensions were excited among the Moslems, and the Moslem League began to assume a more militant attitude. In the middle of 1938 the Executive Council of the Moslem League announced that the Congress Party represented only Hindus, and that the League was the sole organisation which could speak for Moslems. It presented an ultimatum to Congress, demanding that all matters concerning Moslems should be left in its own hands, and that all Congress activities involving Moslems should be carried on only with the consent of the League. Moslem rights and practices were not to be interfered with; the use of Urdu was not to be curtailed; the Communal Award was to be honestly accepted by the Congress, and statutory enactments were to guarantee various other claims of the Moslem community. Only on these conditions would the League make a working alliance with the Congress. Somewhat naturally it was impossible for Congress to accept these demands. To recognise the Moslem League as the only organisation which could speak for Moslems would be tantamount to an acknowledgment that the Congress was a purely Hindu organisation. This, of course, would stultify the Congress claim, so often reiterated, to speak for the Indian Nationalist movement as a whole. Again, to recognise the Moslem League as the authoritative

new Constitution on the more radical ground that it had been imposed by Britain and was not Indian-made. Mr. Nehru and his supporters are still in a minority in the Congress, and, despite his personal prestige, the Right Wing has tended to discount his sweeping condemnation in favour of their own more detailed criticisms. Nevertheless, the Congress 'High Command' went so far with him—and for the matter of that, still go so far with him—that they are emphatic in holding that the Central institutions provided by the Act are wholly unacceptable. Mr. Bose, last year's Congress President, stated that if there were any question of the Congress accepting office in an unamended Constitution, he would resign his position in order to head the opposition. His re-election this year as President, as against the 'Right Wing' candidate favoured by Mr. Gandhi, has been a blow to Mr. Gandhi's prestige: and indicates some reaction, among the rank-and-file of the Congressmen, against the dictatorial policy of the 'High Command' as well as against their 'Right Wing' tendencies. At the moment, the working unity of the Congress appears in some danger.

Prior to the institution of Provincial autonomy, both Hindu and Moslem opinion found, as we have seen, many objections to the new Constitution. But even at this stage their opposition was based upon differing grounds. An illustration of this is provided by the reasons cited by Hindus and Moslems respectively to justify their opposition to the participation of the Indian States in the federal legislatures. The Hindus disliked the representation of the States primarily because the choice of representatives vested in 'autocratic' rulers. The Moslems, on the other hand, in their opposition to partnership with the Indian States, were animated primarily by communal considerations. Since the majority of States are ruled by Hindu Princes, the Moslems expressed the fear that the representation of the States in the Central Legislature would still further increase the Hindu predominance in that body, and the suggestion was from time to time put forward that the association of the Indian States with the new Constitution would be unremittingly opposed by Moslems unless the States were in a position to guarantee that one-third of their representatives would be adherents of Islam.

It is important to recognise that the growing divergence

hostile to the scheme of federation as laid down in the Act. But the violence of the opposition to particular provisions of the Act has tended to vary from time to time, and no analysis of the present groupings of opinion in India will be intelligible which does not take some account of these alterations in stress.

The Congress, in voicing its opposition to the federal scheme which now holds the field, claims to speak for the entire Indian Nationalist movement, Moslem as well as Hindu. But a significant development of the last two years has been an increase in membership of the Moslem League, largely guided by the forceful personality of Mr. Jinnah, and the strenuous insistence by this body that it alone represents Indian Moslem opinion. It may be doubted whether even to-day the total membership of the Moslem League exceeds in numbers the Moslem members of the Congress party; but it is undeniable that the Congress as a whole is under predominantly Hindu leadership, and its Moslem membership, though doubtless capable of exerting an influence where communal questions arise for consideration, is definitely subordinate to the Hindu majority. The claim of the Moslem League to emphasise the typically Moslem point of view is not therefore offset by the more representative character of the Congress organisation. The division of opinion, typical of the Hindu and the Moslem point of view, upon such questions as the relative allocation of power between the Centre and the units, has already been explained; but prior to the institution of Provincial autonomy, both Hindu and Moslem exponents of Indian Nationalism found much in common to attack in the federal portions of the Government of India Act.

The main indictment brought by Hindus and Moslems alike against the Constitution as set out in the 1935 Act may be summed up in the statement that from their point of view it appeared undemocratic. They objected to the safeguards with which Provincial autonomy was hedged; they objected to the division of functions between reserved and transferred powers in the Central Government, and they objected to the weighted representation of the Indian States both in the Upper and Lower Federal Houses. In addition to which the Left and Socialist wings of the Congress, under the leadership of Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. M. N. Roy, attacked the

distinction and exceptional capacity as do the Indian Liberals; but, despite their personal prestige, they count but little in comparison with the mass movements which the Congress can command. From time to time, as when the Congress boycotted the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, the Indian Liberals have exercised a very valuable directive force upon Indian history. It is possible that they may do so again, for, although they are derided by their Congress opponents as voices crying in the wilderness, the 'voices' have in recent years had an uncomfortable habit of prophesying correctly, whether as against the British Government or as against the Congress Committees. The attitude of the Indian Liberal Federation at the present juncture shows all the signs of the clear-sighted realism generally characteristic of it. It is not pressing for any immediate amendment of the Government of India Act, but for the institution of such modifications, within the four corners of the Act, as would commend themselves to progressive Indian opinion. That much may be done by the interchange of assurances as to the use which will be made of the reserved powers, the special responsibilities, and the clauses dealing with commercial discrimination, has already been indicated by the experience of the working of the Provincial Constitutions. On paper, as Nationalist opinion from the first pointed out, the Provincial Constitutions lay open to most serious criticism. Yet, in fact, when the new popular Governments took office in response to official assurances, it was apparent that the substance of power vested forthwith in the Cabinets. The Indian Liberal Federation has this analogy clearly in mind, and also realises that until the Federal Centre is inaugurated, its practical, as opposed to its theoretical, defects cannot be discovered; and until they are discovered they cannot be remedied. In addition to this, the Indian Liberal Federation has made it clear that it perceives another fundamental fact, namely, that the readiest way to remove the obstacles to popular control, which some sections of the Act create, is to acquire the power which other sections of the Act confer.

With the exception of the Mahasabha and the Liberal Federation, neither of which can be reckoned as a tangible political offset to the immense weight on the other side, British Indian opinion, both Hindu and Moslem, is definitely

necessity for this unity as the only means by which the stirrings of national consciousness could be given due expression.

Lord Linlithgow's insistence upon the function of federation in promoting the unity without uniformity upon which sound political progress in India has already rested was well timed, but a considerable volume of criticism was evoked by his plain announcement of the determination of His Majesty's Government to institute, without amendment of the Act, the particular variety of federation laid down in 1935. For this particular type of federation has found little support among organised opinion in India. Two exceptions to this statement are presented by the Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian Liberal Federation. The Hindu Mahasabha is in essence a religious body, whose main object is the preservation of the Hindu religion in its full orthodoxy. It is by no means divorced from political activities on communal lines, and has, moreover, interfered with greater zeal than discretion in the relations between Hindus and Moslems both in British India and in the Indian States. But in consequence of its religious affiliations it has little sympathy with the reformist tendencies of the Left Wing sections of the Indian National Congress, and despite the respect which it holds for the personality and ideals of Mr. Gandhi, has not hesitated to differ from him upon important points connected with his programme for the removal of 'untouchability' among the depressed classes. The Mahasabha's general concentration upon religious matters, and its prevailing anti-Moslem complexion, probably suffice to account for its general support of the federal structure outlined in the Government of India Act —a structure which, it doubtless considers, gives to the Hindus a guarantee of a substantial majority at the Centre.

The other body which is prepared in the last resort to support the British Government in introducing the federal portions of the 1935 Act as they stand—though it advocates amendment in certain particulars—is the Indian Liberal Federation. The Indian Liberals, despite their individual brilliance, do not carry sufficient weight throughout the country as a whole to enable them effectively to combat Congress policies. There can be few political parties in the world which contain so high a proportion of men of individual

strong criticism from the Congress rank and file, it seems certain that if the activities of the Parliamentary Sub-committee of the Congress had been less effective, the apprehensions expressed by Hindu opinion in the early discussions of the new Constitution would have been justified; and the driving force of the Congress, as the exponent of the most vocal and most highly organised section of the Indian Nationalist movement, being dissipated into purely local channels, would have been diverted from its principal, if self-constituted, task of acquiring complete control over the destinies of the country.

This examination of sectional predilections affords a clue to much of what otherwise would be obscure in the development of opinion regarding the federal structure contemplated in the Government of India Act. It was perhaps inevitable, in view of the compromise nature of many of its provisions, that the Constitution shortly to be inaugurated should have few friends, except the British who framed it. Fortunately, perhaps, these friends are both staunch and powerful. Both Lord Zetland, as Secretary of State, and Lord Linlithgow, as Viceroy, have from time to time enunciated the determination of His Majesty's Government to secure the inauguration of the federal structure as soon as circumstances may allow; and it is pretty clear from these pronouncements that 'circumstances' in this instance has an administrative connotation. In other words, the delay which has supervened between the commencement of Provincial autonomy and the hitherto unachieved next step has been caused, not by any doubts or hesitations regarding the rightness of the step itself, but by the enormous mass of exploratory and preliminary work which needs be accomplished by the officials before the great change-over can be made.

In a speech delivered towards the end of last year, Lord Linlithgow gave public expression to the faith of His Majesty's Government in the scheme of federation envisaged in the Act. He stated that the consideration of dominant importance in the minds of the framers of the federal scheme was the unity of India. He displayed some concern lest the success of Provincial autonomy should lead to increasing manifestations of centrifugal tendencies which might mar the unity of the country; and he laid particular stress upon the

States; but, as we shall see, it was some considerable time before this fact was realised, and, even now, the alliance has scarcely emerged into the field of practical politics.

It may be remarked in passing that the apprehensions which Hindu opinion has expressed regarding the dangers which Provincial autonomy might present to the continued existence of a strong Nationalist movement are by no means without foundation; and if at the moment of writing there are few signs that the influence of the Congress throughout the country has suffered by the dissipation of energies inevitably accompanying acceptance of office in the Provincial Governments, it is because effective steps have been taken to counteract the danger. Much has been written—and not without some justification—adversely concerning the so-called 'Congress dictatorship,' but the reasons for its existence are not always understood. In the judgment of Hindu Nationalist leaders, the delay which has ensued between the institution of Provincial autonomy and the completion of the Constitutional structure by the inauguration of Federation has made it necessary to institute definite machinery to counteract the centrifugal tendencies developed by the absorption of Provincial Congress leaders in the local problems with which their new responsibilities oblige them to deal. The task which the Congress 'High Command' has set itself has been to control, by rigid application of party discipline, the policy of those Provincial Cabinets which are staffed by Congress adherents; to maintain at all costs the unity of the Hindu Nationalist movement, and to make the approval of the Working Committee of the Congress an essential element in the stability of each Provincial Government. These difficult tasks have not been accomplished without considerable friction. There have been loud complaints from Provincial Cabinets that their discretion in local affairs is being overridden. Indeed, certain actions of the 'High Command' have been exceedingly ill-judged: witness the attempt to force Hindi upon Madras, a Dravidian-speaking province, and the arbitrary treatment of Dr. Khare when Premier of the Central Provinces—which was accompanied by a disingenuous attempt to lay the blame upon the Governor, who had behaved with entirely constitutional propriety. But despite these and other incidents, which have brought their punishment in

British Indian claims received a powerful reinforcement from the decision of the third party, the Indian States, that they could not contemplate federation with a Central Government which was not of a Responsible Parliamentary type. Finally, the Indian States, as is only natural, have shown themselves deeply concerned with the preservation of real autonomy among the federating units.

Again, on the great question which besets the framers of every federal constitution, namely, the division of power between the centre and the units, the three parties to the new plan have put forward slightly varying conceptions. The British Government has from the first been convinced of the necessity of securing 'a strong Centre,' even possibly at the expense of the federating units. British Indian opinion has been divided, mainly on communal lines. Hindu leaders throughout the Round Table Conference discussions pressed for the vesting of great authority in the Central institutions. For this there were several reasons. In the first place, it was felt that ultimate control over such vital matters as Defence, Finance, Foreign Relations and Communications should vest in a single Centre in which Hindu numerical preponderance would ensure Hindu influence sufficient to carry the Nationalist campaign to victory. Secondly, Hindu opinion has always been traditionally sensitive to the charge that India is a continent and not a country; and there was wide apprehension lest overmuch autonomy in the units would undo the centralising tendencies of British rule—tendencies which the Congress has itself utilised as the foundations of its claim to speak on behalf of all India.

In contrast to Hindu opinion, Moslem opinion has always regarded the conception of a strong Federal Centre with doubt and apprehension. For, despite any concessions which can be made to the political importance of the Moslem community by such devices as the Communal Award, the numerical disparity between Hindus and Moslems must remain so great as to give the Hindus an effective majority in the Central institutions. Thus the Indian Moslems, by the very circumstances in which they are placed, find themselves inevitably driven to support the claims of local units in the division of power with the Federal Centre. In taking up this attitude, their natural allies might well have been the Indian

the absence of an authority extensive enough to co-ordinate the activities of the semi-autonomous units into which, for many functions of administration, the country is naturally divided. The desire for such co-ordination has acted as a powerful, if sometimes unrecognised, reinforcement to the creation of many Empires in the past; and not least to the rapid extension of the British dominion.

Thus to-day we find in India a curious anomaly. Federation for the whole country is widely recognised as inevitable, at the very moment when the particular federal machinery envisaged in the Act is bitterly attacked. The result is a certain unreality in contemporary political discussion; a tendency to ignore the very large measure of fundamental agreement as to ends which is common to all parties; and to concentrate upon the bitter differences which have revealed themselves regarding the particular means by which these ends may be achieved.

The much-criticised complexities of the new Government of India Act are the inevitable result of an attempt to formulate legally the inter-relation between three principal ideas: a federal structure for India as a whole; the institution of Responsible Government of a Parliamentary type in the Federal Centre; and the preservation of Local Autonomy in the federating units. Corresponding with these three ideas are the three parties to the new Constitution: Great Britain, British India, and the Indian States. It is surely no mere coincidence that in the protracted discussions which gave birth to the new Constitution, each of the three collaborating parties should have laid stress upon one in particular of the co-ordinated ideas. From the first it is the British Government which has been concerned to lay the greatest stress upon the federal conception. The reasons for this are obvious. The experience of the British in India has shown conclusively that the co-ordination of All-India interests by a Government at once sufficiently strong and sufficiently representative to hold the country together is a prime essential of India's advance to full participation in the Commonwealth conception. British India, on the other hand, preoccupied with its struggle for self-government, has throughout laid stress upon the necessity for Parliamentary responsibility in the Federal Centre. In the discussions turning round this conception,

INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

A Survey of Opinion in British India and the Indian States

I

The majority of India's present-day political problems centre round the details of the Constitution laid down by the Government of India Act, 1935, particularly round the federal structure, which is perhaps its most characteristic feature. But an essential clue to the present acute differences of opinion in India will be missed if a distinction is not made between federation in general as a constitutional device, and the particular scheme of federation which the Act envisages.

It is clear that some system of federation offers the only practical means of holding the country together. The variety of ethnic types, the diversity of cultures and the multiplicity of languages have combined with the great size of the country to militate against all attempts to maintain in being a unitary form of government. Long before means of communication had been so far perfected as to overcome the purely physical difficulties, the tradition of local separatism had become too firmly established to be challenged. In such circumstances indiscriminate over-centralisation can only produce restlessness—a fact which the British fortunately discovered, although not a moment too early. Yet the prophets of disaster who fear that provincial autonomy and Statal independence may combine to threaten the hardly won realisation that there exist, throughout the length and breadth of India, governmental functions in which uniformity is necessary, may take comfort from the lessons of Indian history. An insistence upon the fundamental unity of India is among the most deeply rooted assumptions of Indian political thought. At no period has India willingly condoned

lated, since, for reasons which I cannot enter upon here, the Disarmament Conference adjourned indefinitely in the following year.* About the same time, the fact that Germany was constructing an Air Force contrary to the Versailles Treaty became known, and public opinion in Britain swung round to the policy of rearmament in the air, to which I have alluded, and which was duly put into operation.

It is not true, therefore, to assert, as so many partisans are in the habit of doing, that the British proposal to retain bombers for police action was either a cause of the failure of the Disarmament Conference or of the failure to abolish military aviation. The British Empire has either to keep order or fail in its responsibilities. Keeping order must obviously in many cases involve the use of force, and there are certain parts of the Empire where the bombing aeroplane has definite advantages over other methods of coercion. Nevertheless, we have always been ready to renounce those advantages if the retention of the bomber for police purposes were to stand in the way of agreement with other countries, and that assurance has recently been repeated in the House of Commons by Mr. Chamberlain (June 16th, 1938).

It is equally untrue to say that my own industrious efforts are responsible for the preservation of the luxury of air bombing for civilisation. The hideous consequences of all warfare are utterly repugnant to me, and personally I should have been glad if an effective method could have been devised at Geneva to prohibit the use of all lethal weapons. Unfortunately, as I have shown, it was driven home to me that if bombing from the air were to be forbidden by an international convention, that convention would be of no value whatever unless it were possible at the same time so to control all civil aviation that it would be equally impossible for civil aircraft to be used for the purposes of bombing. Hence, in view of the difficulties of internationalising civil aviation, arose my disposition towards reduction and limitation of air armaments both quantitative and qualitative, which, I felt, was the proper channel through which the desirable ideal of total abolition ought to be approached. That is still my view.

LONDONDERRY.

* The history of the Conference is fully traced in my book, *Ourselves and Germany* (Penguin), pp. 40–67

because the reservation might raise possible complications elsewhere, *e.g.*, France and Italy would no doubt wish to maintain bombing squadrons in North Africa—which could easily be transferred to Europe across the Mediterranean. *There was, however, never any question of the Conference threatening to break down on this point.* This is borne out by the report which Dr. Lange (Norway), the Vice-Chairman of the Air Committee, submitted to the Bureau of the Conference, and also by Mr. Eden's declaration to the House of Commons (July 5th, 1933) that 'if the occasion arose when the only thing which stood between the signing of the Convention and the agreement on the Convention was this reservation, then, indeed, a very different situation would have arisen from the situation at the present time.'

The police clause was thus never a serious obstacle to the progress of air disarmament, nor, for that matter, did it ever have the slightest international significance. It is clear from Dr. Lange's report that the real obstacles lay in the attitude taken up by other Powers besides Great Britain. Several of the delegations, which had submitted amendments to the British Draft Convention, refused to adopt any definite position upon the question of air armaments on the ground that these problems could only be solved if studied in the light of the general political situation, or of problems raised in other spheres, and more especially in the light of naval problems. The Japanese delegation, for example, made its consent to the abolition of bombing from the air conditional upon the abolition of aircraft carriers. The French delegation considered that the various aspects of armaments were interdependent and that the value of a separate discussion on air armaments would only be relative, and demanded notification of construction programmes as well as supervision. The Italian delegation, on the other hand, while accepting the British Draft Convention in general, was unable in existing circumstances to discuss any amendments to that Convention.[8]

On June 7th, 1933, the British Draft Convention, which had already been accepted as a basis of discussion, was adopted by the General Commission as 'the basis of the future Convention.' Unfortunately, this Convention, which was to have been the Convention proper, was never formu-

[8] Arthur Henderson. *Op cit.*, p. 90

abolition at Geneva. On the contrary we showed ourselves time and again ready to accept complete prohibition if other nations would do likewise, and we made it clear that we were prepared to abandon the police bombing reservation if international agreement depended on that alone.

This much criticised reservation contained in Article 34 of the Draft Convention, for sponsoring which I have been attacked with extreme bitterness by members of the Labour Party and others in England, was in reality quite a minor one. It arose from the fact that British colonial possessions are widely scattered, and since the war our responsibilities have been increased by the various mandates which we hold from the League of Nations. More than any other Power we rely upon our Air Force to discharge our mandatory duties and to police and control wild and undeveloped regions such as the North-west Frontier of India. On this frontier there are wild tribes which, as Mr. Anthony Eden once said at Geneva, 'sometimes had a passionate appetite for disturbing the tranquillity of their neighbours.' It was found by successive administrations, including incidentally the Labour Government which was in office from 1929 to 1931, that these tribesmen could be quickly brought to reason by bombardment from the air. This bombardment is usually carried out without the loss of a single life, for when confined to villages it is a strict regulation never infringed in any circumstances, that a warning should be given at least twenty-four hours beforehand. As a form of control it is well understood in outlying regions, and is most effective. Moreover, it is superior to other methods on grounds both of humanity and economy, for anyone who has studied the matter impartially will admit that the air weapon is less severe than the old-fashioned punitive expeditions ending in machine-gun fire and a round-up with the bayonet, while the presence of a small air force may render superfluous the maintenance of a much larger body of ground troops.

It is true that the British reservation did not command much support at Geneva, except from Irak, Persia, India and Siam, but the criticism which came chiefly from the smaller Powers when the Draft Convention was before the General Commission in May 1933, was based, not on grounds of humanity to the dwellers on the North-west Frontier, but

adjourned in order to enable the delegations of distant countries to consult their Governments.[6]

Meanwhile, the British Prime Minister, the late Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, arrived on the scene, and on March 16th, 1933, he made a gallant attempt to give the Conference a new lease of life by submitting to the General Commission a new and complete scheme for the reduction and limitation of armaments. This was the famous British Draft Convention, of which Article 34 provided for '*the complete abolition of bombing from the air (except for police purposes in certain outlying regions)*,' and Article 35 provided for '(a) *the complete abolition of military and naval aircraft, which must be dependent on the effective supervision of civil aviation to prevent its misuse for military purposes; or* (b) *alternatively, should it prove impossible to ensure such effective supervision, the determination of the minimum number of machines required by each High-Contracting Party consistent with his national safety and obligations, and having regard to the particular circumstances of each country*'[7]

I need hardly say that as a member of the British delegation I supported the Draft Convention, and in particular Articles 34 and 35 which concerned my own department. At the same time, however, it seemed to me, for the reasons which I have already given, that more satisfactory results could be achieved from the adoption of the alternative specified in Article 35, since I frankly doubted whether any effective scheme for the internationalisation of civil aviation could be put into practice. The prime difficulty inherent in any scheme for the international control of civil aviation, such as that put forward by M. Cot, lay in the fact that on the outbreak of war all the civil machines would be located in different countries and would provide in themselves additional aircraft for military purposes. To point out the difficulties confronting the proposals for total abolition and internationalisation of civil aviation, as I did from time to time both to my own colleagues at Geneva and to the delegates of other nations, is quite a different line of conduct from opposing abolition and advocating bombing. The British delegation, either individually or collectively, never opposed the principle of

[6] Arthur Henderson: *Preliminary Report on the Work of the Disarmament Conference*, pp. 87–88.

[7] *White Paper*, Cmd. 4437

warfare. Hitherto, however, the Conference has found no precise scheme which can be relied upon to prevent such misuse. It must be remembered that aviation is only in its infancy and that we are considering a convention to safeguard the future as much as the present. My delegation are conscious that the questions involved may well tax the abilities of the most skilful among us and will require painstaking and exhaustive examination, but they approach them with a keen desire and an earnest determination to make every contribution on their part to the devising, if at all possible, of a practical scheme which will give to all nations a real protection against horrors to which imagination can put no limit, while preserving for their use and convenience the beneficent development of peaceful flying.

Unfortunately, the question of bombing could not be treated as a simple and isolated proposition, but it had to be related to all kinds of other factors. Some countries connected it with the abolition of aircraft carriers, others with the control of civil aviation, and still others with the abolition of military aircraft. M. Pierre Cot, the French Air Minister, in a vigorous speech before the Air Committee propounded a scheme for the internationalisation of civil aviation and the creation of an international air police. While some countries, like the United States of America and ourselves, were inclined to adopt a cautious attitude with regard to this scheme, others such as Japan and India, expressed the opinion that the internationalisation of civil aviation was purely a European problem. Italy, on the other hand, declared that she was not prepared to accept total abolition of military aircraft, though she was in favour of strict limitation; and this opinion impelled the German delegate, Herr Brandenburg, to state that he could not continue to participate in the discussions on the internationalisation of civil aviation until he knew the intentions of other delegations in regard to military aircraft. This difficulty was temporarily disposed of by a resolution of the Committee as a whole that its work was based on the hypothesis of the total abolition of military and naval aircraft, but that no decision could be reached on such abolition until the preliminary questions of the internationalisation of our transport and the creation of an air police force had been settled. These preliminary questions were accordingly referred to special sub-committees while the Air Committee

to co-operate with Great Britain in a thorough examination into the practicability of the proposed scheme of abolition. At the beginning of 1933 the British delegation accordingly proposed the appointment of 'a committee of representatives of the principal Air Powers to examine the possibility of the entire abolition of military and naval machines and the bombing from the air, combined with an effective international control of civil aviation.' Within these terms of reference the Committee was in due course constituted by the General Commission.

The Air Committee, which consisted of the representatives of eighteen Powers, had its first meeting at Geneva on February 20th, 1933, under the chairmanship of Señor Madariaga, the delegate from Spain. It fell to me to open the proceedings on behalf of Great Britain and to lay the British Government's proposals before the gathering. The following were the principal points in my speech :—

(1) The development of aircraft in the last twenty years has laid open to attack cities and centres of population lying far behind their frontiers.

(2) The United Kingdom Government are prepared to subscribe to universal acceptance of the abolition of naval and military aircraft and of air bombing, except for police purposes, provided only that there can be devised an effective scheme for the international control of civil aviation which will prevent all possibility of the misuse of civil aircraft for military purposes.

(3) The result of a mere abolition of military and naval air forces without effective means for the international control of civil aviation would only be to enhance the menace of indiscriminate bombardment of the civil population of great cities.

(4) Any effective scheme must satisfy at least two conditions : (*a*) it must effectively prevent any possibility of the resources of civil aviation being used for military purposes in the event of an outbreak of hostilities ; and (*b*) it must not prevent or hamper the fullest development of aviation in every country for civil and commercial purposes, nor must it restrict freedom in the realm of experiment and research.

The concluding sentences of my speech were as follows :—

So far as the Government I represent are concerned, they are deeply impressed with the grave possibilities of unrestricted aerial

Geneva on February 2nd, 1932. The general discussion began on February 8th, and Sir John Simon, then Foreign Secretary, in his opening speech strongly urged on behalf of the British Government the outlawing of bombing from the air and the abolition of gas and chemical warfare.[2] Speaking again on April 20th, 1932, Sir John Simon moved a resolution approving the principle of 'the selection of certain classes or descriptions of weapons, the possession or use of which would be absolutely prohibited to all states or internationalised by means of a General Convention.' The bearing of this resolution on aerial warfare is obvious and it was in fact adopted by the General Commission of the Conference.[3] A little later, British policy was clearly set out in a declaration which was submitted to the Conference (July 7th, 1932). 'There is no aspect of international disarmament,' ran this memorandum, 'more vitally urgent than the adoption without delay of the most effective measures to preserve the civilian population from the fearful horrors of bombardment from the air. The Government of the United Kingdom would be prepared to go to any length, in agreement with other Powers, to achieve this object, and if more drastic measures are proposed from any other quarter and are shown to be practicable, they will examine them with the utmost sympathy.'[4]

True to her word, therefore, Great Britain proposed the complete prohibition of all bombing from the air 'save within limits to be laid down as precisely as possible by an international convention.' Attacks upon the civilian population should be entirely prohibited. Shortly afterwards, Sir John Simon, addressing the Air Commission of the Conference, repeated that his Government were prepared to go to any lengths in agreement with other countries to prevent bombardment from the air, and they proposed quantitative and qualitative restriction of military and naval aircraft as well as a set of rules to prevent the misuse of civil aircraft for military purposes.[5]

On November 17th, 1932, Sir John Simon reiterated the policy of his country, and invited the other chief Air Powers

[2] *White Paper*, Cmd 4018
[3] *Conference Documents*, I, pp. 94, 113.
[4] *White Paper*, Cmd. 4122.
[5] *Minutes of General Commission*, I, 171.

In that same speech I took the opportunity of pointing out that, whereas a pacifist sentiment had previously been uppermost in the minds of a large number of people in this country, public opinion had changed entirely, owing mainly to German rearmament becoming a recognised fact, and that, instead of decrying the Air Force, many of them who had condemned us before were anxious to know whether the Air Force was efficient and what steps we had taken to provide the Air Force with its necessary bombing strength.

In referring as I did to the need for the policing of certain outlying districts in the Empire, such as the North-west Frontier of India by R.A.F. bombers, it will be seen that I employed phraseology which can only be described as extremely unfortunate for myself. My words, which were entirely directed to describing the attitude of the pacifist public at home, who, as events have proved, were too ready to go in advance of world opinion and practice in disarmament, have been distorted by various newspapers and others for Party purposes in an attempt to prove that at Geneva I advocated the retention of bombing for bombing's sake, while paying lip-service to the principle of abolition, and that the National Government, of which I was at all material times a member, by its insistence on the police bombing reservation, prevented agreement from being reached on the subject of total abolition. In point of fact what happened was quite the reverse. *Neither I, as representing the British Government at that time, nor any other representative of it, ever opposed the abolition of bombing at the Disarmament Conference.* On the contrary we indicated our readiness to agree to complete prohibition, including police bombing in outlying regions if other countries would do likewise, and the resulting failure to achieve success was entirely due to the conflicting views held by those other countries which made complete and effective international agreement impossible.

The record of the British Government in this connection bears careful investigation, and in view of what has happened and the criticisms which have been formulated, it is perhaps not uninstructive to examine more closely the chronicle of that period.

The Disarmament Conference commenced its sittings at

I actually said or did at Geneva but upon a fragment torn from a speech which I delivered over two years later in the House of Lords when, as Air Minister, it was my duty to announce the first substantial increase to take place in our Air Force since the war. The whole context is quoted below, and I have italicised the particular passage on which criticism is usually founded :—

I have held the responsible position of Secretary of State for Air for nearly four years, and during that period I have seen and I have had to prepare myself for some strange changes in public opinion and public policy in regard to the air arm, which must depend ultimately upon that opinion in a democracy like ours. In 1931 the National Government assumed office to guide the country through what is known as the 'economic blizzard.' That was certainly not the time, and that was certainly not the year, in which we Ministers in charge of the Defence Forces of this country could bring forward any policy of expansion, or could do anything more than avoid the most perilous decreases in the strength of the forces for which we were responsible. In 1932 the Disarmament Conference assembled, and almost its earliest discussions were centred around the possibility of the total abolition of air forces or at least the abolition of the artillery of the air, the bombing aeroplane, which is the weapon which is the distinctive arm of the Air Force, and to which it owes its separate existence.

Throughout that period, difficult for one who, like myself, has always been convinced of the prime importance of the maintenance of an effective air arm to the security of this country, I kept impressing upon my colleagues and upon the country generally, the vital nature and place of the Royal Air Force in the scheme of our defences. *I had the utmost difficulty at that time, amid the public outcry, in preserving the use of the bombing aeroplane* even on the frontiers of the Middle East and India, where it is only owing to the presence of the Air Force that we have controlled these territories without the old and heavy cost of blood and treasure. I felt certain that when the ideals of abolition of Air Forces were examined practically, they would be discovered to be inapplicable in the state of the world to-day. We could not put the clock back. Limitation, not abolition, was all we could really hope for. Limitation, I foresaw, was the ultimate policy; the policy which I continually urged; the policy for which I and my advisers at the Air Ministry were constantly preparing; and I am indeed gratified to find in Herr Hitler's words a definite acceptance of this doctrine.[1]

[1] *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords. Vol. 96, cols. 1016–1017 (May 22nd, 1935).

of the bombing of civilians, the *News-Chronicle* printed the following paragraph in a leading article (February 3rd, 1938):—

The British Government has an evil past to live down in this connection. The infamous record of Lord Londonderry, who had such difficulty in preventing the abolition of air bombing some years ago, hangs like a foul smudge in the sky over a dozen cities since tortured and wrecked by bombs.

In a recent Labour Party publication, *Your Britain No. 2*, which deals with the Disarmament Conference, the following sentences appear:—

. . . British prestige and authority were at their peak when the 'National' Government came to power. Britain could have given a decisive lead towards disarmament, instead, the 'National' Government preferred to lead in wrecking the Conference.

It can boast of one achievement through Lord Londonderry and Anthony Eden, the British Government, in face of the other great Powers, insisted on retaining bombing 'planes and made it impossible to abolish them.

Speaking in County Durham on January 20th, 1939, the Labour M.P., Dr. Hugh Dalton, is reported as having said:—

I am astonished that Lord Londonderry has the cheek to speak in public on this subject at all, for it was he, who, in 1932, when he was Minister for Air, threw away the finest opportunity we ever had of securing an international agreement for the complete abolition of bombing aeroplanes. Germany at that time had practically no air force at all, but as Lord Londonderry told the House of Lords, he himself was responsible for preserving the use of the bombing aeroplane.

Again, the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party has made the following statement in its pamphlet, *Unity, True or Sham*, published last month:—

Lord Samuel and Sir Archibald Sinclair were Cabinet colleagues of Lord Londonderry at the time when in his own self-accusing words 'he succeeded' at Geneva 'in preserving the use of the bombing aeroplane.'

Such reckless charges as these are, I will attempt to show, either wilful falsehoods or made in ignorance of the facts. Apparently the case against me is based not upon anything

in Abyssinia, China and Spain, have proved that any immediate plan for making the total abolition of air bombing an effective reality must be dismissed for the present. Where the hope for the future lies, if, indeed, there is any hope, is in the restrictions which may be imposed upon this mode of warfare by international agreement. In these circumstances it is not unreasonable to assume that if nations must go to war they will, at any rate in Europe, try to keep within the scope of these limitations, if only out of fear of reprisals and the collective vengeance and censure of the civilised world.

As is generally known, a plan for the total abolition of air bombing was, with one small reservation, adopted by the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1933. This plan, which was submitted to the Conference in the form of a Draft Convention by the British Delegation, was conceived in a laudable spirit of international idealism. Unfortunately, as I am about to explain, its proposals were not destined to be realised in practice principally because their carrying out failed to commend itself to many of the countries who professed to subscribe to them in theory.

It fell to the writer of this article, who was then British Air Minister, to take some part in the discussions of the Conference as one of the United Kingdom delegates. Briefly our point of view was that, if all bombing from the air were prohibited, such prohibition would be of no value unless it were possible at the same time to control the civil aviation of all countries so as to prevent the conversion of civil aircraft to military purposes. For this reason I personally pinned more faith on the possibility of bringing about a reduction and limitation of air armaments, and I drew the attention of the delegates of other countries to the difficulties confronting the realisation of the proposal for total abolition. On this account I have been bitterly attacked in this country, I have been labelled as the inhuman defender of bombing and protagonist of the bombing aeroplane, and but for me and my 'infamous record,' it is alleged, there would be no smoking cities and mutilated bodies in China and Spain to-day.

Let me take four examples which are typical of the many malicious and ill-informed criticisms to which I am constantly subjected from partisan quarters. Discussing the question

may thus be safely argued that if you abolish the bombing aeroplane of any country, you *ipso facto* wipe out that country's air force.

The old-fashioned anarchist bomb-throwers frequently killed innocent individuals and bystanders who were not the professed objects of their attack. Similarly the aerial bomb-throwers of the present generation have inflicted serious casualties among civilian non-combatants, although the bombing airmen have endeavoured to exercise care and discrimination in selecting objectives of known military or strategical importance. A case in point is that of Liverpool Street railway station which was bombed with terrible results by German Zeppelins during the first daylight raid over London in the Great War. In spite of the fact that sights are considerably more accurate to-day than they were at that date, it is still incorrect to assume that bombs can always be dropped with mathematical precision on their objectives. The great height and speed at which bombers are often obliged to fly by reason of the defending forces' anti-aircraft guns may make any real precision of aim impossible. Another reason lies in adverse weather conditions, when clouds and fog obscure the targets. Again, cargoes of bombs sometimes have to be unloaded suddenly and unexpectedly when a forced landing is inevitable; and sometimes, too, wrong objectives are bombed in error, which frequently occurred during the War, particularly in night raids. Neither in these days can a country against whom war is declared rule out the possibility of the deliberate bombing of its civilian inhabitants with the object of shaking the national morale and obliging its leaders to sue quickly for peace.

There is no need for me to dwell here on the horrors of aerial warfare from the point of view of the unhappy civilians who, through no individual fault of their own, find themselves the victims of international conflict. There are few people in the world to-day who do not earnestly hope and pray that one day war may be effectually outlawed and that the nations of the universe will forever renounce recourse to it as a means of settling their disputes. Air bombing, with its accompanying horrors, will, we trust, become a gruesome relic of the past, and it will no longer be necessary for any country to keep military aircraft. Recent events, however, notably

1939

BOMBING FROM THE AIR

Experience has shown us that the bomb, from whatever direction it may come, is less discriminating in its objectives than other kinds of weapons. In the nineteenth century it was largely the weapon of the anarchist and political assassin, as, indeed, we know from such tragic stories as those of the French Emperor Napoleon III and the Russian Czar Alexander II, and the horrid plot which all but resulted in the death of King Alphonso XIII and Queen Ena of Spain. At this period the use of the bomb was confined within fairly narrow limits. Early in the present century the conquest of the air and the coming of what is known as air power heralded a complete change. It followed from the invention of the aeroplane and airship that aircraft would possess hitherto unheard-of uses in war. Like all the inventions of science which have outstripped the imagination of the most advanced prophet of even twenty years ago, these inventions have followed the example of every invention of the past which takes full cognisance of its advantages for the advancement and well-being of humanity, but at the same time develops to its full capacity its inherent lethal potentialities. This really is the inexorable rule which hitherto has cast a shadow on all the wonderful discoveries which science has been able to display and implement before an astonished and continually enquiring world.

In this way it came about that, just as the rifle and artillery had in their time become the weapons of the army and the torpedo the weapon of the navy, so the weapon of the air force should be the hitherto despised bomb, but this reprehensible characterisation remains as a distinction between it and the guns of the army and navy, both of which through the ages carry with them a more or less romantic history. The fact remains that the bombing aeroplane became the substance and in effect the backbone of national air forces. It

Stafford is probably inclined somewhat to over-estimate the success of such a party as he envisages. He is satisfied to act without the support of dissentient Conservatives, and, indeed, regards Mr. Churchill as a competitor with himself for the support of the detached or detachable sections of the electorate. Taking the situation as a whole, the Conservative Central Office can afford to regard it without undue alarm.

To say all this is not to deny that many of the necessary elements exist for the formation of a new party, but a new party is less likely to be formed by the conscious efforts of a few men than by the growth to voting age of the rising generation and by economic changes among the older voters. The process must of necessity be slow in such circumstances. That it should take place at all is the outward and visible sign of the failure of the Conservative Party and the National Government to solve a particular set of problems. The orthodox of the Party have apparently been unable to produce a Conservatism suited to the foreign and domestic needs of Britain as a democratic State. Attempts from its own ranks (such as Mr. Macmillan's) to produce a coherent philosophy, it has largely ignored. Yet, save for extraordinary circumstances, it has still some period of continued success ahead; to be followed by a longer period of eclipse. So long as there remains that cushion of urban and middle-class opinion, suspicious of general principles in politics and strategy, the Conservative Party will be able to avoid the operation of those natural laws which ultimately place creative thought above mere organisation and have rendered parties once all-powerful the prey of the thesis-writer. But in the end the thesis-writer has his way with us all.

W. L. Burn.

Cripps, basing his argument upon the belief that the present times 'are absolutely unprecedented in their seriousness for democratic and working-class institutions of every kind,' went on to point out that in the last twelve months 'the strength of the Labour Party has not increased in anything like the same proportion as the intensity of anti-Government feeling.' That opinion, which the National Executive of the Labour Party directly traverses, has been confirmed by the result of the East Norfolk election, where, although the Government vote fell by some 5,000 in comparison with the last contest, the Labour vote remained very nearly the same.

Sir Stafford's venture, so far as any immediate success is concerned, was hopeless from the first. Mr. Greenwood, speaking at Manchester, has discovered that 'there can be no freedom apart from treading the path of nationalisation, public ownership and control.' The *Daily Herald*, with a somewhat unsuspected attachment to *a priori* principles, has announced that 'neither working-class freedom nor democracy can be saved now except by Socialism'; and even Miss Ellen Wilkinson is reported as saying that 'the strength of the Party must always be the dominant consideration.' At the basis of all this, besides the reluctance of any highly organised body to admit its own failure, lie other considerations. One is the irritation, never far below the surface, of the trade unionists with the bookish, the professional, the 'clever' elements in the Party. But, perhaps more fundamental than this, is the fear which the present writer has detected in correspondence on the subject, that a Popular Front might succeed in winning an electoral victory. In such an event, that criticism of the Government which comes so easily to the Opposition would no longer serve. They would then have to make precise decisions; to continue or abandon the principle of non-intervention in Spain; to make it—or not to make it—a reality; to supply arms (and perhaps more than arms) to the Spanish Government; to take over the almost overwhelming task of organising passive defence. Greater men than the leaders of Transport House have shrunk from such work as this and have preferred (consciously or unconsciously) to enjoy the luxury of irresponsible criticism. It is only fair to add that Sir

informed and much more suspicious. Nor is it likely to be necessary. The forces described in this article as working in the long run against the Conservative Party cannot yet have much effect. That Party can safely go to the polls counting upon the mental inertia, the complacent optimism of the voters and upon the irritation which any attempt to preach general principles in international politics and strategy almost invariably rouses in them.

The political manœuvres of the last two months cannot often have been surpassed even in an American Nominating Convention. They have disclosed the strength and weakness of the Conservative Central Office. The Duchess of Atholl was defeated in West Perthshire (not an overwhelming surprise to those acquainted with the naturally authoritarian character of the Scottish people). In East Norfolk, Mr. Wright, after refusing to be 'dictated to,' was induced by a personal appeal from the Prime Minister to withdraw from the contest, and the seat was saved to the Government. But the fact that such a personal appeal had to be made and that it was followed by the promotion of a back-bencher to the office of Minister of Agriculture, as the avowed preliminary to a policy of price-insurance, shows how sensitive is the Conservative Party to the threat of dissensions and revolts in its own ranks. Wise in checking such revolt at the source, the Central Office may have over-estimated its dangers. For even the most critical of Conservative M.P.'s show a marked reluctance to throwing their bonnets over the windmill. The interesting, if ambiguous, effort of Mr. Duncan Sandys appears for the moment to have spent its force; perhaps by reason of that very ambiguousness. Turning to more distinguished names, it is very difficult to say exactly where Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden stand. But it is evident that those who looked for a definite Conservative rebellion by the meeting of Parliament have made a considerable miscalculation.

On the other side, if there has been no great difference in result, there has been more publicity. The difference of opinion between the official policy of the Labour Party, heavily weighted in the direction of trades unionism, and that of those members who are known as the 'Left Wing intellectuals,' has developed into a minor crisis. Sir Stafford

Government will repeat their *coup* of 1935. In that year, it may be recalled, they had been unperturbed by the known designs of Italy towards Abyssinia until the Peace Ballot revealed the existence of a much greater volume of support for the League of Nations than they had calculated upon. The result was that famous speech at Geneva in September 1935, in which Sir Samuel Hoare declared that 'the League stands and my country stands with it for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression.' This was followed by a General Election expressly designed to give the Government a mandate for such resistance. When the mandate had been obtained the former policy was resumed. There was a disturbing outburst of indignation over the Hoare-Laval Agreement, but, without form, it achieved a technical victory and collapsed. The application and even the discussion of Oil Sanctions was postponed, and, finally, Sanctions were withdrawn. Earl (then Mr.) Baldwin, reflecting on the whole pleasing course of events, remarked: 'All I did was to take a moment perhaps less unfortunate than another might have been, and we won the election with a majority, but, frankly, I conceive that we should at that time by advocating certain courses have been a good deal less successful.'

This *coup*, as we have remarked, cannot easily be repeated. It may be essayed in the form of a stiffening of attitude towards Germany on the eve of a General Election, but whereas Italy was remote and could be used in 1935 with comparative safety for a game of diplomatic 'tig,' Germany is alarmingly near. Mr. Chamberlain, moreover, is not Earl Baldwin. More energetic, more ignorant, he has little of that statesman's political subtlety and nothing of the late Prime Minister's curious, if intermittent, objectivity of outlook. Instead, Mr. Chamberlain appears to be working himself into a belief that he has been 'chosen' for the 'task' of appeasement; and he is unlikely to abandon that 'task' for the mere purpose of electioneering. Had he not been so convinced both of the importance and the righteousness of his rôle, there might have been a General Election in October 1938.

Such a *coup* as that of 1935, then, is improbable, with a Prime Minister far less subtle and an electorate much better

stand in the eyes of the intelligent men and women of th rising generation. But the Hoare-Laval Agreement, th whole tragic, sorry business of Abyssinia, the farce of non intervention in Spain, the confusion of thought and the lacl of foresight and nerve which resulted in the ruin of Czecho Slovakia—these are what Conservatism has come to mean Seats won or lost in by-elections are not yet greatly significant But the fact that many men, the most fitted and in the bes position to influence opinion, writers of books and article as distinct from writers for the Press, are overwhelmingl against Mr. Chamberlain—this is of the greatest significanc for the ultimate future.

But what of the immediate future? Mr. H. G. Wells writing in the *News-Chronicle* of January 2nd and 3rd last prophesied a great Radical victory in a General Electior which should sweep away the present Government withir this year. The article was not convincing. On the historica side, the picture which it painted of a consistently selfisl governing class oppressing a consistently righteous class o governed, was over-simplification pushed to distortion. The idea upon which it was based, that one set of motives actuate the people whom we like to champion and another set (quite different and highly dishonourable) the people whose policy we dislike, is fantastic. It is probable that Mr. Wells' view of the future, like his view of the past, is too simple; and that his great 'Radical' victory will be postponed. For one thing, there are very few Radicals to-day. Mr. Wells' choice of that word is significant as being something of what the psychologists describe as 'wish-fulfilment.' Radicalism depended upon a particular set of economic circumstances and political-religious ideas which have almost all disappeared. It cannot be conjured out of the past by the mere use of a name. Nor can a name breach the gap between the Labour Party and such Conservatives as Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery. There is no evidence, moreover, that the Labour Party wishes the gap to be bridged.

Any discussion of the probable result of a General Election during the present year must assume the continuance of the present precarious peace if it is to have any objective value. The results of war would be too incalculable for discussion. Assuming, then, peace—of a sort—it is not likely that the

according to the pressure put upon it by groups within the country and foreign nations without, is not an attractive one. Nor is it one which, in any case, would attract the class of recruit which a successful party must have. But the rift over foreign policy has thrown a glaring light on policies and tendencies which might, in the ordinary course of events, have gone for years in obscurity. As a result, loyalty to the Conservative Party has been changed to indifference and indifference into seething opposition.

In almost every class of society with which the writer is acquainted, where their elders are divided, the younger generation are desperately ashamed of Mr. Chamberlain's policy and fearful of its results. The catchwords of the Government benches—'non-intervention,' for example—are regarded as so obviously fatuous or hypocritical as to be unworthy of serious discussion. This applies to the majority of young fellows in unemployment discussion centres, as it applies to the majority of undergraduates. These people, or many of them, are turning from the newspapers of their class, *The Times* or the *Daily Herald*, and seeking their information in News-Letters or such 'Penguin Specials' as Mr. G. T. Garratt's and the Duchess of Atholl's books. The influence of Penguin Books at this juncture is a factor in the formation of public opinion which the historian of the future will have to consider.

And to the thinking, reading generation now growing up, what does Conservatism mean? What does the Conservative Party appear to stand for? Church and King, as the old phrase was? But the Church to-day needs the support of no party; while a monarchy so dissected as ours during the late 'constitutional crisis' cannot form a rallying point for anyone for a long time to come. The old, crude beliefs, then, of which one is half proud and half ashamed—trade, imperialism, the imperial name? When were the future prospects of our foreign trade more grave? When did that name count for less? For that balanced national life which an older generation of Conservatives regarded as desirable? But the drift from the land goes on, and the depressed areas are depressed still, and thousands of young men are growing up with no prospects other than the life of a State pauper.

For none of these things does Conservatism appear to

present Government. This, however, has not been said in order to initiate a discussion of that policy. What does strike him, not as a politician, but as a student of politics, is the negative attitude of the Government and the Conservative Party generally; and the improbability of a party programme so founded proving to be enduring.

In politics that party ultimately succeeds which can draw its strength from those forces which we call progressive. The 'progress' need be in no one direction, but it must appear to be progress to those elements which represent the active, optimistic, constructive sections of the nation. In the 'sixties and 'seventies of the last century those elements, convinced of the everlasting rightness of Free Trade, Individualism, Freedom and Sanctity of Contract, Toleration and Opposition to Imperialism, rallied under the banner of 'Peace, Retrenchment and Reform.' To the 'nineties, frightened by trade depression, irritated by the failure of Gladstone to formulate a social policy, excited by the prospect of colonial development, progress meant quite a different set of conceptions.

Instead of progress in the sphere of foreign affairs, the Conservative Party and the National Government have offered appeasement. The use of the word to describe the policy of the Munich Agreement is significant. It signifies an approach to problems which has no guiding principle of its own but consists in yielding more or less to various forms of pressure and in satisfying or partly satisfying various demands. Nor has appeasement been confined to foreign affairs. In the matter of agriculture, the Government have failed to deal with the two major problems, uncertain prices and an inadequate labour supply; but they will doubtless offer palliatives to angry and rebellious agricultural voters. It has been far worse with the problems of the special areas, of A.R.P., of rearmament as a whole. Certain steps have been forced upon the Government, certain concessions have been wrung from them; but in every case such a broad, vigorous, far-sighted policy as would command enthusiasm has been lacking.

The spectacle of a great party, perhaps more highly organised and served with more effective financial support than any other in our history, yet moving here and there

were to be another slump, the shaky foundations upon which many middle-class homes are built must disappear, and hundreds of thousands of their people, finding the struggle too hard, must sink into the ranks of the working class. The same thing has recently been seen in the United States, where farmers and business men in districts which had voted Republican since there was a Republican Party to vote for, were changed by the depression into Democrats.

The other menace to the Conservative Party lies in the policy of social insurance. The essential difference between the middle and the working class is less one of wages earned than of psychological attitude to wages. The one is a wage-earner whose payment is not determined by his individual capacity but by agreements between his Union and his employers. The other is either an independent capitalist or a salaried worker whose payment is in some measure fixed by his individual value. Again, the working class did, while the middle class did not, draw unemployment benefit when out of work. But as the insurance level, on the one hand, and taxation, on the other, are gradually raised, so, within those limits, something like a classless society will be formed. Educated in the same kind of school, safeguarded against the worst effects of unemployment or economic failure by the same means, their economic activities increasingly regulated by the State, what will there be in a quarter of a century to distinguish middle from lower class? It is by no means certain that the new 'classless' voter will vote Labour; but it is very likely that he will cease to be influenced by those forces which at present incline him to the Conservative Party.

So far we have been discussing this question as a study in social and economic groupings, as though no such things as political principles existed. They have been, since the war, at a discount, but it seems that now, starting from foreign affairs, they are being revived. The rift over British foreign policy is a fundamental thing, like the rift over our attitude towards the French Revolution, which compels thinking (in the end) along lines of principle rather than of economic circumstances. For the sake of candour it is proper that the writer should acknowledge himself a Conservative bitterly opposed to the foreign policy of the

hire-purchase organisations to pay them rather more than he can easily pay. To such a man, two things are of supreme importance. One is his economic security, the preservation of his slight margin of safety and, consequently, the avoidance of whatever might shake his hardly won and precarious position. The other is his social status, the maintenance of all those barriers, tangible and intangible, which divide him from the working class. To him and his kind, and to millions of their womenfolk, the cry of 'Safety First' has an appeal which (save in exceptional circumstances) is irresistible.

To this great block of voting strength the Conservative Party is able to add from other sources. The Press is less what it ought to be—the sensitive ears and the honest mouth of a democracy—than an organ which provides amusement for many and profits for the few. The bitter, fighting Radicalism of Victorian days has largely disappeared. The development of bureaucratic government has considerably lessened the interest of the ordinary man in politics and has played into the hands of the party in power. It might very well seem that Conservatism, as at present organised and expressed, will continue to dominate British politics to a period beyond our vision.

But the waters of politics are treacherous. In 1880 it appeared as certain as could be that Liberalism would be the dominant motif in British politics for the next half-century. Instead, a dozen years saw the Liberal Party broken as a political force and in office, with a new spirit and policy, their Conservative opponents, who had seemed, in 1880, committed to years of factious negation.

A party built upon class divisions (however narrow) may be destroyed by two factors. One is such a change in those class divisions as shall render ineffective a party based upon them as they formerly existed. The other is the supersession of class divisions by divisions of principle as the foundation of political parties.

One possible source of such dissolution of the existing middle class as would constitute the first of these factors is economic. So long as the black-coated worker can keep his head decently above water he is likely to vote Conservative. He can only do this, however, if a reasonable level of prosperity prevails over the whole country. If there

iscernible breakaway of note in the Liberal Party. adstone developed his Irish policy the retreat became

The historian of the future may well come to believe ie most important thing about the Home Rule consy was not so much its effect upon Anglo-Irish relations way in which it broke party alignments in Britain and e-arranged them so that an overwhelming mass of the 's wealth was enlisted in the support of one party. ice that time it has been broadly true to say that parties ieen not the expression of particular political beliefs, economic desires and fears organised along lines of livisions. The Conservative Party has attempted to his fact; the Labour Party has gloried in it. Whether i or glorified, it is the most important single fact about i party organisation to-day. The work of the Central s of the two larger parties is comparatively easy against ckground of class loyalties. The propagation of any ole which may cut across class loyalties is increasingly lt. When class loyalties are projected into international the difficulties of discerning principles of politics or of strategy are magnified The danger to British erce and French security from a Spain in the hands :es hostile to Britain and France is the most obvious of ;ical facts. Yet 'service' people, who might be ed to appreciate such a fact, are, for the most part, d to it by this projected class feeling, which causes o sympathise with the Spanish rebels. If our strategical ts had been threatened by Russia, the Labour Party no doubt have been similarly blind to the danger.
to the present, a division on class lines has suited the rvative Party. A number of seats where working-class are in a great majority (mining constituencies, for :e) are regular deficits in the Conservative balance

On the other hand, the Party has gained immensely he creation of a new middle class or from an enlargeof the old. The typical Conservative to-day is no to be found in the countryside but in the towns. not a hunting farmer, but a 'black-coated worker'; a arning anything between £4 and £10 a week, living ew house mortgaged to a building society, running a iich he cannot quite afford, under contract to various

It was a point often taken by the older writers of text-books, that whereas American parties were organised on considerations of history and geography, those of Britain were organised on explicit political principles. The inference was that an immense amount of valuable political energy was thus saved. A Boston banker, it was represented, had really a great deal in common with an Alabaman cotton planter, but they were cut off from effective participation by the historical accident that their grandfathers had fought against each other in the Civil War. Thus the energy and intelligence and good sense of the nation were eternally divided. The weakness of this argument lies in its failure to observe that these geographical divisions are not accidental. Nor are they mainly due to historical causes. They represent divisions of economic interest which preceded and largely caused those historical events which still 'condition' American party organisation.

This, however, is not the place in which to discuss American parties in detail Let us turn to the other part of the argument—that British parties work economically and smoothly because they represent different political principles. Now, at certain times, this has been more or less true. In the reign of Queen Anne, for instance, a Tory would be likely to uphold the Church against Dissenters, to flirt with the idea of the Old Pretender succeeding the Queen, to criticise the expensive continental campaigns against France and what he regarded as the undue dominance of mercantile over agricultural interests. A Whig would hold the contrary beliefs. From 1714, however, well into the reign of George III, there existed no such sharp contrast of opinions; and the party system was hardly existent. The French Revolution and the rival systems of Burke and Fox once more provided two sets of beliefs; the conflicts between Reformers and anti-Reformers and the personal rivalry of Gladstone and Disraeli served to keep them alive. But in the 'eighties the position changed. So far, Liberals and Conservatives had been fairly well balanced socially. Taking the country as a whole it was impossible to say that one party represented a greater volume of wealth or of social prestige than the other. Gladstone's introduction of the two Radicals, Dilke and Joseph Chamberlain, into his 1880 Government led to the

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

No. DCCXLV—March 1939

THE FUTURE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

It is not the purpose of this article to discuss Conservatism as a political faith. Our concern is simply with the particular political organisation which embodies the Conservative philosophy to-day. The distinction between the two things is obvious—to the moderate. The extreme partisan always swears that Conservatism consists in the set of beliefs held by the party at that moment. If that were true, Conservatism would long ago have been dead in England. In July 1714, the Earl of Oxford (Robert Harley), imprisoned in the Tower, lamented: 'The grief of my soul is this, I see plainly that the Tory Party is gone.' It had failed (though by a narrow margin) to adjust itself successfully to the changes of the Revolution. A century later a new Tory Party, the creation of Pitt and Burke, had to adapt itself to the immensely greater changes of the Industrial Revolution and the downfall of Mercantilist Economy. The defeats over the Reform Bill and the Corn Laws, and the transitory character of Conservative Governments between 1832 and 1874, are evidence of another failure in successful adaptation. The third Conservative Party, less the creation of Disraeli than of Joseph Chamberlain, is now faced by the necessity of adaptation to a spectacular diplomatic revolution. This article is concerned with its chances of effective survival.

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

1877  1939

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES.

1939 — MARCH — No. 745. Vol. CXXV.

Price Three Shillings. *Annual Subscription 36/- post free.*

Published by

[illegible] & CO LTD, 10 ORANGE STREET, LONDON, [illegible]

[illegible]

of increased intervention in Spain and of the further development of the war of aggression in China. Last, but not least, the year whose main event in the sphere of " Culture " were the anti-Jewish pogroms in Germany. Every contemporary will remember this year as a year of shame. . . .

'Thus we must regard the Soviet country as the only country in the world where people are proud of the past and look into the future with confidence. . . . For us it began with the celebrations of the victory of Socialist democracy. . . . The constitution of Stalin has penetrated the life of the entire nation and produced an immense increase in the creative energies of the Soviet people. . . .

'The political result of 1938 was the flourishing of Soviet democracy and the majestic rise of the internal and external power of the Soviet State. . . . Soviet counter-espionage has dealt out ruthless blows, smashing the gang of Trotzkyite-Bucharinite spies and aggressors, thus proving that the Fascist gangsters have as little chance of success in open as in secret warfare. . . . The moral and political unity of the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party and the great and wise leader Stalin, has now become a power such as was not previously known in the history of mankind. . . .

'Never before has the worker's toil been awarded with such honours. . . . We greet the new year with the introduction of the passport of labour—(National conscription of labour. The Transl.)—with measures to increase the discipline of labour, with the creation of badges and orders awarding distinguished achievements of shock-brigade workers, and with the introduction of the highest award: the title of " Hero of Socialist Labour." These State measures will create the true heroism of labour. . . .

'Long live the characteristics that are ours and ours alone: Modesty and Firmness of the Soviet Citizen, Courage, Honour, and Heroism. . . .'

Hitler is discussed either in a public meeting or in private, one feels like having reached a tiny island of truthfulness in this ocean of lies. Then speeches and debates and words ring true for once. There is no fear of war—perhaps because there is too little imagination of its horrors. On the contrary this war is desired and there are many who would gladly sacrifice their lives and everything they possess for the price of Hitler's destruction. . . .

'In this connection the main point of interest is the striking power of our army and the damage done by the Tuchachevski trial and the subsequent purges. As far as an outsider can judge, the more competent observers seem to agree that the army has more or less survived even this crisis. The territory of the Union is so enormous and the human reservoir is apparently inexhaustible. That may account for the fact that the country as a whole and the army in particular have been able to survive all crises. The activity of the masses, once roused and inspired by the revolution, is not quite dead even to-day. As a consequence of the purges a number of branches of our industry threatened to collapse. Then new men arrived, less qualified perhaps than their predecessors, but in sufficient numbers, and somehow they kept things going. . . .

'Of all these "new men" it is said that they are the most loyal followers of Stalin. It would be more correct to say: "the leader's most obedient servants." For, instead of the present "leader" another one may arise—but their loyalty will remain. . . .'

Izvestia (January 1st) contained an extensive leading article under the title: 'A Happy New Year, Comrades!':

'. . . The workers of our country began the new year of 1939 with their traditional festivals, balls, and concerts. There is no other country . . . where this festival is celebrated so simply and carefree, so full of joy. Nor is there another country which could wish the old year farewell without regrets and without shame. . . .

'Beyond our frontiers, in capitalist countries, no honest man could look upon the past year with an easy heart. The year which was marked by the Munich agreement, the year of slavish retreat before the aggressors, the year of the invasion of Austria and of the destruction of Czechoslovakia, the year

a kind of machine, well trained to utter certain words and to make certain gestures. And as all this has become the daily life of 150,000,000 Soviet citizens, individual suffering is becoming something like a national catastrophe. . . .

'Caution, distrust, and the consciousness that everything around you is based on lies—that is the only thing which the people and the "apparatus" seem to have in common. In all other respects they are separated from one another by an unbridgable gulf, as deep as it was at the times of Ivan the Terrible. On the one side: unlimited power and arbitrariness—on the other side: defenceless, slavish obedience and impotent hatred.

'The extent and forms of the terror are such as nobody living outside the Soviet frontiers could possibly imagine. The number of prisoners in Concentration Camps is truly astronomic. With their labour gigantic constructions are being created, as, for example, the railway connecting the Ochotsk Lake with Verchne-Kolvmsk. This line is built by prisoners with their own bare hands and without machinery. The main junction of the line is Nogayev where an enormous new Concentration Camp has been erected. People are sent there in batches of thousands with mostly very long sentences—*i.e.* up to twenty-five years. There they die like flies, though it is becoming well-nigh impossible to get news from any of the prisoners. All recent sentences contain the clause: "Without permission to write or receive mail."

'Thousands and tens of thousands of peasants, workers, employees, non-party members, Russian as well as foreign Communists, "spies" and "wreckers" from hundreds of different prisons are sent to Siberia, into the Polar regions or else to Central Asia. And for their families these people disappear for ever—lest an unforeseen event should change the entire régime.

'In precisely the same isolation thousands of Socialists, Mensheviks, Social-Revolutionaries, and dissident Communists fill prisons and Concentration Camps. Their life is: utter misery, overcrowded cells, rotten food. They die—die of weakness and hunger, disease and nervous exhaustion. Those who do not die are buried alive.

'The army is the chief topic of conversation. It is said that war against Hitler is generally desired. If war against

the German Reich can rightly claim certain economic privileges.'

BULGARIA

Zemja I Kultura (December) contains the following rather interesting passage : ' We find ourselves in a highly undesirable state of economic dependency upon Germany. This implies for us many unforeseen dangers. The past years have brought upon us many harmful consequences of this dependency.'

III. SOVIET RUSSIA

(*Note.*—Although highly contradictory, the two extracts printed below may be of interest in view of the general scarcity of adequate information about the internal situation of Soviet Russia.)

Socialisticheski Vestnik (November 10th, No. 20/21), the organ of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Mensheviki), published in Paris, contains a ' Letter from Moscow ' from which the following extracts are made :

' Thanks to a happy coincidence of circumstances I have found means and ways to send you this letter, and, so to speak, break through the iron curtain that separates us from the outside world. For all of us exist in hermetic isolation in this enormous country of ours. It has become far more dangerous now to trust anybody or to express one's doubts and views. We feel like suffocating in this country of lies. The really horrible thing is that everybody is lying. Whether you talk to an official, whether you listen to a speaker in a public meeting or to a responsible director of your factory—they are all lying to you and you yourself are lying when you reply, and everybody who speaks during the debates is lying. No one has the slightest illusion of what his audience really thinks of him. It does not make a scrap of difference whatever the topic may be : whether it is this year's harvest or the output of the Donetz coal mines, the success of the collectivised farms, or the strength of the Red Army, Soviet literature or any other topic under the sun. . . .

' This atmosphere of the eternal, and, what's worse, cynical lies (few care to hide that they are not telling the truth) is simply unbearable and renders all genuine expression of emotions or thoughts quite impossible. One is becoming

"trinity" they would lead the second Republic along the same road which led to the ruin of the first.'

Czechoslovakia

Prager Tagblatt (January 4th) prints in a prominent place an interview given by M. Volosin, the new Prime Minister of Ruthenia: 'The Ukrainians in Poland and in Soviet Russia are one and the same people, and as they are our brethren, our sympathies go out to them. The question of an independent Ukraine is one of the great issues and we are too small to intervene.'

Roumania

The following extract from an important political weekly is typical of many Press comments on the same subject:

Libertatea (December 20th): 'Whereas Czechoslovakia was—before Munich—a corridor through which Russia could reach the Reich, the annexation of the Sudeten land has completely reversed the position: Czechoslovakia has now become a German passage to the Russian frontiers. The creation of the autonomous State of Sub-Carpathian Ukraine shows that there is new hope among the Ukrainians for their eventual freedom. . . . Poland cannot avoid granting full autonomy to her Ukrainian minority. Already one-third of her population and territory must be regarded as lost to her. . . . Germany has now a free hand in Eastern Europe. . . . Germany seems anxious to secure new markets in Eastern Europe as well as new raw material resources. In order to reach this objective the leaders of the Reich revived the old scheme of a Greater Ukraine.'

Hungary

Pester Lloyd (January 1st) contains an article written by Count Csaky, the Hungarian Foreign Minister: 'The strength and importance of the Rome-Berlin Axis are steadily increasing. It would be a mistake not to realise that time is working for the Axis Powers. Those two Powers are so closely connected in their ideology that they have acquired a striking force making up for all possible shortage of raw material resources. . . . One cannot disregard the fact that, owing to its size and geographical position in Central Europe,

Soviet Union

Moscow News (January 2nd): 'The ties of friendship binding the Ukrainian people to the other peoples of the U.S.S.R. are indestructible. Any serious politician must understand that attempts to achieve the claims to Soviet Ukraine that are being plotted by the Fascist Secret Services would mean provoking a war and would evoke a crushing blow on those who inspired this provocation.'

Poland

All sections of the Polish Press are, of course, bitterly hostile to the alleged attempts of Germany to create an 'independent Greater Ukraine'

Illustrowany Kurjer Codzienny (December 28th): 'The ethnographical factor alone is not enough to make a State. What is needed is a historical tradition and a tradition of State, and those "Greater Ukraine" never possessed. . . .' The following passage of the same article is obviously addressed to Germany: 'Possibly the "Independent Ukraine" is imagined as a kind of colony. However, the formation of a colonial empire on the territory of Europe at a time when even in black Africa such plans meet with unsurmountable difficulties is a still greater delusion than the creation of an independent Ukraine. This would be the beginning of the transformation of Europe into an empire of *one* nation, *a policy* which Europe has always successfully opposed.'

Gazeta Polska (January 1st), the official Government paper, contains a leading article which seems to be influenced by the statements in *Le Temps* on December 27th (viz., above): 'Those Poles who blind themselves to reality are making a great mistake; it is necessary to think and to act in such a manner as if there were no obligations to Poland on the part of France. The year 1938 has proved that an exaggerated trust in the value of alliances can be very dangerous.'

Gazeta Polska (December 29th) contains a warning to the new Government of Czechoslovakia. The main passage reads: 'The new statesmen who govern the new C.S.R. are experienced and reasonable men. But if they should base their efforts once again upon the fictitious principle of

of the Ukrainian movement, says: 'The situation must be regarded as dangerous, for only last night we received news from Berlin about new orders given by Hess and Rosenberg for an increased Nazi propaganda in the Ukraine. A Ukrainian delegation of members of M. Skoropatskyi's entourage will shortly start on a propaganda journey. As regards the German commission in Carpatho-Ukraine we hear it received orders to carry out numerous measures likely to create in Polish Ukraine an atmosphere similar to that which reigned in the Sudeten areas during the month of September.'

Le Temps (December 27th) contains a leading article on the question of France's commitments in Eastern Europe: 'It is absurd to close one's eyes to facts. For some years now the European situation has undergone profound changes. . . .' Referring to France's commitments arising out of the Treaty of Locarno, the Franco-Polish and the Franco-Soviet Pacts, it is pointed out: 'There exists now a state of affairs which could not be foreseen by the authors of those pacts which formed parts of the system of which Geneva was the highest expression. To what extent are these pacts still valuable? . . . Can France at the same time defend the integrity of her colonial Empire and risk to find herself engaged in dangerous continental adventures? Can she, at the same time, oppose Italy's aspirations with the necessary intransigence and pursue in Eastern Europe a policy apt to provoke Germany to support these aspirations?'

UNITED STATES

New York Times (December 18th): 'It is fair enough to consider the possibility of war between Germany and Russia should Hitler carry out a German drive to set up an independent puppet-State in the richest provinces of Soviet Russia. Such a war would involve endless possibilities. . . . Napoleon went to Moscow, but he had an awful time getting home.'

New York Times (December 25th) publishes a dispatch by its Moscow Correspondent, who says: 'There is considerable belief in foreign quarters . . . that Russia might go to Poland's aid with active military assistance if Germany launched a campaign against the Polish Ukraine.'

Schlesische Zeitung (December 15th): 'The first Governmental declaration of the new Czecho-Slovak-Carpatho-Ukrainian State was undoubtedly of importance to the Czechs and the Slovaks, but for the Carpatho-Ukrainians it meant more, far more. . . . It might be too early to see in the Carpatho-Ukraine the "Piedmont of Ukrainianism," but one would fail to recognise the facts if one were to overlook that the Ukrainians have become a nation. . . . The time has now come when the problem of the Ukrainian nation, more than any time during the last twenty years, is moving to the centre of European interest. This problem must be solved now. . . . We do not wish to prophesy. We only point out that Ukrainianism to-day is more conscious of its nationalism than ever. It would be wise for Europe to watch the movement . . . very carefully, if it wishes to avoid being surprised by developments the extent of which cannot be fully visualised to-day.'

Westdeutscher Beobachter (December 30th), writing in the same vein, says: 'The creation of an independent Carpatho-Ukraine has drawn world attention to the Ukrainian problem. . . . Neither the Russians nor the Poles nor the Hungarians have succeeded in pushing back the Ukrainian racial border. . . . Therefore it is not astonishing that in Poland the battle for the liberation of the Ukrainian territories is being fought with the greatest passion.'

ITALY

Il Telegrafo (December 22nd), a semi-official paper, comments on Hungary's position and rôle in Central Europe by saying: 'Italy and Germany . . . hope that Hungary will become the diplomatic centre for all those States in South-Eastern Europe that wish to be friends of the Rome-Berlin Axis. . . . Hungary might be the pivot of the necessary organisation in South-Eastern Europe, and thereby become the third Power of the Axis.'

FRANCE

With regard to Eastern European affairs the French Press is almost as divided as it was during and after the September crisis.

L'Œuvre (December 15th), referring to German support

Let us say at once that given the present mentality of France, it is easy to foresee that she will refuse Italian aspirations. In that case France will lose. Nobody doubts that Italy will enter into immediate action and with her the Axis. The Italian people are convinced that the French Republic is their historical and actual enemy.'

Popolo di Roma (December 27th) writes in the same vein: 'As to the uncompromising attitude taken up by France with her famous "not an inch of territory," nobody will believe that this can arrest Fascist Italy once the Duce has decided to realise her natural aspirations.'

Relazione Internazionale (January 1st): 'The question of Tunisia remains until that territory is under full Italian control.'

Since the end of December Italian Press comments regarding the prospects of the Rome visit have clearly reflected a growing anxiety lest Mr. Chamberlain should refuse to support Italy's claims.

Giornale D'Italia (December 29th): 'If Mr. Chamberlain were to ignore entirely the Franco-Italian dispute he would be going to Rome with the intention of pursuing his appeasement policy while leaving out of account what has become one of the major obstacles to general appeasement.'

Tribuna (January 9th): 'No real importance need be attributed to the statements by London political writers that there will be no mediation by Mr. Chamberlain in Rome. . . .'

Resto de Carlino (January 10th): 'Mr. Chamberlain wears the pacifist halo of the Munich spirit, but he does not seem to have any clear idea about appeasement.'

II. EASTERN EUROPE

The prevailing uncertainty about the future of Eastern Europe, notably the question of a 'Greater Ukraine' under German domination, is reflected in the Press comments of all countries.

Germany

Although the latest development would seem to indicate that the German Government find it inopportune to press for an immediate solution of the 'Ukrainian question,' a great many references to the creation of an independent Ukrainian State continued to appear in German newspapers.

on Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Rome. The chief point is 'Britain's duty to induce France to make concessions.' It goes on to say: 'This Rome visit is a great triumph for the Duce. It shows that Italy has now achieved equal rights with the British Empire. . . .' Referring to Italy's territorial claims, it states: 'The situation . . . cannot remain as it is now.'

The two following quotations may be regarded as typical expressions of Germany's growing interest in all Mediterranean problems.

Nachtausgabe (January 11th): 'Britain and France must reflect whether they intend to tread this path together with Italy, and therefore together with the Rome-Berlin Axis, or if they intend once more to resist until one day the facts become too strong and Italy wins for herself what the others had refused her.'

Der Angriff (January 12th), after referring to the Mediterranean as too important a factor in European politics to be confined to the Mediterranean Powers alone, writes: 'A French paper says that the question How far will Mussolini and Hitler march together? is the question of the hour. It is no mystery. Germany and Italy, whose historical and political experience have shown so much in common during the past year, will also fight together in order that the world may be more justly arranged.'

Italy

The violent Italian Press campaign against France and in support of Italy's territorial claims has continued unabated. Apart from that, speculations as to the outcome of Mr. Chamberlain's talks in Rome and expressions of hope for British pressure upon France have taken up much space.

Tribuna (December 15th): 'It is not to be excluded that Mr. Chamberlain will exercise pressure on France to make concessions in Tunis if that would lead to a promise of a lasting normalisation in the Mediterranean situation.'

Relazione Internationale (December 18th), an important weekly review in close contact with the Italian Foreign Office, contains a particularly violent article: 'Once more the Rome-Berlin Axis and the Entente Cordiale find themselves face to face with the need for reaching a decision of precise clarity.

Germany

The attitude of the German Press towards the Italian claims on French territory has been conspicuous for its wavering and uncertainty. On the whole the Italian demands have been supported. In the beginning this support seemed rather lukewarm. However, since the second half of December German Press comments supporting Italy's claims have become increasingly outspoken.

Frankfurter Zeitung (December 18th), referring to the French protests to the Italian Government, says: 'One should have thought that France does not need a cheap victory in a battle which is not even fought. . . .'

Berliner Tageblatt (December 28th): 'The problem of the Mediterranean is precisely the same as it was in Munich, namely, the recognition of a nation's living space ("des völkischen Lebensraums").'

Völkischer Beobachter (December 29th) contains an article under the headline 'Lies from London' which strongly supports Italy's demands: 'The balance of power has been altered. . . . A new start must be made, beginning with the Treaty of London of 1915 which promised colonial compensation for Italy. Rome insists that France should fulfil her obligations. . . . Even a flood of sensational lies cannot alter the facts, it only goes to show how the so-called freedom of the Press is becoming the curse of the human race. . . .'

Hamburger Fremdenblatt (January 2nd) says in a leading article: 'If people abroad would only take the trouble to take into account the clear and inviolable obligations which the Führer has just reaffirmed with regard to Germany's friendship with Italy—the German attitude in the Mediterranean question would be clear beyond the possibility of doubt.'

Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (January 9th) publishes a signed article by its editor-in-chief, Dr. Silex, which contains the following interesting passage: 'Everywhere it is being asked what Germany's attitude is. We make no secret of the fact that we are strengthening the Rome-Berlin Axis in all spheres. . . . Germany's southern frontier is only about 50 miles by air from the Mediterranean.'

Frankfurter Zeitung (January 11th) contains a leading article

understands only the language of force and trusts in our weakness. The risks can only increase if we fail to act at once.'

Figaro (December 23rd): 'Since it pleases the Rome Government to nullify the agreement it has signed, we for our part consider it absolutely useless to conclude others.'

La Republique (December 23rd): 'Neither Tunis, Jibuti, nor a single inch of territory will be surrendered.'

Le Populaire (December 23rd): 'The best way for the French Government to end this crisis quickly . . . is at once to administer to Mussolini a proof of his imprudence by putting an immediate end to the Italian privileges in Tunis.'

Le Temps (December 26th): 'The French Empire forms an entity and France is determined that it shall not be weakened. . . .'

L'Epoque (January 3rd) contains a passage referring to M. Daladier's successful journey to Corsica and Northern Africa which is typical of the comment of the French Press as a whole (not excluding the Communist *L'Humanite*): 'Thank you all, dear Fascist deputies, who on November 30th cried "Tunis, Jibuti, Corsica, Savoy." You gave the French people an opportunity to reply with impressive unanimity "Stop that." . . .'

A certain apprehension found expression in all sections of the Press prior to Mr. Chamberlain's journey to Rome; the idea that the present conflict between France and Italy might become the subject of a conference of Powers, or else of British 'mediation,' was unanimously rejected by all French papers.

Le Populaire (January 9th): 'The least Mr. Chamberlain will be asked for will be to subscribe to a Four-Power Conference. . . . One thing only can prevent Mr. Chamberlain from falling into such a trap—and that will be the absolute conviction that it would be futile for him to try and drag France into the same trap. . . .'

Le Temps (January 11th): 'If the Duce asks for British mediation . . . Mr. Chamberlain should not be surprised to get a refusal.'

Paris Soir (January 11th): 'If Italy wants to talk to France, let her talk directly and politely.'

WORLD OPINION

A Press Summary

I. WESTERN EUROPE

France

The dominating topic of the French Press were the Italian claims to France for 'territorial readjustments.' The tone of all sections of the French Press has been impressively vigorous. That, and the practically undisturbed unanimity with which the Italian claims have been rejected, are all the more striking if compared with the caution and disunity displayed in previous months.

Excelsior (December 18th): 'It can be presumed that the Führer advised the Duce. . . Italy's claims are inadmissible in so far as they affect our sovereignty or the freedom of the Mediterranean. They will meet with a sharp and extensive resistance here. French opinion is not divided in this matter where the patriotism and rights of man and the patriotism and rights of France stand united.'

L'Œuvre (December 18th) said in a leading article: 'We, too, have claims to make: No common frontier with Italy on the Pyrenees, no bases of action against our sea communications in the Eastern Mediterranean.' A few days earlier, on December 13th, the same paper had published a much noted article by the former Under-Secretary of State, M. Pierre Vienot, discussing Italy's formal repudiation of the Franco-Italian agreement of January, 1935. The main argument, repeated by many other newspapers, was that Italy had in fact broken the 1935 agreement when she failed 'to co-operate with France in order to defend the territorial *status quo* in Central Europe.' M. Vienot concluded: 'We are faced with an unprecedented piece of blackmail on the part of a man who

in the handling of the sex problems of the child and adolescent. As the result one gets the present sex craze and irreligion.

Regarding the main systems of analysis the Freudian often brings out very powerful religious feeling to the benefit of the patient. Above all we must recognise the definite cures by Freudian methods of terrible neuroses. As to Jung, his system is quasi-religious, and Rome is definitely interested in this type of analysis. Jung says in one of his books that in his early days he was surprised to learn that Rome had made a careful study of all his publications. Witness also the recent Sunday broadcast of Fr. D'Arcy, S.J., and his reference to Jung Jung teaches union with one's psyche and I cannot see much difference between that and Catholic teaching of union with God It is very easy to reconcile Jungian psychology with the mysticism of St John of the Cross.

In the third great system of analysis, Adlerian, I must confess that I have not found any specific reference in its literature to a religious viewpoint, but Adler's principle, that one uses illness for a definite purpose, in some cases, I am sure, means the 'purpose' is wrapped up in fear, and desire of union with God.

Prinzhorn is, I believe, not generally known in England. His character psychology bears a marked resemblance to the 'little way' of St. Theresa of Lisieux.

I can assure Mr. Dingle that in the course of a long analysis one comes to the unmistakable conclusion that all neurosis is caused by a phenomenon which has various names, but is a variant of doctrinal 'original sin.'

E. G Timbrell, B.Sc., Lond., etc.

questions concerning the Ukraine can be solved by accepting the hard fact of the inborn inertia of Ukrainian national feeling. The Mongol invasion dealt a fatal blow to the Ukrainian culture. With their culture destroyed this tragic race could not remould their national character in such a measure as to contrast with the Russian. I am deeply convinced that had the Ukraine passed from the very beginning under Russian rule—without enjoying the period of not too severe Polish rule—her vague national character would have emerged more impaired and perhaps would have been completely eradicated.

The fact remains that in 1918 the Ukrainian revolt in East Galicia found no large appeal among the population and Poland crushed it, although not having at that time a regular army. In 1920 the attempt to build an independent Ukrainian state federated with Poland failed largely because it found no support among the Ukrainian masses who were crippled by a centuries-old inertia. And now 35,000,000 or more Ukrainians in Soviet Russia raise no voice of protest.

There is undoubtedly a Ukrainian problem, and there is certainly a Ukrainian race. But first of all a separate Ukrainian culture must be built up, and that is not a matter of a few years only. On the basis of that culture alone could a hopeful national sentiment arise, a feeling of such a strength as to win through by the virtue of its own power.

Yours faithfully,
Dr. Z. Grabowski,
London Correspondent 'I K.C.' Newspapers Syndicate.

78, Charlbert Court,
Albert Road,
Regent's Park, N.W.8.

'THE DECLINE OF THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND'

To the Editor of the Nineteenth Century and After

In the extremely interesting article by Mr. Dingle in your December issue one detects a resistance to the merits of psychological treatment which needs further consideration.

Firstly, on the main point that theology has declined, as, similarly with Mr. Dingle, I have passed through the period of change from the Victorian era to the present, I can say that in my opinion one of the principal reasons for decline was our parents' mixing up sex suppression with religion and the tactlessness, or even brutality,

CORRESPONDENCE

'GERMANY, POLAND AND THE UKRAINE'

To the Editor of the Nineteenth Century and After

Sir,—Allow me to add some remarks to Mr. Paneyko's article 'Germany, Poland and the Ukraine' in your January number.

Mr. Paneyko's aim is to belittle the strength and value of Poland in every respect, as, *e.g.*, when he says that the Polish State comprises no more than 15,000,000 to 16,000,000 Poles, but two pages later he makes mention of them as 'a people of 20,000,000.' Perhaps if the article had run to a greater length Mr. Paneyko might have arrived at the correct figure of 24,000,000–25,000,000 Poles (the Ukrainians being 5,000,000–6,000,000 strong, Jews over 3,000,000, Germans about 1,000,000). Mr. Paneyko also appears anxious to forget the fact that Poland had been once rather successful in establishing a *modus vivendi* with Lithuania and the Ukraine on a wise and equitable basis.

It is really astonishing that the Poland which Mr. Paneyko tries to reduce to nothingness was formidable enough to change the whole course of the Soviet policy towards the Ukraine and was responsible to a large extent for the post-war malaise and the miscalculations and faults of the French policy. Such a paradox is too naïve to be dealt with.

While vigorous in his unrestrained attacks on Poland, Mr. Paneyko offers little on the constructive side. His article certainly reflects the state of mind of Ukrainian politicians. What are the aims of Ukrainian leaders? Mr Paneyko reviews a couple of possibilities, but we learn nothing from his treatment about the real feeling in the Soviet Ukraine. Are the Ukrainians in that land satisfied or not? Do they wish to have an independent state, or not? Why from the Soviet Ukraine, comprising over 35,000,000 Ukrainians does there come no appeal of unity to the Ukrainian race?

These are all riddles to the solution of which Mr. Paneyko's article offers us no help. He is even not decided as to his choice of the prospective patronage of the new Ukraine.

But the riddle of Mr. Paneyko's silence about the really vital

substitute for religion in a time of religious 'disintegration'; the mature poet would certainly repudiate the rôle assigned to him by Mr. Read, and the student of affairs to-day would hardly agree about the religious disintegration.

The essays we must confess not to have found particularly stimulating. We were neither persuaded to return upon the writers we knew well, nor sent to those with whom we had little acquaintance. We felt in them, so often, that Mr. Read had been caught in the web of his own theorisings; and we have wondered whether fear of taste as a basis for criteria of works of art—taste which is the development of the personality of the audience—may not arise from some lack of *ardour* of approach to them. Mr. Read may have all the scientific appurtenances, but we wonder, sometimes, whether he has the scientific discipline and temper. In his essay on Froissart there appears the following passage: 'There is something foreboding in the way this eager little man (*there is perhaps no evidence* for his littleness, nor yet for his leanness, but a man so active in body and lively in observation suggests the figure . . .)'—the italics are ours. Such fantasy and conjecture go ill with the qualities we expect in a critic anxious to evolve a new science.

L. AARONSON.

seems to have confused psycho-analysis, a clinical method for dealing with mental disorder (disorder, in this sense, implying 'anti-social' tendencies), and psychology, the more general study of mind as a factor in human behaviour. Moreover, Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious* and Freud's *Ego and the Id* are largely drawn upon; and Jung's mysticism of the collective memory and the primordial image is regarded by many psychologists with suspicion, while Freud's treatise is quasi-philosophical. With all Mr. Read's affectation of preparing a new scientific logic we notice in him a fondness for the vaguer terms like 'inspiration,' 'unconscious,' 'super-ego,' even 'blood'—as where he speaks of 'blood which is not coeval and congenital with language.' A scientist invents an instrument which he continually and carefully tests and retests by reference to the realities of his material. Whenever Mr. Read approaches his realities he makes strange statements. He quotes a poem of his own as an example of work written in a trance (his own poetry he avers is only authentic 'when written immediately, instantaneously, in a condition of trance'—does he correct in a trance?), and it seems to us not poetry but prose. He reiterates his old heresy that Wordsworth in his later years lost his poetic skill and inspiration; he quotes a poem of very ordinary rhythm by E. E. Cummings, chopped up in an eccentric and arbitrary way 'for the eye,' as an example of free verse; he says that *The Ancient Mariner* is 'full of obscurities' (we had not noticed them), seeming to suggest that logic and obscurity are opposites.

We have other misgivings, too. The essay on the personality of the poet makes a distinction between 'character,' that which fits a man for the world according to his lights, and 'personality,' the total quality of the individual, and fails to see that personality that has no will to integration, no quality of *character*, in fact, becomes mere restlessness, or degenerates into madness. Also, Mr. Read's obvious dislike of organised religion leads him to ignore the works of the great Christian thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas and Kierkegaard, for whom, by the very nature of their beliefs, personality has been a particular preoccupation—Kierkegaard is profoundly penetrating when writing of the poet's personality. At times he seems to suggest that poetry is a

method in criticism and creation, and dealing with such matters as the personality of the poet, obscurity in poetry, metaphysical poetry, and the nature of criticism, the second with individual writers, ranging from Froissart, through Swift and Vauvenargues, to the Brontës, Patmore, Hopkins, and Henry James, it throws its net widely and seriously. Of Mr. Read's range there is no question. The volume bristles with quotations from the works of 'authorities,' from Freud, Jung, Adler, Groddeck, Roback, H. B. Brewster, Montaigne, Fernandez, Proust, Vico, Croce, Dryden, Sonnenschein, Bergson, Eliot, Coleridge, Empson, Ernest Jones, Valéry, and many others. All are pressed into his service—poet, philosopher, critic, and, above all, psychologist. They make a bewildering array, too bewildering perhaps, since Mr. Read seeks with their aid to effect a synthesis, prelude to a real science of criticism, to fit 'the scientific temper of our age.'

It would be impertinent, within the compass of a short review, to attempt a searching and complete assessment of Mr. Read's claims. The work ranges over fifteen years of growth and continual revaluation, and is obviously charged with much close thinking. Nevertheless, certain misgivings have arisen in our mind. Let us record some of them. Mr. Read himself is also uncertain. On p. 23 he says: '. . . As a literary critic—that is to say, as a scientist in my own field. . . .' On p. 125 he says: 'It is only because I want to distinguish one kind of literary criticism from another . . . that I resort to a *pretence of science*' (the italics are ours).

There is far too much jargonising in the book; and reference to authority is by no means 'authoritative' unless its establishment is clear. The three psychologists, Jung, Freud and Adler, in professed hostility to each other it should be noted, provide the most material for Mr. Read's method. Psychology, that is to say, is to be the science which he most frequently raids for his postulates. In his Preface he speaks of picking 'from the science of psychology his brightest weapons.' We are frightened of that word 'brightest.' Scientists are chary of such words in such a context. They do not pick and choose with quite such pragmatic ease. In any case, psychology is still a young and by no means established science; and Mr. Read himself

connection, the artist Cruikshank, who presented in visible form the exaggeration and gargoyle Cockneys of the early Dickens period against the sobering background of Palladian London, assumes a very important place. He needed, and we need, repose and poise to give effect to what would otherwise be mere eccentricity. And out of this demand for poise and restfulness at the moment of swiftest movement comes the Palladian style—'impartial and capable of looking after itself, even in the most uncongenial surroundings.' It is interesting to note, amid the turbulence of every contemporary chaos, the emergence of a demand for simplicity, for functionalism, for a kind of cool-headedness in stone, that is finely in our tradition.

The three Sitwells—whom, for once, the facts of authorship justify us in so naming—offer themselves and their whole artistic integrity in defence of this thesis. The contrast between the blustering and vulgar crudity of Mr. Powys and the twinkling good-humour which, especially with Mr. Osbert Sitwell, plays blandly over the surface of their essential seriousness, is remarkable. They have their idiosyncrasies—and the section for which Miss Edith Sitwell is responsible presents a very workmanlike charting of the more navigable channels among the poetic quicksands of the day rather than the general approach I have suggested—but the truth at which they have arrived has been attained primarily through their artistic perceptions. Here they have done as their favourite English architects did. They have brought their very personal notions, their ability to shoot abroad fireworks of imagery and wit, to bring forth fanfares of fascinating and kaleidoscopic verbosity, into contact with the discreet urbanity of a University audience. Their work in the process assumes a sober, ironic, an almost sub-fusc tone that sets it in harmony with the Palladian England which is their ideal, and in which they successfully find embodied the permanent qualities of the race.

BENJ. GILBERT BROOKS.

Collected Essays in Literary Criticism, by Herbert Read (Faber and Faber, 12*s*. 6*d*. net).

Mr. Read's collected essays make an imposing volume. Divided into two parts, the first concerned with literary

that idealisation of 'unintelligent nonentity,' a quarter of whose personal essay is devoted to the disembowelling of Baconians!—before, notwithstanding that heaviness that 'tends to brush away some impalpable petal-dust from the "purfled" parterres of his Muses' Pleasance,' he is allowed 'to enter the ensorcelised terrain of his guarded mount.' On Matthew Arnold he is interesting, though his argument in favour of the amateur poet, in spite of its modern instances, is not sound. And he fails altogether to apprehend the typically French moral framework on which Proust's great book is mathematically constructed.

Here and there, as I have hinted, one lights on a sensitive piece of critical comment: the sort of thing which, left in the form of a suggestive note, or relegated to the limbo of literary table talk, might have justified inclusion in a small brochure of some conceivable value. Such might have been his observations on Hardy, or Dostoievsky, or Nietzsche, had he not allowed the last-named to influence his style so disastrously. Such *is* his analysis of Wordsworth's genius. But here he is using the peculiar interpretation of the country world with which he and his brothers have become identified to a purpose for which there can be nothing but praise: and here alone he strikes the only justification for such a book as his.

Trio, like *The Pleasures of Literature*, represents a kind of mental stocktaking: but, being compiled throughout with a deeper artistic sincerity, and depending for its final effect on the workings of that sincerity, it forms just such a reassessment of our English fundamentals as has become increasingly necessary since last September. If our civilisation is the sort of second-hand, second-rate thing which it would appear to be in the mirror of Mr. Powys's 'style,' then it is not worth preservation. But surely the national genius which, in *Trio*, is isolated in its most effective forms of artistic expression, justifies itself as a unique and valid contribution to human life.

Along with an acceptance of the fantastic and individual elements which are among our richest endowments, there goes, according to Mr. Sacheverell Sitwell, an insistence that these are made part of civilisation by the neatness and homely elegance of their architectural setting. In this

Mr. John Cowper Powys, is indeed so completely wrong, that it is a pity to find its perfection marred by very occasional excellencies. *The Pleasures of Literature* is on the face of it an evaluation which vainly claims to be a revaluation of certain authors of general and established interest. The Hazlitt method of attack, at which Mr. Powys is conceivably aiming, was sound enough in a period when the main body of readers undoubtedly stood in need of inspired pointers. But at our present stage, it is sheer commonplace pretentiousness for anyone, even a successful novelist who offers to kiss his public 'on both cheeks,' to gallop us for 600 well-printed pages through the output of thirty world figures in this way. Surely Mr. Powys's 'fans' cannot be such simple souls that enlightenment of the sort he apparently thinks he is giving is really necessary.

Whether trying 'to pander between many sensitive and erotic souls and these immortal, invisible and evasive odalisques,' or to connect 'the most intimate peculiarities of a writer's style with the very centre of his soul's circumference and the indirect parabola of its circling flight,' he adopts the same would-be prophetic tone: pseudo-Carlyle, plus pseudo-D. H. Lawrence, plus pseudo-Glendower. He can talk with charming uncritical abandon of 'a happy reversion to Rabelaisian Christianity, or even some subtle merging—hints of which I fancy I have found in Rabelais—of a cosmic beatitude and a delight in all sex joys that "mean no harm" with a feeling of "being born again" into a selfless equality of all souls.' He is prepared at any moment to fling into this sea of 'soul' an unctuous reference to Tao. He can discuss 'that deepest of all kinds of metaphor, the kind that sinks down into the very substance, essence, or occult life of the thing described, indicating its inmost esoteric affinity, nay! its spiritual identity, with some kindred emanation from the world-reservoir, whose external appearance is different but whose root in the same underlying Noumenon is the same.'

That Goethe, for him, means little more than a translated version of the 'Faust' need not trouble us, since Goethe's thought, one is glad to know, 'does not wed itself so intricately and absolutely to the syllabic sounds he is using *as to be undetachable from them*.' Milton is subjected to a series of schoolboy comparisons in relation to Keats and Shakespeare—

On the other hand it must be admitted that Professor Thomson has made out a good case for the significance of matriarchy in the tradition which lies behind the work of Æschylus, and as the purely classical evidence for this institution would not take us very far, analogy must be freely used to support it. Professor Ridgeway in 1906 explained the *Suppliants* on the assumption that father- *versus* mother-right was still a living issue in Athens at the time of the play, but his view was never widely accepted; Professor Thomson has extended it to solve the problem of the end of the *Eumenides*, and explain the extraordinary grounds on which Athena gives her vote for Orestes; that he is his father's son, whereas his mother merely harboured the seed which the father produced, so that matricide is not an inexpiable crime, while the Furies, who represent the old matriarchal strain of thought, regard the relation between mother and son as all important. This supposition makes the end of the play, if not reasonable, at least explicable on rational grounds; on any other view it must depend on a theological fiction of a very inferior type. But even so, the theory presents difficulties; what was Æschylus' own position? Patriarchy had long been unchallenged in Attica; yet this solution presupposes both in poet and audience a clear conception of the issues involved in the ancient struggle between the two systems, not a mere acquaintance with some half-understood tradition.

Time will show whether the methods and outlook which Professor Thomson advocates will gain adherents among scholars, also, perhaps, whether there is any future for scholarship except among liberal-individualists. But in any case this edition of the *Oresteia* is a substantial and valuable piece of work.

D. W. LUCAS.

The Pleasures of Literature, by John Cowper Powys (Cassell, 12*s*. 6*d*.)

Trio, by Osbert, Edith and Sacheverell Sitwell (Macmillan, 7*s*. 6*d*.)

The two books under review offer an interesting contrast between what may be termed the probably right and the certainly wrong way of useful assessment. One, that of

his own head—the tendency to simplify the order of the words, and the intrusion of glosses; in the case of the last a very sharp distinction can be drawn between the frivolous and the justifiable emendation, and the frivolous are here exposed with due severity.

The notable part of the introduction, however, is neither the section on the text nor the very full analysis of the trilogy in which the complicated harmonies of its structure are revealed, but the portion entitled 'Æschylus and Athens.' Here we have the most representative sample of the author's 'tentative beginning' at the task of expounding literature 'in the light of the general development of Greek art, philosophy, and social institutions,' in which he seeks to break away from 'the liberal-individualist traditions of English scholarship.' Of course, there is nothing new in studying literature in the light of its environment; what is novel in classical scholarship is the attempt to deduce the poet's outlook directly from the social conditions of his age, and the assumption that there is enough uniformity in the development of human societies to justify conclusions based on analogies and generalisations for which in the particular case there may be little evidence. If this method can be legitimately employed it is important, for there is much interesting work to be done in the re-interpretation of antiquity. But the results of what is admittedly only a sketch, so far as they can be judged by a liberal-individualist, are not wholly encouraging. Is it true that the doctrine 'measure is best in all things' was developed under the post-Homeric landed aristocracies to keep the toiling serf in his place, that the *Œdipus Tyrannus* is 'a mirror of the deep-seated perplexity engendered in men's minds by the transformation of a social order designed to establish liberty and equality into an instrument for the destruction of liberty and equality'? Is there a direct connection between the *Oresteia* and the fact that the democracy of the day marked 'a further advance in the direction of equality than had been attained anywhere else in the ancient world since tribal society had been superseded by the State'? Possibly an even more pertinent question is, if these things are true, how large a part of the truth are they? For it is a vice of most such methods that it tends to be assumed, however tacitly, that one explanation is the whole explanation.

and a supplement in which certain points in the introduction and commentary are discussed at length. To deal first with the translation; here Professor Thomson has parted company with Headlam very decidedly. Headlam, who was one of the great translators of his day, believed in using a medium with associations of its own which seemed to him to correspond as far as possible with the spirit of the original; in consequence his contemporaries found him superb, and we, for all his taste and dexterity, pastiche; for to them echoes of Swinburne's choruses conjured up visions of Hellas, but they only remind us of Swinburne. Professor Thomson has chosen quite a different method; the blank verse into which the iambics are rendered is completely colourless; it is intended to have, and it has no associations at all, apart from the associations of poetry as opposed to prose. It is at times elevated, at times strikingly colloquial, and it renders perfectly the tone of the original as the translator sees it. This method is quite justified in its results, only naturally it fails to produce anything with much independent value as poetry, and Æschylus is supreme poetry, Headlam's method aims higher, this one will probably wear better. The choruses present a harder problem; in spite of the technical developments of the last twenty years lyric for most readers still connotes rhyme; yet any rhyming metre must arose echoes of the kind which Professor Thomson is at pains to avoid. Actually he has attempted to reproduce the rhythms of the Greek and to make a systematic use of quantity in the process; but quantity is a strange thing to the English ear, and it is hard to estimate his success without hearing him read them aloud himself.

It is hardly the task of the reviewer of Vol. I to discuss the text; it may be said that Headlam's conjectures have not so far been accepted as widely as they deserve by editors, and here he comes into his own; but the sort of scholar who sticks to the MS. as long as some sense can be extracted from it will accuse both Headlam and the present editor of excessive self-confidence in re-writing Æschylus according to their own intuitions. But no one who is interested in the art of emendation should fail to read the section of the introduction which deals with the errors of MSS.; of particular interest are the effects of the changing pronunciation of Greek—for what a copier writes is affected by the sound of the words in

Oresteia' of Æschylus, edited with Introduction, Translation, and a Commentary in which is included the work of the late Walter G. Headlam, by George Thomson, M.A., Professor of Greek in the University of Birmingham and formerly Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Vol. I.: Cambridge University Press. Price, 25*s*.

'he appearance of this edition of the *Oresteia* by Professor nson is an event of importance for two reasons. Pro- ·r Thomson discovered among Headlam's books in the :ge Library at King's two interleaved copies of Wecklein's hylus which contained a substantial proportion of the rial for his projected edition on which he was engaged at leath in 1908. The *Oresteia*, the last work of Æschylus :he only trilogy to survive complete, is, after Homer, the valuable of the legacies of antiquity; Swinburne was y of less than his usual exaggeration when he called it haps the greatest spiritual work of man.' Headlam was of the finest of English scholars, and Æschylus was his en field; Professor Thomson learnt his Classics, not ·d from Headlam himself, but from those whom Headlam .nspired; he is already known as an editor of Æschylus now the happy collaboration of the dead and the living produced a work which is an important advance in the r of the *Oresteia*. Secondly, in spite of its debt to the past, edition is significant because in it a conscious attempt is : to apply to the study of antiquity the methods and nptions which are now much used in some quarters for nterpretation of more recent events. If classical studies nue, this book may come to be regarded as the fore- ·r of a new tradition. Of this I shall have more to say cussing the introduction.

ıe first volume which is sold separately, especially for nefit of those who do not know Greek, contains the action, text and translation; the second the commentary

'I was born in Hamburg. It's such a nice town, and I can always perform there so much better.'

'Why don't you cut your hair shorter?'

'Dad doesn't allow it. I must look like an Abyssinian.'

'But it must make you so hot!'

'Not so much. It's the combing which is such a nuisance.'

'You needn't have to comb it.'

'Oh well—I must, otherwise the lice get into it.'

'Do you like London?'

'Not very much. It smells where we live. Hamburg is such a nice town.'

'But tell me: of what does it smell where you live?'

'I wouldn't like to say, Miss.'

Suddenly she is swept away by a group of howling Abyssinians. I had a feeling that their warcry sounded somehow German to me. They are doing the last turn. 'God Save the King' follows, which the sea lions do much more assiduously, sometimes out of tune, but always with a great deal of humour. Perhaps the audience would be more enthusiastic about it if they were stimulated by an occasional herring.

The show is not quite finished. The microphone announces: 'My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, as you walk out, please pay attention to the fun fair.'

This I faithfully did. But what a sordid affair! The only amusing thing was the flea circus. Big, well looked after fleas they were. I asked the men if they were a special kind of fleas. 'Oh no, quite ordinary ones, but I am kind to them.' They carry whole aeroplanes and royal coaches on their backs. It is only a short display. Then they go back to their soft cotton box. The man puts the lid on; the show is over.

URSULA HARTLEBEN.

table. I hardly think that they have any nerves either. Garday proudly reports that he has had eleven accidents, including three lots of crushed ribs.

America is very advanced in many ways. A young man whose parents cannot afford his education is quite capable of joining a circus, if he is good in athletics and acrobatics, so that he can earn his own keep and carry on his studies. This happens to be the case in one of the turns at Olympia.

Sea lions always make me think of Leni Riefenstahl, the German film actress. Some years ago I read that she went on an Arctic expedition with a film company to make a new film. They needed sea lions for their shots and therefore played to them some Beethoven Sonatas on gramophone records in order to make them come out of the water. The poor creatures got further and further away from the shore, always listening to the music. In the end, when they were no more needed, the company went away and left the sea lions behind in misery.

I can forgive Leni Riefenstahl for being a favourite with Hitler, but not for the other reason Since that time I have always had great sympathy with sea lions; they are very fastidious. Trout (lake trout if possible) and salmon they like best. They might descend to a herring if nothing else is on the menu. I wonder how they would like a fish ordinary at Simpson's in Cheapside! A haddock doesn't go down with them at all. What they don't like they simply spit out. Their fish must always be cleaned very well. While they are performing they have to be quietened down by fish all the time. They are so sensitive to outside noise and get upset very easily. They were perfectly calm in the waggon until I showed my face against the bars. Then they broke into hysterical outbursts which I could not bear for long. Sea lions are very sensitive to temperature. The damp English climate does not agree with them at all (they find London colder than the North Pole).

I happened to spot the Abyssinian group. I walked over to them and got into conversation with one of their number, a twelve-year-old child. A sweet little thing, with thick fuzzy hair, doing her cartwheels all the time. She started speaking German with me, to which I responded.

'Do you come from Germany?'

the audience seems to be more amused with him than with the actual goings on in the arena. He is dressed in rags and busies himself mostly among the audience. He dusts and sweeps all the time, as slowly as my own charlady. The only difference is that I pay him to be amused only and her not only to be amused. Sometimes he stops for a moment, leaning against his broom, and looking at you, his head slightly bent, in a most unhappy manner. Apparently he is very slow in the uptake. He cannot grasp why his extraordinary hat, which he puts on one end of a see-saw, should go right up into the air. He goes on doing it and finally gives it up and starts dusting and sweeping again.

Charlie Rivels is perhaps the greatest clown of our time. His Charlie Chaplin imitation is of course first class, but does not show so much his own creative mind, except that he is the better acrobat of the two. He is really grand in his last act, when he does his 'acrobat' scene The very word 'acrobat' is, to my mind, quite ingenious He begins to tickle his fellow clown and walks about with him arm in arm, always saying to himself the word 'acrobat.' Then something of a disturbing character happens and for the moment he forgets his 'acrobat.' In the end he walks out of the arena triumphantly saying 'Acrobat.' There is something cruel about seeing the circus. It is almost like watching a bullfight. The excitement in the audience of what might happen high up on the trapeze is tremendous. I had different thoughts while I was looking up at the Four Queens doing their aerial stunt. They are exceptionally pretty girls, with slim figures, which you don't often see at the circus. How much they have to depend on one another! Supposing two of the girls have fallen in love with one and the same man. And supposing the one girl, who might be of a jealous nature, unloops the girl who is clinging to her and who has also fallen in love with the other girl's boy friend—this, indeed, would end in a terrible tragedy. But apparently they have nerves like steel. I am told that they were doing this act when the earthquake shook Los Angeles in 1933. In future I shall go into my own emotions more carefully and always read a programme before the show starts.

But what about 'Garday and Corbett'? They are two Germans who knock about all over, beside and beneath the

into my gullet. I immediately got up and walked out of the restaurant backwards, my front legs high up in the air like a liberty horse. Up to now I did not know what a liberty horse was until I made the acquaintance of the master of the horse, Tom Tagg. He looks like a coachman on an old-fashioned Christmas card. With his reddish face and too narrow trousers he might have stepped out of a Dickens story. This is about all he revealed to me, that a liberty horse will never be trained for riding purposes. They are described in the programme as 'a group of beautiful horses performing complicated evolutions at the word of command.'

As they enter the arena they are divided into four groups, with little flags stuck on their backs. The British one of course comes first, then the German, the French, and the American flag last. I am ashamed to say that during their complicated evolutions only the British horses dropped their dignity.

Tom Tagg looks after the horses He keeps them in condition and sees to all the work done by the trainers. He picks them up from all over the world. One, for instance, he got from Russia, just an ordinary horse before a butcher's cart trotting along the streets. In the mornings the horses do their regular training in the circus arena, while the cleaning and moving is going on. Tom Tagg watches them with an inquisitive eye, as Mr. Cochran would watch his young ladies. He also chooses the names for the horses. It is quite characteristic of the never changing atmosphere of the circus to call a horse 'Albert' instead of 'Adolf.'

One of the grooms took me round the stables. The Arab horses are beautiful creatures to look at. Some sticky stuff is rubbed on to their backs so that the riders won't slip when they do their dangerous tricks.

I must relate a short conversation I had with a clown, who was standing about, apparently off duty.

'Are you German?' he asked.

'Yes, I am, and what are you?'

'I am an Italian.'

'There isn't much difference between the two!'

'Thank Heaven, no!' he said.

But there is one, an American clown, Kelly, with whom I have quite fallen in love. He draws a lot of attention, and

BERTRAM MILLS' CIRCUS

I HAVE friends who live in the top flat of No. 1, Dorset Square, the general office of Bertram Mills' Circus. It is a charming late eighteenth century house. The porter wears a blue uniform with gold braid (I think I am still an inexperienced writer to 'phone up in order to find out whether the colour was blue or green). He looks like a Russian aristocrat and only shrinks into an ordinary human being when he is off duty, when he is just the husband of the housekeeper down in the basement. While you walk up the stairs you look at lots of framed pictures; some of them are caricatures done by Tom Titt, of *The Tatler*.

After a seven months' tour all over England the circus returns to London to prepare for its month's season at Olympia. All kinds of funny people turn up at No. 1, Dorset Square: robust women, children with old faces, dwarfs, etc., which already creates a pre-Christmas atmosphere between the month of October and the middle of December. About one week before the opening of the circus the whole staff comes from the training centre, Ascot, up to town. I have not been to Ascot myself. March seems to be the best time to go down there, because then they get ready for the road. It makes one think of George Borrow's roads, but 'road' nowadays only means railroad. All these activities made me want to see the actual thing. At last I found myself sitting in the Press office of the circus at Olympia.

I have been to the circus so many times to get the 'atmosphere' that I am beginning to do weird things myself. The other day, at a restaurant, I noticed the waiters were looking at me very curiously because I was the only guest left and it was nearly midnight. I kept on opening my mouth wide, always looking in their direction. At last they understood me and threw lump sugar out of their trouser pockets right

ime he failed to ring the bell. At night he started ing in the road and four men could not restrain him. in an asylum.

ade Revival.—When I go for a walk, the cork trees are :light. They are nude and red to the waist, and their make green-blue, metallic clusters. The land is full le cork factories, which have been shut up, but recently to work. The reason is that cork is used to make s on battleships.

ne chestnuts have just fallen, prickly but split with the n-veined nut inside. The chestnut harvesters get only ics a day, but as it is fun, wages don't matter. You work hard, because the patron works with you: but are long intervals during which you dance to a gramo-. There has been a revival in chestnuts this year: it rs that crushed chestnuts are used in the manufacture aluminium alloy, and there is a boom in armaments.

ERIC SIEPMANN.

life, or returning to a place to recapture a happiness which it once held: all this indicates the false association of ideas which underlay the 'art' of magic.

Later.—The mountains are as beautiful, and the sea glistens as brightly. The pine trees have their identical smell. It is all exactly the same as ten years ago. Why should I expect it to have changed?

Later still.—Mosquitoes hoot their horrid horn
A tiny torment in the night.

Poets.—What is the poet's reward? Of a man like Herrick, who roystered a few years in Fleet Street and spent the rest of his life regretting London in a dull, country parsonage—and did not even write more than a few lines of remarkable verse! Clearly, a state of mind.

Méounes.—Life rises up in nightmare boulders all about. The foal-like daughter of the house despises the customers. Innumerable dogs bite at innumerable flies. The claret-coloured marquee against the church is a kind of ambient Woolworth. A cart loaded with lavender passes.

Greetings.—How cold, formal in England! Here they are an urgent, oft-repeated contact like a dog brushing up against one's legs. One does not say 'good-bye.' One says: 'Very well, good-bye, what? Henri, eh, good-bye?' (*Allez, au revoir hein?*—is a minimum).

Prawperty.—['My little pile, my keppital, my property!' —the beetle as it rolled its ball of dung in Kapek's 'Insect Play.']

The old villages in Provence were built high, like a fortress, for protection. In safer times the steep slopes proved inconvenient, and in every village there is an upper layer of houses which have fallen into ruins. They can often be repaired and are bought by people from Marseilles for about 700 francs. A man went mad in the road last night, because he felt that he had been swindled out of one of these ruins, which he regarded as his property. The rent was 50 francs a year, but he had never paid it. The trouble preyed on his mind. He called on Maître Demerle, the notaire, every day at 7 a.m. to protest, rang the bell, found that the lawyer was not yet up, and went away grumbling. Yesterday for the

A PROVENÇAL DIARY

I SIT after my supper in the open air under the acacia and plane trees, and it is cool after the usual very hot, very clear, very blue day: relieved by my afternoon dip in the cold stream underneath the Chartreux monastery at Montrieux. Two visiting bourgeois have just left in a rich car and the remark has been made: '*Elle en a des cuisses!*' La belle Hélène is serving out drinks and clearing the tables. Simon has gone off with a car-load of villagers to a neighbouring fête. (There is a fête *somewhere* every day.) The radio blares forth tunes suitable for dancing the quick-time Java. On the terrace two games of boules produce the usual loud click of balls and louder yells of excitement, abuse and defiance. As Provençal vitality cannot be appeased even by boules and shouting, a trapeze hangs from the acacia and someone in blue workman's trousers swings upside down by his knees.

Provence reproduces characteristics of Southern Spain—individualism, regionalism and at the moment political extremism. But compare félibrigism with the savagery of Catalan separatism to see the difference in conditions. Along the coast of Andalusia in 1936 men slept in caves; here they own a house, a vine and a boat and work when they feel like it. Still, there is temperamental similarity. A friend of mine says he saw '*arriba yo!*' written up on a Spanish wall—'hurray for myself!' The yelling on this terrace is one long stream of boisterous self-assertion.

Solitude.—A shrewd Frenchman says solitude reproduces some of the symptoms of adolescence: a constant expectation of the unknown. Some of the shocks, too: rude contact, by a wandering star, with stolid constellations firmly set on their courses.

Magic.—What a lot of crude magic is practised in daily life—and how stupid it is. Going to a new place to acquire a new personality, tidying a desk when the aim is to tidy a

prestige and defend the interests of Great Britain in Central Europe, says to me: 'I am hopeful that something may be done to counteract German influence. The Export Credits idea is good, so far as it goes. But of course it is a mere flea-bite. Meanwhile Germany is getting control rapidly by disorganising the economy of the South-Eastern countries, thus making them more than ever dependent on her.'

To a third representative Briton I suggest: 'In England the supporters of Chamberlain reassure themselves with two possibilities: (1) Give Hitler enough rope and he will hang himself; (2) The South-Eastern countries will rebel against German methods. You know these countries. What is your opinion?'

He replies: 'Ultimately it is a question of military strength. Germany is highly organised on a military basis. The surrounding countries are disorganised, split by minorities, dependent on the German market. I see no reason why Hitler should fail in this part of the world.'

After all this despondency I am astonished to meet an optimistic Briton. He is a naval officer coming home overland from the Persian Gulf.

Only the Germans, he thinks, are to be compared with the British. 'Ultimately, the struggle is between Britain and Germany,' he assures me. 'There will be war, but Chamberlain is cunning: *he will choose his own moment.* Britain will choose the time that suits her. The Czech crisis was not a suitable occasion for us to fight. Besides, *we don't want the help of other races.* We don't want to be mixed up this time with Greeks and Rumanians and Serbs and Czechs and Italians and French. They can't be trusted. They were more trouble than they were worth in the last war. In the next war we shall choose our own time, and we shall fight Germany alone, and we shall thrash her. Mark my words.'

George Pendle.

I talk with a plump Spaniard. He has bright black eye and Azaña spectacles. His overcoat rather worn at the edges He is living in Paris earning a pittance by buying and selling rags. Formerly he was a rich man. He shows me a cutting from a Madrid newspaper of September, 1936, in which it i recorded that his fortune of 200,000 pesetas has been seized b the Republican Government. He talks like a machine-gun.

'So you are a supporter of Franco?' I ask.

'Not now. I do not like the way things are shaping in Nationalist Spain. It smells too much of Hitler. Those tricks are not for us Spaniards. We are different. We are not like the Germans. Look: Hitler, when he has a headache takes an aspirin, *but a Spaniard needs a whole tube of them.*'

Simplon-Orient Express. I travel with a prosperous French Jew. He tells me that he works in Rumanian petroleum. He is a dapper little man with a Maurois-shaped head

'If only Russia were not Communist!' he exclaims. 'If only Russia were a strong country and one that we could rely on! Then Britain and France with Russia could re-establish the balance in Europe. But you simply cannot trust Russia to-day. That is why Czechoslovakia had to be sacrificed *What Europe lacks, is Russia.*'

I ask him what can be done, pending the Russian counter revolution.

He replies: 'The British Empire cannot be defended. It is impossible. So you must act quickly. You must spend money. Britain and France have money. Germany and Italy have none. For you and us it would cost little to buy up the Balkans. Germany is getting control of Rumania by offering 20 per cent. above market values for her petrol (the transaction is barter, but the exporter himself receives payment in lei: more lei than he would have received if he had sold his petrol elsewhere). Britain and France should outbid Germany. They could easily afford it, even if they had to re-sell the petrol at a loss. Money is all that matters in the Balkans, *and money is what the others haven't got.*'

I meet the editor of a Bucharest Liberal newspaper. He wants to know all about British party politics and British personalities.

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING ABROAD—II

I

CALAIS-PARIS Express. Three Italians are talking together:

'What a fertile, *abandoned* country this is! Yet they want to keep their colonies!'

'And do you notice that the train is travelling on coal *all the way? Think of it!*'

'What abundance!'

They marvel. Their suits look rather skimped, but their gestures are rich.

A Czech returning to Prague from London says to me: 'I have often been to England. I have always liked the English. But this time I have observed that they are soft. They have no idea how perilous is their position. In London I was struck by the leisurely movements of workmen building a house; the early hour at which office-workers pack up in the afternoon; the long week-ends, and I feel frightened for the English people. They are so soft. They don't understand that their privileges are a relic of the time when England was omnipotent, and that she is no longer omnipotent. They continue behaving as before! Poor old England! She has been comfortable too long.'

'What else did you notice?'

'That the girls are very much smarter than they used to be. Really very smart. And even the poorest people seem more resigned and middle-class than they were formerly.'

He continues: 'But in France it is worse. I feel that the French nation would prefer to decline, enjoying as long as possible its present luxuries, rather than make the uncomfortable effort at reconstruction. The French, unlike the English, *know* what is happening in Europe, so their softness is all the more pathetic.'

may never get it again. So look at the danger you have created for yourselves.'

I met a number of professional men, doctors and writers, and also some business men, merchants, brokers and so on, and their wives. Sometimes the conversation became very heated. 'Perfidious' was the adjective hurled at England, *apropos* the Munich settlement.

I took them to task for venting all their bitterness on Britain. After all, I said, the British did not have a direct obligation to defend Czechoslovakia. The French did. Why do you decry the British, and not say a word about the French?

The answer was this: That they voiced their criticism of Britain because, after all, Britain is still a Great Power. Why bother to curse France, they said, since France had already sunk to the rank of a second-class Power?

One of the company took a different view. He said that probably history would record that Mr. Chamberlain had saved civilisation from a terrible catastrophe.

Another said—and in this he was expressing a view almost universally held in Yugoslavia—that the whole thing had brought home to the Yugoslavs the realisation that it would be unwise for them to rely on help in an emergency from any of the Great Powers. 'We must build up our own defence, and rely on ourselves,' he declared.

A Yugoslav woman—highly intelligent and educated, and in touch with politics and public affairs—expressed to me the view that the totalitarian system, especially economic totalitarianism, was the direct outcome of the chaotic economic condition of the post-war world. She did not like it. She only thought it was, perhaps, unavoidable.

In conclusion I would say that my general impression was as follows:—

Since Munich the Yugoslavs as a whole are somewhat disillusioned in the Western Powers. As regards the Axis Powers, they do not intend to quarrel with them, although there is not much love lost. For the rest they will proceed upon the old adage that 'God helps those who help themselves.'

GABRIELLA MELVILLE.

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING ABROAD—I

I WENT to Yugoslavia recently to give some wireless talks on Britain and the British. The fact that I am a Yugoslav by birth, married to an Englishman, enabled me to talk with people—my compatriots in race—with a frankness which perhaps would not have been possible had I been an English woman by birth instead of adoption.

An 'intellectual' whom I met in Belgrade, soon after I had given my broadcast, said to me with engaging candour: 'It's a good thing, my dear lady, that you spoke from the wireless station and not from the platform of a public hall.'

'Why?' I asked him.

'Because,' he replied, 'at the wireless station you could not have an audience throwing rotten eggs at you.'

'Was my talk as poor as all that?' I demanded.

'Oh, no, your talk was very well done,' came the reply, 'but had you said all those nice things about Britain before an audience in a hall, they would have expressed their displeasure in no uncertain manner. Believe me, after the British betrayal of our Czechoslovak friends at Munich, no Yugoslav audience would have listened politely to your praise of Britain and the British.'

I travelled from the Italian frontier to Belgrade in a railway carriage in which, amongst others, were two Yugoslav army officers. One, a colonel, was a Croat; the other, a captain, was a Serb. Both expressed the same view. That from the strategic point of view the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was a blunder of the greatest magnitude on the part of Britain and France.

'Before Munich,' they said, 'the Western Powers had the military balance of power in their favour. If you had fought, we and the other countries of Eastern Europe would have had to come in on your side. Since Munich the balance is in favour of Germany. You threw away a great chance. You

BALLADE OF CLAPHAM COMMON

Of old, all Town blessed Clapham's ' Plough '—
As *bona-fides* from Park Parade.
But wiser now, on ' dusty pow,'
The ' Windmill ' casts its dappled shade.
By platinum curls, in swift swings swayed,
Grim moves, on squares where chess-men bristle,
Hat-tilted, chin to stick, are made :
While breezes through cool tree-tops whistle.

Far, where faint blossomed domes allow,
'Gainst billowing shapes, with sharp pulls stayed,
Taut twines coax high their wind-borne ' dhow.'
'Neath columned chapel chaste and staid,
'Mid hum of trams, by fountain sprayed,—
Nude cherubs from a painted missal,—
Scented with sweat, shrill children wade,
While breezes through cool tree-tops whistle.

Red moon, night-drummed across the brow
Of rustling leaf-clouds disarrayed,
Salutes the nymphs that from each bough
Hoof-prancing satyrs, loud with raid,
Pursue : while dim through woodland glade
Smoke bubbles float like down of thistle,
O'er smouldering flares with canvas laid,
While breezes through cool tree-tops whistle.

Envoi

Prince, at Dawn's call, dew-silvered, ' feyed,'
Fair dames, deck-chaired, weave dream's epistle :
Commercials, car-clad, doze—unpaid :
While breezes through cool tree-tops whistle.

Benj. Gilbert Brooks.

BALLADE OF THE BALLETS RUSSES

Grey moonlit arch of shuttlecocks,
Feathered with gliding 'tos and fros':
Blue, swift with velvet-footed shocks
Of criss-cross bright, and twirling nose:
Slashed amber castle (glades enclose)
Through which black sylphs and princes dive:
Nude, leaping green, where sapphire flows,
Fleet, geometrical, alive.

Mendicants crutch, quaint minstrels fox,
Fair dames bemuse Venetian beaux:
Cracking serenity, sharp knocks
Split misty noon with neat black blows:
Stout shopman's ware fantastic shows
By rain-washed lake or tall-tiled hive:
And dolls flick moth-like past in rows,
Fleet, geometrical, alive.

Red blares, and purple glory mocks
The lonely, savage queenly rose:
Wildly the hot air throbs and rocks
With negroid trumpets bellicose:
By umbered Tartar camp fires close
The sudden archers leap and strive:
Night's gaudy Sun-Boy toy-like goes,
Fleet, geometrical, alive.

Envoi

Prince, break strife's demon-prancing foes,
Let faun-gay peasant gods arrive,
Still leaps the sweet pursuing pose,
Fleet, geometrical, alive.

BALLADE OF DE BASIL'S DANCERS

Lichine stands taut, a stallion fair
Limbed like a lyric Hercules,
Or sweeps wide arms to drift on air
With mellow and majestic ease :
And Shabelevsky's swingeing knees
Twist to the anguished violins ;
His lean head writhes with subtleties :
For wind whirls and the dancer spins.

Tall Baranova's golden hair
Drifts on the froth of silver seas.
Drooping with elegant despair
She glides through perruqued courtesies :
And Danilova's classic frieze
Breaks from long stillness and begins
With eager thighs our eyes to tease :
For wind whirls and the dancer spins.

Pale, melancholy, wan with care,
Floating upon the moonlit breeze,
Dim Toumanova hovers there,
Storm-eyed from woodland elegies :
And, exquisitely swift to please,
While fragile fire her body wins,
Stalks Riaboushinska through the trees :
The wind whirls and the dancer spins.

ENVOI

Prince, for Massine, swift melodies
Like a machine that stamps and grins,
Sways and recoils, advances, flees :
For wind whirls and the dancer spins.

BALLADE OF THE THEATRE QUEUE ENTERTAINERS

Mole-grey with white and vertical streaks
Roadwards the tall walls pit-like sink,
Where, noon or night, through days and weeks,
Queues trail and rotted peanuts stink.
Still, be your garb striped shirt or mink,
Whether you Gods- (or Pit-) wards fare,
Needs must you rub your eyes to blink
At Mercury of the Yellow Hair

Two tumblers grim in flannelled breeks
Roll, twirl on chairs, clap hands, pause, link
Palms in the air, shoot toe-tipped peaks,
Dive through held hoops, square shoulders, wink,
Spring-footed trot, then elsewhere slink ;
But while with tense and glass-eyed stare
The whining crooner throbs to pink,
Comes Mercury of the Yellow Hair.

Monkeys, black-coiled Chinese antiques,
Clamber around the doorway's brink :
The Negro Shylock croaks and shrieks
Blank verse that grates like steel-scrubbed zinc :
The paper-tearer earns his drink,
Sweet-smiling, whispering, debonnaire ;
The gagging juggler makes knives chink ;
But—Mercury of the Yellow Hair !

Envoi

Prince ! At each queue, swift as on rink,
You'll see (long mane, jaws lined with care,
Rolled 'brolly' swung, eyes blue as ink)
The Mercury of the Yellow Hair.

POEMS

BALLADE OF MODERN ART ON PICCADILLY
(1937)

WHEN blue light pales 'mid soot-streaks airy
And we loll West-bound from the scrum,—
When traffic's thunder grim and hairy
Sinks, as in aromatic gum, —
Discreet, effete, long, strong and dumb
(Our twills dove-soft, our voices chilly)—
Lo !—red-bricked, prim, St. James the Glum
Rings out neat chimes on Piccadilly.

Here, to stale brains in states contrary,
Art would imprint its tee-to-tum,—
Picasso's strictly-wrought vagary
Slices black cones with gaudy thumb :
But—mocking (taut from Afric's drum)
Dick Wyndham's slender negro'd lily
(Ringed nose, ringed moon and ring-shaped bum)—
Ring out neat chimes on Piccadilly.

London's crushed strawberries in a dairy,
Snared through Grau-Sala's thin-spread thrum !
Matisse springs wide with rhythms wary,
Balancing gold, blue, black and plum :
Max Jacob's nightmares wade through rum :
Sickert depicts an old-time ' filly '
Purpling—what drab proscenium ?
Ring out ! Neat chimes on Piccadilly.

ENVOI

Prince, Rouault's lurid dolls that strum,
Benois' Swan Pool and mystic ' Wili '
Are ogres—'gainst whose ' fee-fo-fum '
Ring out, neat chimes on Piccadilly.

nothing very spectacular or brilliant about it, but firmly based on the essential humours and make-believes of the tradition. It had, too, the great virtue of a proper brevity. Four hours is too much, even four hours of Mr. Rose or Mr. Melvin.

I am aware that I have overlooked some important pantomimes, but one's capacity for assimilating pantomime is limited, particularly since pantomimes grow from a common stock and are not above duplicating one another's jokes and songs. I have already watched two dough-baking scenes in which dough is flung from the stage up into the gallery; two almost identical classroom scenes, which follow a slap-stick rhythm as formal as ballet; I have twice heard 'The Spreading Chestnut Tree' and 'Phil the Fluter'; and have seen good vanquish evil four times in all. After a while one tires of even this heartening spectacle.

* * * * *

It is encouraging to find, after so much attempted suppression of fact in the cinema, that the latest issue of The March of Time news-reel has been permitted to state the truth about the refugee problem. It is something of a novelty in England to hear a news-reel commentator refer to Japan as an 'aggressor,' and to the 'looting' of Japanese soldiers. The account of Hitler's pogroms, in word and picture, is equally direct. There may have been cuts made in this reel—some of the sequences towards the end seem a little disconnected—but it does give a clear and uncompromising picture of the refugee problem and how it has come about.

No doubt it was made before the recent fantastic suggestion that Jewish refugees should be bartered in exchange for economic concessions, on the principle of: 'Buy them or we'll persecute them.' Jews, in fact, are beginning to be regarded by their oppressors as a valuable commodity, an asset like minerals or coal; and it is possible to envisage a situation in which a country, having got rid of its Jews by barter, might actually be glad to acquire others, for persecution and export at a profit.

ALEX GLENDINNING.

there is still plenty to enjoy, and in particular the song, 'I'm the Fairy, Wish-Fulfilment,' which is the wittiest song heard on the London stage for a long time.

The Queen of Hearts has no more point than one asks of a Lyceum pantomime. It is a good raucous entertainment, with plenty of tinsel and glitter, sprites shooting up through the floor, crowds of chorus girls, fauns, penguins, a pretty ballet, a storm with a tidal wave, a harlequinade, acrobats, and Mr. Clarkson Rose as the Queen of Hearts, as genial and phlegmatic as ever among countless misfortunes and improbable attires. I was lucky, at the Lyceum, in finding an audience mainly composed of children, who created a proper atmosphere of gazing attention, laughed out of turn with the grown-ups, sang and gesticulated in 'The Spreading Chestnut Tree,' and here and there were a little sick, bringing among us a patient attendant with sawdust. All that I found disagreeable in this pantomime were some jokes about hunchbacks and dwarfs, and there was rather a grisly band scene, in which the chief source of amusement was the drummer's frank longing to thump the gouty foot of his neighbour; but perhaps I am over-squeamish.

By comparison with the Lyceum, the Drury Lane production of the *Babes* is rather a staid affair, though it has the incomparable Mr. G. S. Melvin in the part of the babes' nurse. Mr. Melvin takes such opportunities as are offered him, but they are not many. He comes into his own as a physical culture instructress and gives a display of that benevolent inanity which is his special achievement. There is also a very agile horse, inhabited by the Agar Young Duo, a model of co-operation. At one point it descends from the stage, and one finds that the spectacle of a horse reclining in the stalls does not seem so odd after all. The most remarkable feature of this pantomime is the performance of the Arnaut Brothers, who appear as birds and conduct a quarrelsome but perfectly intelligible conversation in bird language. Miss Fay Compton is unembarrassed by the thankless part of Robin Hood—virtue is always a little dull in pantomime, I fear—and sings very prettily.

I think in many ways the best pantomime I saw was also the most unassuming and traditional—*The Babes in the Wood*, at Collins's, Islington. This was a twice-nightly show with

and what you're getting really is just somebody's opinion. Well, *it may not be your opinion*. See what I mean ?'

This kind of dialogue might take place anywhere, but it seems peculiarly appropriate among the pin-tables and peep-shows of Funland. As a social phenomenon I find Funland infinitely depressing, not because it encourages a kind of tedious gambling, but because so many people are willing to spend their leisure, night after night, staring absorbedly into little glass boxes, fiddling with little cranes and levers. The 'gifts' are not a sufficient explanation of the crowds to be found in these places ; and I think we cannot afford to be complacent about a state of society in which Funland provides for the leisure of such large numbers of people.

* * * * *

Is there some topical significance in the fact that *The Babes in the Wood* has been the dominant theme of the London pantomimes this year ? The Wicked Uncle, the two robbers, the helpless babes and the valiant Robin Hood—surely there is a hint of the contemporary scene in this somewhere. I think the producers must have felt so too, with a belated uneasiness, for topicalities are—with a single exception—conspicuously missing from this year's pantomimes. At the Lyceum I thought I did detect a certain macabre topicality in a figure wearing a white policeman's helmet and a Union Jack and carrying an umbrella which turned out to be a rifle ; but any suspicion of satire here was dispelled by a line about the British Empire, which in fact secured a rather embarrassing round of applause. Apart from this, topical jokes are of a lame and cautious kind. A reference to a chamberlain as 'Baldwin' is typical of the bolder sallies this year.

The exception is *The Babes in the Wood : a Pantomime with Political Point* at the Unity Theatre, which is so topical as scarcely to be a pantomime at all. Here the traditional struggle between good and evil is identified with the struggle between classes, and Robin Hood appears in the last scene wearing Russian dress. If you can envisage the U.S.S.R. as Robin Hood without misgivings, and accept the general viewpoint this impersonation implies, you will, no doubt, find little fault with this uncompromising satire. If not,

watched a man working in the approved way, penny after penny, in an effort to extract a cigarette case. Sometimes the prongs of the crane slithered off the plated edges, sometimes they caught on something and raised the case an inch or two and dropped it again, sometimes they merely quarried a little in the coloured gravel. In went the pennies; the attendant brought more change; more pennies; the crane swung, dropped and missed; the man cursed and shook the machine; more change. . . . Just over our heads a loud-speaker had been left on and somebody was giving a talk on China and Japan. 'Let me draw your attention,' said the earnest voice above the swinging crane, 'let me draw your attention to the conceptions of isolation and inseparability . . .' The little crane clutched at the edges of the case, raised it, dropped it, retreated: 'More change!' At last he got his prize and turned away tiredly, dropping the case into his overcoat pocket. 'Shows you what ——g perseverance can do, don't it?' he said.

Pin-tables and cranes are not the only amusements offered. At the back of most of these saloons are a number of little cinematic machines which, for a penny, illustrate such themes as 'After the Bath,' 'Through the Keyhole,' or 'The Sultan's Favourite,' and are nicely calculated to encourage a zest for voyeurism.

* * * * *

Not to be outdone by M-O, I will record here a conversation overheard in Funland. Picture two young men in wasp-waisted overcoats, with little black moustaches like the mark left by a sooty finger. Their conversation is very slow and serious and deliberate.

'Tell me, Harry, do you ever read books?'

'Last time I read a book was, let me see, must be two years ago. (*Pause.*) Do you know what I think? I think a film is as good as a book. Or even better.'

'I don't know that I entirely agree with you. After all, they're not the same.'

'O, they're not the same, I grant you.'

'What I mean is, there's more *in* a book.'

(*Pause.*)

'I'll tell you what I think about books. You read a book,

gure, and can do this often enough with a pennyworth of ills, you are rewarded with a package of cigarettes. pparently this game represents an uneasy compromise with e law, for notices explain that it is for amusement only, and e cigarettes are a gift awarded solely at the discretion of the roprietor. As well as pin-tables there are curious machines ith glass windows, like showcases, brilliantly illuminated om inside. The floor of the case is covered with a kind of loured gravel, and on the gravel lie watches, clocks and garette cases. By inserting a penny you can operate a iniature crane which automatically advances, descends and utches among the 'gifts.' If it succeeds in gripping one, retreats to the back of the box and drops it down a chute, ad you have won. Here, again, a large notice explains that e machine is purely for amusement, the 'gifts' have nothing do with it. 'You pay to see it work,' says the notice, and far as concerned my own efforts with the crane, this was terally true. I was amused to find that several of these achines were of French make, and that the French attitude wards this amusement is perfectly open. *Essayez d'obtenir des jolis cadeaux exposés*, reads the notice in the French box, ut perhaps the English law cannot be broken in French. t all events, the gibe that we are a nation of hypocrites is orne out by our pin-table saloons.

A novice among these instruments, I had supposed that ne left it to luck whether the crane brought out a gift or not, ut on asking an attendant about it, he explained that it was great deal more complicated. It seems that there is a special lace, a projection of some sort, on each gift, by which it can e seized by the crane, but only by a long series of manœuvres nd pennies) can you ensure that the crane will seize the rojecting part. These manœuvres may include digging way the gravel (at a penny a time) from the sides of the gift o that it may drop or tilt into a better position. In order to ecure a single gift, as I realised with a kind of awe, one might pend an entire evening putting in pennies and digging and lutching with the little crane. 'You don't suppose you an get one of them things for a penny, do you?' said the ttendant.

Later, at a saloon in the Edgware Road, I joined a tense, lent group round the glare of one of these glass boxes and

'cake-walk' originated in Lambeth; but a letter from Mr. Chaplin's Film Corporation informs us that he can trace no connection between 'The Lambeth Walk' and his 'screen-character.' His walk, the letter adds, 'would seem to be the logical effect of being compelled to wear ill-fitting shoes—much too large for his feet.'

M-O concludes that 'The Lambeth Walk' is a healthy social phenomenon, leading away from the 'paradise-drug of the American dance-tune.' I remember thinking something of this kind as I watched the Folk Dancers' Festival at the Albert Hall some weeks ago. It was easy to believe that the peasant dances of the Lithuanians or Yugoslavians were still part of a living tradition, were, in fact, contemporary dances, but I found the English folk-dances a little embarrassing. I could not help remembering that the only folk-dancing in England is performed by students of the Folk Dance Society, and that the only popular dancing in England is the terrible slinking and huddling we have imported from America. 'The Lambeth Walk' is certainly a step, or series of steps, in the right direction, and it deserves the serious analysis which M-O devotes to it; so universal a phenomenon cannot be socially trivial. The fact that there is a movement to suppress it in Germany confirms one's feeling that it represents something of considerable social value.

* * * * *

A less conspicuous and odder social phenomenon is the growth of a form of amusement known as the pin-table saloon, now spreading like an epidemic in London. Every hundred yards or so in the main streets you will find one of these places, ablaze with electric bulbs and variously described as Funland, Sportsland or (with melancholy accuracy) Modern Amusements. I wondered what so compelling and ubiquitous an attraction might be' and made a tour of some of them the other night. The results of this single-observation are perhaps worth recording.

The amusement in Funland mainly consists of a row of sloping tables on which you can play a kind of bagatelle, and if you succeed in so propelling a ball that it circumvents a hedge of little pins and falls into a hole marked with a high

There are many verbatim reports of conversations, answers to questionnaires and so on, and what emerges clearly from these is the appalling confusion and bewilderment of the public's reaction to a complicated political issue. M-O attributes this in part to lack of information on the facts; but there is little evidence that the public to-day is capable of assimilating such information were it available, or of drawing a sound conclusion from it, or that it would be less likely to respond to emotional appeals and propaganda, whatever its 'opinions.' Knowledge can only be of value to a public capable of discrimination, above all a public with a sense of the ends towards which the machinery of politics ought properly to work. I do not think any of the opinions quoted by M-O show the slightest *understanding* of the issues involved last September. Most of them seem to have been arrived at by pure instinct.

* * * * *

Of the non-political surveys in *Britain*, by far the best is M-O's study of 'The Lambeth Walk,' its origins, its affinities with older dances and with Lambeth itself, and its social significance. The development of this famous dance is traced in detail from its beginnings in the cockney walk of Mr. Lupino Lane in *Me and My Girl*. His performance impressed the managing director of the Locarno dance-halls and his chief dancing instructress, who elaborated Mr. Lane's walk into a ball-room dance, with some modifications. The ball-room version, first demonstrated at Streatham, is now familiar throughout the world. M-O includes a report from Hungary, where an observer 'had heard nothing else but "The Lambeth Walk" for a fortnight.' (It would be interesting to know how the song emerges in translation. And do they shout 'Oi!' in Hungary?) 'The Lambeth Walk,' it appears, might as easily have been the Hoxton or the Stepney Walk, the title is pure chance; but observation in Lambeth reveals a very curious tradition of dancing there. The account of Lambeth dances in which 'men dress up as women or pretend to be animals' reads like something out of Sir James Frazer.

In Lambeth, M-O succeeded in locating the former landlady of Mr. Charles Chaplin, and she was certain that his

COMMENTARY

I HAVE just been reading *Britain* by Mass-Observation, or M–O, as it is called in the text. By M–O we are to understand Mr. Charles Madge and Mr. Tom Harrisson and the numerous 'observers' who provide them with reports, analyses, 'personal documents,' and so on. It is an absorbing little book (a Penguin Special, 6*d*) which attempts an anthropological approach to contemporary English behaviour, as revealed in such phenomena as 'The Lambeth Walk,' the 'Keaw Yed' festival in Lancashire, All-in Wrestling, Astrology, etc

There is also a survey of the crisis which recreates vividly the farce and nightmare of last September, and includes many interesting documents. Among the odder manifestations of crisis psychology recorded is an extraordinary report of a coach journey in Lancashire :

> The whole atmosphere of the journey, which should have been a pleasant one, was marred by talk of war and Hitler. Even more of Hitler than war, it seemed to be all Hitler, particularly four old ladies refused to discuss anything else, only war and Hitler. They *created a morbid feeling among other passengers, and when passing* through Lancaster, someone suggested paying a visit to the home of Dr. B. Ruxton the murderer They all agreed to this. The driver had a job to get some back in the coach. . . .

The party grew more bloodthirsty as the evening progressed ; and reading about it I began to wonder if perhaps there was, after all, something in the theory of a friend of mine, which I had dismissed as nonsense, that the recent outbreak of 'slashing' was a specifically post-Munich development (the other end of the argument which attributes a religious revival to Munich).

During the crisis, M–O reports, 'quick marriages at registry offices jumped 500 per cent.,' and there was a boom in the sale of wills, deed boxes and metal cash boxes.

justified if, by that word, is meant the strenuous adherence to privileges which have become out-moded. They are not justified if it be recognised that real prestige lies in maintaining the principles of service and in substituting true understanding for complaisant assertions of superiority. The sense of discipline which the British community has long acquired is one of its most admirable characteristics. It could with advantage be extended to other parts of the East where British effort is important. As for the foibles of social snobbery, they are in process of natural dissolution by the material facts of present-day economics and may be dismissed with a good-humoured shrug of the shoulders.

EDWIN HAWARD.

in England which can discriminate between the defeatest attitude of the pukka sahib school of thought and the emotional and often uncontrolled endorsement of the extravagances of an extreme section of Indian political opinion. Much might be done to protect the newcomer to India against both mentalities. On the way out he will meet the inevitable old hand, who will tell him that the country is going to the dogs. On arrival he may be buttonholed by the over-enthusiastic individual who sees India only through Congress eyes.

When in the present century the British Government made certain definite steps forward toward the introduction of representative institutions in India, the milestones on the road being the Morley-Minto, Montagu-Chelmsford and now the Hoare-Linlithgow reforms, it was always handicapped by its inability to produce a magical change in the ranks of official thought. This does not overlook the remarkable loyalty and intelligence displayed by the chief men in the services—again wonderfully confirmed in the support which Congress ministries have gratefully admitted It must, however, be remembered that the success of the paternal era of government depended on qualities which were quite out of keeping with the requirements of a later age. Difficulties and misunderstandings certainly occurred because there was this divergence of view between what may be conveniently called the secretariat and the district schools of thought. It would be dangerous if this were allowed to persist.

Kipling may have erred in excessive adulation of his Bulldog Drummond types, but his gospel of service to India and to the Empire should be as faithfully revered to-day as when he was preaching it to more receptive ears. Probably the young generation will not be as self-conscious as its predecessors in professing that creed. They have to serve and advise where previously they would have been able to command and prescribe. Their task is all the more difficult—it is all the more honourable. It is unbelievable to them, therefore, that their countrymen should take so little pains to appreciate its significance or understand the burden thrown upon men who serve overseas, whether as officials of the Government or as immigrant adventurers.

The fears that British prestige is waning in the East are

Dramatic Club, wrote one or two of the prologues to its plays and with his sister acted in them, although her part was greater than his. No: the Kipling vogue rendered service to English literature, but in its political aspect it was damaging to an alert understanding of the problems before British rule in India.

Viewed in its proper light, the achievement of Great Britain in India is truly remarkable. An Empire of teeming millions covering all standards of civilisation, culture and race has been negligently absorbed but patiently developed in the arts of self-government and self-expression. Where disunity prevailed, unity has been sedulously encouraged. The path is still difficult and dangerous and the unity has a precarious existence. Kipling was not wrong in admiring the men and women who made such progress possible, but he failed to realise the debt owed to the inherent genius of the magnificent races who were gradually teamed in the work. He therefore created monstrosities of such palpable unreality that the British public refused to make the effort to understand a country where they were supposed to flourish, especially as Bath or Cheltenham—or Mr. Ervine's Malvern—seemed to give the picture so banal a lie.

The failure of England to understand her sons and daughters overseas is not confined to India, but as India bulks so largely in Empire realities it is more vividly illustrated in her regard. Moreover, there is opportunity to gauge the merits of talent which has found scope in India. Seldom in British history have retired officials from India played such important rôles in public life here as now. The belief that long service in India destroys capacity and usefulness afterwards is to-day brilliantly falsified by men like Lord Hailey, Sir John Hope-Simpson, Sir Geoffrey Clarke, Sir Richard Maconachie, Sir Stanley Reed, Sir Herbert Emerson, Lord Birdwood, Lord Meston, and hosts of others.

Is it not time that the prejudice against the retired 'Indian' were abandoned? Is it not also time that in advocating service by young men in India some calculated effort were made to ensure that the recruits are fortified by careful instruction in the significance of Britain's relations with the country of their prospective service?

There is a real need for the cultivation of public opinion

The creatures who absorbed and typified his political sentiments were just those ill-bred, intolerant, sponging, self-satisfied pretenders to rank in the 'pukka sahiblog,' who are too frequently mistaken by the undiscerning for the real thing.

Kipling's spleen created a sort of Bulldog Drummond absurdity from which sanity revolts. In his autobiography this kink drives him to the ridiculous length of affecting surprise on returning to England after six years' absence to find 'white women stood and waited on one behind one's chair. It was all whirlingly outside my comprehension.' His 'own fluent liar,' Pagett, M.P., could not have beaten that childishness. Here perhaps is part of the key to the lack of interest taken by the British public in India. The 'strong silent man' of the Indian administration evolved by Kipling and his weaker followers was on so high a pedestal that the common-sense of the English mind rejected him. When it was found that the retired official was apt to be a bore, was by no means backward in conversation and invariably had a grievance against the Government or the climate or some other indeterminate tyrant, the Kipling myth became irritating.

There had been a time when India was looked at from England entirely through the Kipling telescope. Unconsciously perhaps the official in India grew to imagine that the 'strong silent men' really existed. There is little doubt that in the Punjab, when I first went there this cult was devoutly worshipped in clubs and messes. Paradoxically enough, the author, who, as a young journalist, had been anathema to the 'services,' became their high priest. In the old Punjab Club between the youth Kipling and the youth Michael O'Dwyer a fracas arose because the journalist had referred to the I.C.S. in terms of contempt. The future Lieutenant-Governor was with difficulty prevented from throwing the future poet down the stairs. Neither could foresee that in 1918 Sir Michael O'Dwyer would unveil to Kipling's memory a tablet on the offices of the *Civil and Military Gazette* which had the honour of being Kipling's 'first mistress and most true love.' Kincaid, by the way, repeats the often asserted theory that Kipling was unable to 'get into Simla society.' This is incorrect. Kipling took a prominent part in the affairs of the Amateur

amiable pretensions of social life in Simla and Lahore. He found in the district intense inspiration for hero-worship. On the one hand he clearly perceived the defects of the rigid administration of paternal government; on the other he developed a fine sympathy for, and appreciation of, the work which the officers of that Government performed. Unfortunately he never grew up politically. No one had a stronger desire to champion the bottom dog—the district officer, the soldier in the ranks, the agriculturalist—no one more savagely rebuked the formalism which hampered understanding of the Indian point of view.

Kipling never followed up this judgment with logical appreciation of the nationalism which naturally arose from the deliberate operation of British policy. He became an obscurant opponent of any advance which might be expected to remedy the defects which he had been solicitous in exposing. His writing has never appealed to Indians, who see in him a hostile critic. Even the beauties of Kim have not absolved him in their eyes. This is partly due to the amazingly persistent misquotation of his "East is East and West is West." Divorced from their context those words are made to convey the exact opposite of the poet's intentions :—

Oh, East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's great judgment seat.
But there is neither East nor West, Border nor Breed nor Birth
When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth.

The misquoters have the excuse of interpreting the poet's political outlook rather than the actual significance of his artistic expression. His genius unhappily gave weight to his political prejudices, steeped as they were in racial snobbery and unpardonable ignorance.

He never returned to India after 1889. He never troubled to grasp conditions developing from the natural processes of the British system which he championed, and from the currents of opinion whirling through the globe. Even his lurid but often sharply accurate description of climatic woes does not escape this perverse arrogance. Thus he suggests that Indian incapacity prevents day-time working in the Punjab hot weather—a preposterous travesty of facts and mischievous to boot. The men and women of his tales were of full stature.

country left behind. As the Honourable East India Company developed from pure adventuring into an administration for the 'good governance' of a mighty dependency, standards improved. Sustained efforts were made to raise the tone of society, to eradicate habits which had come to be contemptuously described as 'shaking the pagoda tree.' From unpromising beginnings came the establishment of services which, to-day, for probity, dignity, and single-minded devotion to duty, can bear comparison with any in the world. Victorian influence purged the abuses of the Georgian era. In the middle of the nineteenth century the expansion of British rule in India was directed by men who, narrow, fanatically religious, were resolute in action, imbued with a high sense of duty and paternally efficient.

How was it that, when this extraordinarily well-devised machine with its competent attendants proceeded to create a new India—to fashion from a rich colonial pageant the staid magnificence of an Imperial administration—the country of its origin took but a tepid interest in the development? Picturesque accounts of the mediævalism of Indian States, warm-hearted pride in the dashing exploits of Indian soldiery, had their attraction to Edwardian as earlier to Victorian England, but, except when criticism of 'Indian agitation' was forthcoming, there was little effort to appreciate the true significance of the British Government's encouragement of Indian nationalism. Not three years ago Parliament passed the most massive Bill in its history to establish the new régime of Federal Government in India. Except for a bitter controversy between two sections of expert opinion, that measure attracted scant attention and virtually no understanding. Indeed the popular Press showed complete apathy except when a section of it found criticism of the measure convenient in elaborating attacks on the Prime Minister of the day.

The answer is not easy to find. Inspiration seems, however, to come from perusal of Mr. Kincaid's book. It cannot deal with the later phases of its subject without reference to the writings of Rudyard Kipling, poet of Empire in the Edwardian vein, but, above all, master-craftsman in journalism. Kipling's impressionable years were spent in the Punjab, where the semi-military expansion of British rule had its most modern example. He brought his sardonic humour to bear on the

Critics in England as elsewhere carp at the snobbery which to them seems to mark the social attitude of the English in India. The criticism is superficial, so, too, is that which finds the usual topics of Anglo-Indian conversation boringly full of 'When I was in Sitapur . . . do you remember Brown of the 55th . . . in camp near Jubbulpore . . . the hot weather on the plains.' In his turn, however, the returned exile can legitimately wonder whether the swiftness with which a casual enquiry on the state of India, after being answered by a halting sentence or two, is replaced by discussion of golf handicaps or bridge plans shows any better sense of proportion.

The late Dennis Kincaid, in his partially completed survey of *British Social Life in India*, 1608–1937,[1] managed by a brilliant study of contemporary records to throw much light on the answer to this problem. In concentrating on the social scene he was impelled to bring out the weaknesses rather than the virtues of the exiles who, in strange surroundings, so desperately tried to preserve the manners and customs of their time at Home. In the process of transfer the interpretation became lurid and distorted, but it will be realised that in essence English society in India could not be in advance of the organisation from which it sprang. The raffishness of Calcutta in the eighteenth century, the standards of conduct, were governed by conditions in the England of that day.

Kipling in a later period wrote that India was the paradise of the middle classes. He meant that those classes supplied men—and women—who generally had to set the pace in maintaining standards which actually applied to the upper classes in England. The result was that the 'nabobs' who aroused the envy, ridicule and antagonism of London society in the old days of the 'Company' were not unfairly accused of vulgar ostentation and despised accordingly. Macaulay pilloried them in a classic passage—an attack all the more powerful because Macaulay himself had lived in India—and Thackeray, again endowed with Indian traditions, drew Jos Sedley with a photographic fidelity. His compensatory Dobbin and Newcome were less true to type. Thackeray never explained how so short a career in India brought his upright Colonel an abundance of wealth.

In fact English society in India burlesqued usages in the

[1] London. Routledge, 15s.

to boast of Imperial greatness. If in the heart of the City London this indifference be shown, is it to be wondered at the less instructed public frankly affects boredom and nitely refuses to be interested when Indian affairs are ler discussion. The daily newspapers mirror this indiffer-e with accurate commercial perspicacity. Outside the ct circle of retired 'Indians' who foregather at the East ia Association, the Royal Central Asian Society and the , the most sustained interest in India is to be found in the anisations which are labelled 'left-wing' but which, vever misguided may be some of their deductions and ories, do at least take the trouble to understand and assess significance of British relations with India. On the stage modern dramatist delights to tilt at the foibles of the opean in India or from India.

Stage colonels and majors of quaint imbecility and inter manners are allowed to pass without demur, although Bernard Shaw is heavily—and rightly—castigated for a ve error in dimension because he gives Begonia Brown of nberwell the accent and manners of Shoreditch. Mr. St. n Ervine takes the landladies of Malvern to task because prefer to be loyal to impossible Anglo-Indians (old style) ead of hailing the new patrons of the Malvern Festival. s Cicely Courtneidge, seeking an outlet for her brilliant rers of burlesque, ascribes to the wife of an Anglo-Indian onel a screamingly funny snobbishness which may in fact more readily found any day in the jungles of South sington.

The haphazard manner in which, throughout the long nection with India, young men have been chosen for ice in that country has caused bewilderment to outside ervers. The patronage of the early days has been replaced xaminations or a system of rigid selection, but even then to be doubted whether the young aspirant is as thoroughly ared as for example his Swedish colleague in commercial overseas. Drawn from the lesser public schools or amar schools as a rule, these boys arrive in the East to be ucted less in the realities of British policy as in the pre-ces and conventions of the 'old hands.' The marvel is so many of them emerge with credit and uphold the sh name so well.

KIPLING MYTHS AND TRADITIONS IN INDIA

British complacency in Imperial affairs is proverbial. Worthy organisations in London endeavour to keep the Empire in mind. They are mostly supported by heavily preoccupied men of public life, by retired officials from the outposts and by an uncritical rank-and-file who somehow or other find a social craving satisfied by the amenities provided. They preach to the converted or the heavily shackled devotee. The wide open spaces of suburbia, the Midlands or Yorkshire are indifferent to them. Eloquence on the platform of a school speech day invites 'the best men England can give' to enter the service of the Empire overseas. It never attempts to guarantee the slightest intelligent interest in the results from the British public. Careers of distinction may be carved out. The fount of honour may flow on their account. Yet how many of these Empire builders, on return to their own land, can command a genuine hearing or receive credit for ability displayed?

The other day I was present at a City company dinner at which a worthy civic Knight was called upon to propose the toast of the visitors. Among them was a man who, the usual book of reference showed, had served—like his father before him—for nearly thirty years in the Indian Civil Service, rising in due course to be Finance Member of a province of some 50,000,000 people. He was present apparently because he was a kinsman of the Master in the chair. Yet the toast-proposer, after cataloguing the small beer of the lives of some of the other principal guests, dismissed the ex-Indian official with the naive observation that he had evidently travelled. The discourtesy of this piece of slackness never seemed to strike the audience. Everyone seemed satisfied.

It was of course typical of the impudently patronising tone which the insular Englishman so consistently displays in dealing with men who unassumingly make it possible for

national newspapers and make it possible for a wider variety to appear.

Our exploration suggests that the most likely methods of achieving this would either be by developing a type of newspaper co-operatively owned by its readers or by its staff, or else by public ownership of the expensive plant required for newspaper publication, coupled with the restriction of non-journalistic forms of competition, and possibly with a fund for subsidising new experiments for limited periods with the object of bringing newspaper ownership and operation within reach of many outside the limited class of persons and corporate bodies at present in a position to face its financial demands.

NORMAN ANGELL.

Altogether there are eleven major groups, some of which publish newspapers only, some periodicals only, and some both.

As to the influence of interests, the Report concludes that:

> The influence of advertisers on the treatment of news is not such as to justify a charge of venality against the British Press, but there is undoubtedly a tendency to tone down or suppress minor items that seem likely to annoy advertisers or potential advertisers, and an even more serious tendency to soft-pedal problems that ought to be widely discussed, but which are inconvenient to advertising interests

The Report classifies the influences brought to bear on the treatment of news into internal and external, though the 'external' influence which many now find most disturbing, an insidious but growing political censorship, is not very fully investigated.

> The internal influences are those operating inside the newspaper office, for example the personalities of the proprietor, editor and other chief executives and the conscious or unconscious bias of those who actually collect and write up the news. The external influences are varied, and include the pressure that may be exercised by banks, advertisers, the Government, churches and other institutions, and the impersonal influence of the law. It is often hard to disentangle the two sets of forces, and external influences frequently make themselves felt indirectly through internal agencies.

Well, what can be done about it all? Here are the conclusions of the Report:

> We have examined a great many suggestions for reform, but most of these would involve State interference of a type which would, in our view, form a remedy worse than the disease. There are, however, some possible ways out of the difficulty. The economic conditions which at present favour a few mass-circulation dailies may easily change, and in fact would change if average advertising revenue per column inch per 1,000 readers were to increase to the moderate extent necessary for supporting more newspapers with circulations of less than a million. Also public opinion might solve the problem either by ceasing to demand such large papers, with so many features, or by reader pressure from more educated groups of readers, or by agreeing on some acceptable arrangement which would once more reduce the entrance fee for

that has an added excuse or interest because it has happened. The Report notes:

seek to escape from the drabness of reality by drugging with fantasies in the cinema, in the theatre, in novels zines. Many welcome a newspaper that under the guise ng the news, enables them to escape from the grimness of its and the effort of thought by opening the back-door of nd sex-appeal. They thus keep up the illusion of follow- going on in the world without in fact being in a position that is significant.'

omic forces enter powerfully into the problem, but s in the form of pressure by advertisers or big han in the fact that enormous capital is now necessary d ensure the success of a daily paper, and in the fact dds to the difficulty of maintaining the more serious gainst the more trivial type, since the latter has such ously larger market

vast and difficult is the problem, the P.E.P. Report A few figures indicate the weight of the forces h we are dealing.

37, 1,577 newspapers and 3,119 magazines and s were being published in Great Britain, and in y 100 families bought 95 morning and 57½ evening rs every day, and 130 Sunday newspapers every week. reover, a growing industry. Its net output of lions in 1935 was £6·2 millions up on 1930, and fifth among the industries of the United Kingdom, both shipbuilding and iron and steel. Between 1936 the estimated average circulation of all daily rs rose by some 1·44 millions to 19·05 millions, twelve national Sunday newspapers increased by ons to 14·44 millions.

ndustry embraces vast combines, 'whose ramifica- trate to spheres as diverse as zinc-mining in New- and the manufacture of glue.' But there are also mbinations of one morning, one evening and one ewspaper. There are firms publishing eighty , and there are firms publishing one. There are s that are run as the mouthpiece of one man, apers that speak with the voice of movements millions of adherents.

age have had only an elementary education, many of them when educational standards were much lower than at present. In three-quarters of British families the chief earner probably gets less than £4 a week. Only a minority get an annual holiday with pay; few, again, have ever been abroad. 'With such a background it is not surprising that the interests and the outlook of the great mass of the population, who form the mainstay of the circulation of the popular daily and Sunday newspapers, should be narrow and limited.'

The reader of the mass-circulation daily asks, in some ways, far more of his newspaper than the reader of the class paper. The popular daily or Sunday newspaper is, continues the report, expected to fulfil at least five kinds of function: (i.) to present the news of the day in such a way that readers with the limited background described above will be able to understand it; (ii.) to supply entertainment, and to serve increasingly as a daily magazine; (iii.) to provide a lead for public opinion, especially at times of political stress; (iv.) to carry advertisements, which tell the reader how he can satisfy his daily wants; and (v.) to provide a variety of ancillary services, such as insurance and advice, and to sponsor social, political and cultural movements. A class newspaper, appealing to a small comparatively educated class, is in a very different position as regards these five functions. It has to supply a better quality under heads (i.) and (iii.), and it has to secure enough advertisements to keep itself afloat, but its readers do not expect nearly as much from it under heads (ii.) and (v.).

In none of these five functions, the Report points out, has a newspaper anything like a monopoly. It has to compete, in particular, with broadcasting and the cinema, and in one or more of its aspects with books, theatres, periodicals, the pulpit, hoardings and other advertising and entertainment media. 'Against all these rivals the Press must struggle to maintain both its circulation and its advertising revenue. It is not surprising, therefore, if some of its ideals are loftier than much of its practice.'

Entertainment is by no means the least important function of the Press. In the pictorial daily newspapers features take up almost as much space as news, and much of what appears in the news columns is only thinly veiled entertainment

altogether, the basic difficulty just indicated, which often makes of the Press, particularly the most popular organs, an instrument not of wisdom and enlightenment, but of the intensification of folly, prejudice and anti-social passion, would remain. Public control is no remedy, if what the public insists upon is not being told the truth but what it likes to hear.

The real difficulty is in the nature of the public mind, a nature which need not be regarded as unchanging, since it is certainly in large part the outcome of tradition, education, historical forces. Vast fortunes have been spent in the attempt to create papers that tell the truth impartially, free of bias and sensationalism. The real difficulty has been to persuade the public to buy such a paper. The case is put in the P.E.P. Report thus:

> Circulation, even more than advertising, is the linchpin of newspaper finance, for advertising revenue ultimately depends on it. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the influence of readers over the content and treatment of news, though an indirect one, is the most pervasive of all . . .
>
> . . . This development has, however, unfortunate results. It is all very well to give your readers what they want, but what if they do not relish the truth? If they are adherents of General Franco they like to read about how he is avenging the slaughter and outraging of monks and nuns, but not about the mass-shooting in the bull-ring at Badajoz If they favour the Soviet scheme of government they will want to hear all about the success of the Five Year Plan and the new workers' dwellings in Moscow, but not about the anti-Trotsky reign of terror or the deliberate starvation of the kulaks. Newspapers are continually subject to pressure, not only from interested persons but from readers, to suppress or modify news that is distasteful to them, or grasp at unsubstantial rumours that will please them. Moreover, newspaper proprietors and editors are only too often ready to bury their own heads in the sand and ignore the truth because they do not like it, whether their readers want it or not. Those newspapers which have extensive correspondence columns are at an advantage in that they soon know whether their policy is meeting with the approval of their readers, although letters unpalatable to the Editor are not always allowed to appear.

The Report reminds us that over 90 per cent. of the population of Great Britain who are of newspaper-reading

the events, they have forgotten that they were the victims of the myths and are due for another sensation. And the paper, which had tried to give them the truth, might well by that time be dead.

When we consider the popular Press in its social aspect, the psychological fact which underlies the competitive process just indicated, assumes very great importance. In the competition for circulation newspapers are compelled to appeal not necessarily to the deepest instincts or emotions, but to those most easily aroused, most rapidly excited; to the first as distinct from the second thought, irrespective of the social outcome, or tendency, or temper thus created. Since the most rapidly aroused emotion is often the most anti-social and the first thought, as opposed to the second, a prejudice, this process inevitably sets up in some degree a debasement of public judgment—that judgment upon which in the last resort the well working of our society must depend. A sort of psychological Gresham Law is brought into play. Just as that law in economics explains the fact that if you have debased coin circulating at the same time as sterling coin, the bad will drive out the good (the good metal will be retained and the inferior passed on and remain in circulation), so in the contest of motive, policy which responds to the more primitive feelings and impulses, to first thoughts and established prejudices, will, under the stimulus of the modern newspaper, tend to drive out policies which require rationalised second thought.

II

These reflections are offered as preface to an examination of the amazingly thorough and careful 'Report on the British Press' just issued by 'P.E.P.' They are so offered because 'the problem of the Press' is usually presented as one of resisting the pressure, either of an unavowed government censorship, or of vested interests; of big business, of advertisers, of 'pressure groups.' Even if it be true in some measure (though it is true in less degree than is usually implied) that the Press tends to become the instrument of such groups, the criticism does not reach the core of the problem. If it were possible to get rid of such influences

papers which, to-day, are most voluble in its condemnation, are, in several instances, the self-same organs which at the time of the peace-making were shrieking and howling for terms still more severe. It was quite impossible for those (of whom the present writer was one) who desired to warn the 'jury' of the dangers inherent in the kind of peace terms for which the country was clamouring, to get any adequate hearing in the Press. Again, nearly all the journalistic witnesses were concerned mainly to tell the public what it liked to hear, not to tell objectively the truth. The case of Reparations is perhaps more striking still If the jury, *i.e.*, the public, could have been led to make up its mind to do immediately after the war what it consented to in 1932—the scaling down of the demands to a mere fraction of what was first asked for—it is altogether probable that much of the financial disaster that came upon Central Europe—the inflationist orgy in Germany for instance—would have been avoided, the Weimar Republic might have lived, and Europe to-day be a very different place. But for several years it was practically impossible to secure any adequate presentation of the very simple economic truths which revealed the mischief of the Reparations claims and their almost inevitable outcome in financial and economic disaster.

The process by which millions come to prefer the paper that tells them the falsehoods they like to hear, rather than the truths they don't, has its roots, like every other evil, in human nature. It is not pleasant after a devastating war, when we are furiously angry with the enemy, to learn that he cannot be made to pay for the damage he has done. Articles showing that to be the case are likely to create irritation in the reader's mind; papers containing such analyses are less pleasant to read at that time than papers which insist that the enemy can be made to pay every penny of the cost. And since in public matters, feelings, first thoughts, can be so much more rapidly aroused than reflection and second thought, any newspaper appealing to the former group of motives can 'get away with it' long before one which appeals to the second can establish its case. By the time that those who had been attracted to a given paper by, say, its exploitation of the corpse factory myth, or demands to make Germany pay the whole cost of the war, have been enlightened by the facts,

have any chance of being in accordance with the facts the jury must be isolated from partizanship; that the evidence must conform to the laws of evidence, that irrelevance and unfairness must be excluded, that the jury must hear both sides, and, finally, receive expert help in the sifting out of evidence. And even then there is no very complete assurance that the verdict will accord with the facts.

It is clear that without such precautions there would, in most cases, be no hope of sound and fair verdict except by accident.

Yet the one witness, the Press, upon whose testimony the jury of a nation must depend for the making of decisions on issues of national life and death, is commonly compelled to disregard such rules owing to the circumstances of successful newspaper competition. Indeed the peculiar conditions which govern success in the newspaper industry (an industry which, even when we consider only daily newspapers, is now among the first dozen manufacturing industries of the country) make it impossible very often even to attempt to apply such rules. A certain experience will illustrate.

At a moment when a particular paper was exploiting to the utmost the 'corpse factory' myth during the war, the editor concerned was asked whether he believed the story. In effect he replied: 'Of course I don't. But it is a first-class story and if I don't splash it, X across the street will, and run off with some of my circulation. And I intend to get in first and run off with some of his.' He went on to justify his conduct in about these terms:

> Suppose I am high-minded and refuse to give the public what it wants—and it wants just now the stories which tend to show the enemy to be inhuman monsters—the paper will decline in circulation and ultimately be put out of business. My high-mindedness will serve exactly no purpose whatever, for I shall have ceased to exist. Furthermore, I am responsible to my shareholders. I have under my charge property to the value of many hundreds of thousands of pounds. I have no right to jeopardise it. We are here to serve the public, that is to say give the public what it wants. The public commands and will very quietly by simply refusing to buy my paper, destroy me if I don't obey.

Take a larger issue. To-day there is a very general (too general) condemnation of the Treaty of Versailles. But the

the Press, our civilisation must break down. Parenthetically, dictatorship does not and cannot alter this fact, for the dictator himself is a product of the public mind. Hitler began his political career with thirteen supporters. Only to the extent to which he was able to reach the minds of his fellow-countrymen was he able to expand a party of thirteen persons into a party of tens of millions. He could not have done it, obviously, by physical force: thirteen persons cannot overcome 50,000,000. He was obliged first of all to get at the minds of those who were later to furnish the force which he was to use. The Press was not his only instrument. But if we could have imagined the whole Press being closed to him and transmitting only such information as his opponents desired to have transmitted, he could not have come to power. Immediately he did so he took immense pains to secure complete control of the Press and other forms of the printed word, as of the radio and film. Without such instruments the dictator could not get the uniformity of ideas upon which his power reposes

But if a democracy makes the final decisions of policy, rejecting one policy and choosing another, on the basis of facts which it gets from the Press, the choice depends, not so much upon what papers are prepared to print but upon what the people are prepared to read, upon the type of papers which it chooses: whether papers which give the facts, or only part of the facts; or distort the facts; or which do not even pretend to give the facts, but only to entertain, tickle, amuse.

This aspect of the problem has at present more practical importance than the alleged growth of censorship by government pressure of various kinds, about which we have been hearing a good deal of late. The latter development is important more for what it might become than for what it now is.

When we have to decide so relatively simple a matter as the guilt or innocence of a person accused of having injured or slandered another, or stolen his property, we recognise at once that certain principles of judgment must be applied. First, the task is deputed, the public does not directly decide. Under the jury system twelve men are chosen to make the decision their job. It is recognised that for the decision to

THE PROBLEM OF THE PRESS

From time to time—more frequently perhaps formerly than at present—there arises much public discussion of 'the problem of the Press.'

What *is* 'the problem of the Press'? And how far are the severe criticisms so often levelled at the Press justified?

First let us get some clear notion of the function, the quite indispensable function, which the Press performs in modern society.

As soon as a society has reached any degree of complexity there must be means of transmitting to its members certain necessary information: the knowledge, for instance, that laws or regulations have been altered, new ones introduced; that new rules of the road, indispensable in a hundred different spheres to the preservation of life, have been made; that things which could originally be done without danger must now not be done; that we must put the clocks back, or forward, an hour, and so without end. We take the widespread transmission of this kind of intelligence to-day so much for granted that we do not quite realise that without it, without some means of rapid inter-communication between millions of men and women, things would, in our complicated urbanised society, rapidly fall into such chaos as to bring normal life to a stop.

But this, of course, is only the rudimentary aspect of the thing. Without knowledge which must be of almost daily dissemination the nation is quite unable to make the decisions of public policy which, in a democracy at least, it is called upon to make; decide as between policies which are for millions matters of life and death, as they were in 1914 and again in 1938 and, on many occasions, between those two dates. It is a mere truism to say that unless certain decisions can be made with some degree of wisdom by multitudes of men, on the basis of the kind of knowledge transmitted by

are, however, already quite certain: that the instructions given to M. de Lacroix to inform President Benesh that France would not fulfil her obligations towards Czechoslovakia were decided upon very hastily during the night, within a few hours of the receipt of the Note, in which the Czechoslovak Government explained why it was unable to accept the Anglo-French proposals, and these instructions of far-reaching, nay, historical importance, were given without the consent of all members of the French Government. Only one day earlier, on September 19th, some of the French Ministers, although they agreed to deliver the London proposals in Prague, made a reservation that no pressure should be exercised upon the Czechoslovak Government and that the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance should still remain valid in the event of the Czechoslovak Government refusing to accept those proposals. The exceptional character of this refusal by France to observe her treaty obligations towards Czechoslovakia, her most faithful ally, is accentuated by a new circumstance, the consequence of which will be felt in the future, that a case of such an extraordinary importance was not decided by the whole French Government. The surprise in Prague about this sudden decision was rendered greater because only a few days before September 21st—just as previously, when the visit of the British Premier to Berchtesgaden had been announced—the French Government, through its Minister in Prague, had reassured President Benesh that, despite any difficulties which might present themselves, the French Government was determined to stand faithfully by its Treaty of Alliance.

No document of any sort which might be or will be published can contradict or shake a single one of the facts stated above.

VINDEX.

night. M. Bonnet considered it of such importance that he wanted at first to call a meeting of the whole Cabinet. It would have been impossible, however, at that late hour to get in touch with and summon all the Ministers, so MM. Daladier and Bonnet decided, together with the President of the Republic, M. Lebrun, to send M. de Lacroix instructions to make the required *démarche* to President Benesh.

There are certainly some gaps in this account. Thus, for example, we must assume that Paris consulted London as to what attitude to adopt with regard to the Czechoslovak Government's reply of September 20th rejecting the Anglo-French proposals, for in actual fact the night *démarche* to President Benesh was made by the French Minister together with the British Minister. Nothing is known yet about what arrangements had already previously been made between Paris and London, but the two Governments must obviously have come to a complete agreement beforehand, for when Dr. Krofta, on the afternoon of September 20th, delivered the Czechoslovak reply, rejecting the Anglo-French proposals Mr. Newton immediately threatened that Great Britain would declare herself disinterested in Czechoslovakia and M. de Lacroix associated himself with that threat. Furthermore M. de Lacroix told Dr. Hodzha the same evening that he knew the answer to the request, whether Czechoslovakia could count on French help, would be a negative one, which shows clearly that even before receiving M. de Lacroix's telegram the French Government had decided not to observe their obligations towards Czechoslovakia. It remains, for the present, a complete mystery how M. de Lacroix was able to inform his Government about his discussion with Dr. Hodzha in which, according to current statements, he was informed that the Czechoslovak Government would accept the Anglo-French proposals only if formal pressure were exerted by France and Britain. Until the text of M. de Lacroix's telegram is published I have no wish to probe this mystery further, but will limit myself to the following observations. To anyone who was even partly aware of the opinion held during this period by the Czechoslovak Government, President Benesh and the Army, the daring statement that these people wanted to cover themselves behind the pressure of the Western Powers must sound quite ridiculous. Two fact

Czechoslovakia might or might not count on French help may be taken, on the other hand, as implying the unexpressed prayer, "Do not desert us!" M. de Lacroix informed him, nevertheless, that he knew the answer of the French Government would be in the negative—if he had had any doubts he would not have made such a statement.

The Quai d'Orsay is in possession of a telegram from M. de Lacroix the text of which was allowed to be read by a number of French politicians. It is stated that in this telegram M. de Lacroix reported that Dr. Hodzha, with the consent of the President of the Republic, of the Government and of the Army, asked him to exert formal pressure from London and Paris, because in this way only would the Czechoslovak politicians be able to justify themselves before Czechoslovak public opinion for having accepted the Anglo-French proposals. It was considered in London and in Paris that this acceptance was an essential condition for the avoidance of armed conflict! This statement is in utter conflict with the evidence given by Dr. Hodzha in the letter published in *l'Europe Nouvelle.*

How can the mystery be explained? It would certainly be desirable that M. de Lacroix's telegram should be published in its original form. If it has been read by a number of French politicians and journalists, it has ceased to be a complete secret, but until it has been officially published it encourages the dissemination of various inaccurate versions, and consequently of numerous conjectures and rumours. The French Government is under a moral obligation to publish the documents relating to the ultimatum of the night of September 21st and thus to facilitate the establishment of the truth. It is difficult, therefore, to understand why its publication is delayed!

The Quai d'Orsay describes the course of events roughly as follows: In the evening of September 20th, M. de Lacroix made a telephone call from Prague to his Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, and informed him that he had had an important discussion with the Prime Minister, Dr. Hodzha. When he intimated what it was about, M. Bonnet, fearing the telephone conversation being intercepted, asked him not to continue, but to send a telegram in code immediately. This telegram, worded as already stated, reached Paris late that

was handed to him, that the British Government would declare itself disinterested in Czechoslovakia if the latter refused the Anglo-French proposals, and that M. de Lacroix had associated himself with this declaration. It was not until some time after the Cabinet had adjourned at 8 p.m. that the Prime Minister, Dr. Hodzha, had received M. de Lacroix. The following is an exact translation of the relevant portion of the letter mentioned above :

With reference to the fact that the latter [M. de Lacroix] had made no protest against the declaration made by Mr. Newton to Dr. Krofta in the afternoon, regarding the possibility of his indifference with regard to Czechoslovakia, Dr. Hodzha asked, in most definite terms, if Czechoslovakia could count upon French help, Yes or No. M. de Lacroix, profoundly touched, was unable to give an immediate answer. He declared afterwards that, although he had no official instructions on the subject, he knew, nevertheless, that the answer was negative. Dr. Hodzha asked M. de Lacroix to give this information to the Czechoslovak Government in the most candid terms possible, as it concerned a question vital to the State. M. de Lacroix answered that he would need official instructions from his Government before doing this. The Prime Minister, Dr. Hodzha asked him therefore to request the definite instructions from his Government, in order that he might be able to inform Prague, in the most precise manner, of the attitude of the French Government with regard to its contractual obligations, in the event of the refusal of the Anglo-French proposals by the Czechoslovak Government and consequent German aggression. It was clear that the Czechoslovak Government and Army must know for certain what this attitude would be. During the same night M. de Lacroix delivered a message to the effect that France could not grant military help to Czechoslovakia. At the request of the Czechoslovak Government this communication was delivered also in writing.

It is ridiculous to suggest that this discussion as described by Dr. Hodzha implied a request that pressure should be exerted on the Czechoslovak Government which in the eyes of the Czechoslovak public would justify the acceptance of the London proposals. Prague was naturally concerned to know precisely the attitude of Paris, which was of greatest importance. Dr. Hodzha's insistent request that the French Government should declare quite clearly and categorically whether

with Czechoslovakia, but simply to state the facts and their consequences.

It is comprehensible that those of the French statesmen who were directly responsible for this decision—unique in French history!—should try to explain and diminish their undoubtedly great responsibility. It is not our task to deal here with the explanation they give, namely, that they were unable to risk a rupture with Britain, which would have followed, because the British Government proclaimed that Britain would not enter war even if France had taken steps to help Czechoslovakia. But we would like to say a few words about another statement which has a direct bearing upon the Czechoslovaks. Rumours have been started stating that the Anglo-French ultimatum of September 21st was actually asked for by Prague, in order to be able to justify before Czechoslovak public opinion the acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals of September 18th. At first it was suggested that this *démarche* was asked for through the intermediary of M. de Lacroix by President Benesh, but he categorically denied such a suggestion, and when, in spite of his denial the rumour continued, his *démenti* was published in the Parisian Press in the middle of October. After the Note by which the Czechoslovak Government refused the Anglo-French proposals of September 18th had been handed in, *i.e.*, at 5 p.m. on September 20th, President Benesh did not speak with M. de Lacroix and Mr. Newton until 2 a.m. on September 21st, when they made the decisive *démarche* described earlier. In the meanwhile the general public learned that the supposed request to exert pressure on the Prague Government was handed to M. de Lacroix, not by President Benesh, as has been rumoured in Paris, but by the Prime Minister, Dr. Hodzha. Moreover, when Emile Roche, Director of the paper, *La République*, who had been the first to say in public that Prague had asked for decisive pressure, maintained his statement even after the publication of the Czechoslovak *démenti*, Professor Hubert Beuve-Méry published in *l'Europe Nouvelle* (October 29th, 1938, p. 1167) a letter which obviously originated from the ex-Prime Minister, Dr. Hodzha. This letter described how Dr. Krofta, the Foreign Minister, informed the Cabinet, assembled at the President's Palace, how Mr. Newton had told him, when the Czechoslovak answer

concerned, she was bound to come to the help of Czechoslovakia only after France had already done so. As a result of the French declaration of the night of September 21st the help of Russia became uncertain and dubious. A common attitude on the part of the two Western Powers would have determined the action of the League of Nations, if Czechoslovakia had appealed to it. It was possible, of course, to ask Russia to give help to Czechoslovakia, independently of the terms of the existing Treaty. Although one cannot state with any certainty what Russia would have done in that case, there is no doubt that a war, in which Soviet Russia alone of the Great Powers was against Germany on the side of Czechoslovakia, would be immediately described as an 'ideological war.' And in such a war, waged by Germany only for the 'defence of European civilisation against the Bolshevik pest,' of course, the Western Powers would probably have sympathised with Germany rather than with the Czechoslovak-Russian bloc. They would certainly not have given the slightest help to Czechoslovakia. It was for these reasons that the Czechoslovak Government never asked Russia for help outside the framework of the existing treaty.

When France proclaimed that she would not fulfil her treaty obligations towards Czechoslovakia, the latter instantly became isolated. The decision of France to leave Czechoslovakia to her fate meant not only that the latter could not expect help from anywhere else and was thus exposed entirely alone to the overwhelming superiority of force of Germany. Alas, the consequences of this decision by the country which had hitherto been the main ally of Czechoslovakia were still worse for her. Poland and Hungary were immediately inspired to throw themselves upon isolated Czechoslovakia in order to 'liberate' their respective minorities, and thus as a result of that ultimatum presented in the night by France and Britain, it was not Germany alone who stood up threateningly against Czechoslovakia, but also Poland and Hungary. If the hope was justified that Czechoslovakia could have resisted Germany for several months, before a united attack by Germany, Poland and Hungary she would have succumbed in a few weeks.

The object of this article is not to look for the causes which led France to the denunciation of her Treaty of Alliance

Viscount Cecil added:

I am quite aware that those terms I have read will not be found in the White Paper, and they were not referred to either by the Secretary of State or by the Prime Minister. They said merely that they had advised the Czech Government to agree.

It is true that the sentences quoted by Viscount Cecil in the House of Lords will not be found in any volume of official documents. They do not, strictly speaking, appear even in the written British and French Notes. But Viscount Cecil reproduced faithfully and correctly what the British and French Ministers said to President Benesh during their *démarche* on the night of September 20th–21st. At all events, even if no importance were attached to what was said verbally by this or that party, the meaning of both the French and British Notes is perfectly clear and without ambiguity. Both Notes insist upon the immediate and unconditional acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals of September 18th, and declare that neither France nor England would go to the aid of Czechoslovakia if Germany, because of the refusal of those proposals, attacked her. Both Notes presented the Czechoslovak Government with the following alternatives: either it must accept immediately the London proposals, regarding the cession of the Sudeten-German territory to Germany, or, in case of war with Germany, it would remain isolated and be unable to count on any help on the part of France and England.

The Czechoslovak Government, faced with this brutal alternative, decided to submit to this intolerable pressure. The decisive factor was that France renounced her Treaty of Alliance. The Alliance with France represented for Czechoslovakia the key-stone of her whole system of security. Her Treaties with Yugoslavia and Roumania related only to Hungarian aggression against any State of the Little Entente, but apart from this formal legal stipulation it was clear that Roumania and Yugoslavia would decide their action, in the event of war with Germany, in accordance with that of the Western Powers, France and Great Britain. When both these Great Powers proclaimed that they would not help Czechoslovakia, the last-named could not expect help from Yugoslavia and Roumania. So far as Soviet Russia was

message in the presence of both the Ministers, but afterwards asked nevertheless that it should be delivered to him also in writing—*litera scripta manet*. During the day of September 21st the French Government's message was delivered in writing as a Note. The written text was milder in its expression and form, but the contents were the same: namely that the French Government would not come to help Czechoslovakia if, following on the refusal of the Anglo-French proposals by the Czechoslovak Government, war broke out between Germany and Czechoslovakia. We hope that in the near future the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs will publish the appropriate documents relative to the events of the month of September, and meanwhile we do not wish to forestall this publication by ourselves publishing texts handed to the Czechoslovak Government.

Les Cahiers des droits de l'homme, in its issue of October 1st–15th, 1938, p. 587, stated that M. de Lacroix made the following declaration to President Benesh:

> If the Czechoslovak Government does not accept unconditionally the Anglo-French Plan, it will be held solely responsible for any war which might result from it, and France would not take part in it ('*ne s'y associera pas*')!

This expresses exactly, in the abbreviated form, the sense of the declaration made by M. de Lacroix, and the words '*la France ne s'y associera pas*'—France will not take part in it—are authentic.

Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, speaking in the House of Lords on October 3rd, quoted the sense of the joint *démarche* of the two Ministers in Prague in the following terms:

> Britain and France have the duty to prevent an European war, if humanly possible, and thus an invasion of Czechoslovakia. They wish the Czechoslovak Government to realise that if it does not unconditionally and at once accept the Anglo-French Plan, it will stand before the world as solely responsible for the ensuing war.
>
> By refusing, Czechoslovakia will also be guilty of destroying Anglo-French solidarity, since, in that event, Britain will under no circumstances march, even if France went to the aid of Czechoslovakia. If the refusal should provoke a war, France gives official notice that she will not fulfil her treaty obligations.

iblic. At 2 a.m. they were received by him and the ish Minister, Mr. Newton, handed him a note:

n the opinion of His Majesty's Government the reply of the hoslovak Government does not correspond with the critical tion which the Anglo-French proposals were supposed to , and if it was insisted on it might, after its publication, in the ion of His Majesty's Government, lead to an immediate attack. Majesty's Government therefore asks the Czechoslovak Govern- to withdraw this answer and to consider quickly some other native which dealt with realities. The Anglo-French proposals nt, according to the views of His Majesty's Government, the possibility of preventing a German attack. On the basis of above-mentioned reply His Majesty's Government could not for any useful result from the proposed second visit to Herr r and the Prime Minister would be forced to cancel his pre- ions for it Therefore His Majesty's Government asks the hoslovak Government to consider rapidly and seriously before ing a situation for which His Majesty's Government could ccept the responsibility

lis Majesty's Government would certainly be willing to present Czechoslovak proposal for arbitration to the German Govern- if it judged that in the existing situation it would be favourably dered. But His Majesty's Government cannot consider for ment that this proposal would now be acceptable nor can it ose that the German Government would consider the situation as could be settled by arbitration, as the Czechoslovak Govern- proposes.

f the Czechoslovak Government, after reconsideration of this r, still feels itself bound to refuse this advice it would of e need freedom for such action as might be considered called y the further development of the situation.

M. de Lacroix was authorised by his Government to make rbal statement. He explained to President Benesh that ecause of the negative attitude adopted by the Czecho- ak Government, war broke out, France would not take in it ('*ne s'y associera pas*'); he also pointed out the imstance that Great Britain would not, in that case, come elp France and thus Czechoslovakia, having refused the lo-French proposals, would bear sole responsibility for ng provoked war, and that therefore the French Govern- urgently advised the Czechoslovak Government to pt unconditionally. President Benesh wrote down this

WHY DID PRAGUE CAPITULATE?

The decisive factor in the Czechoslovak drama was the Anglo-French ultimatum which was handed to President Benesh during the night of September 21st. Since so many stories, guesses and doubtful statements have been circulated in connection with this, I feel that it would be as well to describe it in exact accordance with facts which can be verified.

It will be recalled that after Chamberlain's discussion with Hitler at Berchtesgaden the British and French statesmen decided in London on September 18th to propose to the Czechoslovak Government the cession to Germany of those territories with more than 50 per cent. of German population. After discussions lasting for two days the Czechoslovak Government refused these proposals. Dr. Krofta, the Foreign Minister, handed the refusal to the British and French Ministers, Mr. Newton and M. de Lacroix, on Tuesday, September 20th, at 5 p.m. It was suggested that the dispute should be settled in accordance with the German-Czechoslovak Treaty of Arbitration. On this occasion Mr. Newton drew Dr. Krofta's attention to the fact that if Czechoslovakia persisted in her rejection of the proposals from London, Great Britain would declare herself disinterested in Czechoslovakia. M. de Lacroix, the French Minister, associated himself with this point of view. Dr. Krofta immediately passed this information to the Cabinet which was in session at the President's Palace. The Cabinet decided, however, to wait for the answers of the Governments in Paris and in London to the Note which had just been handed in. Thereupon, at 8 p.m., the Council was adjourned.

The answers from Paris and London came sooner than might have been expected, and that very same night, after 1 a.m., the French and British Ministers telephoned asking urgently to be received immediately by the President of the

few French Premiers have enjoyed, first for signing the Munich Agreement and secondly for declaring that France will yield to neither force nor ruse in the Mediterranean. M. Bonnet seems to have found this declaration almost indelicate in its forthrightness, but there is no doubt that it came straight from the heart of M. Daladier and that he enjoyed his second rôle much better than his first. Not the least important outcome of M. Daladier's tour through Corsica and Tunisia was the impression that the tour made on M. Daladier himself. Any decision he may take while the memory of the tour is still fresh will be strongly marked by it.

If the decision to be taken comes in the course of long-spun-out negotiations the result will be much less certain than if the issue is put bluntly and quickly before the country. The division in the Cabinet corresponds to a division running through all parties, except the Communists, and all classes. It represents roughly the distinction between those who feel that France gains in vitality by expending her energy and those who feel that she is a heritage to be carefully husbanded. It is natural that in a country with a stable population, *i.e.* with a relatively high percentage of the middle-aged and elderly, the second attitude should be common. It is further fostered by the fact that in internal politics France has just passed through a period of experiment and adventure. But this period was itself sufficient to show that France cannot be identified with dry prudence and the principles of safety first.

D. R. Gillie.

be liable to interpretation. It has been persistently maintained in many French circles that Germany would not risk a war for Italian claims in the Mediterranean and that Italy in a negotiation would find herself compelled by this fact to reduce her claims to a reasonable minimum. Indeed, since Italy's claims are based on the rewards promised her in 1915 if she would enter the war on the side of the Entente against her former allies, Germany and Austria-Hungary, the idea of German support is singularly incongruous. A more pessimistic view of France's situation could also be put forward as favouring the prospects of negotiation. It might be argued that the advance of General Franco and his Italian allies in Catalonia would so greatly strengthen Italy's bargaining position in the Mediterranean, and that German support for Italian claims would be at all events so substantial that France might find herself compelled to adopt a more conciliatory mood than she had intended, unless she was prepared to wage a war.

All these eventualities must have been considered by those responsible for France's destinies. The ultimate decision must be as much a question of temperament as of judgment. The Government has been about equally divided between those who lean to Mr. Chamberlain's and M. Bonnet's policy of 'appeasement' and those who find greater hope of safety and peace in a more combative attitude. The latter might reasonably hope that the consolidation of France's internal position and the angry indignation at the attitude adopted by Italy would prepare the public for a foreign policy more broadly and vigorously conceived than that pursued hitherto. The psychological readiness has certainly been there; but very little had been done except by the Opposition Press to educate the public in the possibilities and probabilities of the situation likely to arise if the Government continued, as the nation undoubtedly expected it to do, to say 'No' roundly to Italy. It was never very likely that the French nation, having refused to surrender territory or to give a still more privileged position to the Italians in Tunisia, would suddenly start to eat humble pie because Germany ostentatiously came to the support of Italy. The Munich school still, it is true, controls the Foreign Ministry; M. Daladier has within a few months been given receptions such as

influence of the Foreign Ministry has been constantly exercised so as to diminish the impact of Italian impertinence on the French mind. The most preposterous passages in the Italian newspapers have often been omitted in the quotations in the French popular Press.

M. Bonnet is evidently hoping that a negotiation of some kind will prove possible. The text of the French Note to Rome in reply to the repudiation of the Franco-Italian Agreement of 1935 has not been published, but the impression made is that the French Foreign Ministry has been at pains to adopt as conciliatory an attitude as the situation allowed, and not, for instance, to state roundly that fresh negotiations must start from the *status quo ante*.

The former advocates of a Franco-Italian understanding, who had always maintained that the way to agreement would soon be found if an ambassador was appointed to Rome and frank friendly talks were initiated, were of all Frenchmen at first those most put out by the Italian campaign. But it is noteworthy that they have already found positions which will enable them to resume their old policy if Signor Mussolini's attitude will allow them M Léon Bailby of the *Jour* must have shouted ' Eureka ' when the announcement of the death of old Mme. Daniel Wilson, daughter of President Grévy, reminded him how the latter in the 'eighties had been forced to resign because his son-in-law was involved in a scandal. M. Bailby has ever since been warning the great Italian statesman Mussolini against being led astray by family affection and trusting too much his unworthy son-in-law, to whom he attributes all the blame for the strained relations between France and Italy. There have been a number of indications in such papers as the *Temps* that if Italy would limit her complaints to what is reasonable and put them forward in a courteous manner, France would be willing to consider them. In view of France's conciliatory attitude to Italy hitherto, this has scarcely seemed to need repeating.

That events will move towards a Franco-Italian negotiation has been argued on optimistic grounds. It is pointed out that the Italian Government has scarcely committed itself at all on the various questions raised in the course of the Press campaign and that German assurances of support have only been given by newspapers and would at any rate

an end to the agitation. Over and over again he read in his paper with satisfaction that the tone of the Italian Press was growing milder, only to discover a few days later that the campaign was being conducted with the same persistence as before, though in a slightly different form.

A Frenchman feels quite differently about a dispute with Germany and a dispute with Italy. He recognises at once that a quarrel with Germany is a disaster for his own country, however it may end, and that it involves a European war. He does not instinctively take this view of a quarrel with Italy. He is inwardly certain of victory if it should come to a fight, but doubtful of the importance of the issue which he is inclined to assume will be secondary—*i.e.* in keeping with what he supposes to be the military value of his opponent. He does not suppose that a threat to Savoy, Nice or Corsica would be seriously maintained. He was irritated that Great Britain should have insisted upon making the Abyssinian question a first-class issue, because it upset what seemed to him an excellent scheme for preventing Germany's ambition from becoming dangerous and also because he was not inclined to take very seriously Italy's colonial ambitions. He did not feel any particular sympathy for Italians as fellow-Latins, and, indeed, had France been actually drawn into a war on the Abyssinian issue, Frenchmen would probably have fought with at least as much willingness as the English in order to teach the Italians not to give trouble to their neighbours. He finds it quite amusing to read in the Italian papers that the best troops of the Emperor Napoleon I were Italians; it is more than a joke to see it stated in black and white that the French are cowards, and that they were shaking in their shoes when mobilised last September. But people who make such fatuous assertions (and the Frenchman is right in supposing that they would not appear in a German paper even under the Nazis) cannot in the French view be taken very seriously.

This unflattering view of the Italians as opponents and the lack of clear discussion on foreign policy had brought it about that at the time of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Rome most Frenchmen still thought of the Franco-Italian quarrel as not necessarily linked with other European affairs. This state of mind was the more easily maintained because the

Mandel, is attacked in the *Jour* (whose editor is a warm supporter of M. Bonnet) as a warmonger on the suspicion that he provided the anti-Munich Press with the news which alone justified the sending of 1,600 Senegalese to reinforce the garrison at Jibuti.

As for M. Paul Reynaud, the Right is still in two minds as to whether a man who wanted to stand by Czechoslovakia last September can be allowed to salvage the capitalist system in December. To judge by M. Piétri's speech to the Chamber it would be preferable to adopt the socialistic policy of exchange control than have anything to do with a Minister who wants to organise resistance to Germany in Eastern Europe.

How is it possible for the French to be unanimous in support of M. Daladier's 'No' to Italian claims and for the dominant school of foreign policy to overlook the implications of Italy's alliance with Germany?

One of the difficulties of Franco-Italian relations has always been the refusal of most Frenchmen to take the Italians seriously. Italy is in their eyes the traditional country for honeymoons, a country for art students, a country for the interchange of speeches on the values of Latin and Mediterranean culture It is also the country which provides France with an endless supply of unskilled or semi-skilled labour and which can only raise, according to French ideas, rather indifferent infantry. The political talents of individual Italians are highly respected, but not the political calibre of the nation. It has been therefore with all the more tranquillity and confidence that the French bourgeoisie have felt grateful appreciation for the maintenance of social order under the Fascist dictatorship, since it was not believed that the political instrument created by Signor Mussolini could be used to threaten French vital interests.

The ordinary Frenchman, so long as he was not an inhabitant of one of the areas directly concerned by the Italian claims, refused at first to believe that any serious political intention could lie behind the campaign. He was mainly riled by its impudent character. The student rags which were at once organised at Paris and elsewhere seemed to him a proportionate and sufficient reply to the shouts of the Italian Deputies. These, coming on top of the complete fiasco of the French general strike, would, he supposed, put

Paris, but there was none in the exposed outposts which would have to meet the first onslaughts in any attack on her Mediterranean territories.

The curious fact to be noticed, however, is that up to the time of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Rome there has been singularly little revision of general ideas on foreign policy as a result of the Italian demands. The nation is united in saying 'No,' but only very limited consequences have been drawn so far from this attitude. The chief change has been a more sympathetic attitude to republican Spain in circles which had hitherto assumed a Gallio-like indifference. M. Emile Roche, the Right Wing Radical, who is a strong opponent of the Franco-Soviet Pact and an apologist of the Munich Agreement, has even come out bluntly in favour of sending assistance to Barcelona, on the ground that a victory of General Franco and his allies would only increase the arrogance of Italy towards France But at the moment of writing, the only real concession has been the sending of food supplies to Catalonia. The new French Ambassador's speech on presenting his credentials in the first week of January was full of warm sympathy for the sufferings of Spain as a whole, but contained an emphatic reassertion of the policy of non-intervention.

In other spheres of foreign policy, it is remarkable that the debate between friends and foes of the Munich Agreement continued to follow its September and October course. The Socialist Party has rarely been divided by such a profound difference of opinion without splitting as at present on foreign policy. It might have been expected that the Press of the Right would have some kind words to say for the former arch-apostle of disarmament, M. Léon Blum, now that he is pleading before his Party for rearmament and the necessity of being strong both in weapons of war and in allies if negotiation with the totalitarian States is to lead anywhere. But on the contrary it is M. Paul Faure who, against wind and tide, still believes in the magic of negotiation and protests against exaggerated armament that now has the sympathy of the Nationalists. M. Blum, who wishes to maintain the Franco-Soviet Pact, is denounced as a danger to the peace of Europe.

Stranger still, the Minister of Colonies, M. Georges

nd indecision on questions of policy, this clear-cut attitude ras in itself an immense advance. The contribution of f. Daladier was the courage to refuse to negotiate or to ield under threat of a general strike and so to put an end to ie misuse of the French trade unions for purposes of political lackmail. It is not necessary to agree with M. Reynaud's olicy or to think well of M. Daladier's tactics before the bortive strike in order to appreciate the value of these two ien's attitude, because the essential was to give the public t last the impression that the Government was going in the irection on which it had decided and that the State had a ignity and importance which took priority over trade nions or any other corporations.

However unpopular M. Reynaud's decrees might be, a eneral strike was much more unpopular—and much more angerous to the future of trade unionism. The complete efeat of the strike in the French merchant marine, notably n the *Normandie*, was particularly welcome to the general ublic, for the French taxpayer contributes heavily to keep rench shipping afloat, a fact which had not prevented the ailors' unions from holding up France's advertisement ships o often and so ruthlessly in the last four years, that they were eginning to damage rather than enhance the country's eputation. Granted, however, the strong desire in France or a governing hand, the internal situation would have been ery much more difficult to handle throughout December rithout the stimulus provided by the Italian Press. M. Paul leynaud's decrees, intended primarily to set the capitalist ystem going again and only secondarily to comply with scal justice, very nearly brought the Government down in he week before Christmas, even though M. Reynaud had ery substantial results to show in the improvement of the iovernment's credit and the quite unwonted firmness of the ranc. It was the constant barrage of insulting demands and npudent comments in the Italian Press which diverted the ublic's attention from and relieved to some extent the ension of party conflicts. M. Daladier, on his triumphal our of Corsica and Tunisia, was really the representative of 'renchmen of every party. The welcome he received stimu-ited his own self-confidence and that of all his countrymen. 'here might have been doubts about the future of France in

on a neutral floor, as in the repeated debates of the House of Commons.

This must be kept in mind in considering the rather curious reactions of the French to the well-orchestrated cries of 'Tunisia, Corsica, Nice' at the last sitting of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. These cries should in theory have demolished the assumptions on which most French apologists of the Munich policy had constructed their defence. France, they had argued, must extricate herself from the complications of Central Europe in order to join Great Britain in a West European and Colonial 'splendid isolation' *à deux*. Once she had shaken off the trammels of alliances with nations whose names Frenchmen cannot pronounce or whose political theories are subversive, or who are simply on the wrong side of Germany, France, protected by the Maginot line and the two years' military service of her citizens, could enjoy quiet possession of her own soil and devote herself to the Imperial mission she has too long considered as secondary. This was the theory, so far as it could be ascertained, of those who approved the Munich Agreement without admitting that it was a defeat. It was to open the Scandinavian era of French history.

Logically the Italian attitude and the moral support given to the Italians by the German Press even during Herr von Ribbentrop's visit to Paris should have smashed this dream. France was not being left in peace after the retreat from Central Europe. Munich was not a settlement, but the starting point for constantly rising demands.

In fact the Italian claims have contributed as a stimulus substantially to the national rally which has been in progress in France since the end of November, but they have not led to the clarification of views on foreign policy which one might have expected.

The quickening of the vitality, the improvement of the morale of the nation, is already noticeable. The two big contributions to this rally have been made by M. Paul Reynaud and by M. Edouard Daladier. The former laid down the principles of a coherent financial policy and proceeded to apply them, however unpopular, on the assumption that if maintained, they would lead France out of the financial quagmire. After the months of patchwork, half measures

•

THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

THE only foreign affairs debate in the Chamber of Deputies n 1938 occurred while M. Delbos was still Minister at the beginning of February The perfunctory discussion which preceded the ratification of the Munich Agreement and during which the Foreign Minister did not speak cannot be counted. Apart from two short interventions during the Budget debate, M. Bonnet has only given an account of his stewardship to he Chamber and Senate Commissions of Foreign Affairs, whose sittings are not public, though a communiqué is usually ssued and there is generally a considerable leakage of further nformation.

During the year or so that has passed without a debate Austria has disappeared, Czechoslovakia has been partitioned nd reduced to vassalage, and French influence has been rought to a lower point than ever before in most of Central nd Eastern Europe The principles of French foreign policy ave been called in question and seem in many respects to ave been reversed. Yet not only has there been no debate, he popular Press has followed the lead of the Foreign Minister with a calm conformism as if nothing could be more atural or inevitable than the course that has been taken. It s necessary to read an Opposition paper of strongly political haracter in order to learn that two opinions may reasonably e held on the policy that has been pursued, and indeed that here is some contradiction between the actions of the French Government this autumn and its declarations and actions in ast years. Any attempt to point this out arouses in a great any people's minds the perfectly honest suspicion that the eaker is a 'belliciste'—a warmonger—or else that he longs to the Left Opposition.

France has therefore lacked entirely the kind of public cussion on foreign policy in which both sides are heard

nor mankind can afford or even consider without horror and shame.

But Italy is no longer in the position in which she found herself at the end of the war. Before the war Italy was not a Great Power because she was never in an independent position. The presence of Austria upon her northern frontier insisted upon her presence in the Triple Alliance, and her position in the Mediterranean insisted upon an understanding there with England. The war freed her from the German domination. Austria in fact became a guarantee of her liberty, an ideal buffer State for her between herself and Germany and eventually little more than an Italian protectorate. The position now is very different. The *Anschluss* brought her once more within the German orbit, and this time it was Prussia, not Austria, that was her neighbour. In fact Italy had a dream in which she thought she saw the ghost of the Roman Empire and woke to find it was Hitler looking over the Alps. The whole of her admirable post-war position in Central Europe and the Balkans has been altered fundamentally to her detriment, has been sacrificed for the sake of a hopeless quarrel with her old friend England. She is back in her pre-war position, only worse. Therefore her policy will be the same as in her pre-war years. She will have to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, till, in a crisis, she will have to make up her mind, not so much as to where her interests lie, but rather as to which set of Great Powers is going to win: and then she will join them, will rush to the assistance of the winner she has spotted.

But let us banish such horrors as an Anglo-Italian war for the Mediterranean from the farthest horizon of our thoughts. Let us both be content to guarantee and to enjoy the freedom of that sea. Let England and Italy, the only two great nations in Europe which have never fought one another, which have been friends individually and nationally as no other two nations in the modern world, resume, together with France, their traditional friendship and maintain peace, not only in the Middle Sea, that graveyard of Aggressors and Dictators, but all through our chaotic world, where the worst nightmare has come upon us since they parted company.

EDWARD HUTTON.

by no means command the Middle Sea, would be cut off from Italy herself. What would become of Libya cut off from its bases in Italy, with an army of perhaps 100,000 men, which could march neither into Tunisia nor into Egypt because in either case it would leave a formidable enemy in its rear? What would become of Abyssinia, 2,000 miles of sea away from Italy and still by no means subdued, dependent as it is and must be for many years yet on supplies of every kind from Italy? What would become of Italy herself, who receives 80 per cent. of her necessary supplies and trade through the Mediterranean, which she would not command?

Meantime (to continue this nightmare) Italy would be bombing and destroying—what? The Maltese whom she claims as her blood brethren? The Egyptians with whom she hopes to succeed England as ally and protector? England in any case in such a war would be intangible, and for that reason if for no other, England would win and would re-establish her supremacy in the Mediterranean. It would be no new thing for English shipping to abandon that sea for a season. Nelson did so in 1796 only to re-establish British supremacy in 1798 for over a hundred years.

But perhaps in order to establish her predominance in the Mediterranean Italy would find a partner, and that partner would be Germany. In fact that is the only possible war that Italy could wage against the British Empire with any chance of success. But the presence of that ally on her side would bring France in on ours, just as the presence of Japan as an ally of Italy and Germany would probably bring in Russia and the United States as the associates of England and France. In either case Italy loads the dice against herself, unless indeed Italy and her new friends can successfully knock out her old friend England in the first round. But with what object? In order to bring Germany into the Mediterranean? Even if victorious in such a war Italy would have less chance than ever of establishing her claim to supremacy. And what would be her risks in such an encounter and for what an end? With half the Mediterranean and perhaps all against her, with Turkey in action and Russia through the Dardanelles, such a war would involve the destruction of Italy herself, as upon herself she would have insisted upon drawing the lightning. Just that neither she

Legionaries, a large air force, mechanicians and material of every kind, in the hope, to say the least, of establishing a Fascist ally commanding not only the very gates of the Mediterranean and the French and English communications therein, but the English communications with the Cape and the French communications with Casablanca and her West African colonies.

And, in fact, it comes to this, that in the Spanish Question lies perhaps the peace of Europe; the cure of the 'Spanish ulcer' is not only the way to the solution of the Mediterranean 'Question,' but would go far to make the pacification of Europe, *i.e.*, 'appeasement,' a practical policy.

How can this cure be brought about? Not it seems by the victory of Franco, but by the difficult reconciliation of the two Spanish brothers and the re-establishment of Spain as an independent neutral Power. Then the Mediterranean would be big enough for all the legitimate purposes of England, of Italy and of France and might be properly called *mare nostrum* with a fuller meaning.

If, however, Franco, controlled and armed by Italy and Germany, is now to be helped to win by the connivance and in fact the hidden assistance of the English and French Governments, so that a Fascist Power in debt to and alliance with Italy and Germany is enthroned in the very Pillars of Hercules, what becomes of England's old position in the Middle Sea and the 'All Red' route?

The answer may be thought to lie in what we call the 'command of the sea'—not this sea or that, but of the sea—for the sea is all one and its command is finally decided by Fleets in Being.

That is a counsel of despair. If we must consider it, however, it is fairly clear that in the great misfortune of war between the British Empire and Italy it would be folly to spend ships and air power on a difficult and laborious convoy of supply and trade through the Mediterranean. But that would not mean that the Mediterranean became *mare nostrum*, as the Italians have it. Far from it. Our ships of war and our aeroplanes would not abandon it. It could be sealed at Gibraltar and at Suez, and Italy would become the prisoner of the Mediterranean. Meantime one may wonder what would become of the Italian Empire, which since Italy could

and Crete the channel is but 75 miles wide and guarded by islands. Greece swings like a sickle south-east, and with Crete contains the Italian Dodecanese, dominates the Ægean and with the Ionian Islands contests with Italy the entry of the Adriatic. With Salonika she holds the sea-gate of the Balkans.

Crete might be even more valuable to its possessor than Sicily, not only for its position right in the fairway like a long ship at anchor, but for its harbours, the most famous of which, Suda Bay, is sure to play a not inconsiderable part in any future contest in these waters, though it is not more than 200 miles from the Italian strongholds in the Dodecanese.

The same, with even better reason, might be said of the Gulf of Corinth, a *cul de sac* which can be opened or closed at will, easily defensible against the submarine; indeed with its defending islands and the narrows within, only 1½ miles across at the Kastros, or 'little Dardanelles,' it is a *mare clausum* and perhaps safer than Suda Bay from the aeroplane.

If the position of Greece is similar to that of Italy, the position of Turkey corresponds at the eastern end of the Mediterranean with that of Spain at its western end.

Turkey controls the exit of the Middle Sea into the Marmora and the Black Sea at the Dardanelles, just as Spain, but for England's possession of Gibraltar, would absolutely control the western exit into the Atlantic; and the whole of Asia Minor, thrust as it is into the Mediterranean, with a southern and western coast similar to that of the Spanish bastion, though much better provided in every way, studded with islands and broken with headlands and everywhere penetrated by the sea. Smyrna here is the equivalent of Barcelona, though, of course, without its industrial energies.

Spain geographically controls the western entry and exit of the Mediterranean, but with Gibraltar in English hands, she cannot hold them, though she may qualify England's command. She also controls the communications east and west and those from north and south between Europe and Africa with the Balearic Islands. A neutral or a friendly Spain is thus a vital interest of both France and England.

For this reason and others, a new possibility, perhaps rather more, arises out of the situation in Spain, where Italy and Germany in collaboration have raised Franco's 'revolution' and have since aided him with more than 40,000 Italian

geographically in a position to hold the central Mediterranean at its narrowest. As has been said, the distance from the Sicilian coast to the Tunisian Cap Bon is less than 100 miles, and the Italian island of Pantelleria stands up in the middle of the strait. She had only to fortify it, and she has done so. Add to this her formidable air power, and it would be a bold government that would seek, during a quarrel with Italy, to drive its supply shipping through that unavoidable channel.

But there is much more than this. A ship, a convoy of ships, coming up out of the Suez Canal, would have to pass through the Eastern Mediterranean with the Italian Dodecanese to the north and Libya to the south. It must then negotiate the narrows in the midst of which stands Pantelleria. And if it is fortunate enough to get through without mishap, it must still beware of the submarine and air bases on the island of Sardinia, a passage 125 miles wide. It will thus be seen that Italy holds a very strong position in the Eastern Mediterranean both in the north and south, that she virtually controls the narrows between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean and in the western basin possesses a formidable lair of operations in the island of Sardinia.

The Italians, who are possibly the most highly gifted of Europeans, have fully exploited their geographical position, are well provided with aeroplanes, submarines and very swift surface vessels, and upon all this, as well as upon their history, which they claim includes that of Rome, they base their pretensions to the Mediterranean as *mare nostrum*. Such would seem to be the Italian position in the Mediterranean.

There are three other countries which have great strategical importance in the Mediterranean: Greece and Turkey in the eastern basin and Spain in the western.

Greece is strategically the counterpart of Italy, with most of Italy's advantages and few of her disadvantages. She has many magnificent natural harbours and is everywhere penetrated by the sea. She faces both ways and occupies in regard to the eastern basin much the same position as Italy to the western with Crete as her Sicily. Though she does not possess the geographical stranglehold that Italy has at the narrows between Sicily and Cap Bon; between Crete and Africa there are but 175 miles, and between Capes Matapan and Malea

Spanish territory within the Pillars of Hercules)—is, so long as she may depend on a friendly or a neutral Spain, secure. Spain, however, not only holds the southern shore of the western entry from the Atlantic, but the Spanish coast runs first east out of the narrow sea there and then north for many hundred miles to the French frontier, and, even more crucial for French Mediterranean strategy, Spain holds the Balearic Islands.

The attitude of Spain and what it may become at the end of the so-called Spanish civil war must cause anxiety to France even more than to England. But the importance of a neutral and independent Spain is so vital to both that it must bind them together to secure it. And the Anglo-Italian Agreement as we have seen is, so far as Italy is concerned (Italy at present in occupation of Majorca), quite definite in its undertaking to maintain for its part the *status quo*, *i.e.*, an independent Spain in full possession of the Balearics and all its dependencies and colonies.

In any case France would never be left to face a Mediterranean enemy alone in the present condition of Europe. Her interests are too close to England's Anyone questioning the position of France in the Middle Sea will have to fight both countries. Unless indeed ' appeasement ' means in Mr. Chamberlain's mind and that of his ' Private Advisor ' the sacrifice not only of Czechoslovakia but of France—which might well be. But even so, in the Mediterranean, ' appeasement ' could not sacrifice France without sacrificing vital British interests too, and that we may perhaps suppose would not be permitted, however much the folly of the politicians might desire it.

France's chief pre-occupation, together with the defence of Tunis, in this her own sea is the passage for troops from the African Mediterranean ports to Marseilles. She has, it is true, a Moroccan back door at Casablanca, served by a railway all the way from Tunis in parts still a single line, whence she could ship her armies to Bordeaux, but the loss of the Mediterranean passage would be serious, and for that reason alone she could never tolerate an Italian establishment in the Balearics.

Let us now turn to Italy and consider her position and interests in the Mediterranean, and why she has come sud-

terranean, and such the considerations which gradually led England to the position of supremacy she has maintained there for much more than 100 years. Though England holds the Mediterranean it does not wash any English shore: the island controls her vital interests there from afar and derives the energy to do so from very different waters.

The second Mediterranean Power is actually present in the Mediterranean, but not any more than England without distraction. For France is not only a Mediterranean Power, but is washed by other seas, and her chief attention is given to neither one nor other, but to her eastern frontier.

Nevertheless the interests of France in the Mediterranean are of the first order and her position there is of great strength. Not only does the southern coast of France bound the northern coast of most of the Western Mediterranean, her great Empire in North Africa, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, bounds the whole of the southern shore of that western basin, with the exception of some 200 crucial miles of territory never more than 50 miles in depth at the western gates, the Pillars of Hercules. She also possesses in Corsica an island which, in any encounter with Italy, might well prove of the highest importance, for it is not more than 150 miles from Rome and not nearly so far from Genoa, Spezia and Livorno.[3] In Marseilles she possesses what is still the most important port in the whole Mediterranean, and in Toulon close by and in Bizerta in Tunisia lie her naval dockyards and fortresses. From the latter she can question on equal terms the Italian claim to hold the narrows of the Middle Sea between Sicily and Cap Bon—a crucial point.

Her position in the Eastern Mediterranean is far less formidable, and the possession of Syria, which the 1918 Peace gave her, is a questionable asset so far as her strength in the Mediterranean is concerned. Nevertheless she is present there.

Her great position in the Western Mediterranean—France herself being its northern coast—her strength deep in the Gulf of Lyons, her flourishing and wealthy Empire being the south coast, stretching for well over 1,000 miles of littoral and fruitful plateau to the Atlas and the Desert (excluding the

[3] French aerodromes are not more than seven minutes from Turin and twelve minutes from Milan.

speaks, is as old as the Canal and older. We have come to think of it throughout the Empire as an 'All Red' route, and the fact that it is strung with British fortresses, garrisons and harbours has an immense psychological as well as military and material effect on British and Imperial trade. And indeed that phrase, an 'All Red' route, is not so boastful as it sounds. It is guarded and controlled by what till Singapore was built were the strongest fortresses in the Empire[1]; it used to be and is again the home of the strongest of our fleets; and it is not so long ago that once a week the Italian railways gave precedence to the P. & O. 'Special' carrying passengers for India and the Indian Mail to be put aboard ship at Brindisi. It is quite true therefore, though not the whole truth, to call the Mediterranean a *via* for Britain, a short cut, the shortest cut there is to India and the East. The importance of this short cut is obvious for military and for trade purposes, and may be gauged more or less by the following facts. The voyage to London increases *via* the Cape in comparison with the Mediterranean route: from the Persian Gulf by 80 per cent., from the West Coast of India by 77 per cent., from the East Coast of India by 44 per cent., from Hong Kong by 37 per cent., from Australia by 10 per cent.

Formidable though this seems, it is obvious that in regard to trade and supply, with a sufficiency of mercantile marine its disadvantage would be annihilated in a few weeks. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Britain only receives through Suez and the Mediterranean between 5 and 14 per cent. of her total imports. Britain takes about one-third of the oil passing through Suez,[2] but this only represents 18 per cent. of her total import of oil and could easily be replaced. The imports received by Britain from the Mediterranean countries are by no means vital or indispensable. The most important is Egyptian cotton.

Such would seem to be the British interests in the Medi-

[1] Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria. The harbour at Alexandria with its narrow entry is not very satisfactory. Haifa, the terminus of the I.P.L., could be made at small cost at least as good a harbour for the fleet, and Mt. Carmel is more adapted for shore batteries than the sand dunes of the Delta. Greater attention should be paid to the strategic importance of Palestine for British Imperial communications.

[2] As regards petroleum, Great Britain buys of her total import 18 per cent. from Iran, 7 per cent. from the Black Sea, 4 per cent. from Irak through the pipe line. Her total import *via* the Mediterranean is therefore 29 per cent. of this total, of which 18 per cent. could be imported *via* the Cape.

and occupies the Red Sea, receives the waters of the Nile, and gives life to all the more than 2,000 miles of North Africa. Its boundaries are those of the Roman Empire: from east to west, the Caspian, the Persian Gulf and the Atlantic; from north to south, the Rhine, the Danube and the Desert. Go where you will in Britain, Gaul, Spain, the Germanies, the Near and the Middle East, Egypt, and North Africa, you will find the enormous monuments of the Mediterranean blocking the horizon, sweeping over hill and dale, or from sea to sea, bridging profound chasms and valleys and penetrating into the furthest recesses with indestructible highways. Even in the deserts its towns are hidden in the sand; half our English tongue is of the Mediterranean: 400 Roman cities once stood along the plateau of North Africa. Therefore the Mediterranean, main highway and short cut though it is, is much more than that for England. By it she penetrates, by it she is at home, in Europe, by it she influences or controls all that which has been, and is coming again to be, Europe, the Near and Middle East, Egypt and North Africa.

And then by means of the Mediterranean England is able swiftly to reinforce or curb much of her Empire. Those great fortresses and garrisons, Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt: how quickly from them England is able to reinforce her strength in any threatened situation in the Middle East; while from them her arms save seven days to India, fifteen to Singapore Had the Suez Canal been built when the Indian Mutiny broke out, how much more swiftly it would have been crushed.

The Canal in our fathers' time turned the Middle Sea from a *cul de sac* into a highway, thus adding to its potentiality, and we, too, have seen something vital added to it. Just as after 1870 it became a main highway for shipping and especially for British shipping (about half the total tonnage that passes through the Canal is British), so to-day it has become a main highway for our Imperial air lines, and this though the great route nowhere touches British possessions. That route crosses the Mediterranean from Marseilles *viâ* Brindisi and Athens for Alexandria, where it forks: east for Irak and India, Singapore, Australasia and the trans Pacific route; south for Egypt, the Sudan, East Africa and the Cape.

The sea highway, the *via*, the short cut, of which Mussolini

sessions in the Eastern Mediterranean were the Ionian Islands which she occupied in 1812 and over which she maintained a Protectorate from 1815 to 1864, when they were annexed to Greece. In 1878 she acquired Cyprus by grace of the Turks, and in 1882 began her connection with Egypt, with whom she is now in alliance, with various rights confirmed by treaty. Lastly Palestine was conquered by her in the war of 1914-1918 and fell to her as a mandate at the peace.

Since the Battle of the Nile the supremacy thus continuously established has never really been in doubt, but during that long period the Mediterranean underwent a major geographical transformation. From being navally a *cul de sac*, it became in 1870 a continuous highway, being joined by the Suez Canal with the Red Sea; and traffic and especially British Imperial traffic has gradually come to look upon that highway as an 'All Red' route. The cutting of the Canal, the achievement of French genius, at first disturbed and even alarmed British opinion, but with Disraeli's coup whereby England became the largest individual shareholder in the Canal (1875) her doubts were resolved and the security of the route became a major British interest, part of the prestige of the Empire. Hence the acquisition of Cyprus, the occupation of Egypt and the conquest of Palestine.

The Italian claim that the Mediterranean is '*mare nostrum*' and Mussolini's declaration that the Mediterranean is for the British merely a *via*, a route one among others, a short cut, whereas for Italy it is *vita*, life itself, was heard with astonishment and alarm. We will return to Mussolini's *bon mot* later; but first let us understand what we are talking about.

What is the Mediterranean?

The Mediterranean, properly understood, is Europe itself. Everywhere it penetrates Europe and draws it to itself. The map at once discloses how it washes all the long east coast of Spain, shoulders itself up into Gaul and receives the great river mouths of the Rhone, elbows into the knee of Genoa, embraces Italy and thrusts up into the Alps in the Adriatic, penetrates and islands Greece, breaks into the Balkans, insinuates itself through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea into Russia and Asia, thunders on the low shore of Syria, and, not only in modern times, pierces the isthmus of Suez

And yet, even as one writes, one clings to the hope that such a folly, such a fratricidal contest as that proposed by Italy, may be avoided and the world escape a war, inevitably general, in which the whole of our material civilisation would be destroyed. One is encouraged in this hope by the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, signed in the middle of last April, which should help to dispose of the agitation that for a long time now, but especially since the Abyssinian affair, has arisen in Italy in regard to the Middle Sea.

The Agreement covers an immense ground, but everything in it, directly or indirectly, concerns the Mediterranean. The Agreement reaffirms the Declaration between Great Britain and Italy of January 2nd, 1937, and the Notes exchanged on December 31st, 1936. In the Declaration, the two Governments disclaim any desire to modify or see modified the *status quo* as regards the national sovereignty of territories in the Mediterranean area. In the Notes, Great Britain received an Italian assurance that so far as Italy was concerned the integrity of the present territories of Spain should in all circumstances remain intact and unmodified. By the Agreement, arrangements are to be made at once for the exchange of military information, and relations in certain areas of the Middle East are regulated, and undertakings are given with regard to the islands in the Red Sea as well as in regard to territories on its eastern shores. And Italy is to accede to the 1936 London Naval Treaty which provides for an exchange of naval information between the two Governments. All this is excellent, and even more as a beginning of a renewal of the traditional Anglo-Italian friendship than in itself. For it is obvious that in normal times of peace our communications in every sense of the word, our political influence in Europe and the Middle East, together with our prestige, depend upon our freedom and security in the Mediterranean, and any attempt by any Power whatsoever to control that sea or to interrupt those communications is a threat not to Great Britain alone, but to the British Empire, and at once raises the Mediterranean 'Question.'

England may be said to have begun to establish her supremacy in the Middle Sea when she took Gibraltar in 1704. The Battle of the Nile in 1798 finally put a seal on this, and two years later Malta fell into her hands. Her first pos-

of England and the British Empire. Empires are won by arms, but they are maintained by prestige. They are also maintained by the security of their communications. England, an island Power, twenty-two miles from shore in the North Sea, and the British Empire scattered all over the globe are very particularly dependent upon these two things, and more particularly upon the security of their communications. The most crucial of those communications, not for England alone and the British Empire, but for all Europe, lies in the Mediterranean, and this anxiety is felt as much in Australia, India, Palestine, the Near and Middle East and Egypt as in Great Britain and indeed throughout Europe.

For it is in the Mediterranean that the destiny of Europe has so often been decided. It was the command of these waters that allowed the Greeks to invade and lay siege to Troy and finally to burn it. It was in a sea fight off Salamis in 480 B.C. that the Persian fleet was destroyed, Athens delivered from an Asiatic despotism and the future of Europe assured. It was here across the bay of Ægina that Alcibiades raced the Athenian galleys to be destroyed at Syracuse, a disaster, confirmed off the deserted beach at Ægospotami, where Europe perhaps lost the chance of becoming a Greek instead of a Roman world It was here lay the Phœnician strength and Empire, to go down at last before Rome in the Bay of Carthage. It was here lay the focus of the Roman Empire opening around it like a flower. It was here Venice held 'the gorgeous East in fee,' here Don John of Austria led the fleets of Christendom to the victory of Lepanto in the greatest sea fight perhaps even the Middle Sea had ever seen. It was the loss of the Mediterranean that brought down Napoleon's dreams of Empire, when the victories of Nelson gave the command of those waters of destiny to England, in the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar. There are no waters in the world so dark with the fate of nations as those of the Middle Sea.

And now in the general chaos the Mediterranean 'Question' has been raised again for the first time since Nelson disposed of it at the Battle of the Nile in 1798. It has been raised by the rise of Italian militarism. For the first time since Napoleon a European State proposes to contest with the British Empire the supremacy of the Middle Sea. A long period of Mediterranean history has come to an end.

THE MEDITERRANEAN QUESTION

JUST twenty years ago the Powers allied and associated for that purpose won the 'Great War' for 'the overthrow of German militarism'—'to make the world safe for Democracy'—in 'a war to end war.' Twenty years ago there were numbered among those Allies in that splendid enterprise Italy and Japan. To-day German militarism is stronger and more aggressive than ever before; and it would be difficult to find a place less safe for democracy than Europe now is. Italy and Japan have formed an association with the German Dictator. Italy herself has fallen to a Dictator, and Italian militarism is only less threatening to peace and to democracy than that of her new partners Germany and Japan. The Treaty of Versailles has been torn to shreds by force: in defiance of solemn undertakings China has been invaded and ravaged; Abyssinia has been invaded and conquered and annexed to the Italian Empire; Spain has been invaded and is on the eve, it seems, of conquest by Italy and Germany; and Czechoslovakia, the Bohemian State re-erected by the Peace Treaty of twenty years ago, has been violated and murdered by Germany in spite of the protests and at last with the enforced and craven consent of the allies France and England. As for the League of Nations—that crowning achievement of the Allied and Associated Powers, which was to establish the reign of peace, and conference in place of arms—it lies in complete ruin. All the world is frantically arming for another war.

This is a tragic state of affairs. How has it come about? Ask the politicians of England and France. We and our sons must shoulder as best we may the Baldwin-Chamberlain Legacy.

It is obvious that such a chaos, brought about by ignorance, folly, weakness and bad faith, must have already affected the whole world and not least the reputation and the security

It is a fact which fills our hearts with bitterness and regret. But the policy of abdication and surrender is now finished and done with. The populations of our Empire, who have chosen the flag of France to be their common flag, may rest assured that the protection which France affords them will be strong, faithful and enduring. We shall never abandon them; for it is a question, for us no less than for them, of life and death!

We are passionately anxious for peace; we shall do all we can, to the very end, in order that Europe and the world may be spared the horrors of fresh carnage; but we have only one means of success left to us—namely, to keep intact all our material, moral and spiritual strength, so as to ensure an ever increasing cohesion between all the parts of our Empire; and, to that end, TO YIELD NOTHING!

JEAN TILHO.

anxiety in war time to French and British shipping in the North Atlantic. But it could do little in the Central Atlantic and nothing at all in the Southern. Once in possession of the Cameroon estuary at the head of the Gulf of Guinea, it could wage relentless warfare against all merchantmen in the Atlantic Ocean, from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan and to the very harbour lights of France and England.

Should we not then have multiplied tenfold the offensive capacity at sea of the Rome-Berlin Axis? Should we not have diminished in the same proportion our own chances, in case of war, of being able to hold out for a quarter of an hour longer than our adversaries?

* * * * *

Immediately after the signature of the Munich Agreement, Chancellor Hitler declared to the British Prime Minister that there now remained only the colonial question to settle, and that he hoped this could be satisfactorily done without recourse to a new mobilisation

What can this mean?

When Mr Neville Chamberlain and M. Edouard Daladier went to Munich, they had one object only—to preserve peace. They achieved this object, but only by accepting the German demands, and at the cost of dismembering unhappy Czechoslovakia. Will they find themselves confronted one day with new demands relating no longer to Europe but to Central Africa? Is the peace which was so dearly bought in September, 1938, to be imperilled afresh unless we agree to surrender Togoland and the Cameroons?

All friends of peace should convince themselves that *France regards all her frontiers as inviolable; whether in Europe or in her Empire overseas, including the mandated territories.* Great as may be her desire to establish friendly relations with her powerful Eastern neighbour, France would not allow the Rome-Berlin Axis to cut Africa in two, as it has already cut Europe, nor to attempt, in case of conflict, to divide the 66,000,000 inhabitants of France overseas from the 42,000,000 at home.

There is no denying that French prestige was sadly diminished by our extreme weakness in September, 1938.

sible to ships of 1,000 tons and could easily be deepened and widened. At its junction with the ocean, the estuary is no more than 6 kilometres wide, whereas higher up the river it varies from 10 to 30 kilometres. The whole immense complex of waterways, studded with islands and peninsulas, would shelter hundreds of submarines and seaplanes. Its approach is protected, at a distance of less than 60 kilometres, by the Spanish island of Fernando Po, a massive bastion rising to a height at the summit of more than 10,000 feet, and constituting seaward prolongation of Mt. Cameroon, a volcano 13,570 feet high. Between the two mountains the straits on the north-western side have a minimum width of scarcely 30 kilometres, while the opening of the bay on the southern side is from 60 to 70 kilometres wide. The sketch reproduced shows that the whole locality which we have summarily described affords a first class naval position which could easily be rendered impregnable with one or two mine fields, some heavy coastal batteries and a few submarines and seaplanes.

The port of Duala could no less easily be transformed into a powerful arsenal, out of gun-range for an enemy fleet. It is already provided with quays at which passenger and cargo boats can be tied up alongside , it contains workshops, warehouses and level spaces above the waterline, and indeed all the equipment suited to its present needs. Neither the space nor the means required for future development are wanting ; two railway lines connect the port with the interior of the country and supply it with every commodity that can be produced in the rich territory which these railways serve.

Consider what a host of ships would be plying, in time of war, between Europe and South America or the Cape and would be obliged to pass within a thousand sea miles of the Cameroon estuary It would be difficult to conceive of any naval base more favourably situated than Duala, from which to carry on a running warfare against all these ships, French, British and even neutral—since almost any kind of merchandise could be regarded as contraband of war.

This is why the German leaders so insistently demand the restitution of their former colonies. If it were reduced to a single base at Wilhelmshafen, at the other end of the North Sea the German Navy could no doubt be a source of great

leave the field open to rebels guided and supported by German agencies, or else to weaken our European front in order to re-establish and maintain order in Africa.

Moreover, as soon as the Italian forces in Libya had made contact by land with the German forces in the Cameroons, they should find it fairly easy to obtain command over the territories between Lake Tchad and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, since that region is only guarded by two black battalions dispersed between a number of scattered garrisons. The forces in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan would then find themselves caught between two fires. How long would they be able to resist the pressure of Italo-German forces marching to the conquest of Dar-Fur and of Italian forces descending from the mountains of Abyssinia towards the valley of the Nile? Would Egypt itself, surrounded on all sides, be able to sustain the struggle for more than a short period?

It seems, then, obvious enough that a return of Togoland and Cameroons to Germany would have effects upon the destiny of France, of Great Britain and of Europe which it is easy to understand but impossible to estimate. But in addition to the danger from the air and on land there is a third, which is even more impressive.

Naval Danger.—It has been said above that, in the present political conditions of Africa, the Franco-British group would undoubtedly retain, in time of war, the most ample means for securing free communication by sea with the rest of the world, thanks to their unquestioned naval superiority in the Atlantic Ocean.[1] If, on the other hand, Germany were to be reinstated in Togoland and Cameroons, the strategic position would be completely reversed in favour of the Rome-Berlin Axis. The restoration of the Cameroons would indeed signify to the German naval staff the recovery of the port of Duala. Few people in Europe are in a position to appreciate the importance of this port as a possible base for a German fleet on the shores of the central Atlantic. It lies deep within the vast estuary of the Cameroons and is connected with the high seas by a channel 30 kilometres long which is already acces-

[1] Some account should, of course, be taken of the attitude of Spain. But this would entail consideration of a number of hypotheses which cannot be discussed in an article of this length. It need only be said that the strategic dangers which would result from Spanish participation on the Italo-German side greatly strengthen the case for maintaining the French and British mandates in Togoland and the Cameroons.

policing the Central and Eastern Sahara. Instantly, the French African *bloc* would be cut in two by the Rome-Berlin Axis which, by an extension of 2,000 kilometres, would then reach the French Congo, threaten the Belgian and Portuguese possessions, and probably South Africa itself. The most serious consequences would result from three separate points of view—in the air, on land and at sea.

Danger from the Air.—To define the areas which could be covered by bombing squadrons from Libya, Abyssinia, Cameroons and Togoland, curves should be drawn at a distance of 900 kilometres from the frontiers of these four territories. It will be seen at a glance that the whole of French and British Africa north of the Equator would lie within this field of activity, except for a fairly narrow ribbon of territory along the Atlantic, from the Republic of Liberia to Morocco. It will also be seen that German aeroplanes from Togoland and Cameroons would be perfectly free, thanks to their central position, to strike eastwards or westwards, to the north or to the south, at every one of the vital French and British organisations in West, Central and Equatorial Africa; whereas Italian aeroplanes would be similarly placed as regards Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika.

Considering the vast expanse over which many vital points require to be protected, the French and the British would be compelled (as soon as retrocession had been agreed) to maintain an air force in Africa ten or twelve times as strong as that of Togoland and the Cameroons, besides having to establish in all haste the extensive anti-aircraft services which would have become indispensable. Is it possible to make even a guess at the cost of such an organisation? And are we, by any chance, so strong already that we can afford, in case of conflict, to forego the concentration of all our air resources in the European theatre of operations?

Danger on Land.—Once in possession of Togoland and the Cameroons, the German General Staff would have every opportunity of making them centres of distribution for anti-French and anti-British propaganda, with a view to fomenting, even in peace time, with their customary skill, rebellions timed to break out in the very first hours of mobilisation. The result would be that, instead of being able to rely upon our African resources for support, we should be obliged either to

exposed to bombardment from Libya and Abyssinia. On the other hand, the riches of Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia would be entirely beyond the reach of the naval and air forces of the Rome-Berlin Axis.

It seems unnecessary to go into greater detail in order to demonstrate that, in the event of a conflict, *given the present political situation* in Africa, the Franco-British group could afford to envisage the probability of a prolonged war, thanks to the powers of resistance which it would derive from its command of the Atlantic Ocean and the support of its African possessions. And it is fair to suppose that, in any future war of attrition, the side which retained command of its ocean communications would, as in the past, have the last word. As the fear of losing a war is, for potential aggressors, the most powerful of all checks upon their desire to destroy an adversary, we may say that one of the best *guarantees of peace* in Europe would be the maintenance of the political *status quo* in Africa.

* * * * *

What would, in fact, happen if France and Great Britain were to make the grave mistake of agreeing that her former colonies should be restored to Germany?

Let us again consider the map. It shows, shaded vertically, Togoland and the Cameroons, *i.e.*, the two territories against which the weight of pan-German propaganda is particularly directed.[1]

If the Cameroons were German they would lie within 1,000 kilometres of Italian Libya—a distance which, even in the depths of the Sahara, can easily be covered by modern aeroplanes and motor transport, whereas in the war of 1914–18 an equal stretch of desert proved to be an insuperable obstacle to Turko-German efforts from Cyrenaica to establish a foothold in Central Africa.

A few air raids from Libya and the Cameroons would thus suffice, within the first hours of conflict, to destroy the tiny French forts—Chirfa, Bilma, Faya, Mao, Ngnigmi, Agades—which are used as bases by the native troops responsible for

[1] The former German colonies in East Africa (also vertically shaded) and South-West Africa are not dealt with here, because neither the British nor the South African supporters of colonial concessions would appear ever to have seriously suggested that these territories should be restored to Germany.

with two tons of explosives, it will be seen that the effective area of operations for such aeroplanes is limited to Tunisia and a part of Algeria, the remainder of the enclosed area being nothing but desert, with no objectives of any interest from a military point of view. It follows that, in case of war, the French African *bloc* offers nothing of value to the Rome-Berlin Axis by way of the air. It has even less to offer by way of land operations, since it is almost everywhere divided from Libya by desert tracks. The only possible theatre of operations of any importance would be in the boundary areas of Tripoli and Tunisia.

In such conditions it is certain that the greater part of French African resources in man-power could be used to reinforce our European front, and that the African populations could work, in complete security, at actively producing and delivering to the mother country all such raw materials as could be used in the factories engaged upon national defence.

Thus the French African *bloc*, with its 36,000,000 of inhabitants (15,000,000 to the north and 21,000,000 to the south of the Sahara), constitutes a very considerable reserve of forces which would be at the disposal of France so long as maritime communications were not seriously interrupted. Moreover, if transport across the Mediterranean were rendered too difficult by the Italian fleet and air force, we should still be left with the Atlantic route, which would be almost entirely free. Indeed, the Italian naval forces could be fairly easily penned into the Mediterranean, thanks to the blocking of Gibraltar, whereas those of Germany, with their single base of Wilhelmshafen at the far end of the North Sea, would incur considerable risks if they ventured out towards Morocco and Senegal, unless they could rely upon finding safety and supplies in protected naval bases.

Not only could the convoys of French Africa move safely to and fro, under escort, across the seas, but those of East Africa, Asia and Oceania, having abandoned the route *viâ* Suez, would link up in the neighbourhood of Dakar and the Cape Verde islands. The same applies, no doubt, to shipping from South America.

If we pass from French to British Africa, the map shows us that the Nile Valley, from source to delta, would be

Marshal Göring calls for the restoration of her former colonies to Germany in the name of national honour.

In reality, the colonial problem set by Chancellor Hitler is of an essentially military nature. His purpose is to recover the bases—for land, sea and air operations—without which the German General Staff cannot confidently envisage the prospect of another world conflagration. Yet how often, since I last returned from Africa in 1936, have I had to listen to the following objections :—


> Key positions, in time of war? Togoland and the Cameroons? You must be joking! The Germans were in command of them in 1914 and that did not prevent them from losing the war! If there is nothing else outstanding between us and them but this trifling question of colonies, as Chancellor Hitler keeps repeating, let us not hesitate to give them this remaining satisfaction, so that we may be sure of having peace! The fate of the colonies has always been settled in Europe, and the fate of Europe was never yet settled in the colonies!

It is in answer to such objections on the part of men who are, no doubt, sincere but who persist in trying to find in the past a solution of the great political problems of the future, that I have been led to prepare and to circulate a number of maps. The map on p. 141 is based on these.

It shows the *present* position of French Africa and of British Africa north of the Equator, together with the mandated territories attached to them. It also shows that the French possessions form a compact *bloc* from Algeria to the Congo and from Senegal to the confines of the Nile valley. In this *bloc* there is not the smallest fissure through which the Powers of the Rome-Berlin Axis could even attempt to insinuate themselves with the intention of disrupting the whole.

If that Axis is represented by an arrow passing southwards through Rome and Berlin (as on the map), it will be seen that its extreme point does not penetrate the northern fringe of the Sahara desert in the neighbourhood of the Mourzouk oasis.

If a curve be drawn round Italian Libya at a distance of about 900 kilometres from the frontiers, so as to define the zone which could be covered by bombing aeroplanes loaded



SPAIN
ALGERIA
FRENCH WEST AFRICA
NIGERIA
EGYPT
ANGLO EGYPTIAN SUDAN
GOLD COAST
IVORY COAST
RIO DE ORO
RED SEA
BELGIAN CONGO
ATLANTIC OCEAN

Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us, in effect, is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France—a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. . .[1]

No sensible person, after reading these documents (now a quarter of a century old), could think of denying that one of the war aims of the German Government in 1914 was to acquire the French colonies. The world war was determined, prepared and precipitated by that Government, and the loss of its own colonies was the consequence of defeat. On what grounds of right or of fact can the Third Reich now base its charges of theft and injustice, or its demand for restitution?

* * * * *

3. *The Strategic Importance of Togoland and Cameroons.*—But does it matter whether there is greater of less justification? The leaders of the Third Reich refer to a so-called dearth of raw materials and food, although all the experts have proved that German industry has never had any serious difficulty in re-provisioning itself, and that the privations inflicted upon the German people are due to the laying in of considerable reserve stocks against eventualities which can only be military. They have also alleged that Germany lacks space for a population which has become too dense, whereas it was established, as long ago as 1914, by the German Colonial Office itself, that the whole overseas possessions of the Reich were unable to absorb more than a total of 50,000 colonists. And now, finally, leaving aside all such easily controvertible arguments,

[1] These passages, taken from documents published in the French Yellow Book, the English Blue Book and the Belgian Grey Book regarding the outbreak of war in 1914, were quoted by M. Roume, formerly Governor-General of French West Africa and of Indo-China, at a meeting of specialists in colonial questions held in Paris at the Maison des Polytechniciens in March, 1937

the title to a mandate never originated from the consent of those populations. Still less could it result from a decision of the League of Nations, except in the event of a Mandatory Power having so gravely misconstrued the general principles governing the exercise of its mandate that some corrective action was judged to be necessary.

Consequently, with this single exception, no change in the present state of affairs is possible, *even with the consent of the Mandatory Powers*, as long as the populations are not yet able to govern themselves. *In no circumstances whatever could these populations be handed over*—much less could they be subjected once more to the German domination from which they have been set free

* * * * *

(2) *The Colonial War-aims of Germany in* 1914.—On July 29th, 1914, Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, sent to Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, the following account of a conversation which he had just had with the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg :

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam

He said that, should Austria be attacked by Russia, a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's Ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France, should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect.

Sir Edward Grey replied next day, July 30th, as follows :—

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the

following terms the military conquests made by the Allied Armies in 1914 and 1915:

Article 119. Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.

These ex-German possessions were subsequently distributed, by way of mandates, among the various Powers which had conquered them, by a decision of the Supreme Council dated May 4th, 1919; and this was done without consulting the League of Nations, which could have no part to play for the reason that it had not yet come into being.

The principle of 'mandates' meant that the territories withdrawn from German domination were to be handed over in trust to the Powers which had liberated them, to be administered in accordance with certain well-defined general rules, designed to safeguard the well-being and development of the populations concerned, until such time as they might become capable of self-government. For this purpose, the 'Mandatory Powers' were endowed with all necessary administrative authority, subject to their conforming in practice to the principles laid down Responsibility for seeing to it that these principles are observed was to rest with the future League of Nations.

So it is merely for purposes of supervision—and not at all on grounds of subordination—that the Mandatory Powers render their annual Reports to the League of Nations. The League does not exercise, and could not exercise, any authority whatever over the mandated territories themselves. It follows that the mandates confer sovereignty neither upon the Mandatory Powers nor upon the League of Nations (which is merely an association of Powers, and not a State nor a legal personality in international law). Sovereignty over the mandated territories belongs solely to the populations who inhabit them; but it is a 'virtual sovereignty' which remains in suspense until they attain to a state of development that admits of their exercising the rights of 'international persons.'

It is particularly important to remember that the mandates cannot be terminated by decision of the Mandatory Powers, any more than by that of the populations themselves, because

GERMANY'S COLONIAL CLAIMS: A FRENCH VIEW

On this subject a great many mistaken ideas have been in circulation ever since Chancellor Hitler, speaking in the Reichstag on January 30th, 1937, solemnly announced that Germany would never cease to demand the restitution of her former colonies. His words were as follows:—

> Moreover, Germany's colonial demands have always been made with *economic*, and *not with military*, ends in view. Germany has a painful struggle to obtain food and raw materials, of which sufficient quantities cannot conceivably be purchased except by continually increasing our exports. It follows that our colonial demands will always represent a perfectly natural claim on the part of our densely populated country.

By these shrewd oratorical precautions, all suspicions were allayed. In France as in England, many good souls were inclined to sympathise with the lamentations of the Führer. With how much justification? That is what, in this article, we propose to examine, with the help of some precise attention to the map of Africa. But there are two preliminary points which need to be recalled because, important as they are, they are too often forgotten in these days. One has to do with the real present position, in law, of the former German colonies; the second relates to German colonial objectives at the time when William II, in 1914, resolutely launched his people into a 'keen and joyous war.'

* * * * *

(1) *The Mandates in Togoland and the Cameroons.*—Many people believe that France and Great Britain received their mandates at the hand of the League of Nations. Nothing could be more inaccurate than this belief. The mandates are held under the Treaty of Versailles, which confirmed in the

the Channel, and still smaller vessels for the English Channel, North Sea and harbour approaches. In this connection it is worth while to look at the new classes of escort and patrol vessels which, exempt from limitation treaties, have sprung into existence as a result of war experience.

We possess twenty-one of the former, of about 1,250 tons and 16–17 knots, intended for ocean duties, and six of the latter of 510 tons displacement and 20 knots speed intended for coastal work. These will contribute something to the duty of convoy escort, but cannot do more than touch the fringe of the submarine-hunting problem.

Here, for ocean work the destroyers of to-day are hardly too big, and for intermediate work a small type of simplified destroyer of great endurance but not necessarily very high speed would appear the best proposition. For enclosed waters like the English Channel we have a choice between the patrol vessels of the Kingfisher class already mentioned and the wooden Motor Torpedo Boats of 32 tons which have recently sprung into existence in our Navy. These latter have remarkable speed and sea-keeping qualities, can carry detectors and depth charges and show great promise, though as yet almost untried, as submarine hunters. Incidentally, eleven can be bought for the price of one modern destroyer, and they are also economical of personnel.

While only the Admiralty can have the information to enable them to be precise as to numbers and type, it is patent to every Englishman that the danger must be grappled on a generous scale without a moment's delay. Assuming that the most effective hunting unit consists of four boats, I would like to see six destroyer units ready for ocean work, twelve small destroyer units for the approaches and Mediterranean, and at least another twenty units of the smaller craft for the Channel, North and Irish Seas. If that programme were put in hand at once to the utmost extent of our shipbuilding capacity, and if France were to co-operate by building on a similar scale for the defence of her own waters, then the danger that the Democracies could be brought low by submarine blockade, if the bombing of cities had failed, would vanish into thin air, to the great benefit not only of ourselves, but of all mankind.

C. V. USBORNE.

equipment for detecting submarines, and depth charge-throwers for destroying them. All these basic requirements have resulted in the modern destroyer costing nearly half a million pounds.

There has been a movement for splitting these duties between two types of vessel, the escorting or defensive craft, and the offensive or attacking destroyer, but so far the Admiralty have resisted it, preferring to build ubiquitous general utility vessels capable of going anywhere and doing anything.

But supposing our requirements in respect of Fleet duties satisfied by existing and contemplated programmes, there seems no need to continue with such large and costly craft for the special duty of destroying submarines. We have to visualise how the submarine attack on our merchantmen will be made. During the late war the favourite ground for attack gradually shifted oceanwards as the defence measures improved, and it will be the same again. Our merchantmen will probably move in convoy, under escort, throughout the North Atlantic and Mediterranean and must expect attack anywhere in a vast area, as far south as Pernambuco and as far west as New York.

Attacks on convoys may be made by two or more submarines, so that as one draws off the escorts, the others close in on their victims. Unlike the last war when the torpedo track was clearly visible, the modern attack will be unseen, so that an immediate counter-attack with depth charges may not be possible. Time will be required for locating the submarine, and this points to the need of a hunting flotilla which can be left behind or called up from near-by, to deal with the submarines while the convoy moves on, keeping its escort with it.

There are many ways of dealing with submarines. There are mines to deny them this channel or that, aircraft to detect and bomb them, submarines to stalk and torpedo them, but the method which has come to be recognised as most universally effective is that of a unit of several hunting craft, equipped with detector-gear and depth charges.

We need therefore, if we are to avoid waste, hunting craft of considerable size and great endurance for ocean work, lesser craft for the Mediterranean and approaches to

before. Should we unfortunately be at war with the Axis Powers in alliance, both the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic will be sown with these craft, and owing to their great numbers they will be able to take risks and accept losses in pressing home attacks in the face of a strong defence, which would not have been contemplated in the late war.

The submarines will be faster, stronger to resist depth charges and armed with a more efficient torpedo. It would be madness to depreciate the value of their attack. Our destroyers to-day number only 199, far less than in 1914, and it is as certain as anything can be that if war eventuated there would be a tremendous cry for more destroyers.

Like our submarines, our destroyers have been growing and growing to meet various requirements. This destroyer growth is clearly shown by the following table :—

Class Name	Date of Completion.	Displacement.
		Tons
S class	During or just after the war	905
V class	,, ,, ,,	1,100
W class	,, ,, ,,	1,100
Modified W class	1919–24	1,120
Amazon class	1926	1,170–1,350
Beagle and Acasta class	1930–32	1,360
Defender class	1931–33	1,375
Eclipse and Fearless class	1933–34	1,375
Hero and Greyhound class	1936–37	1,340
Intrepid class	1937–38	1,370
Tribal class	1938–39	1,870
Javelin class	1939	1,690
Lightning class	1940	1,920

These remarkable figures show that as more and more duties were assigned to these useful craft, so they have had to be expanded to take the necessary apparatus to enable each destroyer to perform any duty. There is, firstly, sea-worthiness, the need for destroyers to be able to accompany the Fleet in any weather; then gunpower, for engaging and driving off the enemy torpedo craft which attack our battle-fleet; a big torpedo armament so that their own attack, when delivered, shall be effective; high speed sweeping gear, for clearing a minefield ahead of the Fleet; anti-submarine

the danger. The existing British submarine tonnage is 72,629 while the German is 31,282, but whereas the British tonnage is made up of sixty-nine submarines, ranging from 1,800 tons downwards, Germany has seventy-one submarines built or building, none larger than 740 tons.

For attacking a warship or merchantman in coastal waters a small submarine is as good as a large one, indeed in some ways she is better, because handier and more elusive. The only object of large submarines is to permit of prolonged patrol duties in waters far from their base. When it is remembered that at the beginning of the last war Germany had not more than forty submarines built or building, and that the submarines she now has are almost all capable of cruising in the Channel and North Sea and well out into the Atlantic, several of them having visited Spanish ports and the Canary Islands last September, it will be seen that we already have a serious problem to face

Now the new notification permits Germany to build another 40,000 tons of submarines, and it will be a matter of considerable interest to see what type she favours. Should she confine herself to small craft of 250 tons suitable for the Baltic we shall know that her anxieties are mainly concerned with Russia. Should she build medium submarines of from 500 to 750 tons, then her thoughts will be on Britain, France and the Atlantic coast line. Should she indulge in really large ocean-going vessels of 1,000 tons or over she will clearly be anxious to possess the capacity to make her mark on the American seaboard, in the South Atlantic or perhaps even the Pacific. It is therefore not impossible that some kind of threat against the United States is contemplated in Germany's new departure.

But Britain cannot afford to wait too long to find out what Germany is going to build. Despite our confidence in the effectiveness of convoy and in the methods of hunting submarines developed since the war and now in general use in our flotillas, we are very far from possessing sufficient destroyers to admit of protection for the battle fleets in Home waters and the Mediterranean, escorts for convoys, and independent hunting flotillas as well. We shall certainly experience in the next war a density of enemy submarines, if one may use the term, far greater than we have ever known

campaign in Germany has done so much to destroy good relations between that country and America that open abuse and threats of sanctions are the order of the day. The removal of the Czechoslovak danger last October has brought into prominence in Germany the possibilities of Russian military interference, and has thrown the limelight on Russia's naval rearmament, which includes the building of no less than 160 submarines, three new battleships,[1] three aircraft carriers and eight [2] large cruisers. In addition, Britain's naval and air rearmament has been proceeding apace.

When therefore we learn that no particular nation is cited as the cause, and read in authoritative German newspapers that Germany's action has been taken: 'In the interest of defence and maintenance of German sea communications, and is not directed against Britain or any other Power, but to safeguard the requirements of Germany's own security,' we cannot be surprised.

Ever since the Naval Agreement of 1937 the British and German Admiralties have been in close touch, exchanging information on naval programmes, so that it is not surprising either to learn that the meeting between the German and British naval experts was of a friendly character and that the British experts were satisfied that the increase was not directed against Britain.

If we look at the matter through German eyes we cannot but understand their desire to build all they are allowed within the Agreement. Last September saw our two countries on the verge of war, and though Germany had expressed the intention never again to challenge British sea-power her Navy would have had to fight. One may be sure that the German Admiralty had for a long time been anxious for permission to exercise this right, and when, as is now the case, they have built nearly up to 45 per cent. of the British tonnage and must either notify or stop building, it is easy to see that the pressure to notify must have been imperative, and almost impossible for the Führer to withstand, even if he wished to.

We cannot, then, blame Germany for what has happened. All we can do is to look at the matter realistically and see to what extent we are endangered and what we must do to avert

[1] Projected.
[2] Four projected.

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

No. DCCXLIV—February 1939

THE GERMAN SUBMARINE MENACE

Germany closed the eventful year of 1938 by notifying her intention to exercise her right, in accordance with Clause (*f*) of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18th, 1935, to build up to 100 per cent. of British submarine tonnage.

The sequence of events which brought that Agreement into being is worth recalling. In March, 1935, a German offer to limit her Navy to a percentage of the British was reported in the Press, and shortly afterwards, when Sir John Simon made his exploratory visit to Germany, the proposal was put forward officially; whereupon German representatives were invited to London for a bilateral discussion. On April 26th Germany, without waiting for the conclusion of the conference, informed Britain that orders had been given for assembling twelve submarines of which the parts had already been manufactured!

Confronted thus with a *de facto* breach of the armament limitation clauses of Versailles, and offered instead a pledge of the most unusual character linking the German Navy to the British and limiting it to a mere 35 per cent. of the latter, Britain consented to treat, despite the French warning that it was a mistake to admit Germany's right to depart from the limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty.

As a result, an agreement was hammered out whereby in

[illegible] CENTURY

AND AFTER

1877 1939

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

1939 **FEBRUARY** No. [illegible]

Price Three Shillings. *Annual Subscription 36/- post free.*

The German Submarine Menace
The Mediterranean Question
An Uncensored Letter from Russia
What People are Saying Abroad

[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] LONDON [illegible]

Pester Lloyd (November 18th): 'The European Powers must realise that there can be no final solution nor frontiers which can be guaranteed as long as the Carpatho-Russian problem has not been solved in the interest of the Carpatho-Russian people itself.'

Pester Lloyd (November 21st): 'The resentment of the Carpatho-Russian people against their Czech oppressors and those Ukrainians who help the Czechs is growing to the extent of open revolt.'

Ukrainian Press

The leading Ukrainian newspapers which appear in Poland have without exception attacked the new Polish-Russian declaration.

Ukrainian Press Service (November 15th), which appears in New York, published by the American-Ukrainian Council, contains mainly attacks against Poland and the repressive measures of the Polish authorities and police against the Ukrainian population. With regard to the Vienna Award (November 2nd) the *Ukrainian Press Service* states: 'The decision was a complete surprise as the Ukrainians were given to understand that the decision would be made on the basis of ethnology alone.'

Bureau de Presse Ukrainien (October 31st) which appears in Paris, reprints in full the text of a memorandum sent to the Governments of the Great Powers by the 'National Ukrainian Government.' The chief demand is, of course, for an independent Ukraine including the Ukrainian minorities in Poland and Soviet Russia.

welcomes the Polish-Russian agreement and adds: 'In the present circumstances with Germany growing stronger and hostile this Polish-Soviet declaration is a timely and absolutely urgent warning to Berlin.'

Kurjer Warszawski (November 28th) declares: 'The Germans always care to make use of Polish friendship whenever they think they will derive a benefit, but they never reciprocate the same to Poland.'

Illustrowany Kurjer Codzienny (November 29th) says: 'The way from Warsaw to Moscow is across Ruthenia.' Addressed to the Polish Ukrainians, the papers utter a warning not to count too much on German support: 'The Third Reich has other possibilities of expansion besides going eastward from Czechoslovakia. There are in the first place colonies and then unlimited possibilities through the Balkans which open the doors to Turkey and the riches of Asia Minor. . . .'

Kurjer Krakowski (November 29th) declares that Germany's activity in Ruthenia 'has produced the new Soviet-Polish declaration, and any further German activity will only strengthen Polish-Russian co-operation.'

Czechoslovakia

The Czech Press contains a good deal of news concerning the Ukrainian question; however, there is little comment and what little there is, is almost entirely anti-Polish and anti-Hungarian.

Prager Presse (November 25th): 'The campaign of the Hungarian Press with regard to Carpatho-Ukraine has suddenly stopped. It seems that Budapest has found much resistance in Berlin. . . . We are informed that the German Government have made protests in Budapest and Warsaw and declared that Germany would not tolerate Hungarian and Polish interference in the affairs of Carpatho-Ukraine.'

Soviet Russia

The Soviet Press has so far refrained from all comments and contains only articles welcoming the new Polish-Russian declaration.

Hungary

The official Hungarian Press continues the campaign for a territorial union of Ruthenia with Hungary.

An autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine might become an important centre for it. . . .'

Geopolitik (November): 'Of importance is the fact that the national consciousness of the Carpatho-Ukrainians is steadily growing. . . . The population feels deeply connected with their fellow Ukrainians living beyond the borders of the neighbouring states: in Poland, Rumania and Russia. These facts will have to be taken into account everywhere. . . . The idea of Greater Ukraine is alive. . . . In common justice it must be admitted that the great nation of Ukrainians . . . has as good a right to its national state as any other nation. . . .'

Osteuropa (November): 'Since Munich the Polish Press has declared time and again that the situation of Carpatho-Ukraine is untenable and that the only solution could be found in a union with Hungary. . . . The Polish Press is not very careful when it discusses openly the possibility that Carpatho-Ukrainia might become an anti-Soviet corridor, which would undoubtedly have the greatest attraction for the Ukrainian population in all neighbouring states. The Polish interest to liquidate Carpatho-Ukraine by incorporating it into Hungary is in conflict not only with the interests of the Ukrainian people but also with the interests of Poland's Rumanian ally.'

POLAND

Kurjer Poranny (November 10th) contains a leading article whose main passage is clearly addressed to Germany: 'We have, therefore, in the future no intention of accepting resolutions of other countries which affect us. The realisation of our aims will be supported by the armed forces of the Republic and the decided will of the Polish nation.'

Gazeta Polska (November 13th) asserts that: 'The whole of Russinko is unanimous in its desire to return to its Hungarian homeland. Only in this way can conditions of lasting peace be established.'

Dziennik Polski (November 22nd), a semi-official paper, takes the view that: 'The civil war raging in the Carpathian province will be terminated in the very near future before it becomes a cause of international complications.'

Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy (November 28th)

Diplomatische und Politische Korrespondenz (December 6th) attacks Earl de La Warr for his speech in Bradford: 'At the very moment when the German Foreign Minister was about to visit Paris in the cause of peace, Lord De La Warr felt it to be his duty to attack Germany and cast doubts on her goodwill.'

Der Angriff (December 2nd) attacks the Archbishop of York: 'Our reply to the Archbishop of York is that "Christians" do not suffer in Germany. . . . During the war Great Britain let loose Jewish inciters with Bolshevik tendencies in Germany in order to create revolt behind the front lines. . . . The Protestant Archbishop furnished a remarkable demonstration of hypocrisy.'

III. THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION

Germany's attempts to use the Ukrainian minority in Poland for political ends, and her moral support for an 'independent greater Ukraine' have led to a sudden deterioration of German-Polish relations as well as to a Polish-Russian *détente*. The following extracts reflect these latest developments.

Germany

The German newspaper Press has observed an almost unbroken silence on the question of the Ukrainian minority, but the general tone of the Press has become distinctly unfriendly towards Poland. Of this the following quotation is a typical example.

National Zeitung, Essen (November 21st) contains sharp attacks against the treatment of Germans by Polish authorities in the formerly Czech Teschen area. The paper adds: 'German inhabitants expected to be well treated by the Poles in view of the gratifying adjustment of relations between Warsaw and Berlin.'

However, some of the representative monthly periodicals have dealt extensively with the Ukrainian question:

Europaische Revue (December): 'The special importance of Carpatho-Ukrainia, in connection with the entire Ukrainian problem, attracts our attention. . . . One has the impression that the Ukrainian idea (!) is becoming a powerful factor.

The following is a by no means complete list of headlines of some German newspapers of the same date (November 15th): 'Inhuman repressive methods of the English against the Arabs. English history an unbroken tyranny of blood' (*Volkischer Beobachter*). 'Horrible English deeds against Arab fighters for freedom' (*Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*). 'British colonial methods' (*Berliner Borsenzeitung*). 'English "democracy" at its best: Arabs as free game' (*Westphalische Landeszeitung*). 'England's bloodstained path to power' (*Lokal Anzeiger*).

National Zeitung (Essen) (November 16th): 'No Jew had a hair of his head touched, thanks to the outstanding discipline of the German people. The (English) Press which finds nothing out of the ordinary when in Palestine whole villages are blown up and women and innocent children are brutally mishandled, agitates in the vilest tones when Germany carries out the necessary internal measure of putting a stop to Jewish provocation.'

Lokal Anzeiger (November 16th): 'The British Empire was built up with streams of blood, injustice, the breach of treaties and ferocity. England has always known how to make the world forget these crimes. . . .'

The speeches made by Lord Zetland and Lord Baldwin have come in for particularly severe criticism.

Diplomatische und Politische Korrespondenz (November 18th) contains a fierce attack on Lord Zetland whose speech, it says, shows: 'Complete lack of comprehension of the spontaneous defensive action of the entire German people.'

Volkischer Beobachter (November 20th) writes: 'Mr. (!) Zetland in a glass house . . . May we request the members of the British Cabinet to be so good as to concern themselves with the affairs in their own country. They will find that there is very much to be altered there.'

Lokal Anzeiger (December 9th) contains a violent personal attack on Lord Baldwin, who is: '. . . babbling his way into our German affairs and howling about them like a street urchin.' It goes on to say: 'Baldwin was right in talking over the radio to American and English listeners, for his speech is the 100 per cent. expression of Anglo-Saxon cant, Anglo-Saxon political untruthfulness, Anglo-Saxon tear-gland speculation and Anglo-Saxon revolver humanity.'

appeared in the German Press during the months of October and November (see last month's Press Summary) have now been extended and increased in violence. British (and American) comments denouncing the pogroms have caused a veritable warfare of the Nazi Press against Great Britain and the United States. For weeks these attacks have been the main theme of editorials and often filled the better part of a newspaper. 'British Colonial Atrocities' have been the chief subject. The campaign continues unabated. Space forbids the quotation of more than a few examples.

Deutscher Dienst (November 12th) is a semi-official German news agency. Referring to questions about the anti-Jewish persecution in Germany made in the House of Commons, it says: 'A mass of material about British lust of destruction and British atrocities would be before the Reichstag, whereas in the House of Commons the debate would deal with a few broken windows and synagogues which caught fire.'

Volkischer Beobachter (November 12th): 'We must reject any criticism of measures which have been taken for the protection of the German people and through which not a single hair of a Jewish head has been harmed. British sympathy with the Jews in Germany would not even be timely if they had healed those bloody wounds in Palestine which British severity has caused.'

Diplomatische und Politische Korrespondenz (November 15th): 'If one looks at the Draconian measures of reprisals taken, for instance, by Great Britain in Palestine, Waziristan and Mesopotamia one sees that whole villages were destroyed for the death of one British officer.'

Volkischer Beobachter (November 15th): 'The English people should have every reason to be disgusted about their own cruelties against other countries.'

Zwolf-Uhr Blatt (November 15th): 'Palestine is a real disgrace to humanity in this twentieth century. Wide circles who looked upon this disgrace to humanity silently because they did not want to meddle with the affairs of foreign countries are now giving up their reserve. Britain believes herself to be justified in meddling with the affairs of another people for the sake of a few synagogues which were burnt down as a reprisal for a beastly murder.'

Britain will no longer have the right to interfere with the Jewish problem in other countries if they refuse to take part in a great international action aimed at finding an outlet for European Jewry. Failing that, Eastern European Governments will sooner or later try to create such economic and political conditions for the Jews that they will have to leave their respective countries.'

Gazeta Polska (November 27th), the official Government paper, writes in the same vein, attacking the democracies for disregarding the Polish Jewish problem and speaks of the 'ostrich-like policy of the so-called great democracies.' It goes on to say: 'Declarations about humanitarianism are not enough. The immediate problem is the protection of Poland against the advancing tide of Jews from Germany.'

Soviet Russia

Comments on the anti-Jewish pogroms in Germany have been conspicuous by their absence in the Soviet Press. Not till ten days after the riots had taken place were a few foreign comments reprinted in Soviet newspapers.

Italy

The state-controlled Italian Press has, of course, unanimously welcomed the anti-Jewish acts in Germany. The approval of the German pogroms has been accompanied, as a rule, by fierce attacks against the 'hypocrisy of the democracies.' The following quotation is typical of the whole Italian Press.

Tribuna (November 21st): 'President Roosevelt . . . as is known, is of Jewish origin. Therefore it is understandable that he should wish to pick a quarrel with Germany and Germany's friends among whom Italy stands in the first ranks. . . . By attacking the European dictatorships . . . on the eve of the conference at Lima . . . Mr. Roosevelt hopes to strengthen the influence of the dollar in South America.'

II. GERMAN PRESS ATTACKS AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN

The attacks against British statesmen and politicians, who are in opposition to Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy, which

hatred of Jews into a system of government is not only to challenge common sense, but to repudiate the moral progress which humanity owes to Christian civilisation. . . . On the contrary, it is to be feared that the international effect of the treatment meted out to the Jews in Germany will be to increase the mistrust felt in many countries for Germany's policy.'

Le Temps (November 17th): 'The persecution of the Jews in Germany and the reactions it provokes, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, threatens to create an atmosphere which is less favourable to the policy of rapprochement and collaboration that could confidently be envisaged after the Munich agreement.'

Poland

The Polish Press is naturally far less unanimous in deploring the German pogroms than that of other countries. The papers of the Left, like the Socialist *Robotnik* and the Jewish Press, are, of course, strong in denunciation of the anti-Jewish outrages in Germany. But the official Government and Right Wing Press mainly reflects Poland's fears of a further influx of Jewish refugees into Poland, and that her own 'Jewish problem' is in danger of being overlooked. The absence of a strong moral repudiation of Nazi methods in this section of the Press coincides however with an increasing number of very hostile comments on Germany's attempts to stir up the Ukrainian minority in Poland. (For the latter see subsequent paragraphs.)

Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy (November 15th) contains a leading article openly approving the German pogroms: 'We can appreciate the energy with which Germany is conducting her anti-Jewish campaigns, but we must not forget that Poland is the main home of Jews in Europe. . . . The vigour with which Germany and Italy are now waging war on the Jews should be regarded as favourable factors for Poland. If, however, we do not take advantage of the present circumstances and hasten the process of clearing Europe of Jews . . . many of the expelled Jews will come here and strengthen Jewish roots in our country.'

On November 18th the same paper added the following 'warning to the democracies': 'The United States and Great

important German language newspaper in the United States of America, says in a leading article: 'This is a desecration of the German name through fanatics in the ranks of the party in power who are trying to drag a great people into the mire of their sadistic lowness. . . . German-Americans condemn this mob rule.'

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Johannesburg Star (November 12th) contains a leading article the tone of which is typical of that of all important newspapers in South Africa and other Dominions. It says: 'The (German) plea that the outbreak was "spontaneous" . . . simply resolves itself into a proof that the Nazi teaching . . . has inculcated a brutality and susceptibility to mass hysteria which are deplorable in the extreme. . . .'

FRANCE

French newspapers of every political complexion deplore the anti-Jewish persecution in Germany, but it may be noted that considerations of the political repercussions of the pogroms are as prominent in French newspaper comments as moral condemnation.

L'Œuvre (November 12th): 'Does the Wilhelmstrasse seriously imagine that a Franco-German rapprochement, however desirable it may be, could be based on a French anti-Jew campaign in line with the German?'

L'Epoque (November 12th): 'Nothing could be more odious and barbarous than the spectacle of the Government of a great people taking an abominable vengeance on a powerless and disarmed minority for an individual's fault.'

Peuple (November 12th), the organ of the French C.G.T., writes: 'The German people themselves cannot be held responsible for these acts. If the available evidence can be relied on, it shows that the German masses looked on at these excesses passively, it is true, but distressed.'

Le Temps (November 13th) condemns the anti-Jewish riots, but is particularly anxious of the possible consequences for the future of Franco-German appeasement and collaboration: 'It can only be a matter for regret that Dr. Göbbels' explanations did not include any severe condemnation of those who took part in these excesses. To transform

Baltimore Sun (November 14th): 'What has occurred merits description as barbarism in the strictest and least emotional sense of the word. . . .'

Philadelphia Inquirer (November 14th): 'It can no longer be doubted that the Nazi masters of Germany's fate have said good-bye to sanity and have flung the last vestige of reason to the winds.'

Portland Oregonian (November 14th): 'Hitler grasps at a sheer and wicked pretext for intensifying his oppression of the Jews.'

Boston Herald (November 14th): 'Who can doubt that the Nazis, having decreed mob law in Germany and Austria, may sanction it again, and may ultimately direct their booted storm troopers against Catholics, Protestants or any other group.'

St. Louis Globe Democrat (November 14th): 'The civilised world, of which Germany is said to be a part, looks with loathing on the Nazis' most recent orgy of Jewish persecution.'

New York Sun (November 15th) is of particular interest as this paper is well known for its sympathetic attitude towards Nazi Germany. Commenting upon the President's strong condemnation of the Jewish persecution, it says: 'The President . . . must be mindful of the impropriety of interfering in the domestic affairs of a friendly power, yet in deference to public sentiment in the United States he no doubt wished to record in some unmistakable manner this nation's deep concern and displeasure.'

New York Times (November 16th) also commenting on President Roosevelt's condemnation says: 'It is difficult to conceive a more forceful expression of this country's displeasure short of a severance of diplomatic relations.'

New York Herald Tribune (November 18th) writes in a leading article about the recall of the American Ambassador from Berlin: 'The American people, we believe, have no desire to go to war with Germany, but the American people do entertain, as they have clearly shown, an enormous desire to have as little as possible to do in any way whatever with a régime governed by the standard of conduct manifested by recent events. . . . The recall to Washington of the U.S.A. Ambassador, Mr. Wilson, is a fortunate occurrence. . . .'

Staatszeitung and Herald (November 16th), the most

WORLD OPINION

A Press Summary

I. THE POGROMS IN GERMANY

The recent anti-Jewish pogroms in Germany have deeply shocked world opinion. With the exception of countries closely allied with Germany (Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) the Press of the world has reacted to the events in unanimous indignation. Space forbids the quotation of even a minute fraction of the long columns of comment that have appeared in practically every newspaper of the world. The few following extracts may therefore be taken as representative of the comment in other countries.

United States of America

In no country has the Press reacted so violently as in the United States of America.

New York Times (November 13th) writes in a leading article: 'The present leaders of Germany can have learned nothing from the doom which befel their predecessors twenty years ago this week. The National Socialist Government has chosen in the very moment of its triumph to outrage every civilised instinct. . . .'

The same paper on November 15th: 'The crimes to which the German Government makes itself a party are not even crimes of passion. Under the pretence of hotheaded vengeance the Government makes a coldblooded effort to increase its funds. . . .'

New York Herald Tribune (November 14th): 'Demon madness has taken possession of a great nation. An £80,000,000 fine is, of course, stealing, and nothing else.'

Los Angeles Times (November 14th): '. . . Every German who took part in these riots thereby puts himself on the same moral plane as an assassin, or even a lower one. . . .'

coastline threatened by the enemy's combined naval, air and military forces, the war in Czechoslovakia would have ceased to interest the Italian High Command, busied with the defence of its own territory.

Whether, if this defence broke down, the Duce's ally would have come to his assistance is a matter of pure speculation: the 'axis' would not stand too great a strain. The best authorities on Air Warfare seem still very uncertain as to what extent Air Forces will be able to influence the course of future land or sea operations. It seems, however, a fairly safe conclusion that where the rival Air Forces are at all equal, they can only add more horrors to war, without affecting its final outcome. Major Sheppard's supposed combination of German and Italian Air Forces, to the number of 2,000 machines, in order to overcome 'determined resistance' on the part of the Czechs, would, I suggest, have been broken up by the stronger combination of French, British, Czech and even Russian machines, acting either directly, or by a diversion towards German territory The Dictators' 'two-front' war would soon have become a 'three-front' war: since, even if the Maginot Line had been entirely held by French reserves, these reserves, numerous and well-trained, would have constituted a threat to the Siegfried Line, convertible into action if the latter line was not held in strength. The Italian 'front' might have extended from Piedmont to Rome and Naples: and the possible developments of 'fronts' on the Polish or Roumanian borders, as the war spread, might have ended by a complete 'einkrissing' of the Totalitarian States.

I only offer this solution as an example of how guessing the course of the World War No. 2 is almost impossible.

Many will think that in the respective 'war potentials' of the two groups lay the key to the situation; and that, if one Dictator was prepared to disregard his adverse balance, the other certainly was not.

I am, Sir,

Yours, etc.,

A. G. Baird-Smith,

Lieut.-Colonel (Retired).

59a Kensington Gardens Square,

W.2.

CORRESPONDENCE

'THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE CRISIS'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—The very interesting article by Major Sheppard in your December number seems to stress very much the disadvantages, strategic and other, which would have faced the Democratic 'bloc,' but hardly touches on certain obvious advantages.

France and Great Britain, it may be thought, would not have entirely forgotten the lessons of the last war, or have conformed so easily to the initiative of the Dictators. Major Sheppard appears to think that their necessary counter to a combined Italian and German attack on Czechoslovakia would have been to knock their heads against the 'Siegfried Line' He seems also to think that Italy, besides sending the bulk of its army into Czechoslovakia, would have been at liberty to attack, and stop, our sea-borne trade in the Mediterranean, while hindering or even stopping the transport of French reserves from North Africa

The weak point, however, in such a combination between Germany and Italy, to wage war in Central Europe, would be Italy's own geographical situation. It might have been impossible for the Western Powers to penetrate to Czechoslovakia in time ; but to attack Italy, in several ways, would have been comparatively easy. For instance : the prompt concentration of a French army near the Franco-Italian border would probably have paralysed one arm of the 'pincers' with which the Totalitarian Powers were to crack the Czechoslovakian nut. In other words, a threat of invasion in the Napoleonic manner would have diverted the Italian commander from any immediate adventure beyond the Brenner Pass.

Major Sheppard's suggestion that the Italian light cruisers and submarines would more or less have dominated the Mediterranean leaves out of account the French fleet, and a large disposable part of the British fleet : though at the outset he allowed that the Totalitarian Powers must have seen 'their ships, naval and mercantile, driven from all the ocean highways of the world.' I suggest that this drive would have ended by bottling up the Italian warships in their own ports. This having been achieved, and the Italian

The Speedy Return, by George W. Keeton (G. Bell & Sons, Ltd.: London, 1938, 324 pages, 7*s.* 6*d.*).

The background of Mr. Keeton's book is that intense ntagonism which separated Scottish and English merchants fter the failure of the Scottish Darien Company early in the ighteenth century. Scotsmen had invested freely in a comany which was to establish a trading colony in Darien, on ne isthmus between Central and South America, and until nost of the colonists died of tropical diseases or from a lack f food the British East India Company feared and disliked nese Scottish adventurers as possible rivals. Scotsmen, on ne other hand, who had suffered heavy financial losses when ne Darien Company failed found an outlet for their bitteress in blaming the English.

The tragedy of the *Worcester*, privately owned by Thomas lowry, of London, was an expression of this hatred. She set uil for India in 1702, and when she returned several years iter with a good cargo, she put in at the port of Leith in order o avoid attacks from French pirates sailing along the English oast at the time. In Leith the *Worcester* was quite unjustly ccused of having pirated one of the Darien's ships, the *peedy Return*, and the *Worcester's* captain and first mate were ung.

Mr. Keeton is particularly successful in his drawing of haracter. Thomas Green, the captain of the *Worcester*, John ladder, the first mate, Charles May, the ship's doctor, who stifies against the crew to save his own life, all of these men ome to life in Mr. Keeton's novel. Mr. Keeton never adds is own reactions to the story he has to tell. He writes a raightforward book in which he allows the facts to speak or themselves. The result is an historical novel without ntimentality, a lively story without artificial excitement, nd a very readable book.

MARGARET GOLDSMITH.

ward than in, say, Slovakia or Hungary; and communications are not of the best. Accordingly, there is much in Dr. Wellisz's book on the opportunities for foreign investment. But there is not so much on Poland's transfer problem; a problem we have all come to fear since it was first mooted about Germany at the Hague in 1929. Dr. Wellisz gives a table on p. 59 showing that the first import surplus since large-scale foreign investment ceased in 1929 emerged in 1937; and the turnover was from an active balance of trade of 23,000,000 zloty in 1936 to a passive one of 58,000,000 in 1937—a big turnover in a recent year. Poland has very little 'invisible' services to set the account in order; so where is her solution for a continuously re-emergent transfer problem? Partly, no doubt, large-scale investment in Poland now would raise her competitive power; but it is unfortunate that Dr. Wellisz's able and extremely informative volume should have appeared before Poland obtained the Teschen-Bohumin-Czaca coal and lignite regions from Czechoslovakia; for now Poland has had to begin to take soundings about an alteration to the Anglo-Polish Coal Export Convention, since her coal production and coal export capacity have risen alike by some 50 per cent. in a few weeks. Moreover, the costs of production in coal mines in Czechoslovakia are about 25 per cent. below the level in Poland.

Not the least valuable part of Dr. Wellisz's book is that which lists, describes, and analyses the entire indebtedness of the State and private concerns to foreigners. Just under one-half of the entire capital of all Polish joint-stock companies is in foreign hands; and agriculture and breeding account easily for the biggest single item in foreign investments in private enterprises in Poland. The author goes with commendable detail into the need for further development, communications, etc., and believes that, once the current abnormal restrictions upon world trade and the exchanges are alleviated, Poland's capacity to transfer debt will greatly increase. It well may; but it seems a long way off yet.

Very little indeed is known of Poland's economic and industrial life. This book therefore deserves close attention. Nobody should glibly bandy the word 'Poland' about in political or economic discussions to-day until he has read it.

GRAHAM HUTTON.

have leaned back and enjoyed without the uncomfortable feeling that we were being got at—*taught*, in fact.

L. AARONSON.

Foreign Capital in Poland, by Leopold Wellisz, 281 pages (London: Allen & Unwin, 7*s*. 6*d*. net).

Dr. Wellisz's book was badly needed, and well supplies the need; for Poland's industrial development has largely been achieved on foreign capital, owing to the lack of capital at home. The country was starved of its own capital under Russia, in order to develop industries elsewhere; so the great economic progress of Poland since the battle of Warsaw in the late summer of 1920 may be traced to foreign participation. But the progress has not been rapid enough to cope with the enormous annual increases of population (12·1 per 1,000 in 1935, against 7·1 in Germany and 3·2 in the United Kingdom), the utter dependence of the huge peasant population (61 per cent. of the total) on exports or urban prosperity, and the growing need for better communications, and more raw materials raised at home. The latter point was bound to arise in a country of 34,000,000 souls whose main occupation was agriculture; for, as the world slump in trade threw each primary country back on its own resources, Poland, too, found her exports falling faster than her imports of the necessary raw materials of industry. Here was a dilemma: as exports of peasant products fell away, the import of the raw material for the industries, which were being built up on foreign loans, was threatened. If Poland borrowed abroad to buy raw materials she did not thereby increase her own capacity to pay for these imports. Accordingly, only an enhanced rate of *total industrialisation* could raise her productive and exporting capacity. Even when this was achieved a new problem would arise: that of toning down the agricultural export business, as and when Poland's industrial export capacities rose. The objective was clearly to be the raising of consuming power at home so as to mop up more agricultural produce inside the country, raise the standards of health and welfare, and concentrate on exporting semi-finished or raw industrial materials to pay for former loans.

Poland's poverty problem has to be seen to be believed. Holdings are very small; agricultural methods more back-

shoulder at a century which he regrets, and mocking his own fatal will towards the new world. Don Juan is a satire saturated with tears. The Introduction ends with strange statements such as that 'in the future societies will not grow of themselves. [As if societies ever grew apart from individuals.] They will either be made consciously or decay' —a most optimistic tribute to doctrinaire planning!; and that 'poetry which is at the same time light and adult can only be written in a society which is both integrated and free'—which means that we must wait till the millennium for the perfect light verse.

We have examined the Introduction in this way because we feel that the mind at work upon it integrates and defines with far too great facility, and, we fear, generalises to the great advantage (from the point of view of this book) of the particular sort of verse which preoccupies Mr. Auden a good deal these days. If Mr. Auden's definition of light verse be accepted, why has he tended to *judge* different orders of society by, in particular, the type of verse he includes and excludes in the nineteenth century? He omits the hymn, the drawing-room type of recitation, the *vers de société*, the later music-hall sentimental ballad (we refer to the type of 'Roses in Picardy'); while he includes Hardy's 'Waiting Both' and Blake's 'Auguries of Innocence,' which seems to us to be stretching his definition to ridiculous limits. We prefer our Shorter Oxford Dictionary definition of 'light'; 'of literature, plays, music etc.: requiring little mental effort: amusing, 1597.' We resent the exclusion of the verse of men like Henley, the Henley of the character sonnets and of some of the ballads, of Noyes, a 'popular poet' if ever there was one, of Squire, A. P. Herbert, Graves, and Auden himself.

It would be, however, curmudgeonly of us to deny the pleasure we have had in turning the pages of this book. Its very personal quality, and the obvious earnestness, scholarship, and taste of Mr. Auden make it a happy experience. Some of the 'Anon.' pieces are particularly delightful. If only this were not an Oxford Book and all that its 'embalming spices' mean to us, and if only Mr. Auden had not sought to impose upon us his own views about poetry, manifestly to make propaganda for them, but frankly had put forward the book as an example of 'tasting' by a fine poet, we should

bd. The whole of the Introduction is, in fact, packed with controversial matter. There is a neat docketed history of the evolution of poetic matter and manner which settles in far too simple a way the relationship between the world economic and social and poetic creation. There is a paragraph attempting to explain the growth of 'private' and obscure poetry which leaves out its relationship to the growth of science and the new content of the universe given by it, and lays far too much stress on the breakdown of the old social community (he always assumes that there is *one* community into which men fit happily or not, forgetting that man is a member of many communities by no means coincident each with the other). In this paragraph, incidentally, there appears what seems to us a facile correlation of social *milieu* to individuality, which is the curse the Marxian instrument of criticism has brought upon us. Talking of the isolated and [illegible] sion of the artist in the nineteenth century, he says: '[illegible] gnificant that so many of these poets either died young [illegible] eats, or went mad like Hölderlin, or ceased [illegible] od work like Wordsworth. . . .' We see, we [illegible] tle relationship between the tuberculosis of Keats [illegible] adness of Hölderlin (who probably went mad [illegible] ggested, because he could never submit to the [illegible] ons of his own feeling and religious thinking [illegible] ad for the same reasons as Nietzsche did with his [illegible] onstrous, pathetic Ecce Homo); and as for Wordsworth, we are sorry to find Mr. Auden perpetuating Mr. Read's [illegible] resy of the latter death of inspiration. Mr. Auden will have that modern light verse tends to be 'unserious' because it has been only in trivial matters that poets have felt in sufficient intimacy with their audience to be able to forget themselves and their singing-robes.' Later on, he speaks of Byron as 'the first writer of Light Verse in the modern sense. His success lasts as long as he takes nothing very seriously.'

Since in the anthology he includes some stanzas from *Don Juan*, we must assume that the poem is what he terms 'not serious.' This shows the danger of the type of generalisation Mr. Auden seems so fond of. If ever a poem were serious in the sense of mirroring the whole interplay of two poetic worlds, the eighteenth and new nineteenth centuries, it is *Don Juan*. In it Byron is continually looking back over his

virtue in bringing such candles to the dying civilisation which Mr. Day Lewis, it seems to us, is least of all, by nature, capable of saving?

The Oxford Book of Light Verse: chosen by W. H. Auden (Oxford University Press, 8*s.* 6*d.*).

After Mr. Yeats, Mr. Auden. '*The Oxford Book of Modern Verse:* chosen by W. B. Yeats,' set up a pretty controversy. The personal, even eccentric, quality of its choice provoked much hostile criticism; and it was argued that the *cachet* of publication in an Oxford Book meant that its editor must attempt to avoid subjective and arbitrary decisions. Arbitrariness is, to some extent, inevitable in any anthology; not only does taste tend to change from generation to generation, but an editor, being human, cannot help but yield occasionally to his personal predilections—even be unaware that they are so personal as not to be shared by the majority of readers. What, however, he *must* maintain is a perpetual vigilance, and possess a will, catholic and critical enough, to realise the tastes of others and what has some claim to establishment. It is for this reason that the anthologies made by creative artists often tell us more about the choosing artist than about a particular body of work.

Mr. Auden, it must not be forgotten, is a considerable poet with a strong personal idiom and a strong conviction as to the nature and function of poets and poetry; in him, as in so many of the other moderns, there seems to be a complete certainty as to what is truly modern and what indeed the nature of contemporaneousness has always been. In this anthology he has gone much further than Mr. Yeats did; for not only has he made a strong personal choice, but he has defined in novel fashion what the nature of light verse must be if it is to qualify for inclusion. He says in his Introduction: 'When the things in which the poet is interested, the things which he sees about him, are much the same as those of his audience, and that audience is a fairly general one, he will not be conscious of himself as an unusual person, and his language will be straightforward and close to ordinary speech.' This condition, he later says, gives rise to 'light' verse—thereby, it seems, making a greater part of, for example, Herbert's verse, light, certainly a startling conclusion to us.

verse, *e.g.* 'The Volunteer,' lacks power and memorableness: nothing is quickened by it; it pleases but passes over the mind and feeling. The 'Nabara,' a longish seafight poem of the Spanish War, rugged in rhythm, with its saga length of line, is, in our opinion, a failure. At times it degenerates into bastard prose:

> A ship of ten thousand tons she was, a heavyweight fighter
> To the cocky bantam trawlers: and under her armament
> Of eight- and four-inch guns there followed obedient
> Towards Pasajes a prize just seized. . . .

and

> For, standing up in the boat,
> A man of that grimy boat's-crew hailed them: Our officer asks
> You give us your bandages and all your water-casks,
> Then run for Bermeo. . . .

There are many other like passages. Tennyson's 'Revenge' shows us how to handle and quicken such a theme, if it be worth handling at all. In the sequence of poems that gives its name to the book the command of rhythms is very striking. Mr. Day Lewis has that sort of technical experience highly developed. But the bric-à-brac of machine-age imagery often hides trite and banal thought.

The 'personal' poems, however, have no sense of duty to the world, no strain of having to do the right thing. In these, Mr. Day Lewis, in a good egoism, finds real discipline, the duty to himself and his own growth and what makes him

> . . . one more ghost, engaged to keep
> Eternity's long hours and mewed
> Up in live flesh with no escape
> From solitude.

In these poems images come lovely and alive with feeling. He speaks of the swan

> . . . a water-lily upon
> The ornamental water:
> Queen of the mute October air,
> She broods in that unbroken
> Reverie of reed and water.

They have delicacy and wistfulness. Sensibility and meaning have come to terms. Even if night be falling, is there no

not impotent against death because he can 'act for life's sake' (which is the sort of 'blood-stream' action Rosenberg and Goebbels report much upon).

For whom does this sort of poetry clear the decks for action? For those who govern or may govern? It has neither knowledge nor experience, and at the same time is too inward. Indignation there is, but too fluid, without bone. Swift and Dryden, men who consorted with the politicians of their time and were profoundly knowledged in the technique, intricacies, intrigues, and toughness of political power, have shown us the true way of such writing. For the governed? Shelley had to some degree the secret to their feeling; and, better than Shelley, Bunyan and the hymn-writers, the makers of songs to be set to simple tunes in words whose associations evoked the common great Book of their childhood. 'Impersonal' poetry, there, came, as it were, from the mouth of One personality. Such verse, Swift's and Dryden's and the hymns, was memorable, could easily be circulated, made its 'conversions' through the political salon or the market-place. But the verse of Mr. Day Lewis, it seems, can reach only those groups which, converted already and caught in their own webs of abstraction and ideology, are least fitted for action, most removed from the hard realities of government or revolution.

We shall be asked: But what has this to do with the stuff of poetry itself, with Mr. Day Lewis's way of communication, his unique testament? Is the poetry good or bad? Is language remade? Is there a new intrinsic coinage abroad? We answer that it has much to do with the essential qualities of his work. Language is no mere interplay of words; its depth, potency, and strength lie also in its meanings. Superficial meaning makes superficial poetry (the converse is of course not necessarily true); and even the lyric is greatest where it is the result of 'immediacy after reflection.' Mr. Day Lewis has sensibility, an eye for the good and pleasing image (although he hardly gets both hands round what he sees as Mr. Auden, for example, does); but only rarely does the image become evocative of depths of meaning and association. There is the usual quota of Spanish War poetry as if the post-war poets wanted to show their fathers how that sort of thing ought to have been done. The straightforward martial

BOOKS RECEIVED

Overtures to Death and Other Poems, by C. Day Lewis (Jonathan Cape, 5*s*.).

Mr. Day Lewis is a poet of considerable reputation, already much anthologised. In all talk of modern poets and poetry his name comes up almost automatically; it is always Auden and Spender—and Day Lewis. Here is his latest volume. Let us look at it, not in terms of his reputation or of his progress, not only asking to what degree he has added to the territory of poetry, but as example of the trend and tenour of its 'modernity,' which is so often cited over against the poetry of the past, of an old world assumed to be dead or dying. Inside the book's jacket we are given the anatomy of these poems. The title piece, 'Overtures to Death,' is said to be 'a sequence of seven poems, in which Death is addressed as an enemy, a counsellor, a friend; familiarly in some, ceremonially in others.' We are told that this is preceded by poems 'concerned with the shadow of imminent war,' and followed by a group 'declaring the need for action and the belief that man is not impotent against war and death,' since he can help 'to change the world.' It is the usual conclusion of the modern 'political' poet who must make his poetry a prelude to action, and who, in that sense, is a little ashamed to find himself a poet at all. We are furthermore told that 'the book closes with a miscellaneous group of more personal poems,' which, again true to type, suggests that there is some dividing line between what is 'impersonal' and 'personal' in creation. Even if this summary of the book's contents be not directly the poet's, we are already uneasy. The theme of Death is no new thing in poetry. Mediæval and Renaissance verse is full of plaints and pleadings, fears and cries for absolution against the inevitable end. It is significant of our modern poet that he comes to meditate upon death, not in the nature of his own sensible and mortal being, but only when he sees the coming of the total, the mass-death, which is war; and that he, with arrogance, no less arrogant because *naïf*, talks of man being

German Jew-baiting horrible in itself, but also that a régime which can perpetuate such cruelties is bound one day to become a menace to Britain. But there are a few who say: 'Serve the Jews right—what we want is a bit of Hitlerism here.'

The main indication is, I think, that public opinion in this country is steadily moving away from the emotion of relief which accompanied the Munich settlement, and is inclining more and more to take a sceptical view of that settlement.

C. F. Melville.

In a cinema theatre, in a working-class London district recently, when a news reel of Mr. Chamberlain was shown, a voice cried out : ' Go and boil your face ! '

A cockney railwayman, at an East London station, said to me : ' 'Itler wanted Ilford ; but we shan't let him have it.'

I also talked in the train which brings me home from London each night, and at the local pub where some of us drop in for a chat and a ' quick one ' with some other acquaintances. These were not manual workers, but commercial travellers, minor civil servants and the like. One of them said to me over our beer : ' It's got to come. Better get it over. It's like a nagging tooth. Only hurts more if you put it off. Better have it out sooner or later, why not sooner ? ' Incidentally he had some severe things to say about the attitude of women during the crisis. ' If Chamberlain held a general election now,' he declared, ' the blooming women's vote would put him back into power.' The women, in his opinion, could only see that their families had escaped being bombed. Couldn't see any further. But he added, wanting to be fair : ' Natural, I suppose.'

When I came to talk to people other than working-class folk—to the middle-class people—I found less unanimity of thought than I had found amongst the workers, at least amongst the workers of my own generation. The middle classes seemed to me to be very divided. The feelings of many were expressed by the words : ' God bless Mr. Chamberlain.'

A retired regular army captain (Sandhurst or Woolwich, I have forgotten), discussing the events that followed Munich, declared angrily : ' Hitler has got to be stopped. I've nothing against the German people. But why the devil should we allow ourselves to be bullied ? Why this eternal giving way ? Damn it all, something's got to be done about it ! '

A well-to-do industrialist, a Conservative, and owner of a large country house, said that not only was the Munich settlement a monument to political wisdom, but also that its aftermath could have no dangers for this country. He believed that Great Britain and Germany could work together as friends. This outlook is, I believe, fairly prevalent in the City. But the City is not unanimous. City men, I am told,

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING

One of the omnibus drivers in the little riverside town where I live—typical of the skilled, thoughtful, and perhaps rather conservative type of working man—said to me, regarding the Premier's forthcoming visit to Rome: 'I reckon Chamberlain has a lot more to swallow yet.' Mr. Duff Cooper's resignation impressed him. 'He has the courage of his convictions,' was his summing up.

This naturally led on to Mr. Anthony Eden. 'Can't be any doubt,' said my omnibus driver, 'Mr. Eden went because Hitler told Chamberlain to sack him. If Eden had been on the job, it would have been different.'

Opinions on Mr. Eden differ widely. He is rather a question mark. Some think that he is the man who will one day bring down the Government. Others think he is treading very warily. As one local man said to me: 'Looks as though he was riding two horses at once.'

As for Lord Halifax, his name is hardly ever mentioned by the crowd.

I had a talk with two of the busman's mates. 'No good ever came of giving way to a bully,' one of them said. And said the other: 'We must have been less well prepared than we thought. But we should never have got into that mess.'

A ticket inspector, on the same line of omnibuses, confessed himself puzzled. 'I'm hoping against hope,' he said, 'that perhaps there's more in it than meets the eye. Perhaps our Government have been leading Hitler on, and he'll go too far and fall into a trap.' I said I doubted this. He agreed. 'I'm only hoping it may be so,' he said.

Another man, a fitter in a factory nearby, took a more cynical view. 'I bet you anything you like,' he said, 'the Government were frightened of Hitler losing. Thought Germany would go all Bolshie. Got this Bolshevism on the brain. Chamberlain didn't want to fight along with Stalin.'

the back door of the inn. Monsieur le Fèvre came out to eet her himself. He was very tall and thin and always oked hungry. He hated parting with even a centime. sing his hands a great deal, he expressed his desolation at iving had to put her to this trouble. Madame assured him was no trouble, but when she named her price for the birds s gesticulations became even more energetic as he explained iat such terms would bring ruin to him. But Madame was lamant; 30 francs each, or she would take the birds away gain. No, she could allow no discount for cash. So he paid :r the 180 francs, and then they drank a pernod together terwards.

Madame got back into the trap and drove off in the rection of St. Christophe.

She had only just turned the corner when a strange thing ippened. The pile of plucked birds lying on the ground irred. Monsieur le Fèvre stared, rubbed his eyes and ared again. One pernod, the sun—who knew it could have ich an effect? Then he gave a wild cry and dived through ie entrance to the inn.

The movement within the heap became greater, and iddenly six very sleepy fowls got unsteadily upon their legs. hey were still dazed from the alcohol-steeped apricots, but their heads cleared they gathered round the naked cockerel.

The male bird managed a weak crow as he strutted off in e direction taken by Madame Berthod a few moments :fore. He was followed by the five hens as bare as himself.

The strange little group came up with the pony trap where adame Berthod had stopped it to put her money safely vay in the purse she wore pinned beneath her skirt.

When she saw the chickens approaching she shrieked and ithered up the reins in her hands. But suddenly an expres-on of cunning slid over the old woman's face, like a tiny irk shadow: it was there, it was gone.

She got out of the pony trap with her basket and ap-oached the naked fowls. In a very few minutes they were l secured in the basket and the trap on its way back to her rm.

NORAH C. JAMES.

In the sunshine an expression of cunning slid over the old woman's face, like a tiny dark shadow; it was there, it was gone.

'Now, stop that snivelling and help me pluck them. Monsieur le Fèvre requires six birds; he shall have them.'

'But they have died.'

'Keep silent. They have been killed by you as surely as if you had wrung their necks, have they not?'

'Yes, Madame,' Céleste replied, hiccoughing on a sob.

'Then pluck them quickly while they're still warm. When they're ready I will take them to "The Golden Cat" myself.'

They sat down on a bench by the house and plucked the fowls. The feathers were put into the sack in which Madame Berthod stored them towards the feather mattress she intended as a gift to her son and future daughter-in-law when they were married.

Neither spoke, and soon the chickens lay white and bare in the sunshine; only the necks and heads retained their plumage.

'Now put them in the basket and I will drive over in the trap. Then I will go on to St. Christophe. I have some purchases to make,' the old woman said.

Céleste, much chastened by what had happened, put the plucked birds into a basket and harnessed the old pony into the shabby trap.

In a few minutes Madame Berthod came out of the house. She pulled herself up the step of the trap so that the conveyance tipped backwards under her weight. It seemed that the pony's front legs must, inevitably, be lifted from the ground. Then she squeezed herself through the door and slammed it shut. Céleste handed her the basket.

'You can have some bread and cheese for your lunch, and an apple,' the old woman called out. She took the reins, jerked at the pony's mouth, and off she drove.

As she went along the narrow road she decided to charge Monsieur le Fèvre 30 francs a bird. He could not expect her to kill and deliver plucked poultry at such short notice for less. With the money she would buy some more birds in the market at St. Christophe.

She arrived at 'The Golden Cat,' and stopped the trap

Out in the yard strutted the cockerel. He was closely lowed by the five hens, Céleste having forgotten to shut little gate between the orchard and the yard.

The fowls pecked in the gravel till one of them discovered : pan under the olive tree. Eagerly it began to eat the indy-soaked pulp of the apricots. The other chickens ned in the feast. The brilliant sunshine made a dark scurry shadow on the ground between them as they pushed and bbled. In a minute or so, six birds staggered away from : pan. Then suddenly, without a sound, each one of them pped heavily to the ground. The bright-plumaged cockerel is the last to succumb.

Madame Berthod came out into the yard to throw away r peelings. When she saw the still bodies of her fowls she ricked out loud. Then she put the peelings down and shed to the cockerel. Its body was still warm. What had ppened? She looked round the yard until she saw the use of the tragedy. The now nearly-empty pan gave her e answer.

The silver of the olive tree gleamed in contrast to the ile gold of the remaining apricot pulp. That half-wit of a rl, Madame thought furiously, had left the pan on the ound so that the chickens had poisoned themselves. Yes, ie gate to the yard from the orchard was open. The careless ut! Wait till she returned, not that any upbraiding was oing to help.

Through the hot morning Céleste came panting breath-ssly in her hurry.

'Oh, Madame,' she gasped without noticing the proof of er carelessness lying in the yard, 'Monsieur le Fèvre says e must have six birds at once. A message has arrived—a ig party is coming from Toulon for dinner at seven. It is rgent that you kill and pluck the birds for delivery in an hour.'

'Look, idiot! Good-for-nothing, careless, misgotten ne—look! You have killed the birds. All are dead.'

'I, Madame?'

'Yes, you. Who else left the door open between here and he orchard? Who but you, fool, placed the pan of refuse incovered upon the ground for them to get at?'

'I'm sorry,' Céleste said, horrified by the enormity of her crime, and began to cry.

had a wide, red mouth, a cast in her left eye, and m coloured hair that was scraped back from her forehead i painfully tight knot at the back of her neck.

'Wherever have you been, child? I've called you and again.'

'I was looking for eggs. The small hen's laying in a place, I'm sure.'

'Well, come along now and help me strain off the bra Together they lifted the heavy pan and held it over the jar. Up the pan tipped, while, like liquid gold, the ap brandy brimmed over the rim and slid in a shining st through the strainer.

'Oh, it's lovely,' Céleste said, her nose wrinkling pleasure.

'Careful,' admonished Madame.

When every drop of brandy had been extracted fron fruit and the kernels of the apricots added, the old wc began to secure the tops of the jars.

'Now then, you can throw away this mess,' she pointing to the skins and pulp left in the pan.

Céleste picked it up. The muscles in her arms tens she walked with the pan out into the yard. Madame's followed her:

'And then go to Monsieur le Fèvre's and take him score of eggs.'

'Yes,' Céleste answered, and, because she liked g over the fields to Monsieur le Fèvre, who kept 'The Gc Cat,' she did not trouble to empty the pan into the cov waste-bin, but simply dumped it down near the olive Then she put the eggs into a basket and hurried off.

Madame Berthod began the preparations for the mi meal. She felt very contented as she sat by the table pe and cutting up the vegetables for the stew. The hens laying well. Now that Monsieur le Fèvre had two sta the 'Michelin Guide-book' for the excellence of his cui she had a sure sale for her produce. Whenever unexpe guests turned up for a meal at 'The Golden Cat,' he w send his son or daughter to her for whatever he requir butter, a chicken, eggs. It was most satisfactory. The of sheer poverty seemed to have receded into the distance, last year's winter.

Hymn to Ceres by Eusebius

Before I go beyond Earth's boundaries,
Demeter! I would offer up my thanks
And praises, insufficient as they are,
To thee who hast sustain'd me throughout life.
Thy gift was mingled with a gift as sweet
Almost, if any can be, as the first
My mother gave from bosom soft and pure,
After the goat of glassy eye assumed
The place of mother, but deserted soon
And sought her birthplace on the mountain top
Then gentle maiden brought thy benison,
And often if a sickly forwardness
Turn'd my face from her, did she overlay
The cake with honey prest from golden cell.
Why turn I to my cradle, to my nurse,
My infancy, my childhood? What am I?
An atom of less worth than the least grain
Which thou hast scattered on the lap of Earth.
Hast thou not shower'd blessings over all
Earth's children? Zeus for thee sheds quiet rain
The Hours and Iris bending from above
Greet thee, if short their stay, swift their return
Wide are Poisedon's realms, yet thine extend
Wherever he usurps not; tranquil thine,
Tumultuous his; thou givest men support,
He tempts them to destruction; o'er thy fields
Plenty rides forth triumphant, roofs arise
Temples o'ertop them; his what barreness!
Where hideous monsters numberless devour
The strong the weaker, and birds scream for prey
Voracious like them, fiercer grow the fierce
And chase each other as surge chases surge—
until the rising bubbles boil with blood.
Grant to me Goddess, grant to me and mine
A quiet home where thou hast blest the field,
And where the reaper's song shall sing thy praise
When mine hath been forgotten, when my Shade
Hath visited thy daughter's calm abode.

corner of the sheet an embossed crest, which I have failed to identify, is barely visible. This may have belonged to William Wetmore Story, the American sculptor with whom Landor had lately been staying at Siena; that it was not Browning's crest I am certain. But this is a matter of no great moment.

The text of the poem, which consists of forty-eight lines of unrhymed iambic pentameters, contains about thirty corrections, and appears to have been a revised second draft. The whole had apparently been carefully written out, two or three minor corrections being made during the process, a number of more serious ones being added upon the completion of the copying. The text, as is usual with Landor's writings, is extremely difficult to read, being rendered in the present case more particularly so by the presence of a number of interpolated words and lines written one upon the other. However, after repeated attempts this palimpsest has finally been deciphered and is here printed exactly as Landor left it. Certain rather obvious emendations suggest themselves upon a careful reading of the poem, but these may be left to some future editor of Landor's complete poetical works. I have only to add that the following note, which accompanies the poem, is also written in Landor's hand, but would appear to have been added to the manuscript of the poem at some time after the latter had been written out.

Among the poems of small worth attributed to Homer, by learned but unpoetical scholars, is one to Ceres. Had I been so credulous as to believe this to be the production of so great a poet, his venerable name would alone have deterred me from attempting the same subject If mine is no better, it certainly is no worse: here would indeed be a difficulty overcome. (Oct. 23, 59).

The poem is unsigned.

M. F. Ashley-Montagu.

AN UNPUBLISHED POEM BY WALTER SAVAGE LANDOR

Walter Savage Landor died in his ninetieth year (*b.* Warwick, January 30th, 1775, *d.* Florence, September 17th, 1864), his first work appeared in print in his twentieth year, and the last in the final year of his life. The poem, here first published by the courtesy of Doctor Harry Isaacs of New York City, in whose possession it now lies, was completed by Landor in his eighty-fifth year on October 23rd, 1859, only a few days after his return to Florence from Siena, whither he had been taken by Browning following the unhappy quarrel with his family, which led Landor to abandon his home for the last time and take refuge in the streets of Florence, where Browning shortly afterwards found him. A full version of the story may be read in Forster's *Biography*, 1869. During this trying period of his life Landor seems to have been unusually active, for I have succeeded in unearthing a fairly large number of extremely interesting pieces by Landor belonging to this period, among them a number of excellent *Imaginary Conversations* which I have already published (*vide The Nineteenth Century*, June, 1930 and September, 1931, also the *Review of English Studies*, July, 1932; cf. H. C. Minchin's *Last Days of Walter Savage Landor*, 1934).

The present poem is hardly in Landor's best manner, though it is written in his unmistakably characteristic style and *therefore* contains some good lines. The note accompanying the poem is also characteristically Landorian. Both should be of some interest to students and lovers of Landor.

A few words should be said concerning the state of the manuscript and the text of the poem. The poem is written in Landor's own unmistakable hand upon both sides of a single quarto sheet of paper. The paper, which contains no water-mark, is of the simple india-rice variety, such as is still commonly used on the Continent. In the left-hand upper

Redgrave, beaming kindly out of a blonde wig, romps off with the part of Augecheek.

Unhappily, Mr. George Devine is unable to bring Sir Toby Belch to life. It is, indeed, difficult to assess Mr. Devine's interpretation of Sir Toby, for his chesty gruffness is such that one can seldom hear his lines; one is simply aware of a large, gruff figure on the stage. It is no doubt partly the inarticulacy of Sir Toby which mars the revel interrupted by Malvolio in his nightshirt; but I think the production has faltered here, too. This scene has the effect of clumsy improvisation, is noisy without being merry, and serves only to make one aware that the wine-jug is, after all, a stage 'prop.' Remembering the perfect timing and control of the drunken dinner party in *The White Guard*, the failure of this revel is the more astonishing.

Elizabethan clowning is in general a problem for modern producers, and a very difficult one in *Twelfth Night* There is little warmth in the comedy contrived by M. Saint-Denis, and Orsino's mood—'That strain again; it had a dying fall' —comes through as the dominating mood of the play. It is, however, a mood which M. Saint-Denis understands perfectly, and he evokes it with great delicacy and beauty in this production.

* * * * *

I think it is significant that the Marx Brothers, the Surrealists of the cinema, should in their latest film have accepted a comparatively rational plot, and interpreted it with a show of reason. In an earlier commentary I suggested that the Surrealist was now outmoded in a world which had adopted his procedures as a guiding principle, and the Marx Brothers in *Room Service* bear out my contention. The professional lunatic is no longer a novelty, no longer even a distinguishable figure in the world at large; and if the Marx Brothers were to persist in making films such as *Horse Feathers* or *Animal Crackers*, it is possible that they would find their work classified as 'documentary,' and not as entertainment at all.

ALEX GLENDINNING.

control-room as a kind of fetish, his declamatory manner, his elaboration of arguments to justify his obsession—these appear to me as the familiar symptoms and expedients of the neurotic; and when Ferrers confesses to Karen that he cannot bear the thought of failure, for he feels he must appear always as a kind of god in her eyes, one is aware of motives which seem far removed from singlemindedness and purity of heart. One would not cavil at this, did not the whole conduct of the play, particularly in its many lyrical moments, invite one to see in it something universal, and not merely a case-history, to trace some affinity between this theatrical mathematician and 'a woman at her cradle . . . a seaman at his wheel or a ploughman at his furrow.' If one regards this invitation as specious, one will be merely embarrassed by a good deal of this well-acted play, and unable to enjoy it as one would like, either as a simple melodrama about secret plans, or as a psychological farce.

* * * * *

Naturalistic settings—the denial of the convention by which the theatre exists—have spoiled so many productions of Shakespeare that M. Michel Saint-Denis deserves special praise for the formal simplicity with which he has staged *Twelfth Night* at the Phœnix. His 'scenery' is a single structure which can be transformed in a few seconds to suggest, so far as need be, room or street or the sea-coast; and we are at last free to follow, without visual interference, the injunctions of Shakespeare:

> Think, when we talk of horses, that you see them
> Printing their proud hoofs i' the receiving earth.
> For 'tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings,
> Carry them here and there. . . .

free to attend to verse spoken—with a solitary exception—as well as one could desire. Miss Peggy Ashcroft, in particular, is a joy to hear. She plays Viola, and the sensitiveness with which, in look, movement and intonation, she catches each flickering transition from one mood and feeling to another, in a part full of such nuances, have been already praised as they deserve. One can only describe this as a faultless performance. Mr. George Hayes combines fatuity with seedy pomp in an excellent Malvolio; and Mr. Michael

tions of a lighthearted and somewhat inopportune charade, largely irrelevant to the issues it raises with such gay good humour.

* * * * *

Mr. Charles Morgan's *The Flashing Stream*, at the Lyric, is also introduced by a programme note which quotes, as follows, from his preface to the published play :

> Many are persuaded by despair that against the violence of the contemporary world there is no remedy but to escape or to destroy ; but there is another within the reach of all—of a woman at her cradle, or a man of science at his instruments, of a seaman at his wheel or a ploughman at his furrow, of young and old when they love and when they worship—the remedy of a single mind, active, passionate and steadfast. . . . This singleness of mind, called by Jesus purity of heart, the genius of love, of science and of faith, resembles, in the confused landscapes of experience, a flashing stream . . . to which the few who see it commit themselves absolutely. . . .

Singlemindedness, then, is the theme ; and we are to seek it in the story of Commander Ferrers, a mathematician who is working out, in the secrecy of an island fortress, formulæ for an aerial torpedo. Into the monastic life of Ferrers and his fellow workers comes Karen, another mathematician, to continue the work of her mathematical brother, now dead. Ferrers and Karen fall in love, and tension is caused by the conflicting passions of love and mathematics. The Admiralty have doubts about the experiments ; after an unsuccessful demonstration they feel inclined to abandon the whole scheme ; and the plot turns on whether Ferrers can bring himself to admit that his calculations may be wrong. Because of his singleness of mind on this point, he is unable to do so, and his scheme, along with his sanity, is saved at the last moment by Karen's intervention.

Had I not read the extract from Mr. Morgan's preface, I confess that this play would have struck me as a rather confused study of megalomania ; confused because, though the part cast for his hero suggests megalomania, one has also the impression that this is not the effect intended by the author. The hysteria of Ferrers over the temporary loss of the key to his control-room, for example, his worship of the

and restored peace to Europe and Asia.' He adds that the utmost he 'or any other playwright can do is to extract comedy and tragedy from the existing situation and wait to see what will become of it,' and draws our attention to 'one novelty. Instead of making the worst of all the dictators, which only drives them out of the League,' he has 'made the best of them, and may even challenge them to live up to their portraits if they can.' (This is scarcely a novelty; is Mr. Shaw unaware of our present foreign policy?)

He has imagined a situation in which the dictators—Battler and Bombardone—are tried at the Hague court. Their accusers include a Jew, a Spanish widow and an English democrat, and among those who attend the trial is Sir Orpheus Midlander, Foreign Secretary, assumed with customary brilliance by Mr. Ernest Thesiger. The trial scene, approached through two somewhat makeshift acts, is in substance a statement of their philosophies by the dictators, assisted by Mr Shaw Bombardone makes most of the speeches, and is given a tremendous presence by Mr. Cecil Trouncer Battler is sketchily drawn by comparison, particularly by comparison with his original, a much more formidable and complicated person than this cartoon suggests. Bombardone has lost a few subtleties in the transformation too; one would not gather, for example, that the original of this earnest worshipper of courage and carnage had once conducted a pacifist campaign—a significant paradox. But perhaps these omissions are part of a Shavian policy of appeasement, for Mr. Shaw is making the best of the dictators, and he does not include duplicity among their attributes.

If he had also made the best of the Judge, the Jew and the democrat, we might have had a more interesting play; but as it is there is no real conflict and no very pointed satire. It is Bombardone's day, carried with a rhetorical vigour which can be enjoyed for its own sake. The Judge—finely played by Mr. Alexander Knox—has the advantage of being the one dignified figure in the play, and as such his verdict carries some authority; but it is in the end a resigned and general verdict: 'Man is a failure as a political animal.'

The drama which *Geneva* reflects is waiting for us as we leave the theatre, and as we return to the vast farce and tragedy of world affairs, *Geneva* dwindles to its true propor-

In the early months of the century it had degenerated into a kind of bear-garden—there were no doubt actually bears, for the stage of that time was crowded with animals—and though, with the abolition of the 'patent theatres,' it retrieved some of its dignity, it has never quite recovered.

I was reading the other day a book [1] in which the developments of the post-war theatre were analysed in the work of a dozen countries or more, including the Balkan States. England was omitted from the survey, for there was nothing to report. The movements which have shaped the European theatre since the War—futurism, expressionism, and so on—have passed unnoticed in England. With a few exceptions, the only -ism tolerated in our theatre is commercialism.

At the close of the century, Mr. W. B. Yeats, who was then doing his best to uphold in Ireland the traditions England had forgotten, complained that:

> It will take a generation, and perhaps generations, to restore the theatre of Art; for one must get one's actors, and perhaps one's scenery, from the theatre of commerce, until new actors and painters have come to help one; and until many failures and imperfect successes have made a new tradition. . . .

We are still waiting for this new tradition to take shape, encouraged from time to time by some isolated success or interesting failure, and the experiments of one or two private theatres.

* * * * *

In the meantime there is, of course, Mr. Shaw, if indeed he belongs properly to the theatre. An American critic once remarked that if he had nothing else to do he would devote himself to the task of dramatising Mr. Shaw's plays, and there is some critical acumen in the remark. Mr. Shaw, however, is entitled to reply that he has held the stage, literally, for half a century or more, and is at the moment drawing large crowds to the Saville with his *Geneva*.

In a programme note on this 'fancied page of history'—which, I am afraid, involves us once more in politics—Mr. Shaw anticipates the complaint that he has not 'solved all the burning political problems of the present and future in it,

[1] *The Theatre in a Changing Europe*, by Thomas H. Dickinson and Others (Putnam, 15*s*.).

COMMENTARY

I WANT to write about the theatre this month, so I must try to avoid politics, though it is hard to keep politics out of anything nowadays. I wish one could, for preoccupation with them is a sign of ill-health in a State, like preoccupation with bodily functions in an individual. It is a preoccupation with means, with machinery, an admission that some elementary problems of organisation have not been solved.

When we go on a railway journey we are not asked to elect the engine-driver or to take sides about the condition of the engine; we very properly regard these as matters which have been satisfactorily dealt with, leaving us free to attend to our own affairs, and we should greatly resent having to preoccupy ourselves with them.

But if, say, we have doubts about the engine-driver's ability, if it is rumoured that he has never driven an engine before, and we notice that he is going at full speed past the danger signals; if the communication cord is broken, and the guard mentions casually that the engine is short of a wheel but they hope to fix it later, if the train is obviously heading for some destination not shown on our tickets, and finally leaves the permanent way altogether—then we are obliged to take a desperate interest in the mere mechanics of our journey, and even to raise an unpatriotic outcry about the decadence of our railway system. Only a few of us will be comforted by the slogan 'Trust the engine-driver' . . .

But observe how this theme develops—let us turn to the subject of the theatre without delay.

* * * * *

The English theatre suffered a long illness in the nineteenth century, from which it is still convalescing; a weak patient, able, as it were, to go for short walks, but easily tired, and not yet in a condition to assimilate solids.

does the Government apparently shut the other to the need for providing adequate tracks for such vehicles to run upon, and adequate direction for the owners thereof?

Why, also, is there such discrimination against road transport as opposed to other forms of transport, in that the tax on heavy oil is levied at the rate of 9*d*. per gallon when used by road motor engines, and at only 1*d*. per gallon when used by stationary or railway engines?

Remember also that at the last General Election the Government pledged itself to a Five Year Plan for Road Improvement, involving an expenditure of £100,000,000. To-day, three years later, barely £15,000,000 has been spent under that plan. Sir Charles Bressey's report for solving London's traffic problems presents schemes which, if carried out, would, apart from the considerations already mentioned, greatly add to the prosperity of other cities by providing broad new connecting routes with the metropolis. Yet, on November 15th, exactly six months after the publication of the report, we find Sir Charles himself referring to 'vexatious delays,' and recommending the setting up of a small Improvement Trust to get on with the job. That something drastic must be done to stir the authorities to action is evident by the fact that, at the time when this speech was made, not one of the 150 local authorities affected had even replied to requests for their views on the proposals.

All monies at present raised from motor taxation should be devoted to road improvement instead of being devoted to other purposes to the extent of some £66,000,000 per annum. An alternative would be a national loan, redeemable out of the difference between motor taxation and the present cost of the roads.

But, whatever the means, it is high time every thinking citizen demanded that a properly planned programme of road reconstruction should take the place of the present patchwork futilities. Road improvement should be in the very forefront of any schemes for public safety, national defence and industrial prosperity.

Desmond Hubble.

from motor taxes, and that accidents on the Autobahnen have been reduced by five-sixths in proportion to the amount of traffic, compared with the old road system. It is claimed that by the use of the motorways, motorists are saved 30 per cent. in petrol consumption, apart from reduction in wear and tear.

What then, does the Government intend to do? The situation is complicated, but the following facts emerge:

The Government intend to contribute during this year the sum of £21,650,000 to road building and maintenance, against a total motor taxation of £88,000,000. This is heralded as a great increase in expenditure, £6,500,000 over last year's total.

Actually, this impression is completely false, since the sum of £15,145,000 claimed to have been spent last year does not take into consideration £5,500,000 taken over from the old Road Fund at the beginning of that financial year and added, making the sum then available approximately £20,645,000. Nor does the *real* increase for this year, thus amounting to about £1,000,000, take into account the rise in motor taxation from £75,000,000 to £88,000,000 per annum.

As for the trunk roads, the Ministry has announced that £3,000,000 will be spent, but of this sum £2,200,000 has already been earmarked for improvements either commenced or for which approval has already been given, leaving only £800,000 for schemes altogether new!

Dispersal of population in the event of attack, supplies for maintaining defence, public safety, and industrial prosperity all hinge to a great extent on the provision of adequate highways. And then these miserable grants!

The sums spent on the roads for years past have, in fact, fallen many thousands short of the amounts raised annually in motor taxation, and in the present year alone there will be a difference of some £25,000,000 between the sums derived from petrol, oil and vehicle duties, and the amounts spent on the roads.

The Ministry of Transport has evolved a defence plan section to co-ordinate transport in the event of emergency. Thousands of road vehicles have been registered by this section. Having opened one eye to this urgent need, why

and a multitude of signs distract the driver's attention from the road, and they cause a slowing of traffic, whereas the proper aim should be speed with safety, and they are, moreover, an admission that existing roads cannot efficiently carry even their present load. Congestion means danger, and it must be eliminated by better roadways. But more than this must be done. The British Road Federation, with a membership of fifty-eight national organisations concerned in the use of the roads, representing over 200,000 firms, has taken a particularly active interest in this problem. It suggests that the keynote of all trunk road improvement should be the segregation of the different forms of traffic, and the provision, wherever possible, of fly-over and clover-leaf junctions. It maintains that there should be a central governmental control of all classified roads and a uniform plan of development. It advocates dual carriageways on all main roads, with a central dividing strip, thus eliminating the possibility of head-on collisions, that all through roads should by-pass towns and all built-up areas, and that all monies raised in special taxation from road users should be devoted to road improvement.

There is, further, a strong opinion, shared by most road organisations and technical experts, that a limited number of special motor roads on the continental pattern should be built to carry through motor traffic, free from cross-roads, corners, or speed limits, thus easing the congestion on our existing roads.

The cost of the new Autobahnen in Germany has been estimated at about £35,000 per mile, including bridges and the price of the land Conditions in Great Britain are, of course, very different, but Professor R. G. H. Clements has estimated that similar roads in this country would cost approximately £40,000 per mile, as against £60,000 per mile for widening our existing roads. It must be remembered that a special motor road, through the elimination of cycle and pedestrian tracks, need only be 84 feet wide, while a trunk road up to the standards laid down by the Ministry of Transport would occupy a width of 120 feet. Incidentally, the Germans claim that nearly two-thirds of the total cost of the motorways has been returned to the Government in decreased expenditure on unemployment insurance and increased income

Minister draws his conclusions. He makes his statement as the result of an analysis of the causes of 100,000 road accidents, which analysis actually amounts to a mere count of the number of times police witnesses assigned road conditions as the sole or main cause of accidents. It is found, moreover, that in the questionnaire which has to be filled in by the police, for every road accident involving death or injury, only three amongst the numerous 'causes' set out include road conditions; that is to say—view obscured by blind corners or bends; slippery surfaces; and the general heading of 'other road conditions.'

In contrast to such Ministerial findings are those of the County Surveyor of Oxfordshire and his Highways Committee, who, as the result of a thoroughly scientific investigation by technical experts, found that more than three out of every four accidents which have occurred in Oxfordshire during three years' observation would not have taken place had the roads been designed and constructed in accordance with a reasonable interpretation of the Ministry of Transport's own 'Memorandum on the Layout and Construction of Roads.' As a result of the improvement of the rural sections of the five main roads of the county, road fatalities in Oxfordshire were reduced by 44 per cent. in a single year.

Moreover, the Lanarkshire County Council drew similar conclusions as the result of three years' observation on the Glasgow-Edinburgh Road, where it was found that on the length divided into dual carriageways accidents were 80 per cent. less than on the single carriageway section, despite the fact that the volume of traffic was 34 per cent. greater on the dual carriageway section.

Again, the Chief Engineer of the Roads Department of the Ministry of Transport admits that a main cause of accidents is the failure properly to segregate road traffic, while the Ministry's analysis of 100,000 accidents reveals that over 40 per cent. of these occurred at junctions, and the same percentage is attributable to collisions between vehicles and pedestrians.

It is plain that the remedies hitherto attempted have failed because they are directed to making the traffic fit the roads, instead of roads to fit the traffic, which is as useless as forcing a growing boy to wear an old suit of clothes. Restrictions

running straight through from the docks where the cargoes are discharged.

The need of better roads for industry is clear. Adequate roads would greatly reduce the cost of road transport, which forms a large part of the cost of production and distribution, through the elimination of loss of time occasioned by congestion, speed limits, and the mixing and mingling of various classes of traffic, and there would also be a considerable saving of expenditure on petrol and oil. The provision of adequate roads would also render the present artificial restriction of this form of commercial transport inexcusable and unnecessary, and would give an immense fillip to the industry of the country. The linking-up of London, for instance, with the distressed areas of the North by a special through motor road would do a tremendous amount to revive prosperity in those areas. Road improvement would also give a vast amount of employment to types of labour that cannot be used in other spheres, such as the making of armaments.

The motor manufacturing industry and its allied trades has now risen to the position of the third most important manufacturing industry in the country in respect of the employment provided, being exceeded only by cotton and engineering. With its auxiliary industries it is also responsible for an export trade of some £20,000,000 a year, which there will be a grave danger of losing if present conditions continue, to those countries which have been more active in the matter of providing special roads for through motor traffic, and in improving their road systems in general. All exporting interests are, in fact, greatly dependent on the effectiveness of road transport.

Let us now consider the fearful problem of road accidents. Despite ever-increasing restrictions on the free flow of traffic, accidents show no marked tendency to decrease. 6,500 people are killed annually on our roads, and 225,000 injured, a truly appalling total. But to find the remedy we must first analyse the causes. The Minister of Transport has stated that only three in every 200 accidents, which is only 1½ per cent., are caused by faulty road construction. If this be true, it throws an appalling responsibility upon motor drivers.

It is therefore as well to examine the basis from which the

in width nineteen times, from a maximum of 40 feet to a minimum of 20 feet. The London-Birmingham Road has twenty-three different types of surface, with over 100 dangerous 'bottlenecks.' The Great North Road, the A1 route of England, is capable of carrying only a single line of traffic in each direction for over two-thirds of its total length. The Kingston By-pass and the Great West Road, both hailed as the last word in construction at the time of their building, are typical examples of insufficient foresight and of the evils caused by ribbon development. The traffic in 1938 is menaced by the hundreds of hump-backed bridges left to us by the canal constructors of the eighteenth century and by the thousands of level crossings built by the railway engineers of the last century. Road vehicles have increased 2,000 per cent. since 1910, yet new road construction has amounted to less than 2 per cent.!

Defence experts, health experts, and economic experts alike maintain that the population should be spread outwards into 'satellite' dormitory towns and villages, but with London traffic at saturation point that process cannot be continued unless increased facilities are given to people who have to travel into the City and West End for their work.

Other European countries are fully aware of the danger, and all the great capitals are driving new arteries out through the suburbs and into the provinces, roads that will enable their people to be dispersed in the event of war, and which will give even greater return to the nation in increased safety and freedom from traffic congestion should peace endure.

There is another serious road problem related to defence. The trunk roads are the major arteries of the nation, but ours are to-day as hardened, as unfit for the lifestream they must carry, as those of a decrepit man. The demands for the transport of troops, mechanised vehicles of war and munitions would throw upon them a load they are totally incapable of bearing.

Again, England must import a great part of her food supplies, or quickly starve. In any future war the east coast ports might well be put out of action. It is essential that those in the south-west and the west should be linked up with the great centres of population by adequate trunk roads

WE NEED BETTER ROADS NOW

In the event of war there would have to be an immediate evacuation of a large part of the civil population from crowded centres. The report of the Committee on Evacuation, which was issued on October 27th, calculates that it would be desirable to disperse one-third of the population of Greater London in this manner, and it will be recalled that it was proposed during the crisis to evacuate 2,000,000 Londoners within a period of two days.

True, the report claims that there appeared to be adequate transport facilities for a scheme of evacuation on any practical scale, meaning in particular the railways, but there can be no doubt that the roads would actually have to bear a great part of the burden, which, with the main roads as they are, would become an overwhelming part should railway traffic be dislocated by aerial attack on important junctions and stations. This possibility applies also to other crowded centres and must be very seriously considered to avoid chaos in emergency. The chief means of transport alternative to the railways must be capable of functioning with complete efficiency.

Let us consider the state of our roads apart from demands that will be made on them in war-time. Motor traffic has increased by 25 per cent. since 1931, and 500 more vehicles are coming on the roads every day, which will mean a doubling of such traffic within fifteen years Over a tenth of the adult earning population is engaged in road transport, let alone the owners of private cars. There are 62·9 vehicles per mile of classified road, a greater density than in any other country, while the crush of traffic in the metropolis defies description. Yet road communications in and out of many of our large towns, and especially London, remain approximately as in the 1880's. The important trunk roads of the country are notorious for their narrowness, their obstructions and their positive danger. The Bristol Road, 120 miles long, varies

Pas); the Nelson River; the Limestone River, and the Weir and Owl Rivers which drain into Hudson Bay. The country is flat with numerous lakes and rivers, the greater portion being covered with a blanket of muskeg of varying depth, only a small percentage of rock formation being exposed. On the muskeg there is a scattered growth of small spruce timber. The line from Churchill to the Pas is 510 miles in length.

A Canadian recently wrote of this region:

> Civilisation's rapidly growing need of minerals as the discoveries of science accelerate its natural progress: the steady depletion of the richer and more accessible mineral deposits in some countries: and the vast extent of our promising mineral-bearing territory—these conditions appear to me to constitute Canada's unparalleled present and future opportunity. Let those who despair of our economic future make a sincere effort to grasp the full significance of these conditions, which, if clearly understood by the majority of intelligent Canadians, may be made to place Canada in a new position in the world.

In every direction one sees signs of a general awakening to the possibilities of this new field. On the lakes and rivers at the portages—go where you will, it is impossible to pass unseen even in so vast a territory. Prospectors from far-off fields, traders looking for vantage points to establish their posts, railroad construction gangs, power line and telephone crews—all present a picture that would inspire those pessimists who deem the power of the Empire is waning.

KATHLEEN NEWTON.

patience a great mineral country will be opened up. At present the establishment of a shorter route from the prairie provinces to Europe fully justifies the faith of the first promoters—and the future will further justify it. For a new international highway will open up this part of the world.

It is perhaps not generally appreciated that the shortest route from Great Britain to the Far East is by way of Northern Canada. One day a line of steel will cross the North-west from Fort Churchill on Hudson Bay to Prince Rupert on the British Columbia coast. The journey from Britain to the Orient *via* Churchill and Prince Rupert will be several thousands of miles shorter than the same journey by way of the Suez or Panama Canals. Further, the Bay route will at no point cross foreign territory or pass through foreign waters. The importance from the commercial and strategic points of view is obvious. This imperial route from the British Isles to the Pacific Ocean would, in the event of war, be of great service to the Empire.

As long as the run from Cape Chidley to Liverpool, 1,940 miles, is open Britain cannot be starved into submission—an essential to that desired condition being a naval base on Greenland. Such should and would dominate the North Atlantic. Naval and military experts forecast the coming supremacy of the Pacific as the decisive scene of world power. With the Hudson Bay route in operation Britain (with passage to Cape Chidley safeguarded) could arrive by continuous passage under her own flag at the Pacific with success, due to having tapped *en route* unlimited supplies of grain, cattle, dairy products, timber and coal, and possibly oil, and last, but not least, a great recruiting ground, should the cause at issue appeal to the Canadian people.

Fort Churchill, which recently sprang into the list of the notable ports of the world, may one day become the Dominion's greatest port. It is very close to the geographic centre of Canada, yet it is only 700 miles from the heart of prairie production, and practically as close to European markets as is Montreal. Already a trek of settlers is making it into a thriving and prosperous town.

From Fort Churchill to the Pas, Manitoba, the railway runs south-west. Five main watersheds are crossed by the line, the main Saskatchewan River (immediately north of the

far north as latitude 57° 30′ north. Compared with corresponding latitudes on the prairies the Hudson Bay region has a later spring and lower winter temperatures, but the midsummer months have about the same temperature. The opinion generally held that the country around the Bay and at Churchill is that of a barren waste, covered with ice and snow for the greater part of the year is quite wrong.

At the head of the Bay is an area where in summer months good hay can be cut. There are many species of wild fruit which flourish in the rocks and among the mosses. Wild currants, crowfoot berries, and others can be gathered by the bushel. Radishes, lettuce and turnips are grown at Churchill. Of course, the winter climate is usually severe, but not more so than in Manitoba. It can never be called dark in the north, even in the depth of winter.

Trees include spruce, tamarac, balsam, aspen, white birch. Wild animals are prolific. Moose and deer, wolves, caribou, polar bear, musk-ox, seals, foxes, otters, marten, mink, beaver, lynx, skunk, musk-rat, weasel, ermine and wolverine are among the valuable fur-bearing animals.

Fish abound. The whaling industry in the Bay has had a long history. As early as 1619 whalers from Europe entered these waters. The porpoise, walrus, cod, salmon are plentiful. The chief use of the whales is as dog feed, for the huskies are still the only means of drawing the sleighs. Edible fish include the pike, perch, pickerel, herring, sea trout, etc. And mussels, crabs, starfish and many other kinds are found on the beaches.

The mineral deposits include gold, copper and iron. Building and other stone can be quarried from the massive rocks. Many other minerals only await mining. Amber, arsenic, cement, nickel, coal, salt and silver are to be found.

Power is available from the Nelson, Saskatchewan, Churchill and Hayes rivers. Falls and rapids everywhere can be harnessed with very little effort.

With the advance of knowledge in dealing with ice hazards, a way will, no doubt, be found to keep open this wonderful route the whole year round. Meanwhile it is open for navigation during the most useful months. Difficulties have been overcome in the same spirit that prompted Henry Hudson, and there is hope that with encouragement and

into another. Additional stations have been since made at Resolution Island, Charles Island and Coats Island. A vessel about to enter the straits is picked up by Resolution and Hopes Advance, and her position fixed by intersecting bearings throughout the narrowest part of the Strait. From Resolution Island she proceeds west to Cape Hopes Advance, and thence to Big Island. From Big Island westward the ship arrives in Hudson Bay, and continues on a single bearing from the Finding Station to Port Churchill on the shores of New Manitoba.

Lights are fixed at each direction finding station. Ice-breakers are also used to clear the path of the ship and are indispensable, as they assist in the spring in opening the upper reaches of the St. Lawrence River, speed up the traffic through the icefields in the gulf, and in the late autumn escort and assist vessels proceeding to sea through the ice. The presence of an ice-breaker gives confidence to the owners of the ships.

These ice-breakers carry men who make observations with regard to the movements of the ice in the spring and autumn. With these safeguards ships now make use of this route over this waterway during a season of navigation sufficient to carry imports and exports (notably wheat from the prairies) to establish a commercial success. The harbour of Port Churchill has been greatly developed since 1930, and now will become one of the Empire's great ports. A trek of settlers has been taking place during the last five years with the result that properties are being developed and a flourishing town growing up.

The range of latitude is over 18 degrees, or about 1,250 miles, so the Hudson Bay region has a wide variation of temperature. The more southerly part of the James Bay slope, including the belt of Northern Ontario and Quebec, lies between the fortieth and fiftieth parallels of north latitude. The extreme north-westerly shore of Hudson Bay is within the Arctic Circle. On the southern clay belt agriculture is successful. From the south to north there is a gradual change, but the shortening of the growing season, resulting from the increase in latitude, is offset to a certain extent by the longer periods of daylight and greater amount of sunshine. Conditions on the west coast are more favourable to vegetation than on the east. The potential agriculture field is as

growing steadily in recent years. What is commonly spoken of as the 'hinterland' has seen an active development, and there are visions now of that development extending down the Mackenzie Valley towards the Arctic Circle and round both sides of the Hudson Bay.

It is coming to be recognised that the development of the country about Hudson Bay, and of the islands and waters of the Bay, is comparatively near. What appear to be valuable mineral discoveries on both sides of the bay, and the new Hudson Bay Railway are giving a great impetus to the development of that whole northern region. What once seemed very remote and unlikely to have much to do with the active life of the Dominion has now become a present possibility, and has justified the sacrifice of Henry Hudson.

The minerals, timber, water power and fisheries, and particularly the iron ore on the east side of the Bay now only await the necessary capital and the right type of settler to become valuable assets to the Dominion and Empire. The Hudson Bay route now offsets the isolation of the Maritime Provinces by developing an extensive trade between them and the west.

In the Canadian northland beyond the tree belt there is a natural grazing ground for millions of caribou, reindeer, and musk-ox, representing an immense food supply.

The Hudson Bay route needs no apology. The question 'Will it work?' has been satisfactorily answered. The dream of Hudson in 1610 is now a reality. Boats of all sizes and descriptions, from small sailing craft to modern ocean freighters have been entering and leaving Hudson Bay *via* Hudson Strait for two and a half centuries, during which time the losses have been reasonably slight, the records of the Hudson Bay Company, which are especially favourable, showing the destruction of only two ships. In recent years as many as thirty-eight recorded passages have been made through the straits in a single season (1914) without serious accidents.

For modern science has come to the aid of navigation in a way undreamed of by the pioneers. The first of these aids has been the establishment of Direction Finding Stations. During 1928 such a station was built at Cape Hopes Advance, and the Nottingham Island wireless station was converted

increasing mixture of the races of Central Europe, largely wheat-growing, but more and more looking northward to resources of furs and mines. Fifth, the Pacific Coast province, British Columbia, with its sea of mountains, its mines, rivers, timber, its fair fruit-filled valleys and seaports in touch with the Orient. Sixth, the north country from east to west, and bounded to the north by the Arctic, long sealed, but now opening to the magic keys of aeroplane and wireless. It was in 1867 that all these provinces formed a confederation and a dominion.

The great courage and foresight of the first explorers and governors has been justified. It was the handicap itself which acted as the spur, as it ever does with the British people. The very difficulties of settlement in a remote and unexplored country were the incentive to many a man to 'make good.' Such men as are now named in Canada's *Who's Who* substantiate this fact. Page after page teems with short accounts of those who overcame obstacles and rose from humble positions to those of service. Finance Minister Dunning came from England to farm in Saskatchewan some thirty years ago. He rose to be a member of the Canadian Council of Agriculture, Premier of Saskatchewan, and Minister of Agriculture. In a province where farming is the life-blood of the people he led his fellow-citizens through the lean years to better times. Many a small parochial and grammar school of England has produced men who are the most prominent among business and professional Canadians, notably the office boy who rose to be general manager of the Canadian National Railway Restaurant and Hotel Department; the youth who rose from being a reporter in Aberdeen to be editor of a paper in Charlottetown; the one who from clerk in a wholesale dry goods store became president of a large metalware company; from apprenticeship in a Liverpool grain merchant's to be Social Workers' Lecturer in Montreal University; from train labourer to be Minister of Labour; from tutor in a borough school to become Professor of Social Science in a University; from clerk in an insurance company to become vice-president of an electric company; and among the women, from newspaper work to alderman of the capital of Manitoba; from authoress to be judge of a juvenile court. The belief of Canadians in their north country has been

THE NORTHLAND OF CANADA

'Full and free authority, leave and power to sail to all ports, countries, and seas . . . to seek out and discover whatever isles, countries, regions or provinces . . . which before this time hath been unknown,' were the rights and privileges King Henry VII bestowed upon John Cabot and his sons in 1497.

Four hundred and forty-two years later their Majesties King George VI and Queen Elizabeth will visit the same regions of this, the largest and richest of all the British Commonwealth of Nations. Most of its natural resources are still undeveloped, as it is not nearly thickly enough populated. In many places it has so few inhabitants that, on an average, there are only two people to each square mile.

Composed of nine provinces and northern territories besides, its area is about 3,500,000 square miles, making a third of the British Empire, and a fifteenth of the whole surface of the world. In reality there are something like six fairly distinct Canadas. First the Eastern Maritimes: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, chiefly Scotch-English, thoughtful, thorough-going people, with farming, fishing, fruit-growing, lumbering and university professors. Next comes Quebec, extending from the Atlantic along the north side of Ottawa, almost as far west as Toronto, its people very largely French, industrious, thrifty, domesticated, with farming, lumbering, and paper-making as chief industries. Third, Ontario, which extends from near Montreal to near Winnipeg, and from the Great Lakes to James Bay, largely English-Scotch-Irish, central, populous, and dominant among the provinces, with almost all the various industries of soil, water, and rock. Fourth, the three prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, young, optimistic and progressive, Anglo-Saxon chiefly, but with an

of citizenship—a duty which is not conceived as a duty, but is taken for granted. Given that achievement, propaganda in the enemy country—and the perception of this is the best thing in Mr. Rogerson's book—is limited to proving to its citizens that they have actually been defeated and are on the point of being conquered, and that further sacrifice is not only vain but from the patriotic point of view undesirable. Mr. Rogerson's book will appeal to a wider circle than those of his colleagues, for its controversial part affects a far greater number of people and depends less on preliminary technical knowledge for discussion. It will arouse controversy because it is a thoughtful book and challenging, but it would be a pity if the problem were viewed purely as one of publicity *expertise* and if a Ministry of Information were taken as an adequate solution. The real issue is what kind of totalitarianism this country is prepared to accept. It accepted it only once in the form of Cromwell, and a Cromwell to-day would have a task of moral rehabilitation such as the old iconoclasts could never even have conceived.

There is little room left to discuss Mr. Steinberg's book, which deals with many of these problems but superficially. Like most economists, the new phrase 'war potential' fascinates him and leads him to speculations on the future of war that are hazardous in the extreme. His chapter on the defects in Germany's economic organisation are excellent, but they hardly touch the reality of things, and lead him hopelessly to overestimate purely material factors in the determination of the extent and force of national effort, while his own peculiar brand of determinism makes him either ignore or misinterpret history. It is as a store of facts and figures that his book is valuable. Otherwise it carries us very little further, and the best bit of it, an analysis of Germany's foreign policy, while it states the truth that Europe is actually engaged in a major war, still discusses war and policy on the old basis—a basis not made any more impressive for being painted over with Marxist theory. It, too, reflects the doctrinal chaos that exists on the whole subject of war as policy or as a technical operation, and it contributes even less than the others to such understanding of the situation as gives the human spirit the chance to end chaos by brooding effectively over it.

R. T. CLARK.

or any body capable of directing a total war. No military man can deal adequately with the home front—now the most important, and that not merely as a source of supply—and no civilian statesman in the democracies has attempted to deal fundamentally with the problem of its organisation, for 'total' war, besides meaning what Ludendorff and the military mind mean, means that there never is peace but only an absence of actual physical fighting. Under a 'total' war system we are perpetually at war, even if not a single soul but a policeman is wearing uniform.

In the Bles series Mr. Rogerson deals with the home front from the very important viewpoint of morale, for it is still true that it is man who counts, and that morale is the weightiest factor in victory. But, despite his experience, Mr. Rogerson never gets to the root of things. He has wide experience of the technique of getting things across, and it is significant that most of his book is a pseudo-psychological analysis of the possibilities of successful propaganda in enemy countries. He knows thoroughly the media of propaganda, though he has no very clear-cut idea of the possibilities of wireless, and he has well digested the lessons of 1918. But the chapter on the home front is disappointing. His proposed Ministry of Information, though blessed by Whitehall, is really nothing more than a proposal to co-ordinate and increase all the old methods and means of propaganda on a 1918 basis which is hopelessly out of date. There is, in fact, in a total war no place for propaganda in Mr. Rogerson's sense. The word 'propaganda' is still used in the totalitarian States, but less by their leaders than by their critics. The aim of propaganda now means revolution in the strict sense of the term, and once the revolution has been achieved propaganda ceases. The aim is the complete identification of the individual with the State so that he will accept intellectually and materially as self-imposed—the doctrine of race, for instance, or a wretchedly low standard of living—what is, in fact, imposed upon him. The aim of propaganda in a total war is not the heightening of morale, but the creation of a way of life and thought that renders questioning unlikely and doubt impossible. Morale to a governing class or clique really means continued confidence in a so far unsuccessful Government; in a total war morale is just the duty

thereto is found, treatises on the use of this or that weapon are—if one may use the expression—mainly of local interest.

It is not possible here to do more than state the difficulty. War itself is changing both in its conduct and purpose, and we have lately seen a great Power win a major war against a coalition without any casualties and even without hostilities. It is now therefore possible to argue that the mere piling up of unco-ordinated masses of weapons is in itself sufficient to win a war. If that is even approximately so, the function of a commander and the direction of war have fundamentally changed, for war is no longer the continuation of policy by other means; war *is* policy. When that is so in an epoch like ours, the art of war is in full degeneracy with the unintelligence of the machine communicating itself to and triumphing over the intelligence of man. Carry the existing uncontrolled mechanical development to its logical conclusion, and war becomes simply an affair of skilled chauffeurs, so skilled as to escape all direction even by intelligence if unskilled in mere chauffeuring. Napoleon himself would find insoluble the problem of controlling an army so composed, and therefore the modesty of his successors—often mistaken for pacifism—may well be understood. Obviously it was not the task of these excellent authors in the Bles series to deal with something so distasteful (let it be said at once that that does not detract from the very great merit of their books, which are popular in the best sense, well documented and based on genuine study and wide experience, and ought to be read by every voter). Equally obviously it is the task of that series' distinguished editor who in a variety of works has shown not merely that he is aware of the problem but is investigating a solution. He, one feels, will see the necessity of a further volume called *Command in the Next War*, and no one is better qualified to write it. It will be of deep interest to see what view he takes, how far he believes the function of civilian and military man can be separated, and whether he feels that a new fusion is necessary. The old problem of relations between the civil and military hierarchies, solved, as by Napoleon, by unifying them and left in a state of compromise solution by all democracies and in a state of chaos—at present—by totalitarian States, is still with us, but it has been largely displaced by the new problem of finding anybody

lusion about the limitations of the weapon they are using. Major Sheppard does not see the tank displacing ry, never to speak of infantry; Mr. Spaight does not ve that the days of armies and navies are spent. None of faces the problem of unity. It is admittedly a difficult lem to formulate, for in essence it is rather something e mind of the commander communicated to the force he mands than *vice versâ*—a unity that is not destroyed by rsity of armament, nor impaired even by hatred of one by another. It is something much more than co-ation, the need for which both Mr. Spaight and Major ppard virtuously stress; the Navy men have naturally a tly more individual view of co-operation. (Mr. Spaight, instance, would not accept the Douhet doctrine. But Douhet doctrine has never yet been tried out; it is as emic as the arguments of its critics, and the argument *Schrecklichkeit* will pay us no better in the air than in the r elements is a moral argument, and one that is easily able militarily by casual reference to history.) There be co-operation between the arms, or there will be re, just as there must be co-operation between allies. he latter case the difference between co-operation and of command is easy to see. In the former it is not so because the nature of military hierarchy creates a formal , the reality of which has—though often unnoticed—peared. It was no formal unity that enabled Napoleon arry out a campaign like that on the Lech—his most ant achievement—but a unity that meant an instrument ely in the hand of its user. No subsequent commander has had that complete unity of control, and it was so ng in the Great War that strategy was almost given up operations degenerated into a mere senseless battering. consisted merely in using every arm and armament as onent parts of a battering ram, a development that uced some astonishing tactical results but created a kind r that any of the ancients could have bettered. There ust a little room left for a master-mind to teach the ful battle. It may be questioned if there is any room for -day, and if that is so the supreme problem is, not the lication of armaments in number and in kind, but the pment of a new conception of direction; until the way

fears and despises by instinct, and by such experience as is available he tends to distrust.

The element of distrust and doubt is seen very plainly in the books whose titles appear at the head of this article. Characteristically enough, the naval men speak with far more confidence than do the others. That is because, relatively speaking, there has been much less change in the purely naval sense since Jutland than in the army sense since the Marne. Messrs. Bell and Grenfell both speak perfectly confidently of our possible wars, and of the command of the seas, forgetting entirely that if the present rate of development is maintained the disappearance of the sea as a theatre of war is only a matter of relatively short time. They are perfectly confident in the results of blockade or a great naval battle, forgetting that the changes in the political situation make a sea blockade of Germany innocuous, and that there is no need for any hostile coalition to risk a great naval battle. Neither Mr. Spaight nor Major Sheppard is so confident. Both, indeed, are at pains to point out the limitation of their weapons, for both weapons are still *parvenu* and cannot be spoken of with just that reverence that is due to a ship of the line or a Peninsular battalion. Neither of them forgets, as a naval man so often pardonably does, that he is dealing with machinery, and that while a defect in mere man may be overcome in a variety of ways, some, fortunately, no longer tried, a defect in a machine is disaster. All four writers more or less admit that they are reasoning in the dark, not merely because 1918 supplied the last documented war experience, but because subsequent experience may be entirely misleading. It would be unwise to build theories of aircraft *versus* battleship on the Panay or a lucky hit in Spanish waters, particularly as the latter hit is still in dispute, to deride anti-aircraft guns because of failures in China or Spain, to reckon the value of light tanks from Italy's experience in Africa, to conclude that there will be tank battles from what happened outside Madrid, or to deduce the effects of a mass air raid on London from those of a succession of small raids on Barcelona or Valencia.

And none of these writers solves the real problem, that of leadership. To the Navy men it does not arise; the other two ignore it, though they admit the problem by frank

a growing complexity, in turn engendered mistrust of the instrument of war as a whole.

That is ingenious and has more than just a germ of truth in it. There have been profound psychological changes, and one may well doubt whether any modern professional army would consent to being literally walked off its feet as were Kluck's men in 1914, or stand up to the punishing effect of the machine as did Wellington's men or Marlborough's, and that for no other reasons than that the thinking bayonet is the rule to-day rather than the exception, and that fanaticisation is no substitute for a genuine morale. But actually it is no adequate explanation. Generals have often deeply mistrusted their armies, and none the less risked battle and won startling victories. The more adequate explanation is simply the opposite, that once again scientific achievement has outstripped experience, and a general, however trained, when given a modern army is given an instrument which he does not understand. War itself is simple and the soldier essentially a simple man; the instrument given the soldier is absurdly and ferociously complex. Worse still, it is untried. Since 1918 there has been no war in which two modernly equipped, scientifically trained armies have met each other. The director of a modern war has to work in three elements in none of which he has adequate experience to guide him, with instruments so complex that only the specialist can work them, and so incoherent that on the one flank he has cavalry little better than Wellington's, and on the other ultra-modern tanks, for an estimate of the value of which he has to accept largely the verdict of specialists who, he instinctively feels, must overestimate. If he is a student, he knows that in war the unorthodox usually has won, but his whole training leads him to fear to risk the unorthodox. In that fear there are elements completely divorced from that fear of responsibility characteristic of the 'ordinary general,' for he is now not working with a little army of his own, but with a nation. As a student and simply as a reasonably intelligent man, he knows that a modern war is a 'total' one, and that one destructive air raid at home may have deplorable if very varied effects on his army in the field. Trained to command a body of trained men, he is asked to reckon with masses of machinery and masses of civilians both of which he at once

ASPECTS OF MODERN WARFARE[1]

Not the least curious phenomenon of a curious epoch of time is the fact that, just when what the Marxist would call theses and antitheses and the Calvinist calls fundamentals have reached a stage of development when violence is the obvious and historic solution, there is an almost universal refusal to go to war. The alleged softness of the democracies is no explanation; the reluctance to risk war was just as strong, though less vocal and not printed at all, in the 'virile' totalitarian States. Nor is it explainable merely by allegations about the demoralising and debauching elements in certain activities peculiarly characteristic of contemporary culture or by gloom about degeneracy; men can still fight to the last cartridge and are doing so in Spain and China. And not the least curious aspect of the situation is the fact that the most reluctant of all to fight are what the pacifist calls the professional butcher; the cynic who called the War Offices of Europe the last bulwark of peace was merely picturesquely describing a state of mind with which anyone who has watched the development since 1918 of the professional soldier is perfectly familiar. The professional soldier in suitable company will admit it and will explain it in ways appropriate to what now passes for military thought. One explanation supplied by a not undistinguished soldier to the present writer was roughly this: In 1914 any general could trust his men, but every munition calculation went wrong; to-day munitions are ample and excellent, but the men are not what they were. The general can have confidence in the material element, but not the psychological, and that profound mistrust, due, the explainer admitted, to ignorance of

[1] THE NEXT WAR—a series edited by Captain Liddell Hart, each 5s. net: Bles (*Air Power*, by J. M. Spaight, *Sea Power*, by Commander Russell Grenfell, *Tanks*, by Major E. W. Sheppard, and *Propaganda*, by Sidney Rogerson); *Sea Power and the Next War*, by Lieut.-Commander A. C. Bell (6s. net: Longmans); *Germany and a Lightning War*, by Fritz Sternberg (12s. 6d. net: Faber & Faber).

beyond Germany noted above amounts only to 5 per cent. of our total foreign trade, I suppose we shall now, after Munich, have to gather our skirts still closer about us, and see what the Third Reich makes of half the Continent. The dream of Friedrich Naumann is half-realised—more, indeed, than it was after the Treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk, in 1917 and 1918. The dykes are down before the German flood; but, as yet and perhaps for some time, a lot of familiar landmarks will remain above the raging waters. Perhaps by their means we may contrive still to paddle our little commercial canoe across regions that we once knew in better days. But that is no longer very important. What is more important—for it is our duty to ourselves as well as our responsibility in Europe—is to inform ourselves of Germany's methods, past and future; to understand by what means her new European dominions are to be run; to learn where we need to, and can, and to forestall where we lack an advantage. Unless we do that, the expensive British Navy—on which we have spent £1,500,000,000 since 1919—may never be able to blockade Germany again. Unless we do these things, the Third Reich, in its ultimate bounds, will assuredly dictate the destinies of the British people from the vulnerable heart of their Empire. Our dependence on our West European position, on our control of the routes to North America, on our greater supplies of coal and iron and oversea materials, will scarcely avail us in an Anglo-French war with the Third Reich. For that Reich, whose ultimate confines we can only now begin to guess, can be forged and bent and moulded into the greatest and most terrible war machine the world has ever known. Our hope it may not prove so should not be our excuse for believing it will not come about. We can only base our beliefs on our observation of the aims which Germany's new European dominions may be made to serve, and of the measures which the Third Reich employs to achieve them. These aims, these measures, can be most clearly and effectively assessed in the economic sphere. For we ought by now to admit that, in five years, Germany's economic measures—including measures of an obnoxious kind in the social and political spheres—have built up sinews of war far more potent in diplomacy than our own.

GRAHAM HUTTON.

simultaneously; too great demands by the labour camps, S.S., and Reichswehr; and prolongation of conscript service.)

Now, and in future, the Reich is faced with imperative demands for more and more capital: for the out-of-date Sudeten factories, for their conversion to other uses, for the exports of machinery to develop the resources of 'Europe beyond Germany,' for new strategic works in Austria-Czechoslovakia, for purely civil exports wherewith to pay for growing imports to make the new constructional machinery which is to be exported again, and so on. This capital is wanted at once if the Four-Year Plan under Field-Marshal Goering is not to fall down under the weight of rearmament *plus* the new needs of the Reich's Central and South-east European dominions. It may not be fanciful to trace in the apparently vengeful penal expropriation of German Jews something like an admission of a paramount need for more liquid capital—without cost, as in the Austrian and Czech annexations, and even by shameful methods. Clearly, the greater the Reich and the greater its industrial capacity, the more the competitive claims of various industries, and the more complex the task of financing the already over-bureaucratised system.

Thirdly, what about human beings in Germany, as well as in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey? The Nazis go from strength to strength, and become less and less beloved. They have extended the Third Reich until it bids fair to inherit even more racial and administrative problems than the empire which ruled Central Europe and the Balkans before it—the Habsburg Empire. Many a great empire has proved, by foundering, that its economy could not be securely reared upon serfdom and helotry. The 100,000,000 Slav, Magyar, Ruman, and Greek souls that exist between Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey will not prove willing milch-kine, unless administrative devolution, economic generosity, and humane constructive energy find some place in Nazi conduct. As the Third Reich vaunts triumphs on top of successes, these qualities seem to become less and less evident. But their importance to the peoples of the largely undeveloped European countries may prove decisive for Germany's future.

Meanwhile, since British trade with all the countries

work out at roughly 20·8 Reichsmarks to the £1, and not the official 12 or 13, *i.e.*, nearer to the true purchasing power parity of the £1 with the Reichsmark.

Germany has milked her capital resources dry during the last four years. Increases of hours, deliberate restriction of wages and of production of consumable goods, appropriation of companies' reserves, forced loans and levies, all these elements of 'capital-building' have been applied with increasing rigour to a national economy, a national income, which still fails by about 10 per cent. to reach the 1929 figures; and this quite apart from the great falling off in standards and qualities since then. So acute was the problem at the beginning of 1938 that Germany was using what little free exchange she could get to buy up the cheapened State and public bonds of client States, in order to offer to repatriate them to their country of issue as liquidation of the blocked balances in Germany. Last March, when Austria provided the Reich with an £18,000,000 windfall in foreign exchange and gold, the Work-creation Bills—promissory notes discountable at the Reichsbank since 1933—ceased to be issued. They were, however, still prolonged every six months when they fell due, like a revolving credit fund. Thereafter new bills were issued, these were non-discountable, though transferable in open market, and were under the control of the Finance Ministry. Thus, inflation could be carried on by a new method, while new taxes and levies swept the normal inflationary profits back into the Treasury again; and the restricted production of consumable goods drove prices up so that no consumers' gain emerged from the process. This situation was remarkably effective in building up capital (public works, rearmament, etc.) without betraying to the ordinary observer the cost, to consumers, at which it was performed. But it could not go beyond a certain range of operations without leading to severe competition between various *kinds* of industry for labour and materials. As I mentioned above, at the beginning of 1938, and again in August when the Nazis decided to finish the Siegfried Line at breakneck speed, an acute shortage of labour developed in Germany, despite intensification of the multiple-shift system. Much of this was due to over-acceleration in capital construction on too many sectors of the industrial front

Wool, coffee, rubber, jute, cotton, pyrites, and nickel are her outstanding immediate deficiencies; but she has big surpluses of coal, electrical power, sugar, and potash. Her dependence on the iron-ore of Lorraine, Sweden, and Spain cannot be overcome within foreseeable time, since the deposits in Central and Eastern or South-eastern Europe cannot conceivably be worked up to supply anything like Germany's needs for many years—if, indeed, at all. In short, if Germany can afford both to develop substitute fibres and plastics (*e.g.*, 'Buna' for rubber) at home, and also to subsidise with her own labour and manufactures the development of just those branches of production in her client States which would cover her own immediate needs of foods and materials, she could, within as short a time as the Nazi Party State has already been in existence, so systematise the production and trade of her client States that, without any need militarily or even politically to reduce them to vassalage, they would have to become economic associates in the economy of the Third Reich, and dependent on it. But the problem is Herculean.

IV.

It is as well at this stage in the story to recall one or two facts. Even to-day Germany's trade with these client States has not attained the *volume* it reached in 1929. The percentual shares of Germany in these countries' trade are calculated on values—on fictitious values at that. The pengo or the lei is given an arbitrary equivalent in Reichsmarks at a rate favourable to Hungarian or Rumanian exports respectively. If Germany, to secure greater shares in Hungary's total export, agrees to allow 20 pengő (the price of wheat inside Hungary) to equal 16 Reichsmarks, while the pengő is at an official rate of 26 to the £1 and the mark is at an official rate of only 12 to the £1, three things will be obvious. First, Hungary's wheat will go to Germany; for wheat in British markets is at, say, 10 pengő, or 8*s*., only, whereas in Germany the Hungarians can get 16 Reichsmarks. Secondly, the pengő values of Hungary's wheat exports will greatly exaggerate Germany's share, reckoned at 20 pengő per quintal instead of 10 pengő per quintal for England. Thirdly, the so-called 'cross-rate'—*e.g.*, that of the Reichsmarks to the £1, on the basis of wheat prices and not of official exchange rates—will

of large contingents of German skilled labour and technicians during the construction and installation period, thus acquiring both local knowledge and local payment of German workers' salaries and wages.

The incorporation of Austria and the Sudetenland in the Reich, *plus* the stranglehold on the new Czechoslovakia, leaves the Reich a clear road down to the Adriatic, Aegean, Mediterranean and Black Seas. Political implications or possibilities do not concern me here; but it is obvious that the German economic drive, which Herr Funk in Belgrade at the beginning of October said 'cannot be separated from general political aims,' is not likely to raise any serious opposition to the Reich, either in the smaller States themselves, or by way of organisation among them on the part of Britain or France. British or French loans and credits without coherent trading plans are never likely to constitute serious or durable opposition to Germany's systematisation of all these countries' trade for German purposes. We may therefore compare Germany's deficiencies with these countries' actual or potential surpluses.

Germany can more than cover her needs of foodstuffs in the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (now relatively more agricultural), and Greece. Rumania's total oil exports are twice Germany's peace-time needs; but the presence during November of a German trade delegation in Bucharest and of oil experts prospecting for new wells indicates that Germany is already counting on meeting part of her war-time needs (*i.e.*, four times greater) in Rumania. Germany's need of fats, vegetable oils, and fibres (especially cotton) will be partly met by development, on the lines noted above, of the natural resources of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece. In Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia Germany can find copper, lead, zinc, bauxite (aluminium ore), manganese, chrome ore, magnesite; and she has already acquired in Austria the largest world production of magnesite. Among the chief metals, only in iron-ore will she still be deficient; for even with Austria the collaboration of Czech industries will increase her net import needs to over 20,000,000 metric tons per annum; and only Greece and Yugoslavia have small surpluses. Her need of timber is now more than covered.

In the cases of Hungary and Bulgaria—and, in the last few weeks, of Yugoslavia—a technique was followed which has had, and may have, extensive effects. The client State was required by Germany to begin production of things not till then produced in it. The giant German chemical dye trust, I.G. Farbenindustrie, holds about a dozen patents for the planting, cultivation, crushing, and utilisation of soya beans and oleaginous and fibrous legumina. Germany's needs of fats, vegetable oils, and fibres are paramount. The German offers to the smaller States were, therefore, couched in the following terms: Germany will unfreeze existing and eventual blocked balances by installing equipment, and sending machinery, for the cultivation and extraction of the materials she needs to import; she will also establish banks and companies in these countries for administering the whole business, including import of the German machinery and export to Germany of the required products in return. Something of the same organisation was begun with Yugoslavia two years ago when the German *Technische Union* was founded in Croatia to undertake constructive and extractive works. But certain non-economic activities of persons connected with the firm led to the suspension of its operations. Again, it became necessary to replan the streets, sewers, and lighting of a Balkan capital—as, indeed, is a case of need in many such countries—and German architects and technical experts were enabled not only to secure large orders at low prices (because of the subsidies in Germany), but also thereby to secure a highly valuable knowledge of the vital arteries of this Balkan capital. The same methods of German trading, based on the utilisation of foreign creditors' blocked balances and the export levy on all German industries, have been used, and can now be even more utilised, to secure contracts in each such country for large public works—*e.g.*, railways, docks and harbours in Turkey; canals in Rumania and perhaps Hungary; railways and roads in Yugoslavia; roads in Czechoslovakia; oil extraction plants in Hungary and Rumania and Poland; canals, roads, and harbours in Bulgaria and Greece; and electrical stations in every country. All these works are of local strategic importance. The German authorities have also insisted, and will doubtless in future insist more strongly, on the import into these countries

certain quantities of goods for export to Germany. If the quantities are not exactly defined, a percentual quota of the country's production available for export is agreed, and the country promises to send that to Germany; or, and this is a new feature, to hold it on German account. This means that Germany does not need in future to import great quantities of such products into Germany under the clearing account with each smaller State, and then sell it at lower world prices for free foreign exchange which she badly needed. Germany did this so that the smaller countries themselves were thereby stopped from selling freely on the world market, and so building up new markets for their products. In future, she will be able to control the direction of each smaller State's foreign trade, commodity by commodity, and gradually—by expanding her own exports to each country—come to control a larger percentage of each country's foreign trade as a whole. This even gives the Reich a certain control over free world markets; for at any time she can launch big supplies, not needed for the moment by Germany, on a weak market, and buy them back when the price has fallen.

Among her client States, Germany (including Austria) takes between 20 and 30 per cent. of the exports of Poland and all three Baltic States, about 45 per cent. of Hungary's exports, 40 per cent. of Rumania's, 35 per cent. of Yugoslavia's, over 40 per cent. of Greece's, 50 per cent. of Bulgaria's, and about 30 per cent. of Italy's. If we add the big *total* export capacity of the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, *under the Reich's system of controlled trade*, together with their big import needs of materials, the 'pull' exerted on each of these countries by the Third Reich in 1939 will be seen to be extremely powerful. It is likely to grow, despite the British Government's establishment of a £10,000,000 'guarantee fund' to aid British exporters against politically controlled German exports to these countries. This is because 'export credits' can do little more than hold existing trade at present levels, unless a national organisation for exports to each of these countries is coupled with financial aid. Can Germany substantially raise the output, the economic *potentiel*, of Central and Balkan Europe, and convert this development to her own uses?

In this context one or two examples will be enlightening.

restricted in order to turn all available savings into capital equipment and armaments.

From now onwards the question arises: Can Germany, with what was once Austria and an independent Czechoslovakia, so reorganise her economy and finances as to keep her arms programme forging ahead unhampered, while releasing more and more productive equipment and labour for current foreign trade?

It is just in this connexion that recent acquisitions of territory, population and equipment by Germany assume great importance, both for Germany and for Europe. For, with the control of Czechoslovakia's outlets and communications, Germany has a sympathetic new Czech Government in Prague; and there has already been serious talk of a customs and currency union between the Reich and the new State. Moreover, the Sudeten industries, even before 1914, supplied Central Europe and the Balkans through Vienna. Now that both the Sudetenland and Vienna are in Germany, that the Danube is practically under German control, that even Italy's foreign trade is coming to depend more and more on the Reich, the question is what Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and the other client States will do in harness with the Reich. Indeed, if the German drive for a greater current European trade really gets going, the question rather becomes: What *can* they do?

III.

Before Mr. Chamberlain flew to Godesberg, Herr Walther Funk, Reich Minister for Economics, had begun on a trip round these client States of Germany. To Yugoslavia he offered to take anything from 50 to 100 per cent. of her exports, as against 35·2 per cent. in 1937, and 24·1 per cent. in 1929. This was refused, but a new agreement was signed; and it is rather in the terms of the newer trade agreements signed with Germany that we must look for indications of what the smaller States will be asked to do for the Reich. In this agreement, in that with Turkey a few days later which resulted in a £12,000,000 'credit' to Turkey for German goods and installations, in those with Hungary since 1934, in that with Rumania in 1935, and in new agreements with Greece and Bulgaria, the small State is required to earmark

exports, but current exports. The reason for this step, advocated in strong terms to German business-men by Dr. Schacht, Herr Funk, and Field-Marshal Goering, is that the productive equipment of Great Germany has by now been so expanded, without cost, by annexations—especially the latest acquisitions in the Sudetenland and all Czechoslovakia which is left—that the former system of 'importing on tick and then liquidating the unpaid balances by 'additional exports' at high fixed prices, can no longer be safely employed. Here the reason is that all the smaller client States of Germany —Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece and the Baltic States—have, in the last four years, been made painfully aware of the real costs involved for them by that system. They now see that their unremitted export proceeds inside Germany are only liquidated by 'additional' German exports at prices which compare unfavourably with French, Swiss, or other like products. They see that they themselves carry the baby of interim finance for their own exporters, until the import of 'additional' German goods releases purchasing power from their own importers' pockets. With this local currency they can at last reimburse their own National Bank for standing in the gap. They see this; and if they were to cut down their exports to Germany by placing them elsewhere, Germany would be in an economic strait-jacket, immobilised by lack of industrial raw materials at just the moment when her own industrial capacity had been vastly expanded by Austrian and Czech accretions.

Till now, the factor most favourable to German hegemony of 'Europe beyond Germany' has been the inability of her small client States to find outlets for their products in the free-exchange countries. No one takes blocked marks if he can take free sterling, gulden, dollars, or francs. But when the markets in which these currencies arise refuse to take more than minimal quantities of Central or South-east European countries' goods, those countries are driven to find at least a dilatory and expensive method of disposing of their goods in the great and growing German market. In so doing, they have helped to build up the Third Reich's industrial equipment and feed its people, while the latter have had their own production of consumable goods

industry. This new capital must be created either by increasing the toll of indirect and direct taxation on the German national income (hitherto this has been achieved by restricting production of consumers' goods in favour of rearmament and public works, though the national income in 1937 was still 10 per cent. less than in 1929), or else by further subsidisation of exports so as to achieve, instead of the declining export surplus of the last eighteen months, an ever-expanding one. I shall revert to the former method later; here I would point out that Germany can only create capital for investment in the Reich by means of exports, if she alters the foreign trading system hitherto pursued with her Central and South-east European clients.

Till the beginning of 1938 it was broadly true to say that Dr. Schacht's blocking of Germany's long- and short-term debt service, and the system of creating new commercial debts by importing more from Germany's smaller neighbours than current German exports to them, had both vastly increased Germany's percentual share of these countries' trade, and had also run up large 'blocked balances' (*i.e.*, forced credits), representing the unpaid portions of Germany's debt for current imports from them. These balances (*Spitzenbeträge*) were consistently utilised to increase the next lot of German exports to those countries. But such exports could only be 'bought' by the clients from a limited list of German manufactures—obsolescent armaments, optical apparatus, chemicals, harmonicas, cameras, road-building and construction abroad, town-replanning, etc. Thus, by deliberate incurring of debts to these client countries, Germany was able both to subsidise her future exports to those countries at their own expense (since their National Banks had to finance their clamant and unpaid exporters), and to oust trade with competitors, Britain, France, the United States, etc. The smaller countries, exporters in the main of foodstuffs and extracted raw materials like oil or metal ores, could not expand their trade with the freer-exchange Great Powers without bidding a long farewell to part of their 'blocked balances' in their clearing accounts with Germany.

From the beginning of 1938, however, and *a fortiori* since Austria and the Czech territories were annexed, Germany has discovered the need to increase, not possible future

in future effectively as much under German control as the former Austrian or Sudetenland industries. For example, the new Czechoslovakia is to build new roads, not railways, under the direction of German technicians, as a means to assist German strategic plans, and also to help to bring the new State under German economic domination. One of these new roads is to be ceded to Germany; it is to link Breslau with Brünn and Vienna, and is to be staffed and policed by Germans right across the neck of Czecho-Slovakia. Again, Germany in 1938 produced over 20,000,000 metric tons of steel; whereas now, after the annexation of Austrian and Sudeten territories and the acquisition of control over the new Czechoslovakia, this figure can be raised to 25,000,000. The Hermann Goering Reichswerke A.G. have already merged Austria's steel industry in the German system under the Four-Year Plan; and to this must now be added the remaining Czech industry, which cannot dispose of its products wholly within the truncated Czechoslovakia, nor count on the ability to send any of its products outside its new frontiers unless under German direction. We should not be under the delusion that this new Czechoslovakia, which is strategically indefensible and economically unable to oppose German wishes, is anything but an economic abortion *apart from 'Great Germany.'* Its access to raw materials, its communications within and without its frontiers, its ability to maintain economic equilibrium at home for now less than 10,000,000 Czechs and Slovaks, are all dependent on that German control which is henceforth exercisable at any moment throughout Bohemia and Moravia, the industrial core of the country. For the German pincers are only a few miles apart across Moravia; and Germany controls all internal communications.

In acquiring the Sudetenland and control of the new Czechoslovak economy Germany has acquired not only the labour of more Germans and Czechs, together with industrial equipment and 'installations' and railways, she has also, as in the case of Austria six months earlier, acquired a reservoir of unemployed amounting to another 120,000 or 130,000 men. The Sudeten factories, especially those making textiles and metal-wares, will increase her need of industrial raw materials and her need to invest new capital in purely civil

fuel supplies from its remaining industries; to cut off electrical and water supplies from Czech cities; to cut the rail and road communications between the capital and the provincial industrial or agricultural areas in at least two separate places, where newly acquired German territory intervened; and to cut off all the industries and 'installations' of the ceded regions without one farthing of compensation for the remaining State, cumbered with its former national indebtedness. Worse followed. Poland took the Teschen-Bohumin area with its coal mines; and beyond the Polish region proper, the Polish forces occupied the Bohumin rail junction. Though Poles and Hungarians wanted to effect a common frontier by dividing Ruthenia and part of Slovakia, Herr von Ribbentrop was despatched to Rome at the end of October to warn Signor Mussolini not to support the Hungarians' and Poles' pretensions. The result was that, at Vienna at the beginning of November, Hungary obtained not only the legitimately claimed Csállókoz (Schutt Island) north of the main Danube, and other Magyar districts eastward from Bratislava, but also the big towns of Kosice, Užhorod and Mukacevo and the territory between them and the old frontiers of Slovakia and Ruthenia. Consequently the valley-lands below the Carpathian foothills passed entirely into Hungarian hands, and therewith the only viable roads and all the east-west railways of Slovakia and Ruthenia. Slovakia was left with Bratislava, once claimed by the Magyars as their old coronation city, now destined by Nazi Germany for an important German strategic centre; but the eastern end of the new Czechoslovakia was left without east-west communications, and without the fertile valleys. This, then, is the State which, in Herr Hitler's words, is to be constituted, after Munich, 'a healthier and more unified economic organism than before.'

That phrase must be understood as the Nazis understand it. The new Czechoslovakia still possesses the famous Škoda, Česka-Moravska, C.K.D., and Vitkovitze iron and steel, engineering, and armament works; but they are only seven miles or so inside the new frontiers, and their fuel or power now comes from German or Polish sources, once Czech. Accordingly, their current output—15 per cent. of old Germany's in 1937, *i.e.*, excluding Austria—is now and

short that it imperilled German ability to continue to import strategically vital raw materials, and her commercial creditors in the Central and South-east European countries were clamouring for the unfreezing of the balances of their former exports to Germany, now blocked in marks. They threatened to cut off current supplies. Suddenly Germany got Austria, and therewith secured control of Austria's trade and communications with most of Germany's creditors in that region. The Austrian banking, railway, river, and entrepôt 'invisible exports,' and their proceeds, fell into the hands of the Reichsbank, together with the other immediate assets noted above. The situation was saved; and the Reich set out to exploit Austria's human and material resources.

What happened in September was far more than the mere cession to Germany of certain mixed German and Czech regions of former Czechoslovakia. It was the passing of these areas *and of the new Czechoslovakia entire* under the economic, and therefore political, control of the Third Reich. For in compelling the Czechs to hand over their fortifications and natural strategic frontiers and communications, including roads and railways, to Germany, Poland or Hungary, the representatives of Britain, France and Italy at Munich and Berlin really transferred to the Reich the economic circulatory and respiratory systems of the new State—indeed, of more even than the new Czechoslovakia. When Mr. Chamberlain, in his last letter to Herr Hitler on September 26, emphasised the Czechs' natural fear lest their country's 'national and economic independence would automatically disappear with the acceptance of the German (Godesberg) Plan,' Herr Hitler seems to have satisfied him with the following statement. There could be 'not the slightest question whatsoever of a check to the independence of Czechoslovakia. It is equally erroneous to talk of an economic rift. It is, on the contrary, a well-known fact that Czechoslovakia, after the cession of the Sudeten German territory, would constitute a healthier and more unified economic system than before.' Herr Hitler must have satisfied Mr. Chamberlain; for the British and French Prime Ministers promptly agreed at Munich and through the International Commission, which they there set up, to cede to Germany more than the Germans demanded even at Godesberg; to cut off four-fifths of the new State's

based, admit competitive and parallel functioning of the freer economic systems of Britain, France, Holland, Scandinavia, and the United States in Central and South-east European countries? Lastly, are Great Germany's bloodless victories in 1938 likely on balance to increase and to accelerate her ability to risk a European war in support of the next stages in her diplomatic programme; or are they more likely to buttress the factors inside Germany which demand peace as the condition of structural strength? Each of these questions, on the answers to which depend future Anglo-French policy, are really and essentially economic questions. Let us examine them, not as a hypothetical balance-sheet before a future war, but as evidence of the *possibilities* which, after a victorious 1938, lie before the mightiest military Power in Europe.

II.

Let us take, first, Germany's annexation of Austria and the territories of Czechoslovakia.

Germany obtained last March not only the vast output of the mountain of iron-ore in the hands of the Alpin-Montangesellschaft, the timber resources of Austrian forests, and about £18,000,000 of gold and free foreign exchange in the Austrian National Bank. She also obtained the foreign securities owned by Austrians; the entrepôt trade of Vienna for the Danube basin; the control of the Danube as far as Bratislava; and, perhaps best of all at that time, a reservoir of unemployed numbering about 400,000—a godsend at a time when Germany herself had driven the rearmament machinery so intensively that there was an acute shortage of labour, especially skilled labour, throughout the Reich. Thus, though she might lose the exports of certain lower-cost Austrian industries whose costs would rise to the German level, and though she would lose tourist traffic receipts from foreigners, Germany gained the possibility of squeezing Austria's resources, human and material, until the level of Austrian standards of living and of productive efficiency relapsed to those of Germany proper.

The annexation of Austria occurred at an economically critical moment for Germany; for her foreign trading position was deteriorating, foreign exchange was running so

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MUNICH

I.

In the two major crises of 1938, over Austria in March and over Czechoslovakia in September, Nazi Germany has constructed a greater Reich than any other Germany ever possessed. Like a boxer who had harried his opponent by steady wearing-down, Germany then landed two short and sharp body-blows on the most politically and economically vulnerable part of Europe; and now the gong has suddenly sounded. The Munich Agreements, and the work of the International Commission of the 'Big Four's' Ambassadors in Berlin, which consisted merely in rubber-stamping the German decisions, have resulted in an uneasy kind of armistice in Europe. The Germans and the Italians have redrawn the map of Central Europe—in favour of Germany, Poland, and Hungary. But no one yet knows whether Europe beyond Germany can stand up again; whether there can ever be any resistance, economically and therefore politically, to the Nazis' progress in building up the vast European Reich of which Naumann and others dreamed. Are we now to conclude that the Third Reich, with its 80,000,000 of souls, is either complete or else so irresistible as to threaten to dominate the entire Continent, West as well as East? Ought we to reckon Italy's 42,000,000, her arms and resources, as integral with Germany's for all future diplomatic or belligerent purposes? Have Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania to be written off the Anglo-French balance-sheet in company with the remaining Czechoslovakia? Is that German domination of Central Europe, which Mr. Chamberlain in the Commons at the end of last session declared to be necessary, bound to be exclusive of others' interests; or can the German economic system, on which German political influence in neighbouring countries is

process, however, would have deprived Mussolini of any pretext for ever intervening in the Protectorate or putting forward any claim in respect to it. And Italy needs Tunis both for strategic and economic reasons. Recently the French population has been increasing far more rapidly than the Italian, and the anti-semitic laws introduced in Italy have been a further encouragement to apply for French citizenship. Italian nationalism can be kept alive artificially by means of propaganda, bribes and threats, but it cannot indefinitely oppose a natural tendency and Mussolini may well feel that he must claim Tunis now or lose the opportunity of ever claiming it at all.

GEORGE MARTELLI.

Italy. When, in January, 1935, Mussolini concluded his agreement with M. Laval, and in return for a free hand in Abyssinia virtually abandoned his nationals in Tunis, the Italian colony accepted the situation without protest. Few of them volunteered for the war in Ethiopia. My own impression when I was there was that the majority of them were by no means desirous of exchanging the free and easy French administration for totalitarian Government. Their main interests were economic; but nothing they heard from Italy encouraged them to believe they would be any better off under an Italian flag, and it was clear that in such matters as military service (from which, of course, they were exempted in Tunisia), taxation, and freedom of expression and action they would be a good deal worse off. There were, it is true, complaints of discrimination, but they cut both ways, and the answer was that if the Italians wanted fairer treatment they had only to stop undermining the French authority. The complaints, moreover, came from the Fascist bosses, not the employees. The latter duly turned up at the annual Italian ball in Tunis and sang their patriotic songs, they sent their children to Italian schools because it meant free milk and boots, they were glad of the Italian hospital when their wives were pregnant, but otherwise they had no strong feelings about Italy.

There were exceptions, of course; the few individuals whom you will find in any community and for whom politics are a pleasant alternative to hard work. There was the Editor of the *L'Unione*, the local Fascist rag, which specialised in retailing British atrocities in Palestine. There were one or two roughs who lay in ambush for the occasional anti-Fascist, and on one occasion at least had not stopped at murder. There were the Fascist officials, the Ovra's agents, some dependent on and some sent to spy on the Consul-General. But of any genuine irredentist movement I must confess I saw little. And it was not the measures of the French administration, lax to a degree except in regard to processions and the wearing of Fascist uniforms, which prevented pro-Italian sentiment manifesting itself if it had been there.

But for Fascism the Italian community in Tunisia would have gradually fused with the French, from whom no essential interest either commercial or political separates it. Such a

rights touching their trade and juridical status, schools and institutions. This agreement, which on the whole worked well, remained in force until after the Great War, when it was denounced by France. Even so a *modus vivendi* could probably have been discovered but for the advent of Fascism. For from the day Mussolini arrived in power, every effort on the part of the French to de-nationalise the Italian colony was strenuously resisted by Italy. A Fascist Consul-General was appointed to propagate the gospel of *Italianità* and from that moment it has been a fight between France and Italy for the souls, and passports, of the Italian community.

For several years the battle was waged without decision. The Italians, many of whom came from Sicily, were not enthusiastic about the new régime. The methods adopted by the Consul-General to promote their loyalty frequently had the opposite effect. Inducements were offered to adopt French citizenship and often these proved a stronger appeal than patriotism. It looked as though Fascism was fighting a losing cause when the world slump came to turn the scales in its favour. Tunisia was hard hit and the Italians, many of whom earned their livelihood as artisans or manual labourers, suffered as much as anybody. It was the Italian Consul-General who came to their rescue with money provided by the Treasury in Rome. And it was not only individuals who thus became dependent on the Consulate-General. The clubs and charitable institutions, the hospitals and schools, were all in low water. One by one they were taken over by the Fascists. At the same time repeated attempts were made to oust the Livornese Jews from the positions of influence they held in business and the professions.

After two or three years of depression Rome had obtained a grip of its nationals in Tunisia which it never subsequently weakened. To-day, according to French statistics, there are just under 100,000 Italians in the Protectorate. The Italian figure is 150,000, of whom 130,000, it is claimed, are registered at the Consulate-General. Whichever figure is correct, it is a fact that the overwhelming majority take orders unquestioningly from their Fascist officials. Nobody can say that Mussolini's policy has not been effective.

That does not mean that the Italians in Tunisia are necessarily anxious to see the Protectorate transferred to

such development as the present. The few I met who took an active part in the irredentist campaign—professional Fascists, dependents of the Consulate-General, or journalists—were delighted that the deterioration of France's relations with Italy, resulting from the advent of the Popular Front, had given Mussolini the opportunity for going back on his agreement with M. Laval. By this agreement, signed in Rome in January, 1935, the special status of the Tunisian Italians was gradually to be liquidated, so that by 1965 the whole colony would have become French subjects, and their schools and national institutions passed under French control. To appreciate the significance of this accord—it meant the virtual renunciation by Italy of any eventual claims in Tunisia—it may be useful to say a word about her position there previously. It will also help to an understanding of what has happened since.

The special position of the Italians in Tunisia may be said to date from 1868, when the handful of Italian traders, who had previously lived, like the other Christians, under Moslem sufferance, obtained from the reigning Bey a number of privileges which formed the embryo of a capitulatory régime such as was already in practice or eventually to be established in most of the nominal Ottoman dependencies. Under this régime the Italian colony increased and prospered and after the unification of Italy in 1870—and indeed even before—Tunisia had come to be regarded, not only by Italians, as their natural sphere of influence. But England and Germany had other ideas. Disraeli to buy French acquiescence in the ceding of Cyprus, Bismarck to dull the memory of Sedan, both considered France the more convenient candidate, and in 1881 a French army duly invaded Tunisia and established a Protectorate over the country.

Since their immediate bitter disappointment at being forestalled—among other consequences the event hastened the death of Garibaldi and the conclusion of the Triple Alliance—the Italians have evinced nearly every possible mood in the matter. For the first fifteen years they sulked. In 1896, however, the reverse suffered at Adowa induced them to make friends with France. A treaty was concluded by which the Italians in Tunisia, while renouncing their privileges under the Capitulations, were accorded certain

of the north the white-clothed native looks more out of place than the European. It is only when you journey south, beyond Sfax, that the African nature of the terrain begins to assert itself. For the last two hundred miles of the journey to the Italian frontier the road traverses an arid, stone-strewn expanse, bare of life or vegetation. The Romans made a clear distinction between this semi-desert, which continues on into Libya, and the rest of their province. Civilisation then, as to-day, ended at Sfax, and you did not see it again until you reached Leptis Magna, an hour or so away from Tripoli.

Tunis itself, where a large proportion of the Italian colony live, is not a town of which the French are particularly proud, perhaps because its best buildings were built with Italian labour. It was laid down before the genius of Lyautey had proved that modern construction could harmonise with native culture. It has the air and mentality of an important provincial centre, with its Avenue Jules Ferry and Place Gambetta (and statues), its blocks of flats in modern style trying to turn their backs on the squalid Tunisian quarters. To escape its vulgarity you have to walk to the end of the principal street and pass through the gateway which leads to the old city. Here you can forget Europe and lose yourself in another continent and another century, jostling with the anonymous throng in the market or exploring the labyrinth of cool and secretive lanes.

And yet Tunis is not provincial. It is saved from that by its politics. When I was there in the spring the Tunisians were making the politics, while the Italians watched and put their oar in when occasion prompted. Now the Tunisians are watching, while the Italians make the running. The French authorities, I know, would prefer it to be so. They told me then that some external danger might be helpful in making the natives appreciate French rule. The demonstrations of loyalty given by the Tunisians during the last few weeks prove that the calculation was right. Like the Egyptians or the Indians, the Tunisians would prefer to govern themselves. But if the choice is between a French Protector and an Italian, their attitude is not in doubt for a moment.

As for the Italians, they were of course anticipating some

is never wholly recovered, although under French rule it is gradually doing so.

But though Tunisia may not be the plum that it was 2,000 years ago, it still compares favourably with other African territories, and notably with its neighbour Libya. Doubtless that is why in modern times it was the first overseas country on which Italy cast her eyes. Although thwarted of her desire to make it an Italian colony, she has sent more colonists there than to any other African country. The Italian population of 94,000 (French figures, the Italians claim 150,000), compares with the 70,000 in Libya (of which 20,000 arrived only a few weeks ago) and the 60,000 in Egypt. The figures for Abyssinia are not available, but they consist chiefly of soldiers, and can hardly be said to count from the point of view of settlement.

It is not only, however, the large Italian population that makes Tunisia important to Italy. As colonies go in these days it enjoys a relative prosperity. It produces grain, wine and oil in sufficient quantities to feed its own inhabitants and have a surplus for export. When there is not a world slump its phosphates and other minerals are a source of considerable wealth. During the sixty odd years of their occupation the French have invested an enormous capital in the Protectorate. If the constructive effort, because conceived at an earlier and less enlightened epoch, is less striking than the Morocco of Lyautey, and less imposing than the Libya of Balbo, it is nevertheless impressive. Tunisia, you feel, is still a country of promise, if only because its development has not been forced artificially, but has grown by a natural economic and social process. In Libya, by contrast, one has the impression that the last drain of water has been squeezed from the 'box of sand' and that it is only by superhuman efforts, costing more than they can conceivably render back, that any further progress is possible. Here, moreover, the statistics speak for themselves. In the last fifty years the population of Tunisia has doubled. In Libya, under Italian rule, in half that time it has actually diminished.

Like the coastal zones of Algeria and Morocco, Tunisia when approached from Europe does not appear as an African country. Its air has a Mediterranean clarity and its plains and mountains are green. In the fertile area and wooded regions

THE ITALIANS IN TUNISIA

SPEAKING in the Chamber of Deputies just over a year ago, M. Daladier said :

> Should a new war occur, I do not believe that it will be fought on the same ground and in the same way. I do not wish to be emphatic, but I turn my eyes to North Africa, towards the Tunis frontier, and I conclude that we must make our Eastern frontiers impregnable.

Since that day, December 3rd, 1937, the French system for the encirclement of Germany has collapsed. But it is not by Germany that France is now threatened through this debacle. Italy is the country which seems likely to take advantage of her weakness. The Italian claims cover so wide a field, and are liable to such frequent modifications, that it is difficult to know which of them to take seriously. Spain, the Suez Canal, and Jibouti are likely to remain on the *tapis*. Corsica and Nice need not cause us much concern. But Tunis, because of its long association with Italian interests, is in rather a different category and deserves consideration.

There are ample and special reasons why the Italians covet Tunisia. Geographically it is the corner of Africa nearest to Italy, only a hundred miles of water separating it from Sicily. Ten miles from its modern capital the ruins of Carthage are a reminder that it was once a Roman province. There are no more eloquent relics of the 'grandeur that was' than Hadrian's aqueduct and the colosseum at El Djem. My guide-book contains a description of nearly two hundred Roman towns, villages, or military posts, and they are only those which have been identified by name. The surprising thing is that a country which strikes one to-day as fully settled, with a 'white' population of only 200,000, could ever have supported such an extensive and flourishing colony. The barbarian and Arab invasions, combined with a change of climate which dried up the soil, explain a decline from which

continue the eastward advance by way of Subcarpathian Ukraine towards Russian Ukraine. This is the alternative which appears to be suggested by German opposition to a common frontier for Hungary and Poland. It gives rise to a number of crucial questions on which the success of the whole enterprise would undoubtedly depend. Would the Reich, in its march towards the Dnieper, associate itself with modern Poland, and so risk drawing down upon itself the whole complex of hatreds unhappily directed against Polish ambitions (the 'hereditary enemy') by the Ukrainian and Ruthenian inhabitants of the whole eastern part of Poland, as at present constituted, and of Soviet Ukraine? Or would the Reich decide to apply to Poland the principle, so much proclaimed by Hitler, of national self-determination? This would imply relegating the Polish Republic to its ethnographic boundaries, that is to say to the west of the 'Curzon line' which, once upon a time, was drawn by the Allies. The effect would be to set up a Ukrainian Free State in Galicia and Volhynia. But could this operation be performed by means of persuasion and diplomatic pressure on Warsaw, or would it require the use of force?

If force were used would the Franco-Polish alliance come into play, maimed as it is by the behaviour of Poland towards Czechoslovakia and by many other incidents; and would the Western Powers render to Poland the assistance which they have lately refused to Czechoslovakia (though from a strategic, intellectual, moral and every other point of view Poland is far less important to them)? Finally, when all the preconditions of an eastward campaign had at last been realised, and the campaign itself launched, could the Reich be quite positive about the chances of a crushing victory over the Soviet Union which, after all, is the residuary legatees of that same Russia and that same Ukraine where in the course of history the mettle of so many conquerors has been tried—Mongols, Swedes under Charles XII, Napoleon and his Grand Army, not to mention the Poles of Pilsudski in 1922?

Basil Paneyko.

ance. Including towards the Danubian basin, it touches the flank of Roumania; it closely follows the southern frontier of Polish Ukraine throughout its whole length, and represents an ethnical prolongation of that country on the southern slopes of the Carpathians; finally, it approaches quite close to the Soviet frontier and seems to point, like a kind of sign-post, or like a hand outstretched, towards the Russian Ukraine. In this way, through the medium of Czechoslovakia, territorial contact is established between Germany and the Ukraine, directly as regards Polish Ukraine and indirectly as regards Soviet Ukraine, and consequently there is now a German aspect of the Ukrainian problem. But the German, unlike the Russian or Polish, facet is singularly opaque, and what has been said here about the Ukrainian problem in its German aspects can only be brought to a close with question marks—for which the author tenders his apologies—rather than with conclusions.

But one fact is beyond dispute: Germany at present possesses a geopolitical base which could be used as a point of departure for political activity on a grand scale in a south-easterly direction. Has Germany really decided already to intensify her activities in this respect? Such a decision would imply a guarantee of security for the western frontiers of Germany, and this is unthinkable except in the form of a binding agreement with France and Great Britain, equivalent to the securing of a 'free hand' in the east. Will the Western Powers be disposed to give the Reich a guarantee on the Rhine and freedom of movement towards the east? What would Germany be willing to grant in exchange? Might it perhaps be the abandonment of her alliance with Japan in the Far East? Or, if he were to meet with a Franco-British refusal, would Hitler decide to begin by trying the second alternative formulated in *Mein Kampf*—the annihilation of France, as a preliminary? And once the famous 'free hand' had been obtained in principle, in what direction would German pressure be exerted?

The reply to this last question demands consideration of two hypotheses: the first, that Germany would attempt to obtain direct access to the Black Sea, and so to Asia Minor—which would effectively broach the question of the Near East; the second, that the German intention would be to

are being repeated with a view to 'appeasing' the ferment produced in Polish Ukraine by the creation of a Free Ukrainian State within the Czechoslovak Federation on the other slope of the Carpathians. The villages and townships inhabited by the Ukrainian majority in Galicia are the scene, almost every day, of measures which, when they are applied to the Jewish minority in Berlin or Munich, produce such a perceptible tremour throughout the civilised world. The Polish administration has outdone the Nazis by bringing about the destruction not of a score or two of synagogues, but of hundreds of Christian Ukrainian churches (July and August, 1938).

Marshal Pilsudski sometimes used to tell about his idea of a great federation of peoples between the Baltic and the Black Sea, organised and directed, of course, by Poland and erected on the ruins of the Russian Empire. The Marshal imagined that this would be the surest way of preserving the Polish frontiers as fixed at Versailles and Riga. It was nothing but a dream, and it will never be anything else. The arms of Poland are too short to encompass such a span; a people of 20,000,000 has not the stature to play a decisive part between the Russo-Ukrainian block of some 120,000,000 and the German block of 80,000,000, or to establish its own position as a Great Power. The federal idea in itself is excellent. But it would be as well if Poland were to apply it within her own existing frontiers, where this can be done without difficulty and without a war.

In passing now to the German aspect of the Ukrainian problem it should be remembered that, since the advanced bastion of Franco-British policy and strategy in Central Europe—the Czechoslovak bastion—was captured, the road has been opened to the Reich, in an easterly or south-easterly direction, as the Reich may choose. The creation of the Free State of Subcarpathian Ukraine seems to indicate a milestone on that road. It is of tiny extent, and its population is culturally backward, as the result of centuries of unspeakable Magyar spoliation. Twenty years of laudable effort on the part of the Czechoslovak Government have barely succeeded in relieving a condition of unbelievable economic distress. Yet this little country of Subcarpathian Ukraine occupies none the less, a position of first-rate political and strategic import-

The 7,000,000 Ukrainians in Poland 'enjoy' the following guarantees under international law: first, the general protection of national and religious minorities, under the control of the League of Nations; secondly, the special guarantees accepted by Poland over her signature to the Treaty of Riga; and thirdly, the obligations defined by the Conference of Ambassadors when the eastern frontiers of Poland were fixed on May 14th, 1922. This obligation, which also bears the signature of the Polish Government, was to the effect that Poland should confer autonomy upon Ukrainian Galicia.

Not one of these undertakings towards the Ukrainian population has been even remotely honoured by Poland.

It would take volumes to give a detailed account of Polish Government policy towards the Ukrainian people. It will be enough, on this occasion, to draw some of its essential outlines. It has been a colonial policy, availing itself of the recognised colonial methods, including military, industrial and agricultural colonisation, a monopoly of public employment for the Poles, and a progressive suppression of the use of the Ukrainian language for purposes of instruction. In higher education it means the 'numerus clausus'; it involves systematic repression of the Ukrainian co-operative movement and every sort of measure against Ukrainian associations, not stopping short—as in the case of the Ukrainian Boy Scouts' organisation—of actual prohibition and dissolution. An arbitrary police administration has given rise to an endless series of political trials, ending in sentences of penal servitude (often for many years or even for life), or of death by hanging. This domestic Ukrainian policy in Poland attained its provisional climax in the famous 'pacification of Galicia' in 1930, when thousands of Ukrainian villages were surrounded by detachments of Polish cavalry and mounted police, and any Ukrainians who played any part in public life (priests, teachers, employees of the Co-operatives and so on) were dragged from their houses and abused, stripped and flogged, without distinction of age. Their homes, as well as the public libraries and the branches and offices of the Co-operatives, were looted and destroyed. The notorious 'Pilsudski elections' were then held and, soon afterwards, concentration camps were introduced and filled with Ukrainians. To-day (November, 1938) such methods

and converted into a regular police campaign. Thus the Polish statistics give a figure of nearly 5,000,000 of Rutheno-Ukrainian subjects—a figure which can only be accepted as a minimum, and which is violently contested by the Ukrainians whose estimates (also unverifiable) run to a much higher total of 7,000,000, 8,000,000 or even 9,000,000. Exaggeration apart, a figure of 7,000,000 Ukrainians in Poland may be accepted, as against a Polish minority (officials, garrisons, townsmen and colonists) of at most 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 in the south-eastern third of the country. The authentic genuine Poland is a country of about 15,000,000–16,000,000 Poles. Their territory is sufficient to make a State of the second rank, but their numbers are inadequate to provide the human material of a large State, let alone of a Great Power, on any enduring basis. A Polish State really reduced to its own resources of 15,000,000–16,000,000 of Poles might certainly play a useful part as a buffer State between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and might thus contribute to European equilibrium. But a Polish State such as has been created by Versailles and Saint-Germain, Riga, and the Conference of Ambassadors of May 14th, 1922, is so disproportionately enlarged that it cannot reconcile itself to accepting such a modest rôle. Now that a unique conjunction of circumstances has doubled the territory of Poland and given to it the outward appearance of a Great State, if not of a Great Power, the Polish leaders have lost all sober appreciation of the internal possibilities and external realities of the country. The Poland of to-day, with its 32,000,000 of subjects, is responsible for a far greater part than most people imagine of the *malaise* which, since the Treaties of Peace, has afflicted Europe and the world. Presumption is not only dangerous to individuals; when translated to an international and political plane, the danger is amplified. To mention but one single example: the post-war policy of France, which helped to open the way for Hitler by inflicting humiliations on the German Republic, was certainly in part determined, as everyone will remember, by certain illusions regarding a 'Great' Polish State dominating the eastern frontiers of Germany. It is, unhappily, to be feared that this was not the last of that series of causes and effects which began with the forcible creation of a disproportionately large State of Poland.

relations, but in a close alliance. The first of a number of good reasons why this should be so is clear and simple; there is not a trace of any natural frontier between the areas populated by Ukrainians and Great Russians, nor of any strategic frontier that would be even passably defensible; and this applies to a stretch of nearly 2,000 miles. To organise her defences against Germany along a frontier of some 120 miles, part of which is mountainous and therefore relatively 'favourable,' France is compelled to spend thousands of millions on fortifications. What kind of an undertaking would it be if a young Ukrainian State were compelled to organise its 2,000 kilometres of frontier, all 'unfavourable,' against a hostile Russia?

The Polish aspect of the Ukrainian problem is very different. The Polish Republic, despite its pretensions to be a unitary State of Polish nationality, is in reality nothing but a composite State of various nationalities. Only in the western half of the Republic do the Polish elements constitute an unquestionable majority; in the eastern half they are but a minority of the population, and, as a rule, even a small and scattered minority. The whole eastern half of Poland is essentially non-Polish and even anti-Polish, and is held to Poland by nothing but armed force. Similarly, nearly 40 per cent. of the Polish army consists of non-Polish troops, whom the officers and N.C.O.s may be able to handle in time of peace, but who would be found by the Polish High Command to be quite unreliable in the supreme test of war. In the mass of foreign populations hostile to Poland, the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) element is the largest unit. About a third of Poland, situated in the south-east is Ukrainian through and through. At least 500 kilometres of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Poland pass through territories which are definitely Ukrainian.

What does the Ukrainian population of Poland amount to in numbers? It is impossible to give an exact answer to the question, for, as all Polish Governments try to establish (for foreign consumption) the existence of a unitary national State of Poland, their first concern has been to achieve this aim in the realm of statistics. That is why the census of population in the eastern parts of the Republic, and particularly in Galicia, is organised with the most meticulous care,

for the benefit of the Soviet Union, through his broadly conceived and long-range policy of nationalities. The Second Bureau in Warsaw successfully planned, with great ingenuity, to take advantage of the political inexperience of a certain brand of Ukrainian nationalism, enlisted in the service of Warsaw by the personality of the late Petloura.

The penal measures taken by the Soviets against the 'League for the Liberation of the Ukraine' were directly brought about by emissaries in the employment and pay of Warsaw. These measures marked a decisive turning-point in the evolution of the relationship not only between the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the Soviets but—what is more important and more regrettable—between the Ukraine and Russia. The trial of the members of the 'League' played into the hands of Warsaw. Moscow was converted to a policy which in every respect favoured the designs of Poland. It was a major setback to the U.S.S.R., a setback which the Government in Moscow, preoccupied as it continues to be with vivisectional experiments on the body politic of its own people, apparently fails to rate even now at its true value and significance.

The neighbourly relations between Russians and Ukrainians who are so near to one another in origin and anguage, were gravely compromised, and for this the 'S.S.R. is to blame. In émigré circles there is a similar ailure of mutual understanding. On the Ukrainian side here is a youthful nationalism, narrow and aggressive, with very rudimentary political sense and little political experience.)n the Russian side there is a barren obstinacy that refuses o recognise Ukrainian nationality, and a failure to realise that he unity of Eastern Slavism no longer exists. If, at the time f the partition of Poland, Russia had refused to leave a onsiderable part of the Ukrainian territories, and Eastern ialicia in particular, at the mercy of a foreign Power, this nity might perhaps have been preserved. But to-day there an no longer be any question of it. This is all the more to e deplored because, on any objective assessment of Russo-'krainian relations, no serious ground for disagreement ivides the two peoples and States. On the contrary, they are so many common interests of the first importance that ey should be drawn together, not only in good neighbourly

the first period the leaders in Moscow encouraged the 'foreign' nationalities in resisting the tendency towards Russian unification on nationalistic lines. The old unitary Empire of the Tsars was transformed, during this period, into a union of national republics in which the Ukrainian Soviet Republic ranked immediately next to the Russian (Great Russian) Republic in importance, and far ahead of all the other federated republics. Moscow actively promoted the constitution of a Ukrainian State, and energetically supported its development in every domain of public activity. The influence of Soviet Ukraine in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. steadily increased; Ukrainians occupied important positions in Soviet diplomacy. The policy of the U.S.S.R. towards Poland was conducted on lines favoured by the Ukraine. The result was that the whole south-eastern part of Poland, representing a third or more of the Polish Republic, was literally undermined by a Ukrainian irredentism of Soviet complexion. Some Soviet publications envisaged an extension of the Soviet Ukraine over all the territories with a Ukrainian majority, and even a revision of the constitution of the U.S.S.R. with a view to establishing a Commonwealth of free Soviet states. At that time it seemed as if the U.S.S.R. might be emerging from the phase of militant communism and that a democracy of peasants and workers might be established in the enormous territories of the Soviet Empire—a free, progressive, civilised and prosperous democracy.

But the reaction was violent. In every domain of the U.S.S.R. the awakening was cruel. The second period in Soviet policy towards the Ukraine began. It is easy to believe that the prospect of a prosperous Soviet Ukraine was very disturbing to the Polish authorities. If matters were left to take their course greater Poland would disintegrate and the Polish State would be reduced to its ethnographic boundaries. The Government in Warsaw decided to act, and did so with energy and skill on two different planes: first of all, more or less openly, on the diplomatic plane, and, secondly, by way of secret intervention through its emissaries in the interior of Soviet Ukraine. By a veritable masterpiece of political jugglery the Polish Government succeeded in getting the better of the Moscow Government by snatching the whole moral and political capital which Lenin had amassed

tion, inhabiting such a wide extent of territory, should remain unnumbered. Whereas the statistics compiled under Stalin's régime are said to exaggerate beyond all measure the numerical strength of every nationality in the Soviet Union, Polish statistics lend themselves to a notable under-estimation of non-Polish nationalities which have been annexed by Poland, and which are conveniently regarded as minorities whose importance is to be rated as low as possible. But the fact is that, except in Roumania, the Ukrainian problem cannot properly be presented as a question of 'minorities,' capable of being dealt with by special legislative measures of protection. Both in Soviet Russia and in the Polish Republic it exceeds, and by far exceeds, the limits of any such minority problem. It is not a question of minorities properly so called—which would imply, by definition, a relatively small and scattered population living alongside a Russian or Polish majority. n the one case as in the other, it is a question of wide areas—nore extensive than many a fair-sized country—inhabited by compact Ukrainian population. These territories are inconestably Ukrainian, and it is the Russian or Polish elements which, together with the Jews, represent only a more or less gnificant minority, dispersed throughout the ethnically solid 'kraine.

The Ukrainians belong from an ethnical point of view anguage, customs, folk-lore) to the Eastern Slav (Russouthenian) family of nations. This family is sharply distinuished from the group of Western Slavs (Poles, Czechoovaks, Serbs) as well as from the Southern Slavs. Ukrainian ttional consciousness may consequently have wavered a tle in its attitude towards Russia (Muscovite, Great Russian) fluences. But a very clear distinction persists, beyond any ssibility of confusion, between the Ukrainians and the les. The breach is complete and clear. It may be said thout exaggeration that if the epithet 'hereditary enemy'—testable in itself—retains any meaning it applies to the les as they appear in the eyes of the Ukrainian population.

Let us examine the Ukrainian problem in its three aspects ccessively: first the Russian, then the Polish, and finally : German.

In the policy of Soviet Russia towards the Ukrainian estion two periods can be clearly distinguished. During

GERMANY, POLAND AND THE UKRAINE

Now that Czechoslovakia has been converted into a confederation of three autonomous states, including that of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (or Ukraine), further important changes are implied. Not even the most skilful interpreter of what is happening can presume to forecast the nearer and remoter consequences or to grasp their full effect upon Central and Eastern Europe, indeed, upon the world.

The Ukrainian problem is among the foremost of those questions which have emerged from the Munich conversations and agreements, as if from Pandora's box. Let us examine it here, not in its whole extent—which would lead us too far—but in what seem to be its principal aspects.

Linguistic maps of Central and Eastern Europe, produced in increasing numbers, have familiarised the general public with the extent of territory in which the Ukrainian language is spoken. It comprises the southern part of Soviet Russia as far as the Caucasus and the whole of the south-eastern third of Poland. Where it crosses the Carpathians there lies the little country of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (or Ukraine). Outside this territory with its compact Ukrainian population, there are Ukrainian minorities in Roumania; in America there is a considerable Ukrainian population, numbering about 1,500,000 in all, chiefly in Canada; and there are numerous Ukrainians in Asiatic Russia. Of these last, the most important are to be found in the 'Green Ukraine'—a wide area around Vladivostok, where Japanese agents have in recent times been surreptitiously at work. The importance of this Ukrainian outpost in the Far East of Soviet Russia and within the orbit of Japanese ambitions is becoming more and more evident.

The Ukrainian population of Europe amounts to at least 40,000,000 souls. Exact figures are not available, surprising as it may seem that, in an age of statistics, such a vast popula-

road from Lerida to Barcelona. It is now, of course, nce the insurgents took Lerida. As we swung into it hauffeur slowed up the car and pointed backwards. t's Lerida,' he said. I followed his finger and saw it clear and dark against the white moonlight. 'They se us from here,' he added, 'but they won't fire. One n't worth hitting.' And so with headlights gleaming head of us we blazed down the road towards Cervera.

here are some things that imprint themselves deeply rividly on our memory. The thing that I will always mber most clearly about my second trip to Spain during ivil War is the crossing by car from the Spanish frontier ge of La Junquera to the French frontier village of Le ius. You dive away from the dimly lighted Spanish ge through a road between high mountains and the it lights of Le Perthus lie ahead. I don't think I will forget the sight of a small huckster's shop in that latter ge and the fat, crusty, tasty-looking loaves of French l in the window with the abundance of provisions in the ground, and the blue and red trousers of the fat *gendarme* challenged our entry to French soil.

JEROME WILLIS.

was with the troops at divisional headquarters for the Ebro front. I had soup, plenty of rice and meat, a large portion of bread, and wine.

During the meal there was incessant argument. Would France have a general strike and force the opening of the Pyrenees frontier? France ought to do something. So ought England. What would Mr. Chamberlain do, I was asked. Would Mr. Eden become premier? When I put forward the theory that Spain might for a time be governed under some mandatory system by the Big Powers they set their lips tightly and said, No. They would fight on and win the war, despite Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier.

On the way up to another part of the front in the Lerida sector I passed several villages which had suffered severely from bombs. A thing that struck me during this trip was how troops even well behind the line in modern warfare must have dug-outs or shelters, ready to dive into when hostile aircraft appears. The development of aircraft in raiding makes the base just about as nerve-wracking as the front line. Where will troops be sent for a rest in modern warfare? It can only mean swapping the sound of artillery and machine-gun fire for that of bombs falling. Or perhaps they will retire to strange underground villages—a possible and terrible development of the future.

In Acoletge the battalion commander was anxious to show me how well-disciplined the new Spanish army was. I am sure the new Spanish army heartily cursed me. Though they should have been off duty, he paraded them, marched them up and down in the moonlight, made them form fours and right wheel, left wheel. Then he took me up to an observation post so that I could look right down into the insurgent lines. The River Segre separates the two armies and runs like a streak of silver a few hundred yards away. The Government position is an exceedingly good one in this part of the line and dominates the insurgents. As we looked down on that calm moon-bathed scene, undisturbed by a single shot, a dog barked somewhere near the river. 'That's a Government dog,' said one of the soldiers. 'How do you know?' I asked. 'Because he barked; a Fascist dog would howl.'

A mile or two out of that village our car turned into the

that scene, the soldier, chin on hand, and his child sleeping beside him on a couple of blankets laid out on the platform. I think I should have called the picture, 'Soldier on leave, Barcelona, 1938.'

Tired of continuous air raids which disturb their sleep during the night, I found that most families in that neighbourhood stake out a claim to a berth in the Metro station by stacking a bundle containing a mattress, a few pots and pans, and blankets. The station was full with groups of children and mothers and household utensils. No trains pulled in or out of it while I was there.

When the girls showed me their night quarters which sheltered them from air raids, they laughed about it. 'We consider ourselves quite big stuff now,' said one to me, 'you see we have moved from a back street to the famous Plaza del Catalunya.'

Air raids on Barcelona are of too frequent occurrence for one to remember exactly how many there were on any one day. Sometimes you hear the anti-aircraft guns first; sometimes you hear the air raid warning first. There are even times when the rumbling detonations of the bombs is the first indication that enemy aircraft is overhead.

When the warning comes first—a sound like the cry of a lost soul lamenting the imminent doom of mankind—the people in the port quarter and the old city rush to their shelters. West of the Plaza del Catalunya and neighbourhood they don't often bother to take shelter beyond standing in a convenient doorway. Mothers huddle their children close to them, and a few curious people stand in the roadway and gaze upwards to see if they can glimpse the raiding 'planes. In the spring raids of 1938 I understand they did not do this. But then the city was being bombed, whereas generally to-day the raids have been concentrated in the port quarter. At least they were when I was there during the latter days of November and the first week of December.

In the villages people seem to have far more to eat than in Barcelona. The chauffeur who took me up to the front had little difficulty in obtaining a thick hunk of bread and a bottle of red wine. This would be almost impossible in Barcelona unless you were a Government official or some specially privileged person. The best meal I had in Catalonia

Three little children were playing on the sidewalk in front of me. They certainly did look hungry. One was a little girl and she carried a very cheap-looking doll, hugged to her breast. After a while she grew tired, and sat down on a chair near me. She just looked at me, and she had a terribly serious expression on her face. She could not have been more than five years old. I felt in my pocket and took out a few lumps of barley sugar.

She received them in silence, looking at them mysteriously for a moment. Then suddenly she put one in her mouth, sucked, and her face broke into a smile. She scoffed the rest quickly.

Two lorries, filled with soldiers on leave from the front, rumbled down the street. They were singing and cheering. Thinking of other days and another war, when we returned on leave to cities of lights, wine and food, I could not help wondering at their cheerfulness. They were returning to a well-nigh starving city which was raided every day.

In general I found very little of the *saluding* and clenched fist salutes which were so prominent in Government Spain when I was last there (May, 1937). Occasionally when someone shook your hand they said *salud* instead of *buenos*, but it was the exception rather than the rule. Also there was much more of *senor* and *usted* being used.

In a narrow street off the Plaza del Catalunya I visited the apartment of a family of four, a mother, two daughters and a grandmother. They showed me their one meal for the day—a tin of peculiar liquid, made by boiling maize in water. One of the family went out of Barcelona three times weekly to try and smuggle in food, thus swelling the number of shadowy figures with sacks on their backs who move through the city after nightfall.

The family showed me their sleeping place by night. It was the metro station at the Plaza del Catalunya. Down there on the platforms, mattresses were rolled up, and children played up and down. I saw one soldier sitting on an upturned petrol tin while beside him his three-year-old child slept on a couple of blankets. The mother was probably out foraging for food. The soldier's head was resting on his hand, and he was just looking ahead of him in deep dejection. If I was a painter I should like to have painted

of the average citizen—is barely enough to keep body and soul together, you wonder how they manage to smile so easily.

The weekly Co-operative ration for one person for the first week in December was 3½ ounces of meat, 3 ounces of rice, 3 ounces of lentils, 1½ ounces of petit pois. To this was added a daily ration of bread, which varied considerably in quantity. The queues at the Co-operative stores are long, but the queues at the ordinary municipal food distribution centres are endless, and seem to move very sluggishly, for food only arrives in the city very sluggishly.

It was a dismal sight to walk down the broad Paseo del Gracio and see shops emptied of everything eatable or wearable. It was still more dismal to see the procession of women setting out bravely with shopping baskets to wait in a queue half a mile long, and then return with their shopping baskets empty.

As I progressed through the meaner streets I saw more and more hungry faces—mostly middle-aged women, holding one or two children by the hand . . . and those terrible old women in black who sat at various corners with stark despair in their faces. God knows how much or what they suffered, whether through air raids or hunger, but they were perfect photographs of despair.

A few cafés were open, more by habit rather than for the amount of business they did. Occasionally a half glass of vermouth stood in front of a customer. Generally there was nothing on the tables at all but a decanter of water, though people sat round and gabbled and joked, as if they had been drinking the best of aperitifs.

In the Diagonal, that broad highway that cuts clean across the city, I sat down at a terrace café. In normal times I imagine it would have been frequented by the well-to-do. Now people seemed to be drinking something, and they were anything but well-to-do. The waiter hurried forward, with serviette over his arm in a business-like manner. He addressed me as 'usted'—the polite form of address.

I asked for a 'café cognac.' He said yes, coffee, but no cognac. He brought me some dark liquid in a cup. It was not coffee, but some sort of vegetable extract, which I remember drinking in Madrid in the spring of 1937.

their backs. I asked what they were carrying, and my guide informed me they were people smuggling in food from the villages. All food has been taken over by the Government, and is now being rationed. But under cover of night these poor wretches manage to bring in a few potatoes or cabbages to their starving families at home.

Up against the starlit night I could see two lights moving. It was a Government chaser 'plane watching for raiders. I waited in the darkened street for what seemed an hour, though it was barely fifteen minutes, before my guide returned to say that he had found a car that would take me to the Hotel Majestic.

Then it came with two great white beams of headlights that any good observer could see from 5,000 feet up.

The Hotel Majestic lies well away from the port. It was previously known as one of the best hotels in Barcelona. But when I arrived there, there was no possibility of getting any food. It was after nine o'clock, and the last meal—and a frugal one at that—had been served for the day. Everything looked clean and neat, concierge, porter and page boys in uniforms, telephones and lights operating as usual, lounges and foyer, well kept and comfortable looking, but a notable absence of loungers with glasses at their elbows.

Up in my bedroom I gazed a little sadly at the notice on the wall telling me that I should ring twice for the *femme de chambre* and once for the 'wine waiter.' Wine waiter! dear God, what a mockery it seemed just now with the memory of those shadowy figures with bundles still in my mind. And the cadaverous face of the hotel porter!

In the morning I was awakened by a bright voice in the telephone, '*buenos dias, senor, esta ocho hora.*' It was the telephone girl calling me at the time requested. There was nothing obtainable to eat until mid-day, and then it was only a small portion of beans, six small whitebait and a tiny roll of bread.

The people in the streets did not look so hungry and pinched as I had expected. Perhaps the Mediterranean sunshine does something to people, for here in Barcelona they seem to have a lot of natural resistance to slow starvation. For when you consider the Co-operative Society ration—and that is only for members, and naturally higher than the ration

passports, baggage, and then searched us for currency undeclared on the passport. People started to crowd into the station carrying tattered-looking suitcases, bundles, and even sacks. They chattered, laughed and joked like any travellers who are leaving a wayside station for a capital city. For some, perhaps, it was an important occasion; for they were going to board the Barcelona express.

This time, however, it was an express, for I was lucky to catch the auto-rail train, which runs three times weekly to the Catalonian capital, and does the journey in three and a half hours.

The ordinary train, with four or five coaches, takes anything from five to seven hours to complete the trip.

Suddenly with a shrill shriek we are off—the Catalonian express with some seventy to a hundred passengers in a coach made to hold about fifty. Here, in the first-class, we are comfortable, with well-sprung seats and ample elbow room. Next to us most of the people are standing up.

The lights are turned off as we scream through the starlit night until an important-looking gentleman sitting in the corner tells the conductor he cannot read. And so the lights are put on again, and the important-looking gentleman lapses into his paper, while I, as an ex-Air Force observer, speculate on what a wonderful target a well-lighted train makes gliding through the dark like a phosphorescent snake.

Twice we had to halt and put the lights out as anti-aircraft guns started to bark somewhere in the neighbourhood. Each time they were put on again, and the chatter all round me never ceased.

We tore into Barcelona, all lights on. At the barrier as we left the platforms, there were many lean and hungry faces waiting for relatives or friends.

Outside the station there was a queer procession of waiting vehicles drawn up—two-horse cabs, with a piece of candle burning in a tin as headlight—a battered looking motor 'bus with no lights, and several wheelbarrows. The families who alighted from the train climbed on board these strange vehicles with a gay chatter.

I turned into the darkened street, through which without the aid of a fellow passenger I could not possibly have found my way. Shadowy forms passed me carrying bundles on

BARCELONA SILHOUETTE

You leave the slumbering peace of Cerbere, with its crescent of houses dotted on the mountainside down to the blue waters of the Mediterranean, dive into the tunnel and emerge into a completely different world on the other side.

Here there are no busy-looking housewives carrying those tasty, well-crusted French loaves, nor is there a single light on the mountainside. The day I entered they had suffered two air raids, and in Cerbere I heard a Spanish refugee muttering to herself as the white puffs of anti-aircraft shells started to appear in the sky, '*Madre di Dios, Madre di Dios.*' Then came the deep, echoing detonation as a load of bombs fell somewhere behind the mountains.

Now here is Port Bou, the first bit of Spain, the platform full of men in green uniforms—the *carabineros*, who seem to do everything in Government Spain from acting as customs officers to the sterner duties of shock police. All the station lights are dimmed over, and from the platform you can see shadowy forms moving through streets of half-destroyed houses.

We are only four passengers from France; two girls, of sixteen, who the previous day brought over a hundred little children *en route* to Belgium, a Spanish socialist dignitary, and myself. The police at Cerbere had a good look at our passports. They checked all *visas* carefully, and the sergeant then took down a card index, and after noting our names, he began to search for them. It was a record of international criminals.

For an hour we idled about on Port Bou platform. It was eerie moving about in the half-dark, and wondering if the raiders would visit the port again before the train started. There isn't a pane of unbroken glass left in the station, and only a few houses left intact in the neighbourhood.

In the dim light of oil lamps the officials examined our

Guard, and urged him to participate in the *coup d'état.* 'The crowds are in the street and I am frightened that they will get out of hand,' he told him. 'Nothing in particular is happening and I think that your fears are exaggerated; I take responsibility for the maintenance of public order,' replied General Pozas. Franco then approached the Minister of War and the Chief of the Government, urging them to declare martial law at once. He knew that this declaration is equivalent to a *coup d'état* by the Government itself and he began to convey his personal instructions to the generals of the divisions so as to create an irremediable situation. But the Chief of the Government, who was at the beginning irresolute, resolutely opposed the manœuvre and Franco's aims were frustrated. A Government was in power the next day which constitutionally reflected the result of the elections. The opportunity Franco was waiting for had been lost. There was only one other way left: Civil war.

To start this war Franco had a subversive force which alone would never have been of importance, but with the aid of the army it was sufficient to terrify the country and submit it to its will; '*Falange Española*'—Spanish Fascism.

By virtue of this Fascist force, Franco brought about the insurrection, investing it from the first day with complete authority, and disdaining the socially conservative forces on which, until then, he had depended. In the same way as at first he dropped the Dictatorship and then the Monarchy, Franco finally abandoned the conservative forces of the country, in whose name he had rebelled, in order to support international Fascism, and its ambitions in the Mediterranean and Northern Africa. International Fascism has allowed him to wage a terrific war against his own country for over two years, with no other end in view save that of restoring in Spain a personal and arbitrary authority, which will not, in the end, be that of the frenzied supporters of the '*Falange Española*' (the hour will soon arrive when the Falangists will be disillusioned), but rather the authority of an officer who has become the instrument of the imperialism of the totalitarian Powers.

MANUEL CHAVES-NOGALES.

Abd-el-Krim, bringing Spain into a joint and decisive action. Is that one of the causes of Franco's dislike of France? The landing in Alhucemas, which was achieved with the collaboration of the French fleet, and the surrender of Abd-el-Krim to the officers of the French Army, frustrated the war ambitions of the Spanish military leaders by reducing to a simple police operation what was intended to be a long and costly campaign, prodigal in rewards and promotions. For Franco, as for most of the Spanish officers, collaboration is a detriment, an annoying limitation on their ambitions as *conquistadores*.

Another of the critical moments of Franco's life was the dissolution by the Republic of the *Academia General Militar*. When the campaign in Morocco was finished, Franco took charge of the reconstruction of the old Academy and fervently applied himself to the formation of a select body of officers. From a military point of view the Academy was perfect, but Franco's professional limitations, his lack of universality and of humanistic culture, transformed the officer who came from the Academy—professionally irreproachable—into an element disturbing to the life of the State. The comparison between the essential objects of the State and the spirit of the cadets educated by Franco was flagrant. Franco knew how to make excellent officers, but he was incapable of converting them into good citizens and loyal servants of the State, whether this be Republican, Monarchical, of Rights or of Lefts, Revolutionary or Reactionary.

Then Azaña decreed the dissolution of the Academy, but Franco, on taking leave of his cadets, prepared them for the hour when they would have to fulfil the destiny which he had assigned to them. In three years seven hundred officers, who were going to be the nucleus of the future insurrection against the Republic, left the Academy. The Republic did not make a mistake in closing the Academy. Franco's followers would have rebelled equally against any other régime which refused to cede anything to that spirit of caste with which they were imbued.

From this moment Franco was in revolt against the Republican State and was only waiting for his hour to come.

He wished to advance this hour, and hardly was the triumph of the Popular Front in the elections of 1936 known, when he telephoned to General Pozas, Chief of the Civil

revolutionary and foreignising inconstancies, and the Catholic may, with reason enough, protest against the use of his beliefs as a weapon of civil war in favour of a political system which is anti-Christian and anti-Catholic.

There are in Franco's life three critical moments which reveal the rebel tendency of his mind, his inmost revolt against the reality of the Spanish fatherland which would not adjust itself to the scheme his narrow mentality (the mentality of an ambitious and uncultured officer) had drawn. History will say that Franco rose in revolt on July 18th, 1936, because a Republican Government, harried by revolutionary forces, had allowed the murder of Calvo Sotelo. But Franco's rebellion against the 'real fatherland' antedates all the pretexts which have been since invoked to justify the military rising. The rebel existed potentially, and only awaited the propitious opportunity to reveal himself.

The first clash of Franco's personal ambition with the reality of Spain occurred in the time of the monarchy, and was precisely directed against the military dictatorship. There was a moment when the Dictator of Spain, General Primo de Rivera, thought it both prudent and patriotic to put an end to the Moroccan adventure which for the past twenty years had been a constant drain on the country. He encountered the opposition of the African Army. Confident in his personal prestige and in his authority as Dictator, which so far had been beyond dispute, Primo de Rivera went personally to Morocco and summoned to the encampment of Ben Tieb the commanders and officers of the Legion, believing that he could bring them to obedience. They received him in open rebellion, with subversive placards on the parapets, and their hands on their revolvers. The leader of the rebellion, Lieutenant-Colonel Franco, informed the Dictator of the unshakable intention of the officers of the colonial troops, an intention absolutely opposed to that of the Government.

That day saw the moral collapse of the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, and it soon dragged in its fall the monarchy of Alfonso XIII. The war in Morocco continued, and would continue still for the glory and gain of the Spanish officer class, had it not been for the decision of the French Government to finish once and for all with the revolt of

strations and assigns Franco the title of Defender of the Faith. But neither the fundamental irreligion of the Leader nor the frankly heretical propositions on which his State is based would have escaped the experienced eye of a sixteenth-century Inquisitor.

The present hierarchy of the Spanish Church also know that they cannot entertain any illusions on the Catholicism of Franco, but they follow him submissively and cling to the theory of the 'lesser evil' because to-day in Nationalist Spain the Church is weaker than it has ever been in Spain. The one hope of those bishops who lift their right arms in the Roman salute lies in the fact that Franco is not immortal. They hope that Franco may perish before themselves, and give them time to redeem their souls before the hour comes to surrender them to their Creator. And we must remember that some of them are octogenarians.

Against revolution Franco is invulnerable. All the arms which the revolutionaries use, Franco wields with dexterity equal to theirs. Rebellion against the constituted power, the systematic exercise of terrorism, the destruction of established order, the spoliation of the national wealth—everything which the revolutionary thinks permissible so that his revolution may prevail, is practised by Franco so that it may not prevail. That is the only thing the revolutionary might reproach him with—that he is not making a revolution.

On the other hand the non-revolutionary can demand an account from him on every other score, both for the material damage occasioned by his actions and on the score of the spiritual values which, to ensure his triumph, he does not hesitate to sacrifice. If, in order to overcome the revolution, Franco has incurred all the sins of revolution itself, if there is no revolutionary error or crime which he has not committed, what is the moral foundation of his counter-revolutionary action?

From the trenches of the revolution Franco is invincible. From the point of view of the counter-revolution he is, on the contrary, virtually routed. The Nationalist can reproach him with having provoked a double foreign invasion; the Conservative can consider himself defrauded from the moment in which he has been left nothing to conserve; the Traditionalist will ask from him an account for his pseudo-

'Spain,' they say, 'is not in the buildings which may be destroyed by an air bombardment, nor even in the lives of the Spaniards who fall in the struggle. Spain, Imperial Spain, is the idea of her which has been forged in the head of the Leader.'

But in the head of this man without imagination there is no idea of Spain. Can one conceive of any greater tragedy for a people?

To resuscitate Imperial Spain with the support of Germany and Italy and at the expense of the Democratic Powers, that is the arduous historical mission which General Franco has set himself. It may be asserted that a far from common imagination is necessary to conceive such a plan. That is indeed so: that superabundant imagination belonged to an Andalusian youth, a desperate and pathetic intellectual, who was shot in Alicante by the Government of the Republic: José Antonio Primo de Rivera.

General Franco thinks it is possible to harmonise the anti-semitism of modern Germany with the religious persecution which the Catholic monarchs carried on against the Jews. Hitler's Nordic man hates the Jew simply because he is a Jew; the fifteenth-century Spaniard hated him not because he was a Jew, but because he had been a deicide. Four centuries ago the Spaniards did what the Germans are now doing, but not because the Jew represented a peril for the purity of the Spanish race, but because he was the enemy of the Faith. Precisely because it was not a matter of racial incompatibility, but a religious question, the converted Jew was easily incorporated into the powerful Spanish nationality. And thanks to this relative tolerance, General Franco can to-day do what many German Jews would certainly do if they were allowed to live in Germany with the same freedom as the forebears of Franco lived in Spain: support anti-Semitism.

Franco's chief defect is his lack of Christian spirit. Every morning he attends Holy Mass and every night he commends himself with fervour to his guardian angel and the Virgin Mary, after approving the report of the day's operations, in which is triumphantly recorded the number of enemy corpses picked up on the battlefield. The *sancta simplicitas* of the ordinary Spanish Catholic is satisfied with these ritual demon-

easily foreseen, almost inevitable, of each one of his resolutions, we may be certain that he would not have adopted them. If he had been capable of imagining that when he gave the Fascists the arms which were in the barracks of the insurgent regiments, the Government might also give those which they possessed to the Communists and the Anarchists; if, when he decreed the 'white terror' to save the military rebellion which had failed (the pure school of Lenin), he had also imagined what the 'red terror' was going to be; if, when he turned the Spanish counter-revolutionary movement into an international anti-democratic crusade in order to win the support of Germany and Italy, he had clearly envisaged the extent of universal reaction against the imperialism of the totalitarian countries—if he had foreseen all this, it is indisputable that he would have done nothing, absolutely nothing, of what he did. Would the war go on even to-day if Franco could imagine the situation in which Spain will find herself after his triumph? No; the war goes on because Franco, a man without imagination, cannot conceive what the peace will be like, because he cannot conceive that it is even possible. A prisoner of his technique, he does not believe that there is any alternative to war; civil war to-day, a European war to-morrow.

This amputation of the imaginative faculty which characterises General Franco is not a serious inconvenience for the exercise of any technique or of any professions in their middle grades. There are most meritorious men of science and excellent generals with little or no imagination. Franco might even have been the effective instrument of a certain military policy. In the hands of Mussolini he might have been as estimable as Graziani. If the Spanish Republic had known how to use him and he had bent himself to serve her loyally, she might have had cause to be thankful for his virtues.

But this man without imagination, placed at the head of the State at a moment of national crisis, has become a fearful catastrophe for his country.

When the world, horrified by the devastations of the civil war, raises its indignant protest, Franco's partisans argue that the material damage and the loss of human lives are nothing compared with the future of the immortal Fatherland.

him the most horrific vices, and his defenders the most outstanding virtues, without either of them having the slightest foundation in fact. Franco is just a man, like all other men. That is his real strength. The secret of Franco is his identification with the mass, the middle-class, which supports him. The most mediocre of Spanish citizens finds himself mirrored with amazing fidelity in the gestures and speeches of the Leader.

To be entirely fair, we must take from the words all their pejorative meaning. This fundamental mediocrity of Franco's does not presuppose his incapacity for any task, however arduous and painful it may be. With the same uprightness which he has revealed in being a good officer and a perfect husband, Franco might be anything. Anything, excepting one thing: a superior man. His limitations will not keep him from doing efficiently the duties assigned him. Studious, hard-working, tenacious and brave, he came to enjoy the greatest prestige of all the officers of the Spanish Army. He could equally well have come out first in the examinations for Registrars of Property, or for the Board of Archivists and Librarians. Franco is the brilliant careerist. If history were made by the 'firsts' in competitive examinations, Franco would be the man of Spain to-day.

But professional preparation, and mastery of a technique, are not enough to possess that sense of universality which characterises the superior man. The systematic sacrifice of humanistic culture to specialisation and technical ability means that as soon as the specialist and the technician leave the sphere of their particular activity, they become dangerous barbarians. This is the case with Franco.

A brilliant Army officer, excelling as a technician in war, he finds, one day, that the forces ruling his country are in a state of crisis. Spurred on by his ambition, he believes himself capable of ruling in their stead. And, as the one solution in his power, he decrees war, which he knows how to do.

This grave hindrance of specialisation would not sufficiently explain the case of Franco if there were not in it another purely personal circumstance which has been fatal for Spain. Franco is a man without imagination.

If Franco had been able to imagine the consequences,

GENERAL FRANCO

WHO is Franco? Heaven-sent defender of Western civilisation for some, sinister instrument of barbarism for others, a shining archangel or the genius of evil, the saviour of his country or a traitor to that country, a chivalrous paladin or a murderer of innocents, the best and the worst—all that can be said of any man has been said of him.

The rhetoric and the emphasis with which he is invariably spoken of have converted him into an abstract being, a dehumanised personage, a pure symbol of good or of evil. It is understandable that we Spaniards, obsessed by war, should have made a myth of him, but it is hard to explain why the cool and calculating observance of the outsider has not been able to pierce the aureole surrounding him to discover the real features of the man as he is. After two years General Franco is still a polemical abstraction. People are for him or against him, but so far no one seems to have bothered to find out what the real Franco is like.

We are not going to deny the evidence. Franco to-day is the undisputed master of Nationalist Spain. But who is he, in himself? What is the man inside that shining armour in which he presents himself to the world?

If we want to give an exact idea of who Franco is, the first thing is to abstain from all rhetoric. We must constantly use a minor key, from which are excluded the high-sounding words, the superlatives, and all the emphasis of Castilian speech. Franco is as unlike a great man as it is possible to be. In the whole of his life there is not a single trait of greatness. I defy his biographers to point out one. What is most surprising about him is his absolute normality. When his intimate friends speak of him, and wish to be sincere, they say, as the highest praise possible for him, that he is *a normal man*, an average man.

And so indeed he is. His detractors have attributed to

to go on doing things. Life is an encounter, not a spectacle, and immortality for us means just more of this same good common space and time stuff. Only a religious maniac thinks of life as an 'ante-chamber to eternal extinction.' That is how Dunne puts it, and it betrays the quality of his thought. Extinction manifestly is an end; it doesn't go on for a moment, there is question-begging catch in that 'eternal.' No materialist thinks as badly as that. I wish I could get Dunne to come off that dimensional egg now. He has lost all sense of proportion. He says that this Serialism which he imagines peeps and stirs within it, is 'sufficient to reduce to complete nonsense every discussion which has ever taken place concerning the question of survival. It is sufficient to convert into so much waste paper the greater part of the world's more serious books.'

Well, it isn't. It is merely an entertaining paradox expanded into a humourless obsession.

H. G. WELLS.

I doubt if the public is that much Stooge. Try it. I find it inconsecutive, incomprehensible and unreadable. In spite of its air of lucid exposition and its entirely unhelpful diagrams it seems to me no better than the now dreadfully addled egg that was laid originally by way of a lark in *The Time Machine* fifty-odd years ago.

So far as the new immortality is to be 'understanded' at all, it seems that, according to Dunne, you live and die and pass out of this scheme of space and time into a higher dimensional life and then, having no further life to live on this plane, you contemplate your career as a whole and—— ? It isn't clear what else you do. Contemplating your completed life seems about as attractive to me as a bridge *post mortem*, but for the life of me I cannot grasp what else Dunne promises his Stooge. Apparently you also contemplate other lives. This sort of treat is in store for you :

> 'Since your attention can redivide (*i.e.*, possess several foci), it can concentrate one of these foci upon the point where my attention is focussed. And that, of course, is mind-sharing or, as it is called so absurdly, 'telepathy.'

And further, when Stooge is tired of being Dunne and Dunne is finished with Stooge :

> In brief, your attention, radiating and dividing from the centre which is you, can travel through the whole range covered by the Super-Mind. What more do you desire ?

You are to pass into a vast museum of experiences in fact, with nothing more to do and no refreshment room. Does anyone want this highly improbable immortality ? Dunne says that real life without the blessed hope of this Serialist Immortality is 'mere scurrying to extinction.' But is not that better than this awful fate he reveals to his poor Stooge without any escape whatever from that vast collection to scurry to ?

Most people, I think, find this world in space and time so full of interesting things that they do not think very much about death and the hereafter. Religious teachers complain of it. What we common people want, when the question of immortality is put to us fairly, is more of the same queer mixture, and to be able to go on doing things—particularly

at once towards forgetfulness as we realise its inconsistencies. The interesting point about these observations of Dunne was that they seemed to indicate that the 'nows' between sleeping and waking were not in the normal stream of experience That idea that the uncontrolled twilight mind might be able to do a little time-travelling ahead, or at least look forward along the time dimension, had just enough plausibility to excite the imagination. It was like finding a threadbare place in a hitherto impenetrable curtain.

Dunne went on collecting observations for some time, but unhappily neither he nor anyone else was able to devise any means of enlarging or penetrating this thin place in the curtain, and presently he wandered off from observation and experiment into the speculative world he has made his own. He returned to *The Time Machine* paradox. Then appeared *The Serial Universe*, in which, with a certain dismay, I discovered him enthusiastically piling dimension upon dimension and arranging Time A and Time B and so on like a nest of boxes, and my dear old Time Traveller multiplied to a whole succession of Time Travellers, the Dunne 'Observers.' It was done gravely. It was done with scientific and mathematical gestures calculated to make Jeans and Eddington feel insignificant, and it had such a stimulating effect on my friend J. B. Priestley, that, having a highly responsive mind, he produced a book and three plays in rapid succession, taking the most remarkable liberties with our time limitations. (One play at least was first rate.) I watched this development of Dunne with deepening consternation. Presently I heard he was expounding a philosophy of 'Serialism' with a piano accompaniment at a Foyle Bookshop Luncheon; and now here is another book to hand from him on *The New Immortality*, in which he adopts the rôle of something between a cosmic Sherlock Holmes and an Eastern sage, treats philosophers and men of science with a cheerful disdain, and has the most remarkable dialogues between 'I' (Dunne) and a sort of Watson or Stooge called 'You.' They sustain a most harmonious duet and the stooge anticipates and helps out Dunne like an identical twin. The book will, I am quite sure, carry conviction to many, but I doubt if it will be read as much as it is accepted. It claims to be easily 'understanded of the people.'

potential,' in a few million years or so, but anyhow it made an entertaining story, and that was all there was to it.

I went on living in space and time with plenty of agreeable days that became memorable yesterdays, and an undying interest in the incalculable behaviour of to-morrow. Being no sort of physicist I did not know then of the work in hand that presently flowered in the bright diagrams of Einstein. Because you know those theories of Einstein's are essentially diagrams, as he would be the first to admit, they are new and richly suggestive ways of plotting out the structure of our mysterious universe as a universe, but they are no contribution at all to the homely problems of our everyday personal existence, such problems as Shall I meet someone I care for to-morrow? and Will it be fine enough to have breakfast in the garden? I wrote my fantasy and left it at that. But Dunne brooded on this idea of duration as a dimension of space. I think now he has brooded too much upon it.

Quite apart from that he brooded on something else. He began to notice an odd anticipation of coming events in his dreams. He gave that a lot of attention, and put his observations on record in a really very exciting book, *An Experiment with Time*. He devised a system of recording dreams at the moment of awakening, and he got together some passable evidence of dream premonitions. That set one thinking upon an often disregarded fact, that the 'now' is not a mathematical instant, but that it lasts a perceptible time. The belief that our conscious lives are a continual flow of infinitesimal moments is incorrect, we live in measurable bits of time, our consciousness is like a movie film and its pictures, the 'nows,' follow each other with no interval of perception between them so that they produce an illusion of continuity. I remember I had a talk about this to Ray Lankester, and he suggested that our brain cells live for a brief instant as the blood and fresh oxygen pulse to them, and then become inactive until the next heart-beat reawakens them.

Probably our brains in perfect sleep are continuously inhibited or stir only faintly far below the level of consciousness. Then, as we awaken, the cells are stimulated and produce that long, incoherent *now* which our quickening brain contemplates, rationalises more or less imperfectly, and puts into the hasty order of a dream. Which begins to slip back

THE IMMORTALITY OF MR. J. W. DUNNE

YEARS ago when we were young together, though he was the younger, I used to talk to J. W. Dunne about the stability of aeroplanes (he made a very remarkable one) and about a paradoxical story I wrote called *The Time Machine*. In the 'eighties there was much mental play among science students about the fourth (and other) dimensions, and the trick of my story was to declare that every real object had not only three dimensions of length, breadth and thickness at right angles to each other, but *duration*, and furthermore to ignore a certain difference between the former three and the latter. As, for instance, that you could turn objects about between those three spatial dimensions, while time carried on remorselessly in one direction, and would have no such interchangeability with the others. By a dexterous use of impudence and analogy one could present the Universe, past, present and future, as a rigid four-dimensional system and, before the reader had time to object, the story-teller had whisked him off on the Time Machine into the remote past or into the days to come.

There one chased him about and never gave him a breathing space. One had to be careful not to let him go slantingways into time-and-up for example, or into time-and-down, or away from the world and the sun in their orbits, because that might have set him taking notice and asking awkward questions. Such as: would there be two of him to-morrow and three when he came back? And so one got him, a little giddy but quite credulous, into the sombre future of the cooling globe and among degenerate human beings, Eloi and Morlocks, and the like. In those days there seemed reason for supposing the world was cooling down at an alarming pace. Reasons have appeared since which throw doubt on that reduction of everything to 'heat at a low

hold dear merely because the machine they have created will not move and their leaders will not lead? Is national unity, with all that it implies of fresh hope and constructive activity, a mere dream, fantastic but unattainable? Not at all. This is by no means the right conclusion. Not merely is this conclusion not true; it is the very contrary and opposite of the truth. The truth is that all those who believe in national unity must now double and redouble their efforts. With renewed energy and fresh determination they must press on, conscious on the one hand of the abyss which only action such as theirs can avoid, and on the other hand strengthened and encouraged in their endeavours by faith in the political genius of the British people, which has never failed in past times of crisis or emergency, and which will certainly not fail to-day.

JULES MENKEN.

Munich. Either we followed there a policy which we believed was right, or else we bought time because our defences were inadequate. If we thought we had the right policy at Munich, subsequent events ought by now to have taught us otherwise—unless indeed the country and its rulers are incorrigible, and doomed, like all those who will not face the facts, to certain destruction. If we bought time, we are not using it to repair our defences—for that requires a real effort by everyone, genuine sacrifices, abundant energy and determination and work such as the present Government shows no sign of organising.

But if this is the true state of the nation's affairs, what does the logic of the situation inexorably demand? There can be no other answer than that the present Government must be replaced by another possessing the insight, the courage, and the force which the nation needs in its hour of gravest peril. But the Government cannot be replaced unless a tri-partite coalition is formed with this as its immediate end, and real defence, an adequate foreign policy, a constructive domestic policy, and restoration of the country's belief in itself as its larger purpose. Why, then, is such a coalition not formed, a failure the more remarkable because there is a crying demand for this effort from all sorts and conditions of men at the bottom and inaction only by those at the top, the natural leaders who to-day are not fulfilling their function? Again, can there be any answer except that these leaders do not really see that the situation and its dangers are in fact as grave as they really are? Would any sane man want to preserve the Conservative Party if party loyalty meant national downfall? Would any Socialist, however deep and sincere his conviction, persist in refusal to co-operate with non-Socialists in this national emergency if he realised that the result must be German domination and national disaster? Except on the assumption that Britain's political leaders are all corrupt or all knaves—which is notoriously the exact opposite of the truth—there can be no explanation for the paralysis and confusion which have overtaken the nation's public life except that these leaders do not see—perhaps because some of them do not want to see—how unparalleled is our present danger.

What, then, is the upshot of all this? Must ordinary men and women reconcile themselves to the destruction of all they

which a Parliamentary election requires, a rebel will have to defray his expenses out of his own pocket or from the resources of friends and associates, if indeed he can raise the money at all. But even where finance is no obstacle and a Member of Parliament or a candidate possesses himself the necessary wherewithal, opposition to the machine exposes him to the almost certain risk of finding another candidate against him, the official machine hostile instead of friendly, and the chances of his return to a new Parliament gravely imperilled. Since political life, if serious and effective, cannot be a mere sequence of dumb-show and melodramatic gesture, these very practical consequences of action disapproved by the party machine make most politicians accept almost any sacrifice rather than strike out for themselves, and in most circumstances reduce to a handful those with courage and independence enough to follow the Duchess of Atholl's brave line and take up the party challenge with the electorate.

All these barriers to national unity are real and important. To burke them because they are inconvenient is to follow the mad ostrich policy which has led so many British politicians in recent years to take major decisions with their heads buried in the sand. But these barriers are not natural landmarks, irremovable except at the cost of an earthquake They are made by men, and therefore can be shifted by men. And shifted they will certainly be—unless indeed Western civilisation is to be destroyed by barbarism worse than any earthquake, or engulfed by a tidal wave of brutality, craft and oppression.

For when all is said and done, why has Britain not got national unity and a sound policy to-day? Because of these barriers, yes. But why can the barriers continue to exist in such desperate times?

The answer, though unpleasant, is simple. The barriers are there because highly placed men and women pay lip-service, it is true, to the peril of the times but do not admit in their hearts that the peril is as great or as close as in fact it is.

Such an explanation is undoubtedly disagreeable. Many people will read it with resentment and deny it with indignation. But can the present position be explained otherwise? Consider in simple ultimate terms what really happened at

machine, and in the penalties which the machine can impose on politicians, whether actual or would-be Members of Parliament, who disobey the machine's behests.

Party momentum may be deprecated, and even condemned, by those anxious to achieve national unity. Its real merits must nevertheless not be overlooked, nor its causes ignored. Party momentum arises essentially from the loyalty and conviction of party members. Without these characteristics, party politics would either not exist at all, or they would be stripped of every shred of public principle and turned into a mere struggle for private interests. Tories, for example, even the most rebellious of the dissidents, are certainly right to think long and seriously before they take steps which may end in breaking up the Conservative Party. Men and women whose entire public lives have been devoted to building up the Labour Party, to whom faith in Socialism is as the breath of life, who see—or think they see—within their grasp, if only they persist a little longer, both office and the power to carry out measures to which both conscience and advocacy have pledged them—such people must inevitably hesitate before joining with allies who wear different political colours, and will view with quite natural suspicion all suggestions that they should do so.

Party momentum and the influence of the political machine go hand in hand. In normal times this country enjoys the benefits of an organised and highly articulated political life. That means that party organisation is strong. Strong organisations, however, always possess a large inertia, and are not infrequently a little cumbrous. They also resent, and take steps to check, those who do not toe the accepted line. There is nothing peculiar or diabolic in such characteristics and tendencies. They are the common features of all forms of life, which must preserve a certain equilibrium between the organism and the environment if it is to survive at all.

The third cause which hampers the move towards national unity follows from the existence of party momentum and the influence of the party machine. From the standpoint of good party members, the risks and dangers of breaking with the machine are extremely serious. In many cases there is a financial risk. Where the party finds the considerable sums

in recent history has political life so seethed with popular desire for immediate, vigorous and effective change. The fusion of independent progressive forces which worked wonders at Bridgwater was only the successful expression in a single constituency of influences operative almost everywhere throughout the length and breadth of the land. Among bodies of this type established for some time one of the most energetic is the Left Book Club. Other existing societies which have hitherto worked on separate lines are now turning their efforts in the direction of co-operation in what they term an Anti-Fascist Front. Among newer organisations may be mentioned a most interesting group called Active Democrats, and another formed recently in the City of London and pledged to work for National Reconstruction. Looser and less formal efforts in this direction are the attempts at quiet co-operation among all progressive forces now being made in many constituencies. Countless individuals, as well as such political organisations as the Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruction, have been working to the same end. In terms of spontaneous political activity this is a time absolutely boiling with movement, with aspiration, and with goodwill. And among the most valuable results which may certainly be prophesied from all these positive and hopeful efforts, is the emergence of men and women, hitherto perhaps little known, from whose ranks the leaders of the future will appear.

All this serves well the cause of national unity. But so far, it must be frankly recognised, these numberless forces, all striving for the same real end, have lacked the advantage of common purpose and definite direction. If they are to become effective, and quickly effective, they need organisation to increase their strength, multiply their resources, enlarge their membership, and concentrate their effort. Yet precisely this well-nigh essential measure of organisation, which could convert a multitude into a crusade, has hitherto been lamentably unattainable.

The causes of this failure are identical with the obstacles to the realisation of a strong, unified tri-partite coalition which would constitute a real alternative Government and would create true national unity. These causes are found mainly in party momentum, in the influence of the political

As regards programme, there should be no real difficulty. Much ground is common to all those whose co-operation is needed. All concerned believe in Britain and democracy, and recognise the immense danger now threatening both. All want immediately to rally the peace-loving nations whose interests are threatened by the aggressive forces at work in the world and ultimately to re-establish the essential principles of the League of Nations—good faith in international relations, collective defence, peaceful change without threat of force, and the rule of law. All insist on the urgent and paramount necessity of rearmament and defence unchallengeably adequate against totalitarian peril. All want to achieve such defence by a national effort, through equal sacrifice, and with democratic means. All believe that the inertia and apathy which for so long have endured unemployment, the distressed areas, inadequate housing, malnutrition, a sick agriculture and limping foreign trade must be overcome by vigorous constructive measures, framed so as effectively to achieve their healing purpose, and free, so far as immediate aims are concerned, from the constricting bonds of abstract doctrine or partisan dogma. All hold to the fundamental ideals of British democracy—justice, order, and freedom—and believe that these ideals, and these ideals alone, contain the only hope for a civilisation at once developing, decent and kind.

It is true, of course, that many issues of party politics are not held within this framework. The entire complex of questions involved in Socialism is one instance of these exceptions; the problem of conscription is another. But at bottom these are either matters of means, about which sensible men will scarcely quarrel if and when they are once convinced as to their real necessity; or else they concern ultimate social ends which can certainly not be achieved unless immediate and threatening perils are overcome. Even the most impassioned partisans, when they recognise the true issues at stake, will assuredly refuse to countenance the murder of democracy merely because they do not like the clothes or the accent of those with whom they must co-operate to save democracy from its would-be assassins.

If an agreed programme ought, therefore, to present no insuperable obstacle to tri-partite co-operation, lack of will throughout the country is certainly no impediment. Never

to produce results which the nation as a whole does not want, this exclusion may not be permanent. There remain, therefore, victory for one party or a coalition to consider.

No other section of the Opposition except the Labour Party can so much as contemplate an electoral victory which would send it back to Westminster with a parliamentary majority. Can even the Labour Party in fact anticipate such a victory? In concrete terms, can the Labour Party conceivably expect any developments during the few remaining months before the next general election which would result in doubling its present Parliamentary representation? Answers to these questions must turn largely on individual judgment. But the outcome of the by-elections does not seem to justify very high hopes in this respect. Indeed, they appear on balance to indicate that, while the country does want a *different* Government, it does not want a *Labour* Government—though whether this reading is correct or not, time alone can show.

If a Labour victory is impossible, only some kind of coalition can produce an alternative Government. Since Labour and the Liberals are only less likely than Labour alone to be returned with a majority, a two-party coalition is improbable. In any case, it would be undesirable in a situation of the gravest national danger in which only a broad-based grouping genuinely representative of the great majority of the nation can command the strength at home and abroad which resolute and effective action requires. A Government of this character, however, can only be formed if the coalition of which it consists comprises dissident Conservatives in substantial numbers as well as Labour and Liberals.

Is such a tri-partite coalition attainable? If so, what means can bring it to birth? What difficulties must first be overcome? What conditions will make its success more probable?

A programme, desire for an alternative to the present Government, and the will to surmount the many obstacles which block the way, are the indispensable means to a strong coalition; the habit of co-operation and willingness for reasonable self-sacrifice by its component members constitute the conditions of success. None of these factors is inherently impossible.

[illegible]—whether the scale and pace of rearmament are adequate as a whole. Some forty Government supporters put their names down to an amendment critical of the Government's policy on these vital matters; but when it came to the division, only three of them voted against the Government; and while some abstained, a number actually went into the Government lobby in the end! This experience was indeed instructive. It proves conclusively that the truth on the question of conversion from within is very different from what the gentler souls among the Tory rebels appear to believe. The real truth is that the Government's majority is so huge that it can and does disregard its own malcontents. In such circumstances persuasion will not convince unless and until the Tory dissidents follow up their arguments with action.

Failing conversion of the Government from within to other views and policies, the problem of national unity must be faced both in Parliament and in the constituencies. In the constituencies the growing hostility to the Chamberlain policy and its consequences must be developed and then canalised so as to serve Parliamentary ends. In Parliament a majority for a strong alternative Government must be found by some means in the House of Commons; and, since the difficulty of the times makes the prospect of a constitutional crisis intolerable, the new Government must be one which will command adequate support in the House of Lords.

The House of Commons problem is easily grasped. In round figures, Conservatives, Liberal Nationals, and National Labour—the constituents of the present Government's majority—number about 425 or 430 members. Labour holds about 160 seats and the Independent Liberals about 20. Hence 130 seats must change hands if an alternative Government is to have a bare majority, and 150 to 180 seats if it is to have a comfortable working margin. The crucial question of practical politics is how so many seats can be captured on terms which will in fact enable a strong alternative Government to be formed.

Only three answers are possible. One party can win a complete victory; there can be a coalition; or a new party can be formed. In existing conditions the last method may be ruled out—though if the present party system continues

co-operation in a great national crisis which demands self-sacrifice from all.

But the very brilliance and force of Mr. Churchill's and the Liberal Party's efforts unfortunately throw the causes of their weakness into high relief. From no fault of their own but as a consequence of untoward past developments, they lack strong numerical support; and though their onslaughts on Government policy and their educative influence on public opinion prove to the hilt one of Napoleon's aphorisms—that the moral is to the material as three to one—their lack of positive result for the time being against the massive cohorts of official obstinacy unhappily demonstrates another of his sayings—that God is on the side of the big battalions.

Apart from one or two independents like Sir Arthur Salter and Miss Eleanor Rathbone, whose personal influence is considerable, the other sections of the *de facto* Parliamentary Opposition comprise the dissident Tories and Labour. The Tory dissidents have been trying to convert from within the present Government, or at least a large part of the Conservative Party. Labour has refused to co-operate with other parties for any major purpose. In these two facts lie the cause of the ineffectiveness which the *de facto* Opposition has hitherto shown and the central problem which a successful effort to achieve national unity must solve.

If the Tory dissidents can win Mr. Chamberlain or an important proportion of his supporters to a different policy on foreign affairs, defence, and essential domestic issues—one commanding general assent because safeguarding the interests of Britain, the Empire, democracy, freedom and the prospects of civilised mankind—national unity can be achieved practically forthwith. But is this possible? As regards Mr. Chamberlain himself, the prospect would appear hopeless for reasons which need no elaboration. As regards a certain number of his supporters, there may be a chance—a good chance in the case of the more discerning and independent, but a chance which rapidly dwindles as the numbers to be converted increase. In this connection the November debate on a Ministry of Supply is significant. The nominal issue on this occasion was *formal*—whether present methods of rearmament were adequate, or the new method represented by a Ministry of Supply was needed. The real issue was

national criticism which is the very essence and lifeblood of freedom.

All these developments together make it clear that national unity will not be achieved through growing support of the present National Government. The few available objective measures of the movement of public opinion confirm this impression. The findings of the British Institute of Public Opinion—compiled on a scientific basis and published by the *News-Chronicle*—show, since Munich, a small but definite trend away from Mr. Chamberlain. The by-elections tell the same tale. At the time of writing the Duchess of Atholl's result at Kinross is not known. Fylde, the late Lord Stanley's seat and a political preserve for any Stanley nominee, may also be excluded in order to attain really significant results. Elsewhere, six by-elections have been held since September—at Oxford, Dartford, Doncaster, Walsall, Bridgwater, and West Lewisham. At the last general election in 1935 the combined Government vote in these constituencies totalled 150,234, against a combined Opposition vote of 123,257. During the by-elections the Government total fell to 146,615, a decline of 2½ per cent., while the Opposition poll rose to 148,653, an increase of over 20 per cent.

If national unity is not to be realised under Mr. Chamberlain's Government, it must be achieved through some form or combination of Opposition forces. Here, too, progress is disappointingly slow. By-election results favourable to the Opposition have been achieved in spite, and not because, of their resoluteness of purpose and concentration of effort. In the months since Munich the Opposition has, indeed, been perplexed, ineffective and groping. To this general picture there are two notable exceptions. Mr. Winston Churchill, alike in Parliament and in the country, has been magnificent. However grim and paralysing the truth, he has never faltered. He has criticised, denounced, exhorted, urged. All that inspiration could suggest, patriotism counsel, or courage demand he has done unflinchingly, without regard to his personal position or private interests, and with an eye fixed solely on the nation's welfare. The other exception is the independent Liberal Party, which has followed a similar steadfast course with consistence, devotion and readiness for

The first alternative—increasing support of the present Government—has certainly not been realised during the past three months. The Government's failure in this respect is due to the continuing paradoxes of Mr. Chamberlain's policy and the stream of unfavourable events abroad. Nazi demands on Czechoslovakia have proved even more exorbitant than the terms which were flatly rejected at Godesberg; and that unhappy State has been converted from an independent democracy into a German vassal. Preparations for further German advance in Eastern Europe increase and multiply. Britain's decision to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement into operation has been followed by renewed and intensified Italian and German help to Spain, fresh attacks by Franco's foreign-operated air force on British shipping, the extension of the Spanish naval war to the very edge of British territorial waters, and 'spontaneous' Italian demands on France for Tunis, Corsica and Nice. Japanese arrogance towards British interests in the Far East increases with her successes in China. The Anti-Comintern Pact has been tightened and its threat to French and British possessions throughout the world made sharper.

Any one of these developments would cast doubts on Mr. Chamberlain's policy of 'appeasement'; taken as a whole they are shaking even Conservative belief in its wisdom; while much of the small support it still enjoys has been blasted away by the German pogroms of November last, which have shocked and horrified opinion throughout the world more deeply than any other occurrence since 1918.

At home the gap between the Government's claims and its accomplishment widens almost daily. No one has emphasised the needs of rearmament more strongly than Mr. Chamberlain; but he has refused a Ministry of Supply, and turned down all effective means of organising national service here and now. Indeed, his devotion to the arm-chair methods hitherto employed suggests that, whatever his views on other subjects, as regards rearmament at least he is a believer in effortless superiority. And while his policy over defence strains the loyalty of his own supporters to breaking point, Mr. Chamberlain alienates the Opposition and offends opinion generally by remarking that totalitarian States do not foul their own nests—as though democracy did!—by the uncon-

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

No. DCCXLIII—January 1939

NATIONAL UNITY

As the prospect of imminent war drew near last September, the country responded in characteristic and habitual fashion. A few tiny and unrepresentative groups apart, the whole nation, in the face of grave external peril, stood solidly shoulder to shoulder. The arrangements made at Munich removed the threat of immediate war, but left problems complicated and the situation dangerous. National unity therefore remained the precondition of national safety. Yet during the three months that have passed since Munich, national unity has not merely not been realised, but seems further than ever from attainment.

National unity does not mean complete unanimity embracing every shade and section of opinion. It has two aspects. On the one hand, it requires the growth of substantial agreement among the public as a whole as to the objects and policies which should be pursued. On the other hand, it demands the development of the political means necessary to give effect to this agreement. In crude practical terms, national unity therefore means either the rallying of the overwhelming bulk of opinion behind the present National Government, or else the growth of opposition to a point where an alternative Government commanding a substantial majority of the nation becomes politically possible.



THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

1877 1939

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

1939 **JANUARY** No. 74[illegible]. Vol. CXXV.

Price Three Shillings *Annual Subscription 30/- post free*

The Immortality of J. W. Dunne—H. G. Wells
General Franco—Manuel Chaves-Nogales
The Italians in Tunisia
Aspects of Modern Warfare

Published by
CONSTABLE & CO LTD, 10 ORANGE STREET, LONDON, W.C.2
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN